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Abstract
Type the words 'Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development' or 
'the OECD' into any Library catalogue or Internet search engine, and the result is 
a staggering number of publications. However, nearly all of these will be by the 
OECD or about OECD members; very few will examine the organisation itself. 
The OECD is one of the most well-known, but least-studied of the major 
international organisations. Yet, critics claim that the OECD is a 'neo-liberal faith 
propagation office', urging its members, and the wider international community, 
to implement policies based on a neo-liberal understanding of state-society 
relations, roles, and responsibilities. This thesis explores the claim that the OECD 
operates under a neo-liberal framework of ideas within which it places its more 
specific economic and social policy analyses. It begins with an examination of 
the organisation, including its origins, aims, and the obvious and less-obvious 
mechanisms it has to keep its members 'in step'. It argues that viewing the 
OECD simply as a source of authoritative, neutral, and technical advice neglects 
the importance of its underlying framework of ideas in delineating what the 
organisation is prepared to see as a policy problem and the range of solutions it 
considers viable. The thesis then explores the role of ideas in policy-making and 
the debate over the impact of a new set of ideas on existing institutions. It argues 
that institutions are not as resistant to the impact of new ideas as has been 
argued. It then traces changes in the OECD's underlying framework of ideas 
from Keynesianism to neo-liberalism, before looking at the implications of the 
shift for the organisation's understanding and treatment of social justice and 
related issues. The thesis concludes that the OECD's neo-liberal framework of 
analysis has more impact than the organisation acknowledges, and that its 
treatment of such issues as social justice is not as sympathetic as the organisation 
claims.
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Introduction
n February 1997, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
A  Development (OECD) burst into the public spotlight when a draft of its 
controversial Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) was leaked and 
posted on the Internet. This agreement, which OECD members were to negotiate 
but which was to be binding on non-members who were to be encouraged to 
sign it, was a flash-point for protesters world-wide, who denounced it as a major 
infringement on the rights of citizens and governments. A storm of protest and 
increasing difficulties in settling the text of the MAI led to it being abandoned in 
December 1998. Remarkably, however, the flurry of interest that the MAI 
prompted in the activities of the OECD focused only to a minor extent on the 
OECD itself.1 Scholarly and media discussion highlighted the agreement (or, at 
least, the attempt to reach an agreement), but offered little analysis of the body 
organising it, or its current or future role. The commentary canvassed whether 
or not the OECD should be negotiating the MAI, but it stopped short of 
examining whether, nearly 40 years after the organisation was formed, the OECD 
itself was still necessary or worthwhile. Since 1998, anti-globalisation protesters 
have dropped the OECD from their target list, focusing instead on the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World 
Bank and the World Economic Forum. Globalisation scholars have done the 
same, mentioning the OECD in their works only in passing. The OECD as an 
international actor and source of policy advice to members and non-members
1 I want to stress here, at the outset, that when I use the term, 'the OECD', I am referring to the 
organisation itself, including the Secretariat. I will use the terms, 'OECD members' or 'OECD 
member countries', when referring to the countries that belong to the OECD. The distinction is 
important because the OECD has views that its members do not necessarily share. This will be 
explored further in Chapter 1.
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alike has again disappeared from the media's gaze, returning to its previous 
articulation as a useful, and uncontroversial, euphemism for the 'first world'.2
As will be noted in Chapter 1, the lack of in-depth analysis of the OECD as an 
international organisation at the time of the MAI was not a new phenomenon. 
While there is a wealth of material that uses 'the OECD' as a convenient 
grouping of arguably like-minded countries, almost nothing has been written 
about the body itself.3 Studies examine the member countries of the OECD, or 
sub-groups of the members, but rarely look at the organisation's Secretariat. 
Unlike the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO, which have been the subject of 
numerous scholarly investigations and publications, the OECD has not been the 
focus of major research, and discussion of its formation and character usually is 
confined to a few pages within larger studies of international organisations (see 
Chapter l).4 This is not to argue that the OECD attracts no scholarly or media 
attention; in fact, on the latter, its reports of the circumstances within member 
countries often draw a great deal of media interest, as will be explored in 
Chapter 1. My point is that the organisation's actions beyond its reports and 
seemingly endless supply of statistics do not attract notice in the media and 
arouse only minor curiosity among scholars. Post-MAI, the media covers only 
the OECD's comments on the performance and ranking of their particular home 
country, and scholarly interest has returned to a focus on the usefulness of the 
OECD as a convenient smaller study group of like-minded countries. The 
organisation once again maintains a low public profile.
2 For example, David Held and Anthony McGrew, in their book on globalisation, make reference 
on several occasions to 'OECD economies', but manage to discuss anti-globalisation protests 
against the MAI (in a chapter entitled '(Mis)managing the World?') without reference to the OECD 
( 2002) .
3 It is important to emphasise that I am not claiming that there are no analyses of the organisation; 
rather, that the number of such works is extremely limited and the scope fairly narrow. This will 
be discussed further in Chapter 1.
4 The works on the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade 
Organisation are too numerous to detail. The following are a smattering of a much larger 
collection: on the IMF, see Vreeland (2003), Gwin (1989), Myers (1987), Chandavarkar (1984), Ainley 
(1979), and Horsefield's three early volumes (1969); on the World Bank, see Caufield (1997), George 
and Sabelli (1994), and Mason (1973); and on the WTO, see Wallach and Sforza (1999), Krueger 
(1998), and Hoekman and Kostecki (1995).
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The OECD: Worthy of N ote or Past Its Prime?
In the official history of the OECD, From War to Wealth, author Scott Sullivan 
looks at the organisation's role in the 'Third Millennium' and notes that some 
'influential skeptics' have argued that the international organisations created 
after World War II have 'had their day' (1997: 105).5 He observes that such 
doubts, 'however far fetched', have had an impact on policy-makers in an era of 
'universal belt-tightening and budget cutting' to the point where 'parliaments 
have grown stingy with their support to international organisations' (1997: 105). 
Former British chancellor of the exchequer Nigel Lawson is reported to have 
observed in his memoirs that the OECD had outlived its usefulness as an 
organisation and its annual ministerial meeting was a 'waste of time and money' 
(The Economist 1994:17). Earlier, academic M.A.G. van Meerhaeghe made a 
similar comment, arguing that the declarations and recommendations of the 
OECD were 'full of generalities and one wonders why expensive meetings are 
needed for that purpose' (1987: 204).
However, a persistent argument in favour of the OECD has been its convenient 
size: it began with 20 members in 1961 and has grown to a mere 30 members 
today, which makes it a puny David against the twin Goliaths of the 184 
members of the IMF and World Bank. Even the Goliaths' younger sibling, the 
WTO, has 147 members. The argument runs that these latter organisations, while 
not as wide-ranging in their interests, are so vast that, even those who want the 
other bodies (notably the IMF) to make final arrangements, 'recognize the 
usefulness of prior closed-door discussions in Paris' (Aubrey 1967:155).6 Thus, 
the OECD's size is seen to be advantageous in that sessions in smaller groups are 
said to be more effective (Mandle 2003: 65).7 In fact, one argument for the OECD
5 Age Bakker, who, as a scholar, may not count as 'influential', nonetheless is one of those 
observing that the international financial institutions 'were devised in a different era and were 
sometimes also based on a different view of the world' (1996: 2). Bayne, too, observes that 
institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and WTO were part of 'the great wave of institution­
building 50 years ago at the end of World War IT, and notes that: 'all are quite different now from 
what was imagined then' (2003: 236). However, Bayne is not arguing for their abolition.
6 Paris, specifically the Chateau de la Muette, has been the home of the OECD since its first 
iteration as the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) in 1949.
7 An example of this faith in smaller groups achieving what larger groups struggle to accomplish 
occurred at the protest-plagued WTO talks in Seattle in 1999. The chair, United States Trade 
Representative Charlene Barshefsky, frustrated at the lack of progress, convened an invitation-only, 
closed-door session of the 30 leading trading economies in a last-ditch bid to reach a settlement. 
See Allard (1999a, 1999b, 1999c), Garran (1999), Gray (1999), Pearson (1999). The move infuriated
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being the best forum for the negotiation of the MAI was that 'experience shows 
that the more countries are involved, the slower the pace of work' (Engering 
1996:160).* 8 Management and communication problems are thought to become 
more complicated and more difficult as an international organisation becomes 
larger and more culturally disparate (Huntley 1980: 284). Such concerns have 
raised doubts as to the effectiveness of the larger international organisations. For 
example, Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer has claimed that 
expansion has slowed the reform agenda of the region's main multilateral 
organisation, the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), because 
more views have to be taken into account and more countries convinced of the 
necessity of reform (Baker 2001). Similar sentiments have been expressed about 
the WTO, especially in the wake of the failed talks in Seattle in 1999. Australian 
Trade Minister Mark Vaile was among those country representatives arguing 
that the WTO, then with 135 members, had become too big to work efficiently 
and to achieve agreement under rules designed 50 years ago for a club of about 
30 countries (Allard 1999b; Garran 1999). The Economist has argued explicitly 
against expanding the OECD, on the grounds that the need for the OECD 
declines as its membership starts to map that of the IMF (1990: 66).
On the negative side, some scholars claim the OECD has decreased in 
significance as its advisory role has been replaced by the smaller G-7 and the 
larger WTO, but this neglects the OECD's braided relationship with these 
groups.9 Woolcock describes the OECD's 'important and generally overlooked 
role' in shaping the agenda and providing a forum for small-group discussions in 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (later the WTO) negotiations 
(2003:115). In a similar vein, Robert Putnam and Nicholas Bayne cite a European 
premier's foreign policy aide explaining that the G-7 summits are simply one 
part of a set of on-going international meetings that include those at the OECD
the excluded developing countries, and the media reported 'third world' accusations that
Barshefsky and 'the WTO secretariat' had 'hijacked' the talks.
8 Arguments against moving the MAI negotiations to the larger WTO included the long time taken 
to settle the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade talks; see the 
discussion in Kelsey (1999: 321).
9 On the decline of the OECD relative to the G-7, see, for example, Bakker's claim that the G-7 has 
replaced the OECD's Working Party No. 3 (1996:117). The G-7 comprises the seven 'most 
powerful' industrial economies: the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, Britain, and 
Canada. Russia was added to the membership in 1997.
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(1987: 13).10 Although Putnam and Bayne canvass a period when the OECD was 
perceived as 'too Keynesian' for the G-7, they describe continuing close links 
between the groups (see 1987: ch. 7). Other scholars argue that the OECD 'plays 
an important role in making the G-7 strategy operational, and in mobilising 
consensus and disseminating the strategy in all the developed market 
democracies and beyond' (Ougaard 1999: 14; see also 13-15). One Secretariat 
official told me that the OECD undertook work that 'fit into the G-7 process':
G-7 communiques sometimes acknowledge OECD work or they 
request the OECD to do some work. ... The G-7 does not have a 
secretariat; they have a chair each year. ... [There is] no real 
secretariat doing substantive work so they are always commenting on 
or requesting work from the OECD, IMF, World Bank (Interview,
Paris, 19 February 1999).
Sullivan notes a link with the G-7 with respect to the OECD's key committee -  
the Economic Policy Committee -  and its 'celebrated' Working Party No. 3, 
saying that in a 'changing world, the roles of both ... have changed over the 
years', and their most important new task is to 'serve as intellectual crucibles in 
which policy is forged for the annual G-7 summit' (1997: 62).
Despite some claims that the OECD is past its prime, then, it is possible to argue 
that the organisation remains useful because of its small size in an increasingly 
interdependent and complicated world. The Economist, for example, observes 
that, although much of the OECD's work is duplicated by the IMF, and private 
agencies now offer 'equally inaccurate economic forecasts', the OECD still does 
work that would be 'sorely missed' (1994:17). It notes that the OECD 'leads the 
field in producing internationally comparable economic and social statistics, 
much of which feeds usefully into policy', and its 'excellent' analysis of 
macroeconomic matters is unparalleled: 'No other institution looks at these 
overlapping areas with such a global perspective' (1994:17). In a similar vein, 
Age Bakker claims that the OECD's 'horizontal' approach to problems, focusing 
on interdependence and multidisciplinarity, makes it 'eminently suited' to 
analyse complex problems, and its studies are 'far more valuable than the sum of 
national studies' (1996:120). More recently, Nicholas Bayne argues that the
Putnam and Bayne quote the aide saying:
When we set out to influence another government ... we say, 'We'll start off at the 
OECD Ministerial in May, follow up at the summit, and then hit them again at the 
IMF in September' (1987:13).
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OECD is one of the international organisations that 'set the standards in the 
international economy' (2003: 230).
If we accept that the OECD still has a role, then the next question is whether we 
should be concerned with what the organisation says and does. That is, should 
we pay more attention to what the organisation is doing and saying, or is there a 
reason that it has been ignored for so long? Is it that the organisation is 'worthy 
but dull', supplying technical advice and statistics that do not hold much interest 
to the broader community outside policy-makers? Or is it that there is nothing in 
its advice beyond a reflection of what its member countries are thinking and 
doing? Is it that the organisation is content to take a back seat on the world stage 
such that its actions are beneath our notice? In 1987, Bayne rather colourfully 
observed that the OECD was 'something of a Cinderella' among international 
organisations. He continued:
That does not mean it is waiting for a fairy godmother; but rather that 
it works away quietly and efficiently in the service of its member 
organisations. It does not always go to the balls like its grander sister 
organisations, though it often runs up their dresses and sometimes 
clears up the mess after the party (1987: 30).
However, there are signs that Cinderella now wants to go to the ball in her own 
right, especially given the desire for prominence of her 'fairy godmother', current 
Secretary-General Donald Johnston, who has been pushing for a higher profile 
for the OECD since his appointment in 1996. He told a Council of Europe 
meeting in 1998 that the 'days of the "OECD" club' were gone, and that the 
OECD had 'much to offer the globalising world which no other organisation can' 
(Johnston 1998). He argued that the OECD operated as a 'permanent inter­
governmental conference' and, as such, was 'a unique and effective international 
structure which could serve as a model of global economic co-operation' (1998). 
A year earlier, in 1997, he told Sullivan that he wanted members of the public to 
know and understand that the OECD was working for them (Sullivan 1997: 108).
Unfortunately for Johnston, the OECD's most publicised bid to take to the 
international dance-floor failed spectacularly when negotiations on the MAI, 
which had 'screeched to a halt' in April 1998 (Kobrin 1998:98), were quietly 
moved to the WTO's back-burner in December that year. In this embarrassing 
public outing for the OECD, the (then) membership of 29 'rich' countries was
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condemned for negotiating in secret a deal seen as institutionalising corporate 
power and diminishing national sovereignty (see Goodman 1999; Gelinas 
2003: 33).11 Had the OECD succeeded in clinching this investment deal, it would 
have secured a future role for itself on the international stage, in that the OECD 
was 'more than likely' to provide the MAI's secretariat function. However, since 
the failure of the MAI, the OECD has maintained a low profile and has not 
publicly attempted to take the lead again on negotiating such binding 
agreements.12 After a brief fling in the public spotlight, it has returned to being 
'technical, abstruse, opaque, remote, and as multifaceted as the compound eye of 
a housefly' (Huntley 1980: 68).
That said, the OECD's current, relative invisibility on the radar of public notice 
should not be interpreted as demonstrating that the organisation has no role in 
the development of international and national policy.13 Such an interpretation 
underestimates the influence of the OECD in two ways. First, it neglects the 
importance of the organisation's role as a source of policy ideas for its members 
(and others), and second, it overlooks the mechanisms that the OECD can use to 
urge its members to implement its preferred policy options. Bayne, who offers a 
positive analysis of the OECD and its function, claims that the OECD: 'operates 
very tactfully, having the gift of supplying governments with good ideas they 
can then pretend they thought of themselves' (2003: 239). But he ignores both the 
impact of the ideas and that there may be times when member countries do not 
want to pursue the OECD line. It is here that the second factor comes into play. 
Ostensibly, the OECD is a non-regulatory body -  that is, it has no mechanisms by 
which it can force its members to undertake particular policy actions. However, 
it can be argued that, in practice, the OECD has various mechanisms through
11 That the negotiations were held 'in secret' appeared to be a bone of contention with protesters, 
yet, as will be canvassed in Chapter 1, this is standard practice for the OECD, which holds most of 
its discussions 'behind closed doors'.
12 Undoubtedly, the MAI has been an educational experience for the OECD. One Secretariat 
official told me that the organisation had been 'careful to learn from the MAI' when subsequently 
negotiating core principles of corporate governance. The OECD was holding 'open meetings with 
non-members, business and civil society' and was 'putting it on the Internet so everyone can 
comment' (Interview, Paris, 19 February 1999). Jan Schölte makes a similar observation: 'Having 
had its fingers badly burnt on this occasion, the OECD has subsequently expanded its outreach 
activities to civil society' (2000: 270).
13 I say 'relative' invisibility because it cannot be claimed that the media does not place the OECD 
and its actions in front of the public; rather, the point is that these articles seldom go beyond 
highlighting the OECD's country reports and comparisons.
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which it can press its members to take a particular policy direction. These will be 
explored in Chapter 1. It is worth observing here Bayne's comments on the 
relationship between governments and bodies such as the OECD:
With a few exceptions ... governments value the endorsement of 
international institutions like the IMF, the WTO and the OECD. ...
Their endorsement impresses financial markets, foreign investors and 
trading partners and may be necessary to release flows of funds, from 
both public and private sources. Governments do not like to go 
against them.
On the other hand, sovereign governments want to be making their 
own decisions. They do not want to be taking orders from outside. ... 
Governments therefore have an incentive to anticipate what the 
institutions will recommend and do it before they are asked. With 
the possible exception of the United States, even G7 governments are 
not able to tell the institutions what line to take. (2003: 230).
Bayne later qualifies his statement, emphasising that OECD members 'are 
persuaded -  never forced' to adjust their policies through peer pressure or the 
supply of better information' (2003: 239). Of course, the relationship is not all 
one-way; governments in member countries can point to OECD policy advice as 
a reason for implementing some policies, thereby (in effect) shifting the 'blame' 
for unpopular policy directions on to the OECD.14
I acknowledge that the OECD is not the only such policy actor in the 
international area, nor is it the only one able to exert a degree of influence over its 
members' policies. Today, there are a large number of international organisations 
and, once formed, such organisations tend to remain, even if the circumstances
14 Michael Howlett and M. Ramesh note that this is one of the functions of transnational actors; 
that is, 'domestic actors seek them out for information on public problems they are faced with and 
to legitimise their own preferred solutions' (1999:16). Lisa Martin and Beth Simmons contend that 
OECD targets can become arguing tools in policy debates:
International agreements, even those without enforcement mechanisms such as the 
OECD aid target, can provide "hooks" by which interest groups that favor the 
international agreement can increase their influence on the domestic agenda. For 
example, in Scandinavian countries, the OECD target has become a potent arguing 
point in parliamentary debates (1998: 756).
Bayne adds an extra dimension to this argument, saying that, when implementing unpopular 
changes, a government can 'share its burdens' with the organisation and other members in 'a sort 
of "equality of misery"', thereby demonstrating to its people that they are not suffering alone 
(2003:230-231).
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underpinning their creation have changed.15 As a result, states are subject to 
international regulations in an increasing number of policy areas that are worked 
out in international organisations, and it can be argued that states generally 
comply with these agreements despite a lack of overt enforcement mechanisms 
(Risse 1999: 3, 18). Given the real and potential influence of these international 
organisations, it is important to examine what they do, how they function, and 
the advice they give. My argument is that such an exploration is especially 
necessary with regard to the OECD because it has been the subject of so little in- 
depth study to date. Thus, a key reason for examining the OECD is to explore its 
policy analysis, advice, and recommendations to its members, and, if Secretary- 
General Johnston is to be believed, the wider international community. That is, if 
the OECD is a source of policy ideas and has mechanisms via which it can 
shepherd members towards particular policy actions, then we need to know the 
content of these ideas, the recommended directions and the implications that 
they may have.16
Social Justice and Related Issues
Given the dearth of work on the OECD, there are many areas with regard to the 
organisation that are likely to be rich fields of research. Indeed, it is possible to 
take any one of a number of approaches, examining:
• how policy is formulated within OECD
• what role individuals, members and other organisations play within the 
OECD itself, especially their roles in policy choices
15 In terms of the numbers of international organisations, David Held notes an increase from 37 
inter-governmental organisations in 1909 to nearly 300 in 1989. He cites Robert Keohane's 
argument that the increase in state co-operation in post-war years can be attributed to a recognition 
of its usefulness in reducing the costs to states of 'going it alone' in resolving pressing issues, 
reducing the costs of co-ordination through sharing information, and 'reducing the general sense of 
uncertainty in an era in which many important political problems escape the control of individual 
polities' (Keohane 1984, cited in Held 1995:108; see also Smouts 1993). On the tenacity of 
organisations once established, Smouts notes that 'once codified ... with its own constitutions, staff, 
rituals and rules, [an organisation] tends ...to concentrate on organizational goals and to see as its 
main objective its own survival' (1993: 450).
16 Peter Carroll et al. have made this argument in relation to the OECD's 'policy regarding the 
knowledge-based economy' (2002:1-9). They assert that the OECD exerts 'substantial influence 
upon the domestic policies of its member states', which makes it 'vital' for members' policy-makers 
to 'develop a more critical stance' (2002: 8,1). Carroll et al. go so far as to claim that the Australian 
government has adopted the OECD's 'core assumptions, key definitions and principle means of 
measurement' in relation to the knowledge-based economy, which, they argue, is 'unfortunate' 
because these factors, 'while of value, contain potentially serious limitations' (2002: 8).
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• the relationship between policy divisions within the OECD
• how far, and in what respects, OECD policy advice is reflected in member 
policies (that is, policy transfer)
• the movement of individuals between the bureaucracies of member countries 
and the OECD, or
• the relationship between OECD and other international organisations, the 
overlap between their roles and functions, and whether (and how) OECD 
policy reflects, or is reflected in, the policies of these bodies.
All of these are important topics, but there is a further fundamental issue in 
which I am particularly interested that needs to be addressed. As noted above, 
the OECD has not attracted much in-depth academic or media study, yet the 
organisation has been cited in both arenas as an international organisation 
pushing policies -  or, more specifically, policy ideas -  that show little concern 
with social issues and outcomes such as social justice. Indeed, one of the core 
concerns of the anti-globalisation protesters is that the new 'global' policies that 
international organisations, including the OECD, espouse pay too little attention 
to the consequences for the jobless, the aged, and other disadvantaged groups 
(Gelinas 2003; Schölte 2000: ch. 10; Martin and Schumann 1997: 160).
As will be discussed in Chapter 6, the OECD has rejected such criticisms as 
'nonsense' on the grounds that '[njever before in its history had the Organisation 
been so deeply involved in analysing social issues and producing proposals to 
limit social damage' (Sullivan 1997: 55).17 The question, then, is how these 
different accounts of the OECD's policy views can be reconciled. One possibility 
is that the parties to the dispute have conflicting interpretations of such terms as 
'social justice' and different underlying assumptions about the means and goals 
of policy. That is, they have conflicting ideas. It is the OECD side of this conflict 
that I explore in my thesis through an examination of the framework of ideas 
within which the OECD locates its more specific policy analyses. Thus, the 
central concerns of my work are the OECD's main policy ideas, the change in 
these ideas over time, and the implications of this change for the organisation's 
understanding and treatment of social justice and related issues. My argument,
Other bodies targeted with such allegations have defended themselves in a similar vein, with the 
heads of the IMF, the World Bank, and the World Economic Forum all arguing that social justice 
issues are at the forefront of their agendas (Forbes 2000; Powell 2000).
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to be supported with evidence in later chapters, is that there has been a shift in 
the OECD's policy ideas from what it has described as Keynesianism to what it 
describes as 'the supply-side approach', or what I will argue is better described 
as neo-liberalism.18 While the OECD itself acknowledges this shift, it does not 
acknowledge the implications. That is, the unacknowledged, and perhaps 
unintended, result of this shift in policy ideas is a fundamental change in the 
OECD's notions of social justice.
It is important to emphasise that these questions (What are the OECD's 
underlying ideas? How have they changed? With what implications for social 
justice?) are the boundaries of the thesis. While there are many associated 
questions relating to ideas and the OECD, they are distinctly different 
propositions to the research project undertaken herein. Thus, I am stating at the 
outset that I am not examining any of the areas listed above or any of the 
following areas:
• where the OECD's ideas come from (whether they originate in the OECD or 
whether the OECD acquires them from member countries to refine and 
disperse to other members)
• who promotes the ideas or how they move through the OECD's internal 
policy development mechanisms (that is, policy actors, how 'interests' use 
ideas to achieve their goals, or how ideas may form interests), or
• whether and how the OECD competes with other sources of ideas to have its 
ideas accepted.
In addition, I am not arguing that the OECD is the sole source of ideas for policy­
makers within member and non-member countries. Rather, my questions are 
focused narrowly on the framework of ideas underpinning the OECD's more 
specific economic and social policy analyses, and the implications that a change 
in this framework has for its policy advice and recommendations.19
18 This is not to argue that I am the only scholar to understand the OECD's policy framework in 
this way. Gelinas, somewhat more scathingly describes the OECD as: 'the neoliberal faith 
propagation office' (2003:118).
19 Some scholars may criticise the elimination of actors and interests from the study, arguing that 
ideas do not 'float freely' in the policy arena. Rather: 'Ideas are carried into the policy arena by 
actors with interests at stake and executed by politicians seeking reelection' (Schwartz 2002:123). 
The issues that these criticisms raise will be discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.
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Theoretical Framework: Ideas and Institutions
I have placed my examination of the OECD's ideas within the theoretical context 
of the ideas and institutions literature, which examines the relationship between 
ideas and institutions. This literature is part of a broader investigation into the 
role of ideas in policy-making. Key debates in this wider area of scholarly 
endeavour centre on conflicts over the role of ideas; that is, whether the ideas 
themselves have an independent effect on policy or whether their impact 
depends on interests or institutions. While some of these debates will be 
canvassed in detail in Chapters 2 and 3, I note here that this literature 
understands ideas (in this case, policy ideas, as opposed to, say, philosophical 
ideas) as 'shared beliefs' as to the nature of the world and how it works. In the 
policy-making context, ideas are shared understandings of what constitutes a 
policy problem and what can be done about it. Much of the current research into 
the relationship between ideas and policy tends to circumscribe the role of ideas, 
focusing instead on external factors. Although some researchers assert that ideas 
exert independent influence on policy choices, others claim that factors external 
to ideas (for example, institutional structures, elite interest groups, and earlier 
solutions to policy problems) have the most impact on policy. As will be 
outlined in Chapter 2, such approaches do not accord ideas a 'life of their own', 
but use them to 'help other forms of explanation' (Blyth 1997a: 241; Goldstein 
and Keohane 1993: 3, cited in Blyth 1997a: 231).
As noted, some of the theorists examining the role of ideas privilege the role of 
institutions over that of ideas in policy-making. By institutions, they mean 
formal and informal structures that guide human behaviour and organise life. 
These structures include the obvious political and bureaucratic institutions of 
government, such as the legislature, executive, electoral system, courts, agencies 
to implement and enforce policies, laws, rules, and so on. However, they are 
also defined more generally to include arrangements, accommodations, and 
understandings that serve as the basis of a society's organisation. Some scholars 
argue that ideas are hard to change once they are incorporated into the 
institutions that implement and enforce policy. That is, they contend that ideas 
become absorbed into 'reinforcing organizational and normative structures', such 
as the regulatory apparatus of the state, thus becoming 'embedded in 
institutions' (Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 13, 12). In this way, the endorsement 
of one set of ideas is said to constrain policy-makers' choices by eliminating or
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overshadowing other sets of ideas. Existing ideas are embedded in the formal, 
bureaucratic structures that implement and enforce policy and the longer-term 
policy commitments that these contain, and in the taken-for-granted or 
unconscious assumptions behind policy discourse and policy practice. A 
common example advanced in support of this argument is the alleged tenacity of 
the Keynesian welfare state in the face of a move to neo-liberal ideas that demand 
a much smaller role for the state and a greater role for individual self­
responsibility.
However, I will argue that theorists who argue that ideas are embedded firmly in 
institutions overstate the solidity of both administrative arrangements and 
underlying attitudes and assumptions, thereby underestimating the role of ideas 
in effecting change. In supporting my claim, I will examine the impact of new 
ideas on underlying attitudes and assumptions, or what can be described as 
'informal institutions'. Here, I am following Douglass North (1990), who argues 
that institutions can be either formal, 'such as rules that human beings devise' or 
informal, 'such as conventions and codes of behavior' (1990: 4; see also 1990: ch. 5 
and ch. 6, and 1991:97-112). I have interpreted this broadly to distinguish 
between the formal institutions (rules, laws, structures, organisations, and so on) 
and informal institutions (norms, values, attitudes, implicit codes of conduct, and 
so on) that underpin human interaction. Arguments that ideas become 
'embedded in institutions', making them extremely resistant to change, pay too 
much attention to formal institutions and overlook what is happening to 
informal institutions. They are guilty of treating all forms of institution as 
equally stable and equally resistant to new ideas. Yet, it can be argued that new 
ideas bring with them a new set of informal institutions that serve to undermine 
and replace the existing set. As a result, seemingly small changes in policy that 
are based on new ideas can have a large impact on policy goals and public 
attitudes in that they reflect and reinforce a new set of underlying assumptions. 
The policy changes may appear small, but they are, in fact, based on a large 
change in their underlying ideas and thus have considerable consequences. For 
example, 'nicks, chips and slices' (Wilding 1992: 203) to the various aspects of 
welfare programmes can result in their being eroded to the point of effectively 
becoming defunct. This will be examined further in Chapter 3.
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I explore the effect of a major shift in ideas with reference to Peter Hall's 
Kuhnian-influenced model of paradigm shifts. According to this model, one 
paradigm, or set of ideas for explaining the world and how it works, replaces 
another when it is seen as being better able to explain a range of policy problems 
or 'puzzles'. As will be discussed in Chapter 2, Kuhn describes such change as a 
'revolution' because the transition from one paradigm to another is not an 
incremental, cumulative process, achieved by an extension of the old paradigm, 
but a 'reconstruction of the field from new fundamentals' (1970: 85). The 
reconstruction changes the field's basic theoretical generalisations as well as 
many of its methods and applications. As Kuhn observes: 'When the transition 
is complete, the profession will have changed its view of the field, its methods 
and its goals' (1970: 85). In the case of the paradigm shift from Keynesianism to 
neo-liberalism, the new understanding of the world and how it works includes a 
new vision of state-society relations, and an associated new interpretation of the 
roles and responsibilities of the state and individuals. Thus, the effect of a 
change from Keynesianism to neo-liberalism is a sea-change or transformation in 
the way of thinking about state-society relations.
My argument, then, is that new ideas bring a range of new formal and informal 
institutions that have a significant impact on the understanding of policy 
problems and solutions. According to this reasoning, even if external factors, 
such as formal institutions appear to constrain the options open to policy-makers, 
the ideas themselves have an impact which is not determined by those 
institutions. The ideas affect both what can be considered a policy problem and 
what can be considered a viable solution. In this way, ideas can effect change, 
even where the nature of formal institutions would suggest that little change is 
possible. One way in which this occurs is through the discourse of a set of ideas, 
which serves to 'frame and name' in particular ways. Neo-liberal discourse, for 
example, offers frames and names that suggest (among other things):
• that former conceptions of social justice and related issues are no longer 
affordable
• that the unemployed are bludgers who choose to be without work and who 
need to be coerced back into work through cutting their 'generous' benefits, 
and
• that social transfers encourage some people to be lazy at the expense of those 
who are prepared to work.
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It can be argued that this discourse has infiltrated social consciousness such that 
the public is now more accepting of policies that are based on these new 
understandings of social problems and solutions. It is this shift in informal 
institutions from those underpinning collective responsibility to those of 
individual responsibility that suggests that there are problems with the 
arguments for path dependency and institutional lock-in with regard to the 
welfare state. That is, ideas are not embedded as firmly in institutions as some 
scholars would claim.
The OECD: Ideas, Institutions and Social Justice
A study of the OECD's understanding and treatment of social justice and related 
issues through the theoretical framework of the ideas and institutions literature 
serves to add to our knowledge of both the OECD and the relationship between 
ideas and institutions. The literature offers a model of interpreting how (and 
why) policy changes across time. Much of this debate, as noted, privileges 
existing institutions over those proposed by new ideas. If such privilege were 
justified, it would mean that, even if there were a shift in the framework of ideas 
through which the OECD analyses social issues, such a shift would have no 
practical effect on the OECD's policy recommendations because its original ideas 
are embedded in existing institutions and are resistant to change. Thus, only 
those options consistent with its existing institutions could be considered as 
viable solutions to the perceived policy problems. However, a study of the 
OECD's policy ideas across time reveals that, even when there is allegedly little 
apparent change in formal institutions, there may be considerable change in 
informal institutions, thus dramatically affecting formal institutions by altering 
their underlying raison d'etre. This will be explored in Chapters 5 and 6.
Applied to the OECD, this means that, if, as will be claimed in Chapter 1, the
OECD is an ideas repository and ideas monger, then we can:
• examine OECD documents to determine the content of the framework of 
ideas within which the OECD locates its more specific economic and social 
policy analyses, and the change in this framework over time (Chapter 5)
• explore the effect of the new ideas on the informal institutions underpinning 
the OECD's policy evaluations and recommendations through examining the
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underlying assumptions implicit in the discourse associated with these ideas 
(Chapters 5 and 6)
• examine the implications for the OECD's understanding and treatment of 
social justice, including the effects on the informal institutions underpinning 
its interpretation of social justice (Chapter 6).
Thus, a study of the ideas promulgated by the OECD since its inception in 1961 
that isolates them from individuals and policy-transfer mechanisms may offer 
insights that add usefully to the ideas and institutions debate. Such a study, by 
focusing solely on the ideas and not on the individuals promoting them, should 
reveal something about the ideas themselves and how they function. Thus, such 
a study places ideas front and centre in policy-making analysis rather than using 
them as 'minor intervening variables' (Jacobsen 1995: 284).
Effectively, then, I will do two things in my thesis. First, I will examine the 
change in the OECD's ideas over time and the implications of this change for its 
understanding and treatment of social issues, and second, I will argue that 
institutions are not as resistant to the impact of new ideas as has been suggested.
I will contend that neo-liberal ideas have transformed the view of state-society 
relations such that the state is now expected to do considerably less for its 
citizens and individuals are expected to do considerably more for themselves. 
Consequently, the new ideas have changed both the means of achieving policy 
goals and the ends (or goals) themselves. The most dramatic reflection of this 
shift is that policy is no longer concerned with equality of outcome; rather, 
primacy is given to equality of opportunity. While this is presented as a change 
in means only, it has the inevitable effect of changing the ends, given neo­
liberalism's view of individuals and their behaviour. That is, if individuals know 
that they do not have to take advantage of opportunities because the state will 
provide for them if they do not do so, then they have no incentive to pursue 
opportunities that are open to them. The negative effects of state intervention 
mean that equality of outcome can no longer be considered a goal for which the 
state is responsible directly. This is not to argue that the OECD's ideas are 
against equality of outcome; rather, its framework rejects direct state intervention 
to achieve such an outcome. In doing so, however, it accepts an inequality of 
outcome that was not acceptable under the earlier set of ideas. Thus, ideas about 
social justice are not embedded as firmly in the existing institutions of the welfare 
state as the literature suggests. The literature focuses too much on formal
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institutions, which means that it neglects the impact of new ideas on informal 
institutions.
Outline of the Thesis
Chapter 1 sets the scene for my later analysis, exploring the OECD as an 
international organisation and as an epistemic community that has its own set of 
ideas for interpreting the world in which its members operate. In this chapter, I 
trace the development of the OECD, from its precursor, the Organisation for 
European Economic Co-operation, through its initial configuration of 18 
members to the 30-member body that it is today. I then examine the OECD's 
stated aims and objectives, as well as its structures and mechanisms, before 
exploring the claim that the organisation is 'all bark and no bite'. I dispute the 
representation of the OECD as a toothless watchdog that uses accumulated 
evidence to shepherd, rather than bully, its members into taking the desired 
action. My argument is that the technical expertise and information that the 
OECD offers its members is less benign than it appears, and that the reading of 
'technical' advice and measures as 'objective' neglects, among other factors, the 
way in which such measures can be used to demand particular actions.20 In 
addition, the organisation has two major, related mechanisms (multilateral 
surveillance and peer pressure) with which to compel its members to pursue its 
recommended policy directions. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of the 
OECD's role as an ideas monger or epistemic community whose ideas may come 
to construct the 'reality' or 'truth' of the situations that face policy-makers and 
delineate the options from which policy-makers select solutions. I argue that this 
is one of the major reasons that scholars need to pay more attention to the OECD 
and its ideas.
Chapter 2, the first of two theoretical chapters, begins to explore the role of ideas 
in policy-making. In this chapter, I canvass some of the arguments in the 
literature about ideas vis-a-vis experts and institutions before turning my 
attention to an exploration of Hall's Kuhnian-influenced model of paradigms and 
paradigm shifts and how this can be used to explain the change in ideas over 
time. According to Hall's model, a new set of ideas replaces an existing
20 It may be worth recalling here the adage: 'lies, damned lies, and statistics'. My much less 
strident observation in Chapter 1 is that much depends on what is being measured, how, and in 
what context.
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'dominant paradigm' when it is seen to be 'better at explaining the empirical 
observations that remained anomalous in terms of the earlier theory' (Hall 
1989:9). In simple terms, the new paradigm offers policy-makers a more 
plausible account of the hows and whys of current problems and their viable 
solutions. I observe that Hall's model offers one explanation of how ideas can be 
agents of both policy inertia and radical policy change. However, a problem 
with Hall's model is that it suggests that ideas are apolitical; that the replacement 
of one paradigm with another is simply a matter of technical comparison. I 
argue that this is not the case, but my interest is not in the way that policy actors 
may use competing paradigms in a contest for political dominance. Rather, I am 
concerned with whether there are factors internal to the ideas themselves that 
add to their influence. In the second half of the chapter, I argue for the need to 
examine a paradigm's constituent discourse and the way it 'frames and names' 
policy problems and solutions. My argument is that the discourse of a paradigm 
articulates the way that the ideas constitute and organise social and political 
relations, expressing the inherent underlying assumptions and ensuring their 
passage through the broader community. As this discourse is adopted and used, 
it comes to permeate society as the values, attitudes, beliefs, and social mores that 
support the paradigm's established order. My argument is that it is the effect of a 
paradigm's discourse on informal institutions that suggests that institutions are 
more changeable than some scholars assume.
Chapter 3 focuses on the institutions side of the ideas and institutions debate, 
exploring claims for the stability and the instability of institutions. In the 
opening sections of the chapter, I acknowledge the arguments for institutional 
stability in the wake of new ideas, using the claims of those scholars who note the 
resilience of the welfare state. These scholars argue that, despite their adoption 
of neo-liberal ideas that demand a smaller welfare state, many countries have 
made no radical changes to their welfare systems, and have pursued 
retrenchment only cautiously. I then explore the reasons advanced for policy 
'stability' in the tenacious welfare state, which centre on two main themes: path 
dependency and institutional lock-in, and the electoral hazard of going against 
public opinion, which remains generally in favour of the welfare state. In the 
second half of the chapter, I counter some of the arguments for institutional 
inertia, arguing that claims for institutional stability based on path dependency 
underestimate the impact of incremental policy changes and pay insufficient
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attention to the effect of new ideas on the informal institutions underpinning 
policy options. My argument is that institutional (and thus, policy) stability has 
been overstated because, first, incremental change is less path dependent, and 
has more impact, than is assumed, and second, that new ideas have a greater 
impact on informal institutions than is assumed. New ideas act to undermine 
institutional stability by changing the very foundations on which formal 
institutions are built and maintained, especially public understandings of state- 
society relations and their expectations of the state and of themselves. Thus, neo­
liberal ideas have fundamentally altered the way of thinking about government 
and the understanding of state-society relations that underpinned Keynesianism; 
they have acted to undermine public support for the welfare state.
Chapter 4 is an introduction to the second section of the thesis, setting out how 
the central concerns of the first three chapters will be used to explore the OECD's 
underlying framework of ideas and the implications of a shift in this framework 
for the organisation's understanding and treatment of social justice and related 
issues.
Chapter 5 explores the OECD's underlying framework of ideas, using its main 
economic policy series, the Economic Outlook. These documents reveal a 
fundamental shift in the OECD's thinking from what it has called Keynesianism 
to what it calls the 'supply-side', but what I will argue is neo-liberalism. The neo­
liberal ideas incorporate new specifications of both policy goals and the kinds of 
instruments that can be used to attain them, based on a new understanding of the 
nature of the policy problems that are to be addressed. I note in this chapter that 
the OECD acknowledges the shift in its paradigm over the years since its 
inception, but it presents the change as an inevitable, unproblematic -  and non­
political -  response to the failure of Keynesian policies to resolve serious 
economic problems. However, my argument is that this shift was much more 
than a simple change in means to achieve an existing set of policy goals. Such a 
view neglects the implications of a paradigm shift as outlined in Chapter 2: that a 
new paradigm incorporates new assumptions that change what can be 
considered policy goals, and that make the old paradigm's methods for attaining 
policy goals incomprehensible. Thus, the implication of the OECD's change in 
world-view is that, although it may present the shift as simply an unproblematic 
change in means to achieve the same ends, it is, in fact, more complicated, with a
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change in means changing the ends. In Chapter 5 I explore four key ideas of the 
OECD's new paradigm: that state intervention is bad for the economy, that 
public debt is bad for the economy, that public spending is bad for the economy, 
and that the public sector itself is bad for the economy. I argue that these ideas 
are based on a neo-liberal understanding of state-society relations in which the 
state's role is limited to maintaining law and order and the infrastructure of the 
market, and individuals -  understood to be rational, self-interested maximisers -  
are considered to be responsible for their own well-being through their own 
efforts and enterprise. The result is that some previously accepted state roles and 
responsibilities are no longer acceptable or plausible.
Chapter 6 explores the implications of a neo-liberal world-view for the OECD's 
understanding and treatment of social justice. In this chapter, I argue that a 
striking feature of the OECD's discussions in the Economic Outlook from the mid- 
1990s is the linking of social and economic goals in ways not considered for two 
decades or so. I contend that, although this appears to be a return to a central 
focus on social issues after a period in which the focus was primarily on 
economic issues, this move needs to be understood in the context of the OECD's 
new neo-liberal framework of ideas, which prioritises the economic over the 
social. Neo-liberal ideas incorporate several assumptions that undermine many 
of the accepted methods for achieving social goals and change what can 
considered to be acceptable or 'legitimate' social objectives. Explicit assumptions 
include the need to limit the role of the state by decreasing state intervention and 
reducing public debt and public spending, all of which are considered to impede 
the efficient functioning of the economy. But these ideas incorporate two 
important views:
• that there is a need to shift the balance between public and private 
responsibilities in order to decrease state responsibility and increase 
individual responsibility, and
• that individuals are rational, self-interested maximisers, who look to obtain 
whatever advantages they can for themselves.
These views reflect a transformation in the interpretation of state-society 
relations, roles, and responsibilities that affects the range of policy options that 
may be pursued. As a result of this transformation, the OECD takes a different 
approach to social policy, assessing policies in terms of what they add to the 
economy, how they affect the market, and whether they reflect the right balance
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between state and individual responsibilities. Consequently, the new ideas 
constrain the available options for both the means and ends of social policy, 
including those related to social justice. The outcome is a new conception of 
social justice, based on a profoundly different understanding of state-society 
relations and the inherent obligations, rights, and responsibilities of state and the 
individuals comprising society. My conclusion is that neo-liberal ideas have had 
a more profound effect on policy means and goals than the literature suggests, 
which means that ideas are not as immutable as some of the literature suggests.
Chapter 1
The OECD: 
Full of Ideas
INTRODUCTION
n n  he Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development is one of the 
JL  most well-known, but least studied, of the world's inter-governmental 
agencies. Type the words 'Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development' (in either the 's' or 'z' form of 'organisation', with or without a 
hyphen in 'co-operation') or the organisation's acronym ('OECD') into any 
library search engine and the computer will return a list of thousands of items. 
Type the same terms into a good Internet search engine and the results are 
staggering. Yet, only a handful of these 'hits' (responses) will be about the 
organisation itself. The majority of the references will be to publications by the 
OECD or those about its member countries.1 Almost no analysis has been done 
on the OECD as an international organisation in its own right: what it is, what it 
does and what it says.2 Rather, most authors use the OECD simply as a 
convenient shorthand, a catch-all term to cover 'first world', industrialised 
states. Such terms say little about the OECD or of its functions. The OECD itself
1 I repeat here that, when I refer to 'the OECD', I mean the organisation itself, not its member 
countries.
2 In one of the few papers on the OECD, Morton Ougaard observes in a footnote that a 'search for 
literature on the OECD, as opposed to by the OECD, renders very little' (1999: 4, fn 18, emphasis in 
original). He adds that, while the organisation is usually mentioned in texts on international 
organisations and international political economy, he has 'not come across a single analytical work 
on the organisation'. While Ougaard can be faulted for overlooking two early works, Aubrey 
(1967) and Camps (1975), beyond this his claim is sound.
23 The OECD
observes that it has been called 'a think tank, monitoring agency, rich man's 
club, [and] an unacademic university', but it claims that, while it has 'elements of 
all ... none of these characterisations captures the essence of the OECD' (2001c).3
One reason for the limited analysis could be that, before 1997, the organisation 
itself (rather than comparisons of its members) was perceived as not particularly 
interesting or worthy of attention by either academics or members of the public. 
As one scholar observed:
The ordinary citizen of one of the OECD's member countries has 
probably never heard of OECD. Buried in the financial pages of his 
[sic] newspaper may occasionally be an article with the headline, 
'OECD Sees Difficult Outlook for West', but beyond that, OECD is 
unknown to the public, or at least certainly less known than the 
Common Market or NATO [the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation] 
(Huntley 1980: 66; see also Ohlin 1968: 243).4
The organisation now appears determined not to remain unknown. Current 
OECD Secretary-General Donald Johnston assumed his post in 1996 with a
3 This observation is repeated in the organisation's official history, with author Scott Sullivan 
noting that the OECD has 'baffled many an observer and generated some unflattering sobriquets in 
the press: "the rich countries' club", "the talking-shop", "the high-price think-tank'" (1997: 49). He 
goes on to observe that, while there is some truth in each of those tags (and, interestingly, Sullivan 
himself often refers to the 'rich nation's club' in his text), they 'fail to capture the uniqueness of the 
place: its consistent ability to blend academic theory and real-time analysis, to produce policy 
advice that responds to the member countries' needs' (1997: 49). Miriam Camps, in her early 
analysis of the OECD, notes that the 'only shorthand label that has threatened to stick has been one 
no one wanted -  that of a "rich man's club'" (1975:10). On this point, The Economist observes that 
the use of the term 'rich man's club' has always been too simple, given that Greece, Portugal and 
Turkey are relatively poor (1994: 17).
On this point, it must be noted that, perhaps in response to the perceived negative connotations of 
the word 'club', the OECD has since eliminated this word from the information about itself on its 
web site <http://www.oecd.org>. A visit to the site in January 2004 revealed that, whereas the 
OECD once described itself as a 'club of like-minded countries' (2001c; emphasis added), it now 
calls itself a 'group of like-minded countries' (2004; emphasis added). In a similar vein, whereas it 
once said it was 'not an exclusive club' (2001c), it now says 'it is by no means exclusive' (2004).
4 Huntley contends that one reason for this lack of notice is that neither the OECD nor its 
predecessor, the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation 'ever enjoyed the 
straightforward assignment of NATO, to keep the Russians out of Europe, or the glamor of a 
European Economic Community, billed as Europe's new "supergovernment'" (1980: 66). Camps 
makes a similar point, arguing that the OECD has been handicapped by having 'no widely agreed 
raison d'etre, no clear purpose from which its functions could be derived, few very precise 
commitments which governments were pledged to carry out, and no simple goals which 
commanded public understanding and support' (1975:10). Nicholas Bayne offers a much less 
negative view, arguing that, during the Cold War, its members considered the organisation to be 
'the standard-bearer of the West in the contest of economic systems' (2003: 238). This interpretation 
suggests a prominent role at odds with the lack of attention given to the organisation.
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mandate to modernise the organisation, and a personal mission to build public 
support for it. In an aside in his official history of the OECD, Scott Sullivan 
reports an 'unguarded' comment from Johnston that: T want Joe Public in 
Pittsburgh or Palermo to realise that OECD is working for him' (1997: 108).
The year that Sullivan's work, From War to Wealth: Fifty Years of Innovation, was 
published, lauding the OECD's work and boldly arguing that 'the world needs 
the OECD now more than it ever did before' (1997: 108), Johnston got his wish 
for greater publicity. However, true to the adage, 'be careful what you wish for', 
the result was not in the form that he had hoped. The OECD burst into the 
public spotlight in February 1997 when a draft of its controversial Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment was leaked and posted on the Internet.5 Ironically, 
Sullivan's history notes that, in French -  one of the organisation's two official 
languages -  the MAI had the acronym AMI, or the French word for 'friend' 
(1997: 72). However, thousands of protesters world-wide saw the agreement 
more as a potent symbol of their enemy -  globalisation -  and a friend only to big 
business interests. The agreement was denounced as a 'charter of rights and 
freedoms for corporations' that would supersede 'the rights of citizens and the 
powers of governments' (Clarke 1997, cited in Kelsey 1999: 315; see also Dunkley 
1998; Paterson and Goodman 1998; Goodman 1999).6 A storm of protest and 
increasing difficulties in settling the text of the MAI led to negotiations being 
suspended in April 1998 and abandoned in December of that year.7
Remarkably, the flurry of interest that the MAI prompted in the activities of the 
OECD said very little about the OECD itself. Scholarly and media discussion 
highlighted the agreement (or, at least, the attempt to reach an agreement), but 
offered little analysis of the body organising it, or its current or future role (see 
Dunkley 1998; Paterson and Goodman 1998; Goodman, 1999; Kasper 1998;
5 The effect of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) on boosting the OECD's profile 
should not be underestimated. One Secretariat official observed that 'post-MAI', the OECD was 
now 'known by a far bigger society' (Interview, Paris, 19 February 1999).
6 Jay Mandle observes that trading countries that were not party to the negotiations would have 
had little choice but to sign the deal. He argues that failure to do so could have resulted in a 
country being 'shunned' as a destination for investment: 'Its failure to adhere to the treaty would 
have cast a cloud over a country's investment climate' (2003: 65).
7 In another somewhat ironic moment, given that the word 'ami' is French, France was the first 
country to formally withdraw from the MAI negotiations, effectively sinking the talks at the OECD.
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Kelsey 1999, ch. 9; Kobrin 1998; Paterson 1998; Wood 1998; Woolley 1998). The 
commentary canvassed whether or not the OECD should be negotiating the 
MAI, but it stopped short of examining whether, nearly forty years after the 
organisation was formed, the OECD itself was still necessary or worthwhile. 
Since then, perhaps reflecting that fame is fleeting and even international 
organisations can expect only fifteen minutes in the limelight, anti-globalisation 
protesters have dropped the OECD from their target list, focusing instead on the 
World Trade Organisation (to which the MAI was shunted, never to be heard 
from again -  thus far, at least), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
World Bank and the World Economic Forum.8 It is curious that this should have 
happened, given that the MAI can be seen as the initial ripple that turned into 
today's tsunami of anti-globalisation protests.9 However, since the demise of the 
MAI, the OECD as an international actor has again sunk beneath the media 
surface, returning to its previous articulation as a useful acronym for the 'first 
world'.10 In a similar vein, scholarly interest has also declined, focusing again 
on the usefulness of the OECD as a convenient smaller study group of allegedly 
like-minded countries. The organisation once again maintains a low profile -  
either by choice (having been publicly humiliated with the MAI) or because, 
once again, it is no longer perceived as being worthy of more than passing notice 
when compared to the bigger international organisations.
As outlined in the Introduction to this thesis, I believe that the OECD is worth 
examining more closely; that the organisation caught in the headlights of public 
scrutiny with the MAI needs to be dissected and its inner workings revealed.
8 Media coverage of anti-globalisation protests makes no mention of the OECD when discussing 
the protesters' grievances, and those protesters quoted mention only the larger bodies. For a 
selection, see Allard (1999a, 1999b, 1999c), Burrell (2001a), Cassen (2000), Forbes (2000), Garran 
(1999), George (1999), Gray (1999), Hewett (2000), Kitney (2000), Mitchell and Stevens (2000), 
Pearson (1999), Powell (2000).
On the MAI, Patrick Rabe claims that the negotiations 'fell into a coma in 1998, from which they 
have yet to come out' (2003: 223); on the other hand, Jacques Gelinas alleges that 'manoeuvring' on 
the MAI 'has since resumed behind closed doors at the WTO' (2003: 33).
9 Somewhat presciently, James Goodman observed in early 1999 that the MAI was 'likely to be a 
major flash-point at the Seattle WTO meeting' in November that year, with anti-MAI campaigners 
'planning to converge on the WTO venue ... resisting an MAI resurrection' (1999: 244). Since 
Seattle, anti-globalisation protesters have targeted IMF and World Bank meetings in Washington 
DC, World Economic Forum meetings in Davos and Melbourne, a G-8 meeting in Genoa and a 
WTO meeting in Sydney.
111 By this I mean that, although its reports still attract considerable interest (as will be explored 
later in this chapter), its actions beyond this do not.
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For example, the MAI can be understood as a new direction for the OECD, in 
which it tried to stake a claim to new ground, positioning itself for a new role in 
the Third Millennium. The fact that it was thwarted in this endeavour does not 
mean that it will not try again. Yet, scholars appear to know little about this 
international body and, therefore, what kind of future action we can expect it to 
take. In essence, there are two sets of views on the OECD: one sees the OECD as 
a benign organisation, comprising unimportant technocrats; the other views it as 
an influential, neo-liberal think-tank foisting unpopular policies on to member 
governments and, increasingly, the wider world.11 The current small amount of 
scholarship on the organisation fails to offer sufficient evidence to support fully 
either conception of the OECD. Claims that the organisation is unimportant pay 
insufficient attention to the OECD's influence on national policy directions, 
especially given the frequency with which its statistics and reports are cited. 
However, claims that the OECD is simply a neo-liberal think-tank often refer to 
only one or two of the organisation's publications -  hardly enough to support 
such (often scathing) allegations.12
The lack of significant scholarship on the OECD leaves open a wide range of 
approaches for a study of this inter-governmental body, especially given the size 
of the organisation and the many fields in which it is involved. My interest in 
the OECD, as explained in the Introduction to the thesis, centres on the ideas 
and their inherent assumptions underpinning the OECD's thinking on policy 
and the shift in these ideas over time. A central concern of my thesis is how the 
OECD's understanding and treatment of social justice and related issues has 
changed since the organisation's inception in 1961. If, as some suggest, the 
OECD acts as an 'ideas monger' or an 'epistemic community' that sets and 
frames policy debates, it is important to know what ideas it is passing to its 
members.13 In this chapter, I want to set the scene for my analysis, looking at the 
organisation's origins and aims, structures and mechanisms, before challenging 
the view that the OECD is 'all bark and no bite'; that is, the claim that the
11 For the former view, see Bayne (2003); for the latter, see Gelinas (2003: esp. 118-120), Schölte 
(2000: 241), Martin and Schumann (1997:160).
12 Gelinas, for example, having labelled the OECD 'the neoliberal faith propagation office', does 
not list a single work of the OECD in his bibliography.
13 Of necessity, given the breadth of the OECD's work and the more limited scope of my thesis, 
this will be what Henry Aubrey calls in his study of the OECD a '"functional" panorama' 
(1967: 33), rather than a detailed picture.
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organisation is nothing more than a data collection agency and a source of 
technical expertise for its members. I will argue that this view is flawed, not 
only because the OECD stands outside its members as an independent source of 
rational-legal authority to which members can appeal for both policy ideas and 
support in implementing policy actions, but also because it has two significant, 
related mechanisms it can use to keep its members in step -  multilateral 
surveillance and peer pressure.14 I will then argue that the OECD's most 
important role is as an ideas repository and diffusion agency, and that the 
tendency to reduce 'the OECD' to a convenient shorthand overlooks the 
importance of this role. Finally, I will conclude that this combination of factors -  
the OECD's independence, its alleged non-partisan, 'technical' expertise, its 
means of exerting some degree of authority over its members, and its role in 
diffusing policy ideas -  makes an examination of the organisation's ideas, and 
the underlying assumptions on which they are based and which underpin its 
policy discussions and recommendations, a worthwhile, and perhaps essential, 
focus of research.
ORIGINS:
The Organisation  for European economic  
Co-operation (OEEC)
The OECD's precursor was the Organisation for European Economic Co­
operation, which was set up in April 1948 to administer aid under the Marshall 
Plan for the reconstruction of Europe after World War II (Aubrey 1967: 9; Bakker 
1996:110-111; Maddison 1989:66; Mayall 1988:62; van Meerhaeghe 1987:173; 
OECD 2001d). Its membership comprised 17 states of Western Europe (18 once
14 I am using the terms 'multilateral surveillance and peer pressure'; the OECD uses the term 'peer 
review' interchangeably with 'multilateral surveillance' alongside the term 'peer pressure'. The 
terms I use cover concepts that are different, but related. As Fabrizio Pagani explains:
Peer review can be described as the systematic examination and assessment of the 
performance of a State by other States, with the ultimate goal of helping the reviewed 
State improve its policy making, adopt best practices, and comply with established 
standards and principles. ... The effectiveness of peer review relies on the influence 
and persuasion exercised by the peers during the process. This effect is known as 
'peer pressure' (2002: 4, 5; emphasis added).
That said, the distinction often is blurred; for example, in Economic Outlook 58 (1995b), the OECD 
observes that: 'Peer pressure reviews encourage Members to pursue the path of liberalisation' 
(1995b: 34).
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Spain joined in 1959), with the United States and Canada as associates.15 The 
OEEC's aims were to rebuild a sound European economy, to promote the unity 
of 'the most shattered part of the world economy' and, later, to 'sponsor and 
supervise' trade liberalisation (Maddison 1989: 66; Aubrey 1967: 9). Both of the 
latter aims were adopted in response to a belief that the turbulence of the 1930s 
(the Great Depression) and World War II could be traced to a breakdown of the 
international order when a 'virtual absence of collaboration' and 'self-centred 
"beggar-my-neighbour" policies led to utter chaos' (Aubrey 1967: 7, 8; Bakker 
1996: 3; Huntley 1980: 72; Maddison 1989: 52).
As part of his campaign to build a strong Europe, United States General George 
C. Marshall challenged European governments to look beyond the nation state 
to shared concerns (Sullivan 1997:10). The OEEC's mission was to facilitate the 
harmonisation of its members' domestic economic policies so that macro- 
economic policies in one country did not undermine similar efforts elsewhere 
(Mayall 1988: 56). In this way, the economic imbalances that had had such great 
influence on political actions could be avoided (Bakker 1996: 3). Co-operation, 
then, became an imperative, rather than a casual concomitant of post-war policy, 
based on the belief that: 'world peace [could] only be ensured by economic 
prosperity in all countries' (Aubrey 1967: 7; Bakker 1996: 3). The core of co­
operation, in this sense, 'entails policy change in an internationally desired 
direction, resulting (at least in part) from international negotiation' (Putnam and 
Bayne 1987: 269), and the OEEC was to serve as the forum in which that 
negotiation occurred.16
The OEEC was said to be innovative with its techniques for co-operation, 
creating 'institutional procedures' that were considered to be so successful that 
they were later 'taken over, adapted and expanded by the OECD' (Aubrey
15 Aubrey notes that the United States and Canada had 'a powerful voice' in the OEEC, 'despite 
their lack of a formal vote' (1967: 9, fn).
16 Later assessments of the OEEC's performance claim that a major factor in the OEEC's success 
was the European countries' abandonment of pre-war isolationist policy and 'their willingness to 
take account of the interests of other countries' (Bakker 1996:110-111). Over time, the OEEC 
experience 'demonstrated the usefulness of regular and articulate discussions of policy options and 
intentions and established a pattern of co-operation in many dimensions that continued after the 
end of Marshall Aid' (Maddison 1989: 66).
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1967: 27).17 One such successful procedure was the organisation's unanimity 
rule, according to which decisions were made by consensus. Members could 
abstain from a decision, in which case the action taken did not apply to them. 
Henry Aubrey notes that some observers had thought that a unanimity rule 
would condemn the OEEC to life as a permanent conference or 'talking shop', 
unable to make decisions or take action, but he argues that the outcome was 
'quite different' (1967: 28). The OEEC found that it could shift members' 
positions through the processes of mutual education, in which member 
delegates learned of the economies and problems of other states, and 
'confrontation', which Aubrey describes as an 'informal but influential 
instrument of moral suasion' (1967: 28). Confrontation, he argues, became a 
useful device in attaining a consensus 'or at least a workable compromise' 
because criticism acted as a 'powerful prod' in the formative stages of policy­
making, especially when expressed behind closed doors where 'the defense of 
national prestige need not be a prime concern' (Aubrey 1967: 28; see also OECD 
1964: 6-17).
A NEW ACTOR: 18
the Organisation  for economic Co-operation a n d
DEVELOPMENT (OECD)
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, which was 
signed into existence in September 1961, arose out of the OEEC, which was seen 
to have 'largely achieved' its tasks (Bakker 1996: 111).19 The United States 
wanted the replacement body to move away from the 'donor-recipient' 
relationship of the Marshall-aid era to become a forum in which the industrial 
democracies could 'sit down on equal terms' (Bayne 1987: 27; Camps 1975: 11). 
It also wanted the European countries, which were now more prosperous, to 
help it provide economic aid to developing countries; hence, the addition of
I7 For example, Aubrey says, the OEEC was 'ingenious at solving crises with the help of special, 
small working groups of outstanding experts who had sufficient authority and negotiating skill to 
work out acceptable compromise solutions' (1967: 27).
Aubrey argues that the formation of the OECD introduced a 'new actor' to the play of Atlantic 
co-operation, and signified a 'change of setting and plot', in that the increased membership meant 
the stage was 'vaster' and the addition of the problems of lesser developed areas expanded the 
scope of action (1967: 4).
I9 Camps refers to another 'somewhat negative motivation' for the formation of the OECD, a 
dispute over the organisation of Europe after the breakdown of negotiations for an OEEC-wide 
free-trade area (1975:10); see also Bakker (1996: 111).
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'development' to the revamped organisation's title (Bakker 1996: 111-112; Camps 
1975:11). The new body remained a co-operative, rather than a supranational, 
venture, after European aspirations for the latter, which would mean limits on 
the sovereignty of members, gave way to the British desire for a simpler 
instrument of inter-governmental co-operation (Bayne 1987:27; see also 
Harrison and Mungall 1990: 59-60).
The OECD's initial membership comprised the 18 members of the OEEC plus the 
United States and Canada. Over the years since 1961, membership has 
expanded to 30 countries, located as far away from Europe as Australia and New 
Zealand.20 Sullivan notes that, by 1969, the OECD had more than doubled the 
OEEC's economic gravity, producing more than two-thirds of the world's goods 
and accounting for more than four-fifths of its trade (1997: 33).21 Today, at 30 
members, the OECD remains considerably smaller than the IMF and the World 
Bank, which both have 184 members, but it is larger than the G-7 (now the G- 
8).22 The organisation has no immediate plans to admit additional members, 
with the Secretary-General noting in April 2004, at the time of the European 
Union's enlargement, that the OECD was 'reviewing the prospects' for 
enlargement to 'take account of changing world conditions' (Johnston 2004). 
The geographical spread of its relatively diverse membership makes it more 
than a 'regional' group, such as the European Community or the Association of 
South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), but arguably less than an 'international'
20 The original 20 members were Canada, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, 
Austria, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, and the United States. Next came Japan (1964), Finland 
(1969), Australia (1971), and New Zealand (1973). After a 21-year hiatus came Mexico (1994), the 
Czech Republic (1995), Hungary (1996), Poland (1996), Korea (1996), and most recently, the Slovak 
Republic (2000).
Sullivan observes:
In purely economic terms, it represented a greater proportion of world wealth and 
productivity capacity in one co-ordinated economic body than had ever been seen, or 
is likely to be seen again. On the political side, it stood as a colossal, and colossally 
successful, challenge to Soviet and Chinese communism (1997: 33).
22 Figures for the IMF are from its 2003 annual report (2003: v); figures for the World Bank are 
from its annual report (2003:12). The G-7, formed in 1974, comprises the seven 'most powerful' 
industrial economies: the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, Britain and Canada. Russia 
was added in 1997, 'not by virtue of its relatively puny economy but for its continuing geostrategic 
clout' (Burrell 2001a: 24).
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group, although one New Zealand official claimed it was 'global, but not 
universal' (Interview, Paris, 17 February 1999).23
The organisation's size is considered to be an advantage, in that: 'it is just small 
enough to allow every member to take a full part' (Bayne 1987: 27).24 In 
addition, Aubrey contends, its 'compact grouping' of 'virtually all the countries 
that matter in world finance (as well as a few that do not)', gives it a 'special 
role' in international financial matters, especially when 'sensitive issues need to 
be discussed behind closed doors for the purposes of coordinated action' 
(1967: 41-42). That is, the OECD's smaller group -  and the mechanisms its uses 
to reach agreement -  allows issues to be raised and resolved that a larger group 
would find more difficult to tackle.25 Importantly, however, the OECD stresses
23 The official also noted that New Zealand did not find the OECD to be Eurocentric, 'despite 
geographical fact'.
24 While the OECD can be seen as a vehicle via which the larger member states disseminate their 
policies to other member countries, it is also a 'channel through which small countries and [those] 
larger countries ... not part of the G7 can make their interests and concerns known' (Ougaard 
1999:12). An Australian official argued that Australia's size did not affect its ability to take an 
active role in the organisation.
Australia is actively engaged in discussing reports that the OECD prepares, but it is 
also -  as you'd expect from an Australian perspective -  not too shy about telling 
others what it is doing and being fairly open about what the results have been, both 
good and bad. So it's an active participant and contributor (Interview, Paris,
19 February 1999).
25 This issue was touched on in the Introduction to the thesis. That an agreement is more likely to 
be reached in a smaller negotiating group may be one reason that the MAI was initiated in the 
OECD, rather than the World Trade Organisation. The latter has significant problems in getting its 
myriad members to agree. For example, in global trade talks in 1999, United States Trade 
Representative Charlene Barshefsky convened an invitation-only, closed-door session of 30 leading 
trading economies in a last-ditch attempt to secure agreement. The bid failed, with one report 
noting that the smaller session was the 'final straw for many poor countries'. See Pearson (1999: 4). 
However, the 'small group' resolution of issues within the OECD does not mean that all members 
think and act alike. Officials say that the OECD does not necessarily act as a bloc when issues are 
raised in other forums because members have different interests in other contexts (Interviews, 
Paris, 17 and 19 February 1999). For example, members' positions on trade diverge considerably; 
see the discussion in Henderson (1981: 800-802). In addition, 'members believe that acting together 
in the name of the OECD in dealing with developing countries could create a sense of "them and 
us" which could provoke resentment rather than cooperation' (Bayne 1987: 29-30). Camps argues 
that the advanced countries are not, and should not be seen as becoming, an 'economic unit', which 
means that acting as a bloc to secure maximum advantage for the OECD area alone would have 
'substantial costs both to national... and global efficiency' (1975: 24).
Within the OECD, while all the G-7 countries belong to the organisation, they are said not to act as 
a bloc because, again, many of their problems are different. One Secretariat official said that 
Europe not only had a different approach to social policy, it had problems with high 
unemployment, big budget deficits, monetary union, and ageing populations that other OECD 
member countries did not have (Interview, Paris, 19 February 1999).
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that it is not an 'exclusive' or 'closed club', but a 'club of like-minded countries', 
with membership 'limited only by a country's commitment to a market economy 
and a pluralistic democracy' (2001c).26 The latter restriction has been termed a 
relatively 'recent invention', given that Spain, Portugal, Turkey and Greece all 
have been members during periods of dictatorship (Huntley 1980: 285; The 
Economist 1990:17). Elsewhere, the OECD adds a 'respect for human rights' to 
the list of requirements (2001e).27 Whether or not the organisation should 
continue to expand its membership has been the subject of considerable 
discussion within the OECD. It says it has set up contacts with the 'rest of the 
world through dialogue with the countries of the former Soviet bloc, Asia and 
Latin America', and that these contacts may, 'in some cases', lead to membership 
(2001c, 2001 e).28 It also notes that, after more than 30 years, it is:'moving 
beyond a focus on its own countries and is setting its analytical sights on those 
countries -  today nearly the whole world -  that embrace the market economy' 
(2001d).29
The OECD has an annual budget of about $US200 million, which comes solely 
from its members, unlike the Bretton Woods institutions (the IMF and the World 
Bank), which have access to externally generated funds. The contribution of 
each member is calculated according to the 'weight' of its economy, which 
means that the two largest contributors are the United States and Japan (OECD
26 Note that the OECD now uses the term 'group', rather than 'club', to describe itself. See 
footnote 3.
27 Secretariat and delegate officials interviewed in Paris in February 1999 emphasised that 
membership required these three commonalities -  market economies, pluralistic democracies, and 
respect for human rights.
28 Presumably, some of the concerns regarding increasing the membership relate to the 
organisation's desire to maintain its status as a 'rich man's club' and its focus on topics most 
directly related to its members needs and interests. Expansion in the membership of some other 
international organisations has been accompanied by concerns about the effect on the focus of the 
different groups. For example, Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer has criticised the 
expansion of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), on the grounds that the 
inclusion of the poor and politically conservative states of Indo-China had weakened ASEAN and 
slowed its reform agenda (Baker 2001:8). In an important caution that some may argue applies 
equally to the OECD, Downer argued that ASEAN's expansion was undermining its effectiveness, 
and it was in danger of being marginalised unless it increased the pace of economic reform (Baker 
2001).
2<9 Note here that the OECD's 'nearly the whole world' means that it (generally) does not cover 
African countries, the Middle East, or India.
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2001c, 2004).30 Australian and New Zealand officials said that the United States 
and Japan each contributed 25 per cent of the OECD's budget, whereas 
Australia's share was 1.6 per cent and New Zealand's a mere 0.24 per cent 
(Interviews, Paris, 17 and 19 February 1999). As noted in the Introduction to this 
thesis, Sullivan observes that, in an 'era of universal belt-tightening and budget 
cutting', 'parliaments have grown stingy with their support to international 
organisations' (1997:105). Somewhat ironically, he notes that the OECD, 'which 
has for years been pushing governments to make painful structural adjustments, 
is now engaged in that very process', with the 1997 budget 3 per cent lower than 
that of 1996 (1997: 78). The actual budget cut was 10 per cent over three years 
(Bayne 1997: 370, fn 12; Bowley 1997: 4). Thus, like many of the government 
agencies within its member countries, the OECD has been asked to 'produce 
more with less', and has to justify its existence in an age of 'value for money' and 
non-duplication. More recently, Nicholas Bayne has expressed concern at the 
reluctance of governments to spend money on international organisations, 
noting that the OECD, like the other organisations which rely on members' 
contributions, is becoming 'severely squeezed' (2003: 232). He fears that, if this 
results in a decline in the quality of its work, its 'authority' will also decline 
(2003: 232). Despite the difference in the levels of contribution, the OECD 
functions on the principle of one member, one vote, unlike the IMF and the 
World Bank, which have weighted voting structures that reflect the size and 
financial contributions of their members.31
3(3 The OECD notes that, 'with the approval of the Council', members can also elect to supply 
additional funds to pay for specific programmes or projects (2004). One Australian official 
observed that members could act on their own or in a consortium to provide funding to promote 
work in particular areas, and could also act 'on the edges' to influence the work of particular 
committees by offering to fund an extra staff member (Interview, Paris, 19 February 1999). 
Supplying such funding to the OECD was seen as more effective than funding 'at home' because 
'the OECD is a better place to get information. If you want information on what other countries are 
doing as well, it is a devil of a job to try and get it from a national authority.' However, the 
consequences of such additional funding need further exploration. That is, if a state can use the 
OECD as a seemingly 'neutral' source of policy or ideas or, in a similar vein, as 'independent' 
support for what may be unpopular domestic policies, then the implications of a state supplying 
special funding for special projects that may then be cast as products of the OECD take on a 
political aspect that should not be overlooked. This is explored further in the section in this chapter 
discussing domestic leverage.
31 For a detailed discussion of voting structures in international economic organisations except the 
OECD, see Zamora (1980). An earlier iteration of the OECD's web site stressed that all members 
had an 'equal voice' in the organisation, 'irrespective of the size of their budget contribution' 
(OECD web site, 1998). This reiterates the point made earlier (footnote 24) that the size of the 
country is said not to matter to the OECD in terms of this 'equal voice'. On this point, Michael 
Henderson argues that, while the United States 'leads' within the OECD, 'it no longer controls',
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THE OECD: AIMS AND OBJECTIVES
Unlike the IMF and the World Bank, the OECD is 'not an operational agency 
charged with a specific task which is accomplishes with greater or lesser 
efficiency', and it does not provide loans to members or non-members 
(Henderson 1981:793; Ohlin 1968:242; Henderson 1993:19; Deacon 1997: 70). 
The OECD's mandate goes wider than that of either of these Bretton Woods 
institutions or the WTO, 'which treat more closely defined subjects for a larger 
membership' (Bayne 1997:362; Bayne 1987:27; Henderson 1993: 14). The 
organisation's aims, which are set out in Article 1 of its founding Convention, 
state that the OECD shall promote policies designed to:
• achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a 
rising standard of living in member countries, while maintaining financial 
stability, and thus to contribute to the development of the world economy32
• contribute to sound economic expansion in member as well as non-member 
countries in the process of economic development, and
• contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral, non- 
discriminatory basis in accordance with international obligations.
In specific recognition of the need to co-ordinate policies, Article 2 of the 
Convention says that, in pursuit of the organisation's aims, members agree 
to: 'pursue policies designed to achieve economic growth and internal and 
external financial stability and to avoid developments which might endanger 
their economies or those of other countries'. Thus, the OECD continues the 
OEEC task of harmonising domestic policies, or, as Sullivan contends, the OECD 
has the same principles as its predecessor, shares the same goals, and recognises 
the OEEC's founding principle that:'[members'] economic systems are 
interrelated and the prosperity of each of them depends on the prosperity of all' 
(1997: 32).
and American officials insist that the 'leadership is by default rather than design' (1981: 812). He 
notes that OECD personnel insist that there is 'a large gap between leadership and dominance' 
(1981:813). Earlier, Camps had argued against the OECD's membership equality principle on 
efficiency grounds. She claimed that, in order to 'avoid work being unduly slowed down or 
paralyzed by the desire of all countries to participate in everything', the smaller countries 'must 
accept' that it would 'frequently be desirable for the countries that have the major impact on the 
system as a whole to meet together by themselves' (1975: 42-44).
32 It is not clear here whether 'world economy' is meant literally or whether it is a shorthand term 
for 'capitalist economies'. Michael Henderson argues that, although the OECD constantly refers to 
the state of the 'world economy', it is actually alluding to the world market or capitalist economy 
(1981: 811).
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Over the years, the OECD has interpreted its brief broadly, and continues to 
expand into new areas. As noted above, the organisation is moving beyond its 
'borders' to examine other market economies, and it acknowledges that its scope 
is 'changing in other ways too' (2001d). In particular, it contends:
The matrix is moving from consideration of each policy area within 
each member country to analysis of how various policy areas interact 
with each other, across countries and even beyond the OECD area 
(2001 d).
One argument for this move is that globalisation has 'wrested control of much 
national policy away from national governments', with economic 
interdependence and global news media internationalising issues that were 
traditionally considered to be 'home matters' (Sullivan 1997: 92). However, 
Camps made this same point about the OECD's role in 1975, long before talk of 
'globalisation' began, when she argued that: 'there are no longer any well- 
defined and agreed lines to be drawn between policies of domestic concern and 
policies of broader common concern' (1975: 20-21, 25).
Some scholars of the OECD observe that an important point here is that the 
organisation's goal is not a common policy, but parallel action, 'or at least the 
coordination of national policies through cooperation in a consultative forum' 
(Aubrey 1967: 103; Camps 1975: 21; Henderson 1981: 793-794; Putnam and Bayne 
1987: 15, 263). That is, the OECD aims to reconcile members' policies: 'to render 
them consistent and compatible and where possible mutually reinforcing' 
(Bayne 1987: 27). This means working through differences in national objectives, 
economic structures, understandings of economic theory, institutions and 
political climate (Putnam and Bayne 1987: 15), and it is here that the OECD's 
function as a consultative forum is seen to come to the fore. The OECD contends 
that its most important role is to provide governments with a 'setting in which to 
discuss, develop and perfect economic and social policy' (2001c). Members 
share experiences and, aided by analysis supplied by the Secretariat, discuss the 
'whole range of economic and social policies, and not just the economy-wide or 
macroeconomic policies with which [the OECD] is often identified' (Henderson 
1993:14; Ohlin 1968: 242). Thus, the OECD is an agency where social and 
economic problems common to the industrial world can be identified and 
studied, and where a common approach is worked out between governments 
(Mayall 1988:62; Bakker 1996:114). The organisation, again emphasising its 
'international' dimension, contends that such co-ordination is necessary because,
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'increasingly in today's globalised world', domestic and international policies 
'must form a web of even practice across nations' (2001c). It argues that, while 
policy 'exchanges' may lead to formal agreements, more often they simply 
ensure 'better informed' public policy work within member governments and 
clarification of the impact of national policies on the international community 
(2001c). That there is a level of abstraction from the implications of the likely 
results of sharing ideas -  such as policy transfer, for example -  in this 
interpretation of the OECD's functions will be explored further below.
The OECD: Structure and Mechanisms
The OECD is based in Paris, where it has a Secretariat of about 2300 staff 
working directly or indirectly to support the activities of its committees (OECD 
2004). The Secretariat is divided into directorates that are roughly aligned with 
member country ministries and parallel the work of the OECD's technical 
committees.33 In total, there are about 200 committees, working groups and 
expert groups, and the OECD says that most of its work is done through these 
bodies, which 'bring together representatives of member countries, either from 
national administrations or from their permanent delegations to the OECD' 
(2001c). The 'over-riding' committee that has decision-making power is the 
Council, which comprises one representative from each member country and a 
representative of the European Commission. The Council meets once a year at 
ministerial level, when members' foreign, finance and 'other' ministers 'raise -  
and give public prominence to -  important issues and set priorities for OECD 
work over the coming year' (OECD 2001c). More regular meetings of the 
Council, which are held at the level of ambassadors to the OECD, are used to 
give 'general guidance' to the organisation and its work. The OECD points to 
this structure to support its claim that it does not act independently, or pursue 
its own agenda, but rather responds only to what its members request.34
33 Bob Deacon argues that the division into directorates means that it is 'not possible ... to ascribe a 
meta-policy on economic and social matters to the OECD' (1997:70). Rather, he claims, the 
powerful Economic Directorate sits at the top, and the less powerful Directorate of Education, 
Employment, Labour and Social Affairs 'pursues its own agenda' (1997: 70). In later chapters of 
my thesis, I will take issue with this claim, arguing that it is possible to find a 'meta-policy on 
economic and social matters' in the OECD, especially with the organisation's current emphasis on 
'batter[ing] down the walls between "economic" and "social" problems' (Sullivan 1997: 99), and 
that this meta-policy is based on neo-liberal thinking.
34 Former head of the OECD's Economics and Statistics Department David Henderson is adamant 
that although the OECD is referred to as a 'think-tank', it is 'not at all ... a research institute' 
(1993: 20). He explains:
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pilot for macroeconomic policy in all the developed countries', both now serve 
as 'intellectual crucibles in which policy is forged for the annual G-7 summit' 
(1997: 62; see also Bakker 1996: 117).38 The EDRC is responsible for the regular 
reviews of economic developments and performance in member countries, 
which are then published as country surveys. These reports will be discussed 
further below.
Like its predecessor, the OECD works by consensus decision-making, which 
means that all members are associated with a decision. Countries can abstain 
from a vote and each has the power of veto. However, as an Australian official 
notes: 'you can only use that option so many times if you are going to be a 
constructive part of the organisation' (Interview, Paris, 19 February 1999). A 
member who vetoes the proposals of others may have difficulty getting partners 
to follow its favoured ideas and, importantly, can use a veto only to prevent an 
outcome, rather than achieve what it wants (Bayne 1997: 371). The Council of 
the organisation makes formal decisions, which are binding on all members who 
do not abstain from voting on them. Other formal instruments at the Council's 
disposal 'differ markedly in terms of content and scope' and include non­
binding recommendations, agreements, declarations and arrangements 
(Ougaard 1999: 5; Siegel 1985: 202).39 Morton Ougaard notes that the extent of 
members' compliance with OECD instruments is not known, but he contends 
that it is unlikely that members would have continued and expanded the 
OECD's activities if the instruments were worthless, nor would they agree to 
decisions and recommendations if they had 'no intention at all' of complying 
with them, 'at least partially' (1999: 5).
Significantly, the OECD has no overt sanctions it can use against members to 
enforce its decisions and recommendations. It has 'no carrots and no sticks', but 
has to achieve its results by persuasion, that is, by convincing members 'to adapt
38 Age Bakker observes that smaller countries continue to attach importance to EPC meetings 
because they are 'excluded elsewhere' (1996:116).
39 Richard Siegel contends that the OECD makes 'sparing' use of the binding decision clause in its 
founding convention, although many of its officially non-binding formal instruments come to be 
recognised as customary international law (1985:202). Bakker notes that recommendations and 
declarations are not 'powerless' because 'they play an important educational role in public opinion 
and politics' (1996: 113). The importance of this ability to set such formal and informal institutions 
will be discussed in later chapters.
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their perceptions of their own self-interest' (Bayne 1987: 28).40 Two of its related 
procedures for persuasion are multilateral surveillance and peer review, in 
which member governments subject domestic policies to the scrutiny, criticism 
and commentary of fellow members of the organisation.41 The OECD claims 
that peer review is 'unique to the OECD', and says it is based on 'transparency, 
explanation, and, when needed, self-criticism by the countries examined' 
(2001 e). Elsewhere, it argues that multilateral surveillance: 'enablefs] divergent 
perceptions to be articulated, compared and reviewed, with a view to 
reconciling or at any rate clarifying differences' (1988d: 24). The aim of both 
mechanisms is to achieve greater international monetary and financial stability 
through economic policy co-operation aimed at bringing countries 'closer to an 
international policy mean' (Putnam and Bayne 1987:237). Faith in these 
methods to achieve this goal is strong, and both the OECD and the G-7 'clearly 
and explicitly have expressed political will to strengthen this pattern of co­
operation' (Ougaard 1999: 12).42 Multilateral surveillance and peer review, and 
the role of these mechanisms in the spread of policy ideas, will be discussed in 
more detail in a later section of this chapter.
OECD meetings are held 'behind closed doors'. This can lead to allegations of 
secrecy, but the OECD, its member countries, and some scholars see value for 
the members in the closed sessions, claiming that they allow free and frank 
discussion and a depth of criticism that members would not condone in public
4  ̂Bayne likens the OECD to the Delphic oracle:
It offers advice for the present and forecasts for the future. There is no compulsion 
on the members to follow the advice given. They do so because they realise the 
consequences of going against a body with such a solid reputation for accurate 
forecasts (1987: 28).
41 For the distinction between these mechanisms, see footnote 14.
42 The OECD has been working to strengthen multilateral surveillance for some time, a move that 
Ougaard attributes to the G-7's Houston summit in 1990, but which the OECD itself traces to a 1985 
G-10 report on improving the workings of the international monetary system (1999: 8; OECD 
1988d: 7). In a 1988 study, Why Economic Policies Change Course, the OECD argued that multilateral 
surveillance could only 'have teeth' if it was grounded in what governments could and would do 
to redirect policies (1988d: 3). It emphasised the importance of countries 'paying due attention to 
developments and policies abroad' and 'speeding-up the political recognition of the need (when it exists) 
for action', but argued that international peer pressure to achieve this was 'fully effective only if the 
peers share a broadly agreed view of the objectives to be pursued, and the way the system works' 
(1988d: 18, 22, 23; emphasis in original). On this point, it attributed many of the difficulties of the 
1981-85 period to 'differences in countries' ideas and views on economic policy' (1988d: 23; emphasis 
in original).
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forums.43 Aubrey, for example, argues that the 'closed-door character' of the 
OECD ensures the success of its 'process of confrontation' because criticisms are 
heard in private, 'without loss of face', and 'governmental positions can be 
modified to take account of political realities' (1967: 147). He claims that it is 
'less onerous' for members to submit to mutual scrutiny and 'perhaps to yield to 
"moral suasion'" in such closed forums because they are all subject to the same 
process. In a similar vein, Bayne notes that techniques of 'persuasion' are 
'naturally applied discreetly':
In public exchanges governments will dig their toes in to defend 
their chosen policies. In informal debate, out of the public eye, they 
will often be more flexible. This is one reason why the OECD 
deliberately keeps a rather low profile (1987: 28).
However, Bayne contends that, even behind closed doors, comments are 
tempered, with 'blunt criticism' avoided in favour of suggestions for 'shifts in 
the balance of policy and the moderation of extremes' (1987: 29).44 Only rarely is 
the secrecy of the meetings breached; Michael Henderson cites the example of a 
West German delegate in 1977 who 'broke with the convention of 
confidentiality' that characterised OECD activities to give a press conference 
dismissing the OECD's demands for Germany to take strong expansionary 
measures and act as a 'locomotive' for the other OECD economies (1981: 796; see 
also Sullivan 1997: 35).
THE OECD TODAY: ALL BARK AND NO BITE?
The picture of the OECD presented so far suggests that the organisation is 
somewhat benign; a toothless watchdog that provokes its members to action 
using a puppy's boundless energy and yelping rather than bared fangs. It exerts
43 The OECD claims that the 'absence of publicity' enhances the 'atmosphere of frankness' of its 
meetings (1964: 11). New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs Secretary Richard Nottage has 
defended closed-door negotiations on the basis that 'negotiating positions are compromised if they 
are widely known' (Nottage, cited in Kelsey 1999: 333). However, Jane Kelsey notes that the 
secrecy of the OECD's negotiations on the MAI fuelled opposition to the treaty (1999: 333). While 
New Zealand ministers and officials initially agreed on the need for confidentiality, as opposition 
to the agreement grew, 'officials began demanding greater openness from the OECD' (Kelsey 
1999: 333). The OECD eventually released the draft text of the MAI, ten months after it had been 
leaked and posted on the Internet.
44 In this, he echoes Michael Henderson, who argues that any attempt to influence another 
country's policies is 'always done in the most discreet manner' (1981: 794). Henderson quotes an 
official likening the exertion of influence in the OECD's Economic Policy Committee to 'the effect of 
water dripping on stone with a gentle persistence usually being expected to produce limited results 
over time' (1981: 794-795).
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this energy, 'hon[ing] its methodology', and extending its 'analytical grasp' and 
regular reports to cover 'one new area after another' (Sullivan 1997: 48). It then 
uses its accumulated evidence to shepherd, rather than bully, its members into 
taking the desired action. By such methods, the OECD is said to have become a 
'pillar' of the post-war international order, facilitating close and regular 
consultation between members and providing them with the necessary 
information and analysis to co-ordinate policy action (Maddison 1989:90). 
According to this view, the organisation has successfully 'prevented the 
emergence of beggar-your-neighbour policies, and helped preserve a positive 
momentum for the world economy' (Maddison 1989: 90; Bennett 1995: 258). 
Along the way, it has developed a reputation for compiling '[a]ccurate and 
objective data' and a wide range of statistical and technical assessments that 
member governments 'often regard ... as being more reliable than those they 
produce themselves' (Bayne 1987:28; see also Camps 1975:46, Huntley 
1980: 71).45 Sullivan goes so far as to claim that: 'First governments, then
Camps argues that, over the years, the OECD became an organisation that 'civil servants 
trusted, economists found useful as a source of reliable statistics, and most other people knew 
nothing about' (1975: 47); see also Huntley (1980:126). However, as noted above, the faith in the 
OECD's reliability is not universally shared. In an early assessment, D.J. Smyth and J.C.K. Ash 
observe that, judged by the forecasts published in the Economic Outlook, the OECD's forecasting 
performance is 'not very good' (1975: 362). In a similar early review, Michele Fratianni and John 
Pattison note that the OECD's published views on inflation are a 'curious mixture' of the views of 
delegates and 'a small group of OECD economists' that rarely blamed inflation directly on the 
governments that paid the OECD's bills (1976: 893). They conclude that:
where individual countries can influence the forecasts of an international 
organisation, as in the case of the OECD, any serious customer should question the 
value of the policy-making services (forecasts) he [sic] is purchasing (1976: 894).
More recently, J.C.K. Ash et al. argue that, while the OECD's short-term forecasts are 'generally 
useful', there is 'no evidence' that its longer-term 12-18 month forecasts are valuable. They note 
that the OECD undertakes 'little formal accuracy analysis' of its forecasting, leaving it to non- 
OECD economists to undertake rigorous analysis of the accuracy of the organisation's forecasts 
(1998:382).
In its own defence, the OECD does not claim to be perfect. It notes in Economic Outlook 26 (1979b) 
that it has learned from the experience of 1974-75 when the Secretariat, 'in common with other 
forecasters, markedly underestimated the severity of the recession' (1979b: 21). But it does 
periodically defend its forecast record, and claims a high level of accuracy for its predictions. In 
Economic Outlook 28 (1980b), for example, it uses its sub-section on 'Uncertainties and Risks', which 
is usually a descriptive account of factors that can affect the predicted outcome for both the OECD 
economy and its individual constituents, to give some background to its forecasts. It says the 
forecasts are a 'judgement of the most likely outcome among a range of possible ones' and are 
'inevitably subject to margins of error which cannot accurately be quantified in advance' 
(1980b: 21). Forecast errors derive mainly from either 'failure to identify, or estimate correctly, the 
major forces acting upon the economy' or 'failure to understand how economic agents will respond 
to these forces' (1980b: 21). Later, in Economic Outlook 44 (1988b), it notes that the buoyancy of 
activity since mid-1987 had been 'substantially underestimated' by most forecasters, but goes on to
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universities, NGOs, journalists and concerned citizens came to rely on OECD 
analysis and statistics as the most complete and accurate anywhere' (1997: 48).
According to this view, the OECD is merely an organisation comprising 
technocrats (or 'civil servants and experts') and numerous committees and 
working parties (Archer 1990: 40). The former supply data, statistics, and 'expert 
advice and consultation', and the latter 'constitute a network of international 
contacts between persons who speak the same technical language' (Smouts 
1993:450; Bakker 1996: 113). The OECD presents the role of the Secretariat in 
exactly these terms, saying:
Parts of the OECD Secretariat collect data, monitor trends, analyse 
and forecast economic developments, while others research social 
changes or evolving patterns in trade, environment, agriculture, 
technology, taxation and more (2001a).
It says the information and analysis provided by the Secretariat underpins 
members' discussions when they meet in OECD committees, and the work is 
done in close consultation with the policy-makers who will use it.46 That is, as
claim that: 'This kind of "policy misleading error" at the level of total OECD activity is a rare event' 
(1988b: 4).
The OECD expands this discussion in Economic Outlook 53 (1993a) in a separate 'special notes' 
chapter, 'How Accurate are Economic Outlook Projections?' (1993a: 49-54). It notes that it 
periodically reviews its forecasting record, and 'such a particular post-mortem may be particularly 
timely as a guide to economic policy makers because of concern about recent forecasting errors' 
(1993a: 49). (Of course, what the OECD does not highlight is that such 'post-mortems' also give the 
organisation a chance to justify itself to any members who might be concerned about how much 
value for money they get from the OECD.) The OECD notes in this section that any assessment of 
accuracy has to bear in mind that the projections are 'not purely model-based numbers'. 
Projections are both conditional, being based on assumptions concerning exogenous variables and 
the stance of member policies, and judgmental, 'drawing on the expertise and knowledge of the 
OECD Secretariat in respect of factors that are not reflected in pure model-based projections' 
(1993a: 49). (Again, this overlooks the point that such 'judgements' cannot be value-free. This will 
be explored further below and in later chapters.) The OECD claims that, apart from three periods 
(the first oil shock, the stock-market crisis, and the downturn of the early 1990s), its projections for 
output growth and inflation have been, on average, 'close to the actual outcomes', with the 
accuracy improving over time (1993a: 50-51). It then compares itself favourably to other 
international bodies, noting that for the recent period (1987-92), its projection record for output and 
inflation had been 'as good as and perhaps even slightly better than those made by the IMF or 
national authorities ...' (1993a: 53). However, it concedes that its projections are made later in the 
year than those of the IMF and most national agencies, meaning that its forecasters benefit from a 
'more up-to-date information set' (1993a: 53).
My aim is not to suggest that these functions are unimportant. One Australian official claims 
that Australia benefits from both the analysis and the meetings:
[The OECD] has a role that the Secretariat provides in terms of preparing analytical 
reports and looking at what countries are doing. Also, [it brings] together 
participants from different countries and different perspectives where they can
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noted above, the OECD claims that member governments dictate and drive its 
work; an assertion that some scholars accept. Huntley, for example, argues that 
initiatives for action 'must originate in the national capitals', while Ougaard 
emphasises that neither the Secretariat nor the committees 'develops policies 
independently and imposes them on members' (Huntley 1980:148; Ougaard 
1999:11). Rather, Ougaard contends, decisions are reached by consensus after a 
process of dialogue, with input from OECD departments, independent 
specialists and officials from members' ministries and departments.
Thus, the OECD has been described as a useful consultative agency that has 'no 
power but great influence', which it derives from 'an independent attitude and 
the quality of its analysis' (Sylvia Ostry, cited in Ougaard 1999:4; Bakker 
1996: 113). Bob Deacon, for example, contends that the organisation's influence 
is 'limited to sharing the experience of member states among others and, 
through its string-free technical assistance, encouraging societal learning of best 
practice' (1997:70). Others concur, claiming that the OECD derives the 
guidelines for 'best practice' from its continuous monitoring of national 
programmes, and it uses 'harmonisation' techniques, such as research, reviews, 
mutual cross-examinations, and discussions, to achieve policy congruence (Rose 
1993:9-10; Harrison and Mungall 1990:61-63). These techniques are based on 
common values and stress interdependence and the dangers of pursing 
divergent policies. Their use to exert influence 'explicitly avoids intruding on 
national sovereignty', which means they are 'undramatic' (Harrison and 
Mungall 1990: 62-63).47 As a result, the OECD's history is: 'marked by the 
absence of controversy about its operations, its legitimacy or its organisational 
aspirations' (Harrison and Mungall 1990: 63).
Others attribute this lack of controversy over the OECD's role to the 
organisation's weak political power, in that it has no links to special-interest 
constituencies, no parliamentary sounding board or direct line to influential
discuss their own issues and perspectives and dilemmas and in that sense, some 
countries probably benefit a lot from the reports they get from the OECD, but not so 
much in terms of active debates at the OECD. Australia probably goes pretty well on 
both counts (Interview, Paris, 19 February 1999).
47 R.J. Harrison and Stuart Mungall claim that organisations that use the harmonisation approach 
do not claim or seek supranational authority: 'They are servants rather than aspirant masters' 
(1990: 63).
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parliamentarians, and no supranational decision-making powers (Huntley 
1980: 68-69). In addition, while some argue that the major assets of the OECD 
include its 'broad portfolio of subjects' and 'in-house professional expertise 
[that] extends so widely' (Henderson 1993:34), others claim that one of the 
'major drawbacks of the OECD ... is that it concerns itself with all conceivable 
problems', which can result in a 'lack of cohesion' (van Meerhaeghe 1987: 204; 
Huntley 1980: 69). From this, M.A.G. van Meerhaeghe scathingly dismisses the 
OECD as being simply a 'huge publishing house', and concludes that the 
organisation 'demonstrates remarkable activity, but one searches in vain for 
concrete decisions' (1987: 204).48 Goran Ohlin, in an early analysis of the 
OECD's relationship with the Third World, concludes more gently that: 'as a 
"rich man's club" [the OECD] attracts suspicions of a power which it does not 
possess' (1968: 243).
Tlie point I want to emphasise about these assessments of the OECD is that they 
perceive the organisation to have no 'fangs'; that is, it is simply an organisation 
for data collection and analysis, with no mechanisms with which to force 
members to pursue its policy recommendations. Rather, members can discuss 
policy problems, gather information on possible solutions, and then choose to do 
what they want, with no further obligation to take OECD viewpoints into 
consideration. In the words of former OECD Secretary-General Jean-Claude 
Paye:
The secretariat is there to find and point out the way to go, to act as a 
catalyst. Its role is not academic; nor does it have the authority to 
impose its ideas. Its power lies in its capacity for intellectual 
persuasion! (Paye cited in Bakker 1996:114; punctuation as in 
original).
Bayne argues that this has implications for the OECD's impact on policy, making 
it more diffuse than the effects of the WTO, which can apply negotiating 
pressure, or the IMF, which has strong sponsorship from finance ministers. The 
result, he contends, is that: 'Governments mainly value it [the OECD] as a source 
of good ideas which they can later claim to have thought of themselves' 
(1997: 365; 2003: 239).
48 Sullivan notes that the OECD produces about 350 publications a year (1997: 98).
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An obvious critique here is that such statements ignore the influence of ideas; 
they assume that the OECD's ideas are neutral and value-free. The role of ideas 
will be explored in the next chapter. In the following sections of this chapter, I 
will argue that the OECD has both bark and bite, and that these factors are 
important to its role as an 'ideas monger'. That is, the OECD has independent 
authority as an international organisation based on its 'rational-legal authority' 
and control over technical expertise and information. Its methods to achieve 
consensus and compliance, peer pressure and multilateral surveillance, 
significantly enhance this authority. The result is that the OECD can act 
independently of the desires of its member governments, and can put forward 
its own set of ideas, using its 'harmonisation' techniques, which are more 
coercive than they first appear, to pressure members to comply. In the next 
section, I will explore my claim that the OECD has autonomy before examining 
the OECD's compliance measures.
THE OECD: MORE THAN THE SUM OF ITS PARTS
In the previous section, I noted claims that the OECD's members dictate and 
drive the organisation's work; that is, effectively, the OECD's functions are no 
more than the sum of the desires of its constituent members. However, this 
underplays the extent to which international organisations such as the OECD 
develop autonomy, becoming more than 'merely the tools ... of the national 
governments that fund and support them' (Deacon 1997:58, 59).49 In fact, 
international organisations have a separate existence to the polities that 
underpin them; they have 'independent lives of their own as policy making and 
agenda setting bodies' (Deacon 1997: 58). This claim can be supported in a 
number of ways. The autonomy of organisations may reflect that governments 
themselves have contributed to the independence and importance of 
international organisations by increasingly turning to them for 'answers to their 
social and economic problems' (de Senarclens 1993: 453). That is, governments 
have gone beyond treating international organisations simply as a means to 
achieve their ends internationally and now view them as an independent source 
of solutions to domestic policy problems. It may also reflect that bureaucracies, 
including those of international organisations, are claimed to act to preserve
49 There is an extensive literature on the role of international organisations, some of which agrees 
with the position to be outlined here and some of which argues that states are the only actors of 
note in the international system. For a discussion of this debate, which goes beyond the argument I 
want to make here, see Barnett and Finnemore (1999).
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their existence, such that the organisations remain, even after the original 
circumstances under which they were created no longer exist (Fratianni and 
Pattison: 891-892, 893; Bakker 1996: 2-3). Such claims are based on the argument 
that, once an organisation has been formed and has 'its own constitution, staff, 
rituals and rules', it tends to 'concentrate on organizational goals and to see as its 
main objective its own survival' (Smouts 1993: 450).50
However, there is another way of supporting the claim to the autonomy of 
international organisations that falls outside the explanations of state-granted 
authority or bureaucratic interest in self-preservation. Following Michael 
Barnett and Martha Finnemore, I want to argue that the way that international 
organisations are constituted (that is, how they are put together and the tasks 
they are ordered to perform) can also give the organisations (here, the OECD) 
autonomous power 'in ways unintended and unanticipated by states at their 
creation' (1999: 699-732). As noted earlier, the OECD's aims, as set out in its 
founding Convention, are to promote policies in member countries designed to 
achieve high economic growth and living standards, sound international 
economic development, and increased world trade. It aims to achieve these 
goals by co-ordinating members' policies so that actions in one country do not 
undermine actions in others, and it is to facilitate such co-ordination by 
independently gathering information on members' policies, organising meetings 
to ensure co-operation, and monitoring subsequent policy implementation.51 In 
other words, to achieve its tasks, the OECD has to exist separately to the 
bureaucracies of its members, and has to have the authority to obtain data, 
formulate recommendations, and apply pressure to ensure that members 
comply with the chosen policy direction. Thus, the very constitution of the 
OECD as a stand-alone body, combined with its mechanisms of multilateral
50 The organisation defends the 'status and acquired interests of civil servants and diplomats 
working in [its] ambit' (de Senarclens 1993: 460).
51 The OECD's major investigation of unemployment, the OECD Jobs Study (1994d), is one example 
of this function. The OECD collated the policies of its members, held meetings, wrote a report, and 
put forward a series of recommendations, which it has been urging its members to implement. For 
example, in Economic Outlook 61 (1997a), the OECD notes that it has monitored the implementation 
of the Jobs Strategy recommendations and has published its findings as Implementing the OECD Jobs 
Strategy: Lessons from Member Countries' Experience and Implementing the OECD Jobs Strategy: Member 
Countries' Experience (1997a: 12-13). It notes uneven progress across its members in the 
implementation of the strategy and encourages them to 'press on' with it, despite concerns in some 
countries about the strategy's effects on equality and social cohesion, because 'overall' the strategy 
is an effective response to labour market problems.
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surveillance and peer pressure, gives the organisation an independence at odds 
with claims that it acts only on its members' instructions.52
Barnett and Finnemore contend that international organisations become 
autonomous sites of authority through power flowing from at least two 
sources: I) the legitimacy of the rational-legal authority they embody; and 
II) control over technical expertise and information (1999: 707).
I) Autonomy Through Rational-Legal Authority
Barnett and Finnemore use Max Weber's study of bureaucratisation to build 
their argument for the 'rational-legal authority' of international organisations. 
Bureaucracies, they note: 'exemplify rationality and are technically superior to 
previous forms of rule because they bring precision, knowledge, and continuity 
to increasingly complex social tasks' (1999: 707). In addition, bureaucracies 
embody a 'rational-legal authority' that modernity views as 'legitimate and 
good' because it is 'invested in legalities, procedures, and rules and thus 
rendered impersonal', and it deploys 'socially recognized relevant knowledge' 
to set rules on how goals are to be achieved (1999: 707).
The 'rational-legal authority' of international organisations discussed here may 
suggest that the machinery of norms and rules constrains international 
organisations, making them passive mechanisms for states to use in pursuit of 
their goals, rather than actors with independent cultures and agendas for action. 
However, this overlooks the fact that international organisations are involved in 
formulating and transmitting these very norms and rules. While international 
organisations play a role in defending the dominant structures of the 
international order as their member states desire, they also play an autonomous 
role in its evolution through the production and dissemination of the norms,
52 In reiterating this claim that the OECD follows the 'general guidance' and 'priorities' set by its 
members (2001c), I am not arguing that the OECD pursues only an internal, rather than an 
international, agenda. The organisation's aims clearly specify that its focus include the international 
economy. Instead, I am taking issue with the notion that the OECD's agenda and views only 
reflect those of its members and not its own, independent stance. Here, I note Huntley's 
observation: 'The attitude of the OECD is not simply the sum of each member's conception of its 
national interests; in a very real sense, it has been from the first international in character' (1980: 68; 
emphasis added). By which I take him to mean that the OECD has an independent, 'international' 
view that stands separate to both the individual and the aggregated views of its members.
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values, knowledge, ideas and interests needed for its development (de 
Senarclens 1993:461; Camilleri and Falk 1992:94). The ability of international 
organisations to build and publicise support for their norms and rules adds to 
their influence because, as Pierre de Senarclens argues (and as will be explored 
further below):
the political authority necessary for the exercise of power lies in the 
mobilization of a collective imagination shaped by myths, symbols 
and values, and ... [international organisations] provide the kind of 
political rallying-point from which this mobilization can be 
proclaimed (1993: 460).
Thus, the rational-legal authority of international organisations may be more 
enabling than constraining because it gives them significant abilities to shape the 
way in which policy problems and solutions are understood. This capacity for 
international organisations such as the OECD to stimulate policy discussions 
and, importantly, to set the terms of the discourse and the parameters of what 
may be considered in the discussions, has implications for the formulation and 
shaping of policy that are rarely teased out. Such implications are a central 
concern of this thesis.
The result of the rational-legal authority of international organisations is that, 
over the years since their inception, major international institutions, such as the 
IMF, World Bank, and the OECD, have come to be accorded an 'authoritative 
status within the world economy comparable in some respects to that enjoyed by 
the state vis-ä-vis the national economy' (Camilleri and Falk 1992: 95-96). This 
status arises from their 'global reach, organizational strength, professional 
expertise, and close connections with core governments and private banks and 
corporations' (Camilleri and Falk 1992: 95). However, it also can be linked to 
their construction of an intellectual framework for their approach, along the 
lines of that described above (setting the norms and rules), which has given 
them an 'intrinsic legitimacy as voices of economic orthodoxy' (Kelsey 
1999: 57, 68). Such legitimacy is enhanced because their statements converge to 
form a coherent economic policy agenda, a result that Jane Kelsey attributes to 
the same governments playing key roles in each of the institutions (1999: 68).
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II) AUTONOMY THROUGH CONTROL OVER TECHNICAL EXPERTISE AND 
I n f o r m a t io n
Barnett and Finnemore argue that the second basis for the autonomy and 
authority of international organisations is 'control over information and 
expertise', in which an international organisation has 'specialized technical 
knowledge, training, and experience that is not immediately available to other 
actors' (1999: 708). Such control, they contend, 'invites and at times requires 
bureaucracies to shape policy, not just implement it' (1999: 708). This argument 
centres on the notion that, in a world in which inter-governmental organisations 
play a part in regulating international politics, 'scientific and other knowledge as 
well as moral authority have become significant sources of power' (Risse 
1999:5). International organisations, which provide such knowledge and 
information, can 'control the levers of such power' through what they choose to 
cover in their analysis and briefings to members, and the way in which they 
prepare and draft policy proposals (Risse 1999: 5; jonsson 1993: 471).53 The 
result is that international organisations can have an 'often-decisive influence on 
international politics' in that they can encourage access to certain data, facilitate 
or impede communications between negotiators, which advantages or 
disadvantages different delegations, and assist in arbitration (de Senarclens 
1993:461).54 De Senarclens argues that, while this role may appear to be 
'technical', it is 'eminently political' because it can 'bolster legitimization 
processes', 'resolve or maintain conflicts of interest', and 'distribute goods and 
values' (1993: 461).
Of course, one obvious criticism with respect to this concerning the influence of 
the OECD is that the organisation cannot claim to have a monopoly over policy 
expertise or the type of information it provides to its members. As The Economist 
observes, much of the OECD's work is duplicated by other organisations, such 
as the IMF, and, whereas it once 'cornered the market' in macroeconomic 
forecasting, 'fn]owadays a host of private-sector firms produce commentary on
33 Note the contrast here between this view and that of Henderson at footnote 34.
54 pierre Qe Senarclens offers the example of the GATT Secretariat, which he argues played a 'not 
inconsiderable role' in the Uruguay Round of the trade talks, producing studies and putting 
forward compromise proposals whenever governments appeared incapable of reaching agreement 
(1993: 461). Of course, this role is not universally accepted or popular. We should recall here my 
observation in footnote 6 in the Introduction to this thesis that the role of the WTO Secretariat in the 
failed talks in Seattle raised the ire of developing countries.
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individual economies, along with equally inaccurate economic forecasts' 
(1994: 17). Such criticism implies that the OECD, being smaller than some of the 
other international organisations providing similar expertise and information, 
may have little of the aforementioned control and, consequently, little influence 
on international politics. However, the OECD has several advantages over other 
international organisations, including the breadth of its expertise and 
information, its smaller size, and its more 'significant' membership.55 The 
OECD can claim to be more broadly focused and cross-disciplinary than other 
international organisations, which may make its expertise more appealing in 
that it can be seen to incorporate a broader range of issues. In addition, its 
smaller membership, confined as it is to the economically developed, 
industrialised, 'richest' countries, may add weight to its views in that its 
members are those who play a significant role in the world economy. In terms 
of competition from the private sector, the OECD can use its international 
membership and rational-legal authority to claim a level of legitimacy for its 
advice that private firms cannot claim.
The argument for autonomy through control of expertise directly contradicts 
claims, noted above, that the OECD is simply an organisation of technocrats, 
supplying data, statistics, and 'string-free' technical advice. Such assertions are 
encapsulated in the comments of former OECD department chief David 
Henderson, who claims that the OECD Secretariat's role in the organisation's 
inter-governmental meetings is to provide: 'the menu, in the form of documents 
[which] contain facts and figures, analysis and commentary, and sometimes 
suggestions for action' (1993: 20).56 He contends that these documents are
55 Bayne observes that the OECD, the IMF and the World Bank, 'are all very well-endowed with 
staff in relation to their membership, so that their staffs can take on ambitious tasks' (2003: 237). 
The OECD's staff numbers will be discussed further below.
Henderson appears confused on a number of points in his article. He argues vehemently that it 
was 'for member governments ... to decide what the department should be working on', and 
comments that his 'formula' when working for the OECD was, 'We are paid to do what 
governments want us to do. We are not paid to say what governments want us to say' (1993: 20, 
23). However, he then claims that for the Secretariat to be fully effective, 'it has to go beyond 
simply responding to what governments ask of it: it has to exercise imagination and 
resourcefulness' (1993: 24). Henderson fails to acknowledge that a Secretariat 'alert to new 
developments, new issues, and new possibilities' and ready to deal with them, has considerable 
scope to set the agenda, selecting which of these new areas to put before member governments and 
which to ignore. In another statement at odds with his claim to be following members' orders, he 
argues that 'member governments are not the only clients to be served' because the OECD also 
provides services to 'a wider public' and has a 'duty to do what it can to ensure that public opinion 
is well informed about issues and events' (1993: 23). In making this claim, he overlooks that the
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prepared 'from an independent transnational point of view', which the 
Secretariat is able to provide because:
its dense network of contacts with officials in virtually all branches of 
government in its member countries [means] it can offer an extra 
dimension of analysis, a perspective of its own on national and world 
events (1993: 20, 21).
From this, Henderson concludes that the OECD 'can have influence, on 
governments and a wider public opinion, if the work of the organisation is 
professionally competent, objective and timely' (1993: 21; emphasis added). That is, 
member governments, and the public, pay heed to the OECD's advice because 
the organisation's staff are professionals who offer objective analysis from an 
independent, transnational perspective.57
Clearly, Henderson's claim here is that the OECD's 'independent' stance is 
politically neutral ('objective') because it is put together by professionals using 
technical data. The underlying assumption is that the OECD is above partisan 
politics and, 'by reason of [its] technical expertise', is able to decide, and 
recommend to its members, the 'only possible policies' (Cassen 2001). However, 
such claims to neutrality are flawed in two important respects. First, the 
information that the OECD Secretariat puts before its members cannot always be 
'objective' in terms of being impartial between policy positions. This is not to 
argue that it never objective; rather, it cannot be assumed that it is always 
objective. As noted above, what the Secretariat chooses to cover in analyses and 
briefings to members, and the way it prepares and drafts policy proposals and 
recommendations, must reflect the Secretariat's particular perspective. This has 
a number of implications for the OECD's internal decision-making processes. 
Richard Siegel argues that, once an international organisation's staff or 
committees takes a position, a process of advocacy begins in which proposals 
are: 'appropriately packaged and "sold" to other staff units, the major policy­
makers in the Secretariat ... and, most crucially, the representatives of the 
member states' (1985:194). Such a process suggests that, contrary to
governments of member states, elected by their populations, could make a similar, and perhaps 
more legitimate, claim to this purpose.
57 The Economist, too, makes this argument, noting that, 'The secretariat tries to influence the way 
governments view the world by analysing problems from more than a purely national point of 
view' (1990: 66). The underlying assumption of the argument is that the OECD's viewpoint is 
somehow more worthy of note than that of an individual state because it is 'international' rather 
than domestic.
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Henderson's claims, OECD staff are not neutral between policy options, which 
means that national delegates in policy negotiations find themselves under 
pressure both from other delegates and organisation staff. One result is that 
Henderson's 'influence' on governments and the public comes from people 
whose policy positions are not directly democratically accountable. This point 
will be discussed further below.
A second flaw in the neutrality argument is that statistics and analyses are not 
simply 'technical' and 'objective'; much depends on what is being measured, 
how, and in what context. For example, Lovell et al. note in their assessment of 
the macroeconomic performance of OECD countries that, European members 
perform less well, given a particular set of indicators for 'performance'; in this 
case, a high level of GDP per capita, low rates of inflation and unemployment, a 
favourable trade balance, and the environmental factors of carbon and nitrogen 
emissions (1995: 316). However, they add that countries that prioritise objectives 
other than those specified in their model, such as the pursuit of an equitable 
income distribution, are penalised by the omission of such objectives 
(1995: 316).58
One example of the significance of the OECD's choice of measures occurs when 
the organisation's statistical information about economic and social conditions is 
used to construct league tables that rank countries high or low on various 
indicators, such as economic growth, tax, and social spending (Rose 1993: 69).
Other scholars approach this same point (that statistics are not necessarily 'technical' and 
'neutral') from a different angle, arguing that statistics render a population governable by 
quantifying what is to be ruled. James Scott claims that statistics are invaluable to a modern state, 
which makes use of such numbers to make its society legible to policy-makers. That is, the modern 
state uses statistics to 'create a terrain and population with precisely those standardised 
characteristics that will be easiest to monitor, count, assess and manage' (Scott 1998: 81-82). Scott 
observes that such techniques increase the effectiveness of state intervention, 'whether the purpose 
of that intervention is plunder or public welfare' (1998: 78). In a similar vein, Nikolas Rose argues 
that:
numbers do not merely inscribe a pre-existing reality. They constitute it. Techniques 
of inscription and accumulation of facts about 'the population', 'the national 
economy', 'poverty' render visible a domain with a certain internal homogeneity and 
external boundaries. ... Numbers here help to delineate 'irreal spaces' for the 
operation of government, and to mark them out by a grid of norms allowing 
evaluation and judgement' (1999: 212).
Rose specifically notes the 'activities of the OECD', alongside 'such innovations as national income 
accounting', as making up a 'national economy' as a domain that could be 'measured, calculated, 
compared, assessed over time, [and] acted upon in the name of its optimization' (1999: 213).
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Richard Rose correctly observes that pressure groups in countries that rank low 
in these tables 'can use the data to stimulate dissatisfaction and demands for 
action' (1993: 69; see also Martin and Simmons 1998: 756). However, he does not 
take this argument far enough: a government (or opposition party, depending 
on the table's contents) can use the 'technical' data as evidence to support either 
current policy programmes or reform agendas, even though the measures may 
not accurately portray the situation in each country. Sydney Morning Herald 
economics editor Ross Gittens makes this point succinctly when he warns 
readers to be wary of 'propaganda' that claims that Australia's top tax rates are 
higher than countries that have top rates of only 35-40 per cent (2001a: 48). He 
points out that, in the United States, for example, many of the individual states 
have an income tax that is applied on top of the federal tax, and many countries 
have compulsory social security contributions, which are, in effect, another tax. 
Thus, tax rates in these countries are not necessarily lower than tax rates in 
Australia. The disparity in the figures arises from differences in what is being 
counted under the rubric of 'tax'.
As outlined, the rational-legal authority that international organisations can 
claim combines with their control over technical expertise and information to 
give them autonomy and to make them independent sites of authority, standing 
outside the states that created them. Thus, for example, the OECD has a 'public 
image ... of an ' independent and authoritative economic agency' (Kelsey 1999: 69; 
emphasis added), rather than a collective of member states, that offers 
commentary and advice that governments are expected to heed.59 However, 
these sources of authority have another important effect, as Barnett and 
Finnemore note:
The irony in both of these features of authority is that they make 
bureaucracies powerful precisely by creating the appearance of 
depoliticization. The power of [international organisations] and 
bureaucracies generally, is that they present themselves as 
impersonal, technocratic, and neutral -  as not exercising power but
59 Examples of this are legion and are obvious in media coverage of the OECD's various reports, 
which tends to highlight the score-card aspect of the OECD's verdicts on a country's performance; 
governments are expected to act to improve a country's score. See, for example, the headlines in the 
Australian media on the release of Economic Outlook 74. These focus on the prescriptive orders of 
the OECD: 'OECD urges: pull in the reins', 'OECD warning: rates must rise'. See Gordon (2003), 
Marris (2003) and Murphy (2003b).
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instead as serving others; the presentation and acceptance of these 
claims is critical to their legitimacy and authority (1999: 708).
In this view, international organisations can exert political influence 'by virtue of 
their abstract, unequivocal scientific and cultural knowledge, on which 
governments wish to draw' (de Senarclens 1993:460). The result is that 
international organisations are 'more than the reflection of state preferences' and 
do much more than facilitate co-operation that helps states to overcome market 
failures and problems of collective action and interdependence (Barnett and 
Finnemore 1999: 700). They also 'constitute and construct the social world' 
through their ability to classify and organise information and knowledge, fix 
meanings and diffuse norms (Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 700, 710-715; see also 
de Senarclens, 1993: 461). This ability is a key element of my thesis and will be 
explored further below and in later chapters.
THE OECD: KEEPING ITS MEMBERS IN STEP
The discussion in the previous section canvassed the arguments underpinning 
my claim that the OECD is not simply a toothless watchdog following the joint 
orders of its 30 owners and barking only on command. The organisation does 
more than watch over members' policies, analyse the information it gathers and 
offer suggestions for policy action that members can choose to consider or 
ignore. It also has a distinct 'voice' or 'bark', which it uses autonomously from 
its members in discussions on policy problems and solutions to argue in support 
of its proposals. This 'bark' is considered to be both legitimate and authoritative 
because it arises out of the OECD's rational-legal authority, which is constituted 
in impersonal rules and procedures, and its technical expertise, which is 
constituted in an impersonal, non-partisan, professional, 'international' 
interpretation of facts and figures. I now want to take this claim further and 
argue that the OECD watchdog also has 'bite', in the form of the mechanisms of 
peer pressure and multilateral surveillance, which it uses to secure policy 
conformity among its members. Importantly, these are also techniques by which 
policy ideas can be disseminated and enforced, as will be elaborated below, 
which is why it is important to know the content of the OECD's policy ideas. 
However, before moving to this discussion, I want to explore in more detail the 
function of peer pressure and multilateral surveillance in the OECD.60
As noted above, see footnote 14 for clarification of the distinction between these two 
mechanisms.
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Earlier, I noted that the OECD works by consensus and has no overt means, such 
as penalties, by which it can compel members to comply with its policy 
instruments (decisions, recommendations, agreements and so on). The OECD 
itself observes that it is: 'not a regulatory body but rather a forum for the 
exchange of informed views on policy questions' (1964: 6). Some scholars accept 
this claim at face value. Rose, for example, echoes Bayne's observation that the 
OECD has 'no carrots and no sticks', when he argues that the OECD has 'neither 
incentives nor sanctions' to make a country change its policy and that the 'push 
to change must come from national governments' (1993: 69; Bayne 1987: 28). 
According to this view, and as noted above, change occurs through 'persuasion', 
with members reaching a consensus to act after discussing the issues in various 
committees. However, this view pays insufficient attention to the ability of the 
mechanisms of multilateral surveillance and peer pressure to compel national 
delegates towards a policy consensus.
This is not to argue that the role of these methods in achieving consensus among 
members is unrecognised by the organisation itself. In fact, the OECD 
appreciates that these processes are central to its ability to achieve its tasks. 
Here, we need to recall that 'beggar-my-neighbour' policies were seen as 
responsible for conflict in the Western political economy and that one of the 
main aims of the OECD is to ensure that such conflict-provoking policies do not 
occur again. Thus, it seeks among its members mutual enlightenment, 
reinforcement, adjustment and concession in order to avoid such conflict 
(Putnam and Bayne 1987: 260). An OECD paper on peer review notes that peer 
pressure is a form of 'soft persuasion' that has the 'ultimate goal of helping the 
reviewed State improve its policy making, adopt best practices, and comply with 
established standards and principles' (Pagani 2002: 6, 4). The metaphor used 
within the OECD is keeping its interdependent members 'in step'; that is, it aims 
to achieve policy co-operation and conformity among its members in order to 
avoid the 'dangers of being out of step' (1988d, ch. 5).61
61 The OECD is not alone in using the 'in step' metaphor. Aubrey, for example, cites US Assistant 
Secretary of State for European Affairs William Tyler, who, when discussing the OECD in 1964, 
said that co-operation in the OECD did not mean 'uniform national policies'; rather, the 'primary 
aim of policy coordination in the OECD is to ensure that national policies develop in step with each 
other' (1967: 103-104).
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Multilateral surveillance and peer pressure, or what the OECD once called 'the 
confrontation method', are the mechanisms by which conformity can be 
achieved (OECD 1964: 6). Sullivan explains that:
in the 'complex process called "peer pressure" ... [sjubtly but 
powerfully, ideas and standards advocated by a majority of 
committee members gain the agreement of all or nearly all and are 
shaped to account for the views of dissenters. ... Ultimately peer 
pressure makes international co-operation among 29 countries 
possible (1997: 99).
In a similar vein, Bayne, who claims that the OECD has 'no sticks', notes that 
policy comparison and mutual criticism 'is a subtle discipline' that can be 
'quietly effective' in that '[governments can be induced to adapt their policies in 
practice, when they would never accept a formal obligation to do so' (1987: 28; 
see also Bakker 1996:114; OECD 1964:8). Multilateral surveillance, too, is 
perceived to have considerable influence on members and their policies, with 
Putnam and Bayne describing it as the 'most portentous development' of the 
original G-5 summits. They cite an American advocate arguing that multilateral 
surveillance is: 'the one means by which we can keep our economies from again 
moving off in radically different directions' (1987: 182). Later, they note that 
surveillance was seen as a way to 'oblige members, through "peer group 
pressure", to accept more international discipline in preparing economic 
policies' (1987:216).62 The OECD itself notes the success of these 
methods: 'Mutual examination by governments, multilateral surveillance and 
peer pressure to conform or reform are at the heart of OECD effectiveness' 
(2004).
These observations highlight an aspect of the two conformity mechanisms that is 
often neglected: the reason that they are successful at reaching consensus is 
because they are inherently coercive. Peer pressure and multilateral surveillance 
have tangible effects on a country's policy choices, 'with political pressure 
exerted on unwilling countries to make them toe the line' (Bakker 1996: 6; emphasis 
added).63 Consensus arises from countries being monitored and pressured by
62 Putnam and Bayne note that, at meetings of G-5 finance ministers in 1983-84, 'French and 
American fiscal laxity were alike sharply criticized, as multilateral surveillance was used to induce 
"deviant" governments back towards the international policy median' (1987: 177).
63 The result of these mechanisms, then, is that countries may be forced to implement policies that, 
left to their own devices, they would not have chosen to pursue. Importantly, Bakker notes that 
although the OECD has sought more contact with the Dynamic Asian Economies and some Latin
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their counterparts and by the OECD Secretariat to change their policies. Such 
pressure can be seen in a positive light: Aubrey, for example, argues that 
reluctant governments do not find it easy to 'hold out against a thoroughly 
documented and well-reasoned case' (1967: 28).64 Fabrizio Pagani's OECD 
paper concludes that peer pressure and peer review: 'can create a catalyst for 
performance enhancement which can be far-reaching and open-ended' 
(2002: 13). However, such pressure can also be negative if it is based less on a 
well-argued case and more on the need to conform simply to keep in step with 
one's peers, and the distinction between the two is not always clear. Countries 
may find it difficult to resist such pressure, especially when, as Sullivan 
observes: 'No country likes to feel itself on an entirely different wave-length 
from all its partners' (1997: 99; see also Putnam and Bayne 1987: 262). In an early 
discussion of its work, the OECD itself noted that: 'countries finding themselves 
alone against practically all the others are subject to strong moral pressure 
stemming from the universal acceptance of the need for flexibility and 
adaptation in economic policy-making' (1964: 8). Forty years later, the danger to 
a country of obtaining a reputation for being inflexible and unwilling to adapt, 
which may have negative consequences for investment, remains a powerful 
motivation for a country to conform.
The difficulty of assessing the impact of the OECD's 'teeth' with regard to these 
measures, that is, how much 'bite' the OECD actually applies, is that the 
discussions in which both of these conformity-inducing tools are applied occur 
'behind closed doors'. While, as noted earlier in the chapter, closed-door 
discussions are considered to be positive because they allow governments to be 
more 'flexible' in their positions, such an argument overlooks the potential 
negative implications of governments being subjected to covert pressure to 
conform. It overlooks both accountability and the importance of openness to 
decision-making, as former World Bank chief economist Joseph Stiglitz 
highlights in an oft-cited article in which he castigates the IMF for 'secrecy'. He 
pithily observes: 'Smart people are more likely to do stupid things when they 
close themselves off from outside criticism and advice' (2000: 60; for citations of
American countries since the late 1980s, some of these countries 'are still hesitant to get too 
involved in OECD work because they fear the obligations which might result from peer pressure in the 
OECD' (1996:121; emphasis added).
/ TA
° Aubrey is citing Lincoln Gordon 1956, 'The Organization for European Economic Cooperation', 
International Organization, February: 7.
58 The OECD
this article, see Forbes 2000, Hewett 2000, Powell 2000).65 The argument for 
secrecy also neglects the fact that closed-door discussions limit the amount of 
information that citizens have about what their governments are doing, or 
conceding, on their behalf, effectively creating a 'democratic deficit' or, rather, 
an 'accountability' deficit in 'global economic governance' (Risse 1999: 12; see 
also Stiglitz 2000; Jonsson 1993: 471 ).66 On some accounts, this is a necessary 
evil. Scholars have long recognised that governments involved in international 
bodies have to play what is known as a two-level game: negotiating at one table 
with their own citizens and at another table with their fellow international 
players (Putnam 1988; Putnam and Bayne 1987: 10).67 When the matter being 
negotiated is controversial, such as trade issues or the MAI, adverse publicity 
may increase the politicisation of the issue and limit the leeway that policy­
makers have at the international negotiating table (Risse 1999:11). However, the 
OECD's 'deliberately low profile' (Bayne 1987: 28) does not fulfil the demands 
for transparency and accountability that are an integral part of the organisation's 
mantra of good public management within its member governments.68 The
65 Stiglitz argues that 'openness is most essential in those realms where expertise seems to matter 
most', and continues his attack on the IMF and the United States Treasury with the claim that the 
'folly' of these bodies in their dealings with Asia and Russia might have been 'much clearer, much 
earlier' had they invited greater scrutiny (2000-. 60).
66 The 'democratic deficit' applies as much to non-member countries as it does to the citizens of 
OECD members. The OECD's founding Convention makes it clear that the organisation's interests 
are international in terms of contributing both to the development of the world economy and sound 
economic expansion in member and non-member countries, and the organisation openly 
acknowledges that it has increased its focus on the world outside its membership (see the OECD 
web site and the growing number of OECD reports on non-member countries). However, the 
OECD is an 'an "off-camera" forum' (Huntley 1980: 68), which means that most countries in the 
global economy have no official part in negotiating the 'global' policy that the organisation is 
setting and promoting. For example, although non-member countries were expected to sign up to 
the MAI, the deal itself was to be negotiated only by OECD members, with only a few non-member 
countries granted observer status; see Kelsey (1999: 315-352). The international 'democratic deficit' 
is important given Huntley's claim that the OECD is a mechanism 'serving the interests of the 
advanced nations' (1980: 73).
67 Today, a complicating factor is that a government now has to play on three levels: at the 
domestic table, the inter-governmental table, and the multinational corporation table; see Smouts 
(1993:449).
68 On this point, Bayne, who claims that the OECD 'seems very accountable' because it is 
'consensus-based and its member governments must answer to their electorates' and 'very 
transparent, as it publishes a huge amount', notes that this accountability and transparency is in 
output, rather than input (2003: 239; emphasis in original). He observes:
Since the OECD produces voluntary cooperation rather than formal agreements, very 
little of its work actually has to go to parliaments. Hardly anyone gets into the 
meetings where deals are struck except government officials (or sometimes 
ministers) and OECD staff (2003: 239).
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secrecy may also allow the OECD to apply more 'bite' than citizens of its 
member states would find comfortable, especially given the weight that OECD 
views may then be given in domestic policy discussions. This will be explored 
further below.
Of course, given the differences in size and economic 'clout' between OECD 
members, it would be foolish to assume that the coercive aspects of peer 
pressure and multilateral surveillance apply equally to all members. However, 
the general point stands for the organisation's small and medium-sized 
countries, which may be particularly affected by confrontation both in the policy 
discussions at the OECD and in the preparation of reports such as those of the 
Economic Development and Review Committee. These reports, published as 
'Economic Surveys', are prime examples of the peer review and multilateral 
surveillance functions of the OECD. They contain assessments of a country's 
current economic situation and existing policies as well as forecasts and policy 
recommendations, which the OECD then urges the country to implement. The 
way that these reports are used, both internationally and domestically, 
undermines the claim that the OECD has no ability to enforce its policy 
decisions, in that the reports are seen as 'report cards' or 'score cards' of a 
country's performance and are publicised as such in the media.6̂  
Internationally, in a world in which mobile capital judges countries according to 
their 'competitiveness', a negative OECD report may have significant
This view neglects a number of important issues, not least of which is Bayne's own observation, 
noted in the Introduction of this thesis, about the independence and influence on governments of 
organisations such as the OECD (2003: 230).
69 For Australian and New Zealand examples, see Macdonald (2003), Murphy (2003a, 2003b), 
Wade (2003), O'Loughlin (2002), Australian Financial Review editorial (2001), Gittens (2001b), 
O'Loughlin and Wade (2001), Wright and AAP (2001), NZPA (2000), Reuters and NZPA (2000), 
Smellie (2000), Henderson (1999a, 1999b), Wade (1999a, 1999b). Many of the OECD's other 
publications, which rank members countries in areas such as taxation or education, also function as 
report cards. For example, a taxation report in October 2003 ranks Australia as the sixth-lowest 
taxed OECD nation, a fact that Treasurer Peter Costello highlights, see Fabro (2003: 5). In a similar 
vein, an OECD education report in November 2002 was reported under the headline, 'Plaudits for 
our teachers' (Cervini 2002:11), and its Employment Outlook in July 2002 was reported under the 
headline, 'OECD bestows seal of approval' (Mitchell 2002). The latter article noted the OECD's 
attribution of Australia's success in reducing unemployment to the Howard Government's 
implementation of reforms along the lines of those suggested in the OECD's jobs Strategy.
It is worth noting here David Dolowitz's comment, in a discussion of policy transfer, that:
an individual or country might be placed under pressure to engage in policy transfer 
by the perception of being a laggard in the international arena—particularly when they 
are placed poorly in OECD reports or other international benchmarking exercises 
(2003:103, emphasis added).
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consequences.70 Domestically, depending on what the report says, the 
government, opposition parties and interest groups can use its contents to 
support their claims for particular policies.
One controversial aspect of these 'report cards' that raises questions as to 
whether they reflect the authority of the OECD itself or that of its member 
governments centres on whether the country reviews are written by the OECD 
or by national officials. This question appears to return to the dichotomy 
between the OECD as a toothless watchdog and the OECD as a watchdog with 
fangs. The OECD claims that the reports are written within the organisation and 
that they are outspoken to the point of creating problems with members (see 
OECD 1964: 12-16, and Pagani 2002: 22-24, for details of the process).71 Sullivan 
offers the example of the German government, which 'once issued an instant 
and furious press release to refute OECD arguments', and notes that other 
members have 'held up publications of their Economic Surveys for months' 
trying to get a different tone or prescription -  'only sometimes successfully' 
(1997: 49). One Australian official said the reports could be 'robust': '[They] do 
say to France that your minimum wages are too high, that you spend too much 
on social protection' (Interview, Paris, 19 February 1999).72 This view echoes an 
earlier OECD claim that, in the preparation of the reports, 'neither examiners nor 
examinees mince their words' (1964: 13),73 although Bayne contends that the 
need to agree can lead to 'rather dense and oracular prose, with criticism 
expressed in coded language which has to be read between the lines'
711 For example, one could assume that investors would pay attention to the OECD's December 
2003 report on Japan, which calls for bold policy reforms on the grounds that the country is beset 
by 'serious and inter-related' problems that had resulted in it slipping 'from being one of the 
richest OECD economies to around the average' (Pearson 2003: 14).
71 David Henderson states that the country surveys are drafted by the Secretariat, redrafted in 
light of comments from the country and discussion in the EDRC, and published under the 
authority of the committee (1993:16).
77 On OECD reports generally, the official said the reports were critical if they needed to be 
because:
People in the Secretariat see themselves as professionals. They are not in the 
business of writing mealy-mouthed things that don't say anything if there's 
something to be said. They have a certain professional integrity that they want to 
preserve for the organisation. If the organisation becomes a mealy-mouthed, wishy- 
washy place, then it is not going to benefit anyone.
77 The OECD observes, 'The atmosphere is one of frankness and constructive criticism, made easier 
by the fact that what is said is under confidential seal' (1964:13).
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(1987: 28).74 In a similar vein, Bakker observes that the 'wording of sensitive 
passages' can involve 'a considerable tussle between the Secretariat, the country 
concerned and the delegations from other countries' (1996: 117).75
Undoubtedly, the reviewed country has some input, but the extent is said to 
range from consultation with a country's officials 'as part of the initial data 
collection and as a routine courtesy' once a first draft is prepared, to negotiating 
and signing off on the text (Haslem 2000; Kelsey 1999: 69).76 Kelsey argues that 
the latter occurs with the New Zealand reports, and claims that, if criticisms by 
OECD economists survive the negotiating process, 'they may be relegated to 
footnotes, while the major policies that the government wants to plug are 
generally (but not always) included in the reports' (1999: 69). She argues that, in 
New Zealand, the media portrays the reviews 'as objective assessments of how 
well the country is doing, and the government perpetuates the illusion' 
(1999: 70). However, Kelsey stops short of Michael Henderson, who scathingly 
dismisses the country review process as 'nothing short of fraudulent' (1981: 798). 
He argues that 'not a word appears in the published survey which is not 
considered acceptable by the government whose policies have been assessed', 
although the 'myth' persists that they sometimes contain comments that 
governments may not like to be made public (1981: 798).77 From this, Henderson 
concludes that 'the "confrontation" process is informative but rarely ...
74 However, Bayne also notes that the OECD can state critical views 'trenchantly if need arises' 
and cites a review of one country in which the OECD condemned the country's 'institutional 
bottlenecks, bureaucratic attitudes, labour market rigidities, failure to innovate, poor management 
and inefficient use of financial resources' (1987: 28); see also Aubrey (1967: 28).
7  ̂ Pagani argues that it is the possibility of attempts by the reviewed country to 'unduly influence 
the final outcome' that is the main threat to the credibility of the peer review process (2002:13). He 
notes:
The involvement of the reviewed State in the process and its ownership of the 
outcome of the peer review is the best guarantee that it will ultimately endorse the 
final report and implement its recommendations. However, the State's involvement 
should not go so far as to endanger the fairness and objectivity of the review. For 
example, the State under review should not be permitted to veto the adoption of all 
or part of the final report (2002: 13).
7 6 Ian Henderson, writing in The Australian about the OECD's 1999 economic survey of Australia, 
neatly side-steps the controversy by stating that the report was prepared 'in co-operation with the 
Treasury' (1999a).
77 Michael Henderson contends that this practice varies between members, with some insisting on 
writing 'almost every word' of their own survey, while others 'allow the secretariat some latitude' 
(1981: 798).
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contentious' because each delegation realises that its pressing or embarrassing 
questions may 'provoke retaliation in time' (1981: 798).
Given that the OECD's proceedings are confidential, it is difficult to adjudicate 
between these views, especially when the statements of OECD and national 
officials are contradictory.78 However, such uncertainty does not diminish the 
effects of the reports in enhancing the authority of the OECD (thereby 
supporting my portrait of the OECD as 'fanged' watchdog). It is the way the 
reports are used as a product of an impersonal, non-partisan, professional, 
technical OECD, rather than their actual authorship, that is important to the 
process of multilateral surveillance in keeping countries 'in step'. Regardless of 
who actually specifies the content of the reports, it is the OECD's rational-legal 
authority and command of technical expertise that provides the 'bite' to spur 
particular actions. The important point is that the 'conclusions [of the reports] 
have some influence over the political decision-making process in the countries 
concerned', with the 'prestige' of the OECD being 'used to considerable 
domestic advantage' (Bakker 1996:117; Henderson 1981: 798).79 Thus, the
OECD's 'fangs' can work either for or against the government, depending on the 
content of the review.80 As Chris Pierson observes, parties in opposition see 
themselves as govemments-in-waiting, 'and only ever a general election (and a 
little good fortune) away from holding the reins of state power' (2003: 95). This 
means they are looking for ammunition with which to attack the government's 
policies and with which to build their own alternatives. An OECD report critical 
of existing policies can supply what they need.81 When the political parties
78 For example, information that I obtained from interviews in Paris differed to that obtained by 
Kelsey; see Kelsey (1999: 69). A subsequent paper by a member of the OECD's Directorate for 
Legal Affairs (Pagani 2002) offers a different view again. Pagani describes a detailed process of 
approval in which the 'examined country' is able to argue for text changes that are accepted only if 
the Secretariat and other delegations agree.
79 This is not to suggest that this occurs only with OECD reports. Looking at other international 
bodies, Putnam and Bayne note that G-7 members use G-7 communiques to support their 
viewpoints, although this usually works to the advantage of the governments: 'given the care with 
which the communiques are drafted, there are few actual examples of summit declarations that 
were subsequently exploited by a government's adversaries at home' (1987: 261).
80 Michael Henderson considers the advantage to be with the government, '[bjecause it is not well 
known that governments must approve their surveys before they can be published' (1981: 798), but 
this claim rests on his assumption that the government effectively writes the report, and that the 
report supports the policy direction that the government wants to pursue.
81 For example, in 2000, New Zealand's Opposition (National Party) used the OECD's Economic 
Survey: New Zealand to attack the Labour Government, with then Opposition Leader Jenny Shipley
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themselves do not play this point-scoring game with the reports, the media may 
instigate the competition over which party's policies best fit with OECD 
recommendations.82 An OECD paper on peer review notes that peer pressure is 
most effective '[w]hen the press is actively engaged with the story' because 
media involvement often brings the public scrutiny necessary to 'stimulate the 
State to change, achieve goals and meet standards' (Pagani 2002: 6).
THE OECD: EPISTEMIC COMMUNITY AND IDEAS MONGER
As noted above, the OECD's raison d'etre is to harmonise its members' policies in 
order that they avoid actions that would harm their economies and put the aims 
of increased economic growth and higher standards of living at risk. I have 
argued that one way that the OECD can achieve such harmonisation is to apply 
the mechanisms of multilateral surveillance and peer pressure in order to push 
members towards, or coerce them to comply with, an 'agreed' consensus on 
policy actions. According to my argument, the mechanisms of peer pressure and 
multilateral surveillance give the OECD more influence over policy than a 
cursory examination of the OECD's rules and procedures would suggest. These 
instruments combine with the organisation's distinct and independent voice to 
give the OECD both 'bark' and 'bite'. National delegates engaged in policy 
discussions at the OECD find themselves under pressure from their fellow 
delegates, the OECD Secretariat, and organisational mechanisms that may leave
urging Finance Minister Michael Cullen to pay attention to the OECD report, 'which showed the 
Government's policy settings were "profoundly damaging" and were moving New Zealand in the 
wrong direction' (NZPA 2000). Shipley used the OECD's 'objective expertise' in her attack, 
arguing: 'The OECD report is a significant piece of analysis from a body which has provided 
valuable advice and analysis to New Zealand throughout our 27 years of membership' (NZPA 
2000). In response, Cullen attacked the OECD's recommendation for New Zealand to introduce a 
capital gains tax as an 'extreme, socially unacceptable and economically unnecessary' measure that 
would be 'political suicide' (NZPA 2000). While this exchange may support the view that the 
OECD writes the reports independently of the reviewed government, it may also -  in this case -  
reflect the independence of the New Zealand Treasury; see Miskin (1997). In another example, 
Australia's Opposition (Labor Party) used the 1999 OECD report on Australia to attack the Howard 
Government's work-for-the-dole scheme, saying: 'the OECD assessment confirms that people with 
insufficient skills are not receiving adequate training assistance from the Howard Government' 
(Wade 1999a).
For example, a report in the Australian Financial Review in February 2003 compares Coalition and 
Labor positions with OECD Economic Outlook recommendations that countries should introduce 
policies to prevent early retirement (Murphy 2003a). Outlining the OECD's policy suggestions, the 
report notes that Treasurer Peter Costello had given such policies the 'tick of approval' the previous 
year whereas Labor was against forcing workers to defer their retirement. That is, while the 
parties' comments were not directly related to the OECD report, they were, nonetheless, held up in 
contrast against the OECD's recommendations.
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them with little option but to make significant concessions from their original 
positions and acquiesce to the preferred policy line. However, there is another 
means by which the OECD may secure conformity among its members, and that 
is through the ideas that the organisation seeds in the minds of its members, and 
the policy problems and solutions that these ideas acknowledge as legitimate. In 
the final section of this chapter, I will explore the role of the OECD as a 
'knowledge actor' or 'ideas monger', before arguing that another way of 
understanding this is to see the OECD as an 'epistemic community' whose ideas 
may come to construct the 'reality' or 'truth' of the situations that face policy­
makers and delineate the options from which policy-makers select solutions.83
International organisations such as the OECD are 'knowledge actors' who help 
to transfer the intellectual matter that underpins policies by diffusing lessons, 
building consensus and entrenching ideas (Stone 2000:10). Such actors provide 
essential services for policy-makers by acting as resource banks for information, 
advocating policy ideas and inculcating awareness of experience in different 
domains, and spreading ideas and information through their networks (Stone 
2000:11). Thus, any analysis that views the secretariats of international 
organisations as 'weak, inefficient and chiefly ornamental' overlooks their 
crucial role as 'clearing houses' for information, '[especially in issue-areas 
where information is a more important resource than brute force' (Jonsson 
1993:473). International organisations are at the 'confluence of [the] 
transnational exchange of ideas'; they gather information from different 
countries' policy experiences, mediate and synthesise the acquired knowledge, 
and interpret it for their members (Howlett and Ramesh 1999:16). This means 
that much of the information used in national and international decision-making 
'either emanates from, or has "passed" and been processed by, international civil 
servants' (Jonsson 1993: 474).
Understood in this way, the OECD can be seen as a linchpin for lesson-drawing 
or policy transfer, which Dolowitz and Marsh define as:
83 I am not arguing that the ideas necessarily originate within the OECD for, as Keating 
observes: 'in many cases it is impossible to know where an idea has originated' (2003: 435). Nor 
am I examining at this stage how ideas function in policy-making; that will be discussed in the next 
chapter. Here, I am concerned with the OECD's role in dispersing policy ideas.
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the process by which knowledge about policies, administrative 
arrangements, institutions and ideas in one policy system (past or 
present) is used in the development of policies, administrative 
arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political system 
(2000: 5).
Both the OECD and its precursor, the OEEC, have acted to facilitate the 
exchange of such information, the result of which is what Aubrey calls an 
'educational effect' in which members came to 'know the economy and 
problems of another state' (1967: 28). Through such education, members come to 
acquire 'a sense of the interdependence of the policies of all members states' 
(Aubrey 1967: 28), but they also draw from it possible solutions to their own 
policy problems. The role of the OECD in this process is depicted as passive; it 
is simply the conduit through which information is exchanged. Rose, for 
example, who describes the OECD as a 'prime example of an "ideas-mongering" 
international institution', emphasises that it has no authority to issue laws and 
regulations and no sanctions with which to force a country to change a program 
(1993: 69). Rather, it hosts meetings that members' officials attend to 'exchange 
ideas with policymakers from other countries', and prepares papers and distils 
lessons from case studies that 'other nations can choose to adopt if they wish' 
(1993: 69).84 The current OECD Secretary-General offers a similar view, arguing 
that the organisation's strength lies in the sharing of information, ideas, and 
'experience of what works and what does not' ( Johnston 1998). He observes 
that:
Governments can and do make economic policy mistakes, but by 
sharing experiences, submitting to outside 'sounding boards' and 
undergoing peer reviews, OECD governments have learned 
collectively from their mistakes -  and from their successes (1998).
Thus, the suggestion is that the OECD acts as a facilitator, rather than an 
instigator, of lesson-drawing and policy transfer between its members and, 
increasingly, between members and non-members.
In a similar vein, The Economist (1994:17) argues that much of the OECD's value lies in its 
function as the venue in which member states willingly exchange ideas and experiences. It argues 
that the close involvement of government officials in the OECD's work makes them 'more willing' 
to collect data to be used in international studies and makes governments:
more apt to heed the lessons of such studies. Indeed, the OECD is one of the few 
places where government officials can talk frankly with their opposite numbers, and 
so learn from one another's mistakes.
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However, as noted above, the OECD is not simply a transmission vehicle 
through which members pass policy ideas, but is an active participant in its own 
right. It gathers information on policy options from its members, but it screens 
them through it own filter of 'best practice' and offers its own independent view 
of policy problems and solutions back to its members. In this way, it functions 
as what Peter Haas describes as an epistemic community:
a network of professionals with recognized expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to 
policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area (1992: 3).
According to Haas, epistemic communities have a shared set of normative and 
principled beliefs, shared causal beliefs, shared notions of validity, and a 
common policy enterprise (1992: 3).85 These shared beliefs and notions combine 
to give the community 'its own broader worldview'; community members have 
the same understanding of the world and how it works. The result, Haas 
argues, is that, when called on for advice, epistemic communities 'bring with 
them their interpretations of the knowledge [of problems and solutions], which 
are in turn based on their causally informed vision of reality and their notions of 
validity' (1992: 21). Thus, when policy-makers consult the epistemic community, 
they receive the community's version of 'the "reality" or "truth" of the situation 
at hand' (1992: 21).
Haas argues that policy-makers turn to epistemic communities in order to cope 
with the increasingly complex world in which they operate and the uncertainty 
they feel with regard to the many responsibilities of modern international 
governance (1992: 12). He claims that, in an uncertain world in which states are 
strongly dependent on each other's policy choices for success in obtaining their 
goals, there is a demand for information of the sort that epistemic communities 
can supply (1992: 3).86 As noted above, governments are increasingly treating
In this, Haas acknowledges that they resemble Thomas Kuhn's 'broader sociological definition 
of a paradigm, which is "an entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by 
members of a given community" and which governs "not a subject matter but a group of 
practitioners"' (1992:3, fn 4, citing Kuhn 1970:175, 180). Kuhn's notion of paradigms will be 
elaborated in the next chapter.
88 Haas notes that, faced with an ever-widening range of complicated and technical issues on the 
international agenda, a larger and more interactive international political system, and an expanded 
global economy and modern administrative state, decision-makers seek 'new and different' sources 
of advice on current issues and future trends (1992: 12, 13). Epistemic communities can: articulate 
the cause-and-effect relationships of complex problems and provide policy advice about the likely 
results of the various courses of action; help states (or factions within it) to identify their interests;
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international organisations as independent, authoritative sources of ideas and 
solutions to policy problems (de Senarclens 1993: 453; see also Bayne 1997: 365). 
Epistemic communities are seen to offer the professional, scientific, rational, and 
technical advice that has come to be associated with modern bureaucracies and 
that appears to respond to the 'growing technical nature of problems' (Haas 
1992: 11). Haas notes that, in supplying information, community members 
become 'strong actors at the national and transnational level as decision-makers 
solicit their information and delegate responsibility to them' (1992: 4). As a 
result, he says, if the community can consolidate its position within national 
administrations and international secretariats, 'it stands to institutionalize its 
influence and insinuate its views into broader international politics' (1992: 4).
The extent to which the OECD has, in fact, been able to institutionalise its views 
within its member states is not the point at issue in this thesis, which is focused 
more narrowly on an examination of the OECD's main policy ideas, their 
underlying assumptions, and the impact that changes in these ideas may have 
had on the organisation's understanding of social justice. However, the 
mechanisms by which the OECD attempts to institutionalise its views go to the 
heart of why it is important to examine in depth the OECD's commentary, 
analysis and policy advice. The formal mechanisms through which the OECD 
can disseminate its ideas to members have been canvassed above, but there are a 
number of less formal mechanisms that should be noted. One important 
mechanism is the definition of alternatives. Haas uses E.E. Schattschneider's 
pithy comment that, 'The definition of the alternatives is the supreme 
instrument of power', to underpin his claim that epistemic communities can 
have a considerable impact on policy because they can limit the number of 
choices available to policy-makers (1992: 16, citing Schattschneider 1975: 66). 
While decision-makers retain the actual choice of policies, community members 
can influence the options from which they choose, 'pointing out which 
alternatives are not viable on the basis of their causal understanding of the 
problems to be addressed' (Haas 1992: 16).
Another important mechanism for the dissemination of ideas is the networks 
that develop between the OECD and national officials. The OECD claims that
frame the issues for collective debate; formulate and propose specific policies; and identify salient 
points for negotiation (1992: 2).
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about 40,000 senior officials from national administrations come to OECD 
committee meetings each year to 'request, review and contribute to' the 
Secretariat's work (2001c). Policy officials from different countries meet at the 
OECD, ostensibly on an 'equal footing', which leads to the development of what 
Bakker calls 'a certain esprit de corps' as they exchange information and ideas 
(1996: 120). In his volume on international financial institutions, Bakker 
highlights the importance of personal contacts. He notes that regular meetings 
result in policy-makers getting to know others in their field fairly well, which 
'creates a basis of trust which can be very valuable when it comes to the need for 
prompt action' (1996: 8). In addition, he contends: 'Multiple informal contacts 
can lead policy-makers to adopt the same priorities, so that policy is better 
coordinated' (1996: 8).87
Ideas are central in these exchanges between the OECD and officials, both in 
Paris and at home. In Paris, the discussion of policies while they are still being 
made, 'before national negotiating positions are frozen', means that ideas can 
play an important formative role (Aubrey 1967: 143). Visits to the OECD and 
participation in working parties, high-level meetings, and other discussions also 
add to the sense of 'ownership' that officials feel towards policy directions 
worked out in the forums (Siegel 1985: 193-194). Even when no formal 
agreement on policy directions or common undertakings is reached, policy­
makers take ideas home from Paris. As Sullivan observes in the OECD's official 
history: 'officials return to their capitals with an enhanced understanding of 
their colleagues' thinking and with ideas that will find their way into national 
legislation or regulations' (1997: 98, emphasis added; see also Rose 1993: 69). It 
is, Sullivan notes, an 'innocent-sounding device, but the fact is that OECD 
committees do serve as a crucible for members' future actions' (1997:98). 
Gelinas sees nothing innocent in such exchanges, arguing that the OECD's 
training and development programmes, meetings, symposia, and seminars are a 
principle mechanism through which the 'neoliberal faith propagation office'
87 Steve Burrell, writing about the G-8, observes that not all the big decisions are made in formal 
meetings; rather, he says, "'corridor summits" and bilateral backroom negotiations can often 
provide the most significant breakthroughs' (2001a: 24). The point is equally valid for the OECD, 
with David Henderson noting that the main purpose of meetings at the OECD is to 'enable 
delegates to see each other, to interact both within and outside the committee rooms, [and] to 
inform and influence one another' (1993:19).
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disseminates its 'ultraliberal' globalisation ideology (2003: 120, 118).88 Those 
who visit the OECD may maintain their links with the OECD as the ideas 
develop. The OECD notes that, 'even from home', national officials have 
electronic access to OECD documents and can exchange information through a 
data network (2001c).
This 'alumni effect' arising from networks not only spreads ideas from the 
OECD to domestic policy-makers, but also consolidates the organisation's 
position within national administrations, thereby allowing it to become 
indirectly represented in national policy-making processes (Jonsson 1993: 474). 
Such representation may manifest itself in a number of ways:
• policy-makers may look to the OECD as a source of ideas.89 In this way, the 
OECD's interpretations of policy problems and their preferred policy 
solutions come to frame the terms of deliberations.
• policy-makers may have their own ideas, but will use the OECD's ideas to 
'legitimise their own preferred solutions' (Howlett and Ramesh 1999: 16; 
Haas 1992: 15; Harrison and Mungall 1990: 58, Cassen 2001). In this way, if 
the policy has problems, 'the decision makers have the option of pointing to 
the information given to them by the experts and spreading the blame' (Haas 
1992: 15-16).
In both cases, policy-makers can argue that the policy suggestion came from, or 
is supported by, a 'neutral' international organisation, and can thereby play 
down the partisan nature of policy options (Cassen 2001). This returns to the 
notion, outlined above, of international organisations as independent sites of 
authority, which partially arises from their control over 'technical' expertise. As 
more and more issues raised in the inter-governmental arena are cast as 
technical, there is an associated increase in the deference paid to technical 
expertise (Haas 1992: 7-12; see also de Senarclens 1993: 460). As noted above, 
technical advice is not unbiased, but the bias is not always obvious. Here, we 
need to recall Haas's observation that, when policy-makers consult the epistemic
88 He notes: 'Each year, some 60,000 senior civil servants and politicians of all kinds file into its 
Chateau de la Muette offices in Paris to retrain themselves in neoliberal policy and management' 
(2003: 120).
O Q
oy For example, Chris Pierson observes that, in welfare policy, international agencies such as the 
OECD are 'increasingly a clearing house for an international epistemic community of (social) policy 
makers who draw on OECD information as a ready source for the reform agenda at home' 
(2003: 87); see also Rose (1993: 69).
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community, they receive the community's version of 'reality' as based on the 
community's beliefs (1992:21). Thus, the community has 'great social and 
political influence' because it articulates the dimensions of reality (Haas 
1992: 23).
In addition to the 'technical' arguments, policy-makers can gain extra domestic 
political leverage by pointing to an internationally agreed policy consensus.90 
Aubrey argues that being able to cite such a consensus gives policy-makers 
additional support for their stance, strengthening their hands against interest 
groups or permitting a 'new thrust from a different angle' (1967: 146; see also 
Bayne 2003: 230). In either case, an international consensus can provide a 
buttress for a government that wants to maintain or introduce policies that may 
not have wide public support. As Aubrey observes: 'implementation is much 
easier if one can explain the need for such action by reference to collective 
responsibility in a large group of nations whose problems are similar' 
(1967: 147). This 'international endorsement' can be seen to have a 'real impact 
in domestic politics' (Putnam and Bayne 1987: 261). Putnam and Bayne note 
that, in the 1980s and 1990s, co-operative action provided support for 'painful 
and unpopular' adjustment policies in that governments could 'point to others 
who were making the same sacrifice' (1987:98, 261-262; Bayne 2003:230). 
However, as noted earlier, an international consensus can also be used to apply 
pressure to a 'rogue state' to bring its policies into line (Finnemore and Sikkink 
1998: 903). Policy-makers may use the OECD to bolster their policy choices, but 
they are also open to policy suggestions from the OECD. The result is that 
members are not simply picking and choosing what they want; rather, the close 
ties may mean that the set of ideas currently in fashion at the OECD may become 
the dominant paradigm, which members are then expected to use to formulate 
domestic policies. In this way, the 'common strategies' at which the OECD 
arrives via what are said to be co-operative processes, 'increasingly define the 
outer limits of the range of viable policy options across a growing number of 
issues' (Ougaard 1999: 13).
The result of these informal mechanisms by which the OECD disseminates ideas 
is that its long-term influence may lie more in 'the cumulative effect of its
90 Aubrey calls this a '[m]ore subtle, but even more important ... collateral effect that radiates back 
home from Paris' (1967:146).
71 The OECD
continuing process of information sharing and policy formation by osmosis' than 
in the formal decisions or recommendations that it reaches (Huntley 1980: 67; 
Aubrey 1967: 144). Huntley makes this claim in his examination of the OECD 
and goes on to observe that:
member countries tend to arrive at the same general policies (not 
invariably, to be sure, but often) because their own governmental 
apparatus receives the same information from which to derive 
decisions. Moreover, the international institution and the domestic 
apparatus of all of its members are so linked that subtle pressures are 
inevitable, often pervasive, and on many occasions strong enough to 
force conformity to a general norm (1980: 67; emphasis added).
At a superficial level, this conformity may seem unproblematic. As noted earlier 
in this chapter, the OECD views itself as a 'club of like-minded countries', with 
membership 'limited only by a country's commitment to a market economy and 
a pluralistic democracy' (2001c). Such Tike-mindedness' suggests that members 
could be expected to march in step, sharing similar ideas about how the world 
works and structuring their policies accordingly.91 In this sense, members 
would be unperturbed by the OECD's interpretation of policy problems and 
solutions because it is likely that they would interpret policy problems and the 
range of possible solutions through a similar underlying framework of 
assumptions. Johnston is adamant that the OECD does not offer a single model 
to its members; rather, it offers: 'a framework for countries to develop their own 
institutions and approaches in support of the three principles that bind its 
members -  pluralistic democracy, respect for human rights and open market 
economies' (Johnston 1998). However, this underestimates the impact of 'a 
common set of values and a common store of information and interpretation' 
(Harrison and Mungall 1990: 63) in ensuring conformity to a narrow band of 
policy ideas.
The OECD itself has made explicit the need for the analysis underpinning 
multilateral surveillance to be 'based on agreed foundations' (1988d: 24). In a 
publication examining the reasons why members change their economic 
policies, it blames 'differences in countries' ideas and views on economic policy' 
for economic 'difficulties' in the early 1980s and warns that, although there was
91 As will be discussed in later chapters, the OECD's official history claims that, for nearly 20 years 
after it was established, the organisation, like most of its members, 'marched to the music of Lord 
Maynard Keynes' (Sullivan 1997: 50).
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now a 'greater degree of consensus, such differences remain an inevitable source 
of possible problems' (1988d: 23, emphasis in original).92 It further cautions that 
peer pressure, which, as outlined above, is seen as essential to members' co­
operation, is 'fully effective only if the peers share a broadly agreed view of the 
objectives to be pursued, and the way in which the economic system works' 
(1988d: 23). Some scholars also view the sharing of ideas in the OECD as benign 
because of the like-mindedness of member countries. Huntley, for example, 
notes that OECD members 'borrow ideas and coordinate planning at the 
intellectual and intergovernmental levels', which 'tend[s] to reinforce the 
common characteristics of their economies' (1980: 38). What is neglected here is 
that OECD members may be 'like-minded', but they are not identical. Members 
may share some common political values, such as the commitment to free 
markets and pluralistic democracy, that the OECD proclaims, but they may 
diverge on such aspects as how much freedom a 'free' market should have and 
the role of government in society. Such differences often are overlooked because 
of the tendency to amalgamate countries that share similar broad philosophies 
into a singular, 'shorthand' unit as though they share exactly the same 
philosophy.
The pursuit of a single set of policy ideas may, in fact, be problematic and 
undermines the claim that international organisations, including the OECD, are 
apolitical in character. Bakker argues that the statutes on which international 
financial organisations are founded 'generally state that the economic and 
political systems of member countries will be respected' (1996: 6). In the OECD, 
this means respecting market economies and pluralistic democracies. However, 
policy advice that leans towards the 'promotion of free markets' (Bakker 1996: 6) 
tends to treat all market economies as being fundamentally the same; that is, it 
assumes that all countries apply exactly the same weightings to the market/state 
divide. Yet, this is clearly not the case, as Gosta Esping-Andersen elaborated in 
his The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990).93 The disparities between OECD
92 This publication, Why Economic Policies Change Course, is another example of the organisation's 
distinct and autonomous voice. It explicitly notes that responsibility for the analysis in the study 
'lies entirely with the OECD and not with Member governments ... the interpretations and 
assessments provided are exclusively those of the OECD' (1988d: 8).
93 See also Hall and Soskice, who divide the OECD members into three groups:
Among the large OECD nations, six can be classified as liberal market economies (the 
USA, Britain, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Ireland) and another ten as 
coordinated market economies (Germany, Japan, Switzerland, the Netherlands,
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members have several implications for lesson-drawing and policy transfer. For 
example, Rose argues that when states look outside their borders for policy 
'lessons': '[l]ike-mindedness in political values is a key element in choosing 
friends and neighbours to turn to' (1993:102). That is, countries look to those 
who think most like themselves. The result, he contends, is that: 'No one 
country can be an exemplar for all advanced industrial nations because countries 
differ in their dominant political values and in what they choose to do with their 
wealth' (1993:108).94 Thus, poorer countries that do not want a 'big' 
government are more likely to look for policy lessons to the United States and 
Japan, which, although wealthy, have limited social programs. They are less 
likely to look to the Scandinavian countries, which choose to spend more on 
social programs (Rose 1993: 108-109). Yet, the United States, Japan, and the 
Scandinavian countries all belong to the OECD.
This argument suggests that the OECD should face significant difficulties in 
pursuing a single policy direction among its disparate members and, 
increasingly, the wider world. Yet, as later chapters of this thesis will 
demonstrate, the OECD has persisted in offering members an understanding of 
policy problems and solutions based on a particular world-view. Over the 40 
years since the OECD's inception, this view has changed from what can be 
called Keynesian social democracy to neo-liberalism. While the impact of this 
world-view on policies within member countries will not be explored in this 
thesis, it is possible that its effect is considerable, given the centrality of the 
OECD's role as an ideas-monger for its members.95
Conclusion
As noted in the Introduction to this chapter, there are two sets of views on the 
OECD: one sees the OECD as a benign organisation, comprising unimportant
Belgium, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, and Austria) leaving six in more 
ambiguous positions (France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Turkey)
(2001:19, 21).
They omit Luxembourg and Iceland from the list because of their small size, and Mexico 'because it 
is still a developing nation'.
94 Hall and Soskice argue that it is the differences in the structures of the European economies that 
have made agreement on 'best practice' so difficult (2001: 53-54).
95 A test of the policy transfer between the OECD and its members may be a fruitful topic for 
future research.
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technocrats; the other views it as an influential think-tank spreading its neo­
liberal policies to member governments and, increasingly, the wider world. 
Arguments presented in this chapter contend that claims that the organisation is 
unimportant pay insufficient attention to the OECD's ability to influence policy 
directions. The OECD is more than a toothless watchdog; that is, it is more than 
a data collection agency and source of technical expertise for its members. 
Rather, the OECD has fangs; it is an organisation with both bark and bite. That 
said, much of the OECD's influence can be linked to the way it functions as an 
epistemic community or a network of professionals whose recognised expertise 
gives it an authoritative claim to knowledge in policy areas in which its 
members seek advice. When members consult the OECD, they receive the 
OECD's interpretation of the 'reality' of the policy problems that they face, as 
well as what they can consider as legitimate solutions. As Haas observes, the 
responsibility for articulating 'reality' gives the community great social and 
political influence (1992: 23), and it is this influence that many scholars overlook 
with regard to the OECD. When they contend, as, for example, Ougaard does, 
that the OECD is without political power in that it is 'not a centre for 
authoritative decision-making', they ignore the import of what Ougaard himself 
acknowledges: that 'the OECD is seriously involved in the production of knowledge 
about major problems facing the international community, in the identification 
of viable policy paths and the development of strategies' (1999: 11, 13; emphasis 
added).
It is the OECD's 'knowledge' about social justice and related issues, and what it 
identifies as viable policy solutions in this area, that is a concern of this thesis. 
While there is valuable research to be done on the impact of the OECD's ideas 
on its members (that is, whether they introduce the OECD's recommended 
policies), an important first step in such research is identifying the OECD's 
ideas, and the assumptions about the world and how it works that the ideas 
carry with them. Thus, the focus of this thesis is an examination of the change in 
the OECD's ideas over time and the implications of the change for the OECD's 
understanding of social justice and related issues. One argument to be explored 
is the notion that ideas are hard to change once they are incorporated into the 
institutions that implement and enforce policy; that is, ideas become embedded 
in institutions. Once embedded, ideas continue to have effects on policy by 
becoming the taken-for-granted or unconscious assumptions behind policy 
discourse and policy practice. The point to be taken from this chapter is the role
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that international organisations, such as the OECD, have in affecting these taken- 
for-granted or unconscious assumptions. As outlined above, international 
organisations play an autonomous role in the evolution of the international 
order through the production and dissemination of the norms, values, 
knowledge, ideas and interests needed for its development. They can build and 
publicise support for their norms and rules because they are defining 'reality' for 
policy-makers, setting out their vision of how the world works, what policy 
problems exist, and how they can be resolved. The capacity for international 
organisations, such as the OECD, to stimulate policy discussions and, more 
importantly, to set the terms of the discourse and the parameters of what may be 
considered in the discussions, has implications for the formulation and shaping 
of policy that are rarely teased out.
Chapter 2
Ideas: of M admen and  
A cademic Scribblers
INTRODUCTION
X  n the previous chapter, I observed that the OECD, despite being among the 
_L most well known of the world's international organisations, has seldom been 
subjected to detailed scrutiny. I noted that the lack of significant scholarship on 
this inter-governmental body left open a wide range of approaches for study, 
but that my interest arose from the way the OECD functioned as an epistemic 
community, acting as an ideas monger for its members and, perhaps more 
arguably, the wider world. I argued that, if the OECD's main tasks are to 
formulate, promulgate, and, via peer pressure and multilateral surveillance, 
ensure that its members (and non-members) implement its recommended policy 
options, then we need to know more about the ideas on which these 
recommendations are based. Several authors have cited the OECD as a source of 
neo-liberal ideas. Critics take the view that the OECD is one of the main 
perpetrators of pro-market ideology, foisting unpalatable neo-liberal and 
globalisation ideas on to an unsuspecting public (Gelinas 2003: esp. 118-120; 
Schölte 2000: 241; Crouch 1997:357; Kelsey 1997:17; Martin and Schumann 
1997: 160). Others simply note that the OECD has a 'strongly pro-market 
liberalisation and neo-liberal' orientation and has 'grown in influence'
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(Goldfinch 2000:49; Argy 2000: 121; Bell 1998: 163).1 However, most of these 
authors rely on only a few, scattered OECD publications to make their case, or 
they fail to provide any evidence to support their claims.2
In contrast to the generalisations in this scholarship, I want to offer a systematic 
examination of the OECD's policy assessments and recommendations as 
contained in the organisation's main economic and social policy publications. 
Thus, a central concern of this thesis is an examination of the OECD's policy 
thinking: What are the OECD's policy ideas? How have they changed since the 
organisation's inception in 1961? What are the implications of this change for 
the OECD's understanding and treatment of social justice and related issues? As 
such, my concern is not with the origin of the OECD's ideas (that is, whether 
they originated in the OECD or outside the organisation), who in the OECD 
developed or championed the ideas, or the mechanisms by which the OECD's 
policy ideas are transferred to its members. Rather, I want to explore the ideas 
themselves (what underlies the policy assessments and recommendations that 
the OECD puts forward in its documents), how and why these ideas are 
important to the organisation's policy formulation, what has happened to these 
ideas over time, and the implications of the new ideas on previously held 
conceptions of social justice. My argument, to be supported with evidence in 
later chapters, is that there has been a shift in the OECD's policy ideas from 
what can be described as Keynesian welfare liberalism to neo-liberalism. While 
the OECD itself acknowledges this shift, it does not acknowledge its 
implications. That is, the unacknowledged, and perhaps unintended, result of
1 Fred Argy describes the OECD as a place where what he calls 'hard liberal' ideas may be found, 
but then says the organisation, like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 'basically express the 
unrepressed views of Treasury and central bank people' (1998: 56, 234, 259 fn 4).
2 Shaun Goldfinch's comments draw on his interviews with 180 'leading economic policy makers 
and policy influentials in Australia and New Zealand' (2000:12). He finds that the OECD scores 
the second-highest (behind the Australian Treasury) when respondents are asked which important 
institutions and individuals contributed ideas to economic policy-making in Australia from 1983 to 
1993 (2000: 43, table 2.7). Several Australian respondents 'noted the importance of IMF, OECD and 
World Bank writings on their perceptions and understanding of economic policy', and one 
observed that 'pragmatic ideas and applied economic studies, especially those produced by the OECD 
and the World Bank' were more important influences than '"high falutin'" theory' (2000: 49, 39; 
emphasis added). However, while Goldfinch makes liberal use of OECD statistics and 
comparisons in his discussion of economic policy-making in New Zealand, he does not pursue an 
examination of the content of the OECD's policy ideas. I suggest that Goldfinch's evidence 
reinforces my argument that it is important to know what ideas the OECD is promoting.
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this shift in policy ideas is a fundamental change in the OECD's notions of social 
justice.
However, before examining the OECD's policy ideas in detail, I want to look at 
ideas more generally, explore the debate over how ideas function in policy­
making and look at a model outlining how we may understand shifts in policy 
ideas across time. Ideas matter to policy. John Maynard Keynes noted this more 
than 60 years ago, when he concluded his book, The General Theory of 
Employment, Interest and Money, with the following observation on the power of 
ideas to influence policy-making:
[T]he ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they 
are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is 
commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. 
Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any 
intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct 
economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are 
distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years 
back. ... [I]t is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for 
good or evil (1936: 383-384).
However, since Keynes's pithy summary of the importance of ideas to the 
selection of policy options, the research of academic scribblers of a different kind 
-  political scientists -  has shifted to concentrate on other factors influencing 
policy, such as institutions, interest groups, state structures, and, more recently, 
the impact of globalisation. In his examination of some of this research, John 
Kurt Jacobsen argues that there was a temporary 'surge' of research into ideas in 
the late 1960s:
when many scholars, struck by the spectacular failure of rational and 
quantitative methods to anticipate the social upheavals of that era, 
challenged what they regarded as the analytical myopia of the 
"behavioural" revolution in the social sciences (1995: 283).
He observes that this surge subsided in the 1970s when the dominant interest- 
based and rational-choice models gave 'little if any' credence to ideas, 'which at 
best were deemed minor intervening variables' (1995: 284). Eventually, Jacobsen 
contends, ideas re-emerged as a focus for research in the late 1980s, a move he 
attributes to a renewed impatience with 'the inability of rational interest-based 
models to explain, let alone predict, policy outcomes', combined with 'the 
evident onset of another period of prolonged socioeconomic change' (1995: 284).
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Thus, ideas, those 'voices in the air' pursued by madmen in authority, are back 
on centre stage, with the study of ideas becoming, in one reviewer's words: 'a 
cottage industry in political economy' (Blyth 1997a: 229). However, much of the 
current research into the relationship between ideas and policy still tends to 
focus on factors external to ideas. Although some researchers assert that ideas 
exert independent influence on policy choices, much of the literature on ideas 
appears to suggest that it is factors outside the ideas themselves, for example, 
institutional structures, elite interest groups (politicians, officials and 
economists), and historical factors, such as earlier solutions to policy problems, 
that have the most impact. Such approaches do not accord ideas a 'life of their 
own', but use them to 'help other forms of explanation' (Blyth 1997a: 241; 
Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 3, cited in Blyth 1997a: 231).
Therefore, key debates in the current literature on ideas and policy-making 
centre on conflicts over the role of ideas; that is, whether the ideas themselves 
have an independent effect on policy or whether their impact depends on 
interest groups, elites, or institutional structures. A study of the ideas 
promulgated by the OECD since its inception in 1961 that isolates the OECD's 
ideas from individuals and policy-transfer mechanisms may offer insights into 
this dispute. Such a study, by focusing solely on the ideas and not on the 
individuals promoting them, or the formal institutional structures that facilitate 
or constrain their implementation, should reveal something about the ideas 
themselves and how they function. Insights could include, for example, whether 
there is anything about ideas that adds to their impact. It could be that the way 
a set of ideas frames, or presents, a particular policy issue, and the discourse 
intrinsic to that set of ideas, adds to the influence of those ideas on policy 
choices. According to this reasoning, even if factors outside the ideas 
themselves, such as formal institutions (that is, rules and procedures), constrain 
the options open to policy-makers, the ideas themselves have an impact which is 
not determined by those institutions.3 The ideas affect both what can be 
considered a policy problem and what can be considered a viable solution. In 
this way, ideas can effect change, even where the nature of formal institutions 
would suggest that little change is possible. Thus, such a study places ideas
3 The distinction between formal and informal institutions will be noted later in this chapter and 
explored fully in the next chapter.
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front and centre in policy-making analysis rather than using them as 'minor 
intervening variables' (Jacobsen 1995: 284).
Before moving to explore the OECD's policy ideas, I first want to discuss policy 
ideas more generally: what 'ideas' are in the context of my discussion, how and 
why ideas may change over time, and how a change in ideas on means to 
achieve goals may affect the goals themselves. In this chapter, then, I will 
examine some general definitions of ideas and the role of ideas in policy-making 
before exploring, in a more extended discussion, a framework for understanding 
policy and policy changes. In this discussion, I will argue that Peter Hall's 
Kuhnian-inspired model of paradigms and scientific revolutions offers a useful 
way of understanding the dominance of a particular set of ideas, what happens 
to policy ideas over time, and how one set of policy ideas comes to replace 
another.
IDEAS DEFINED (WHAT IS MEANT BY 'IDEAS'?)
The definition of 'idea' most appropriate to the discussion of policy ideas (rather 
than, say, philosophical ideas) in my thesis is that of a 'way of thinking' or a 
'conception of something to be done or achieved; an intention, a plan of action' 
(Fowler and Fowler 1964: 601; Brown 1993: 1303). Ideas in the policy-making 
context are generally seen as a shared way of thinking; as 'shared beliefs'. That 
is, they are shared understandings of what constitutes a policy problem and 
what can be done about it. Thus, ideas reflect what we believe about the nature 
of the world and how it works. Jacobsen makes an explicit statement to this 
effect, noting in his review of some of the ideas literature, that: 'Like all the 
authors, I treat economic ideas as "shared beliefs'" (1995: 287). However, he 
distinguishes economic ideas, which are the 'means to reach socially approved 
ends', from 'consensual social beliefs', which 'shape the legitimate ends of 
economic activity' (1995:287). Economic ideas, he says, are 'explicitly 
programmatic about the organization of production and the distribution of its 
benefits and burdens' (1995: 286-287; emphasis in original). Shared social beliefs 
set the overall goals of policy, while shared economic beliefs determine the 
methods by which these goals can be achieved.
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Such a division has problems in that it implies that changes in economic ideas on 
means have no effect on socially approved ends, when, as will be argued below, 
this may not be the case.4 Despite the difficulty, however, Jacobsen's general 
definition of ideas as 'shared beliefs' stands, in that both his economic and social 
beliefs are shared, and thus his definition remains useful. Hall is less explicit in 
his definition of ideas, but can still be seen to understand ideas as shared beliefs. 
As will be discussed in more detail below, Hall sees ideas as interpretative 
frameworks or 'policy paradigms', which can be understood as 'shared 
conceptions about the nature of society and the economy' (1989: 383).
In his review of some of the literature on ideas, Mark Blyth is more cautious 
about the definition of ideas, arguing that, in many treatments of ideas in policy­
making, definitions simply reflect the wider theory in which they are embedded. 
In a somewhat circular, 'chicken-and-egg' argument, he claims that the choice of 
institutional analysis largely determines 'the type of ideas employed, their 
theoretical level, and their explanatory scope', while, at the same time, the view 
of ideas and what they do circumscribes the type of institutional analysis that 
can be employed (1997a: 231). Thus, he contends, the two main schools of 
institutional theory, the historical institutionalism of authors such as Peter Hall 
and Kathryn Sikkink and the rationalist institutionalism of authors such as 
Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, have distinctly different approaches. 
Whereas historical institutionalists understand ideas to 'exist prior to individuals 
and give meaning and content to their preferences', for rationalist 
institutionalists: 'all factors anterior to individuals (such as ideas and 
institutions) must be reducible to the actions (and hence the preferences) of 
individuals' (Blyth 1997a: 239). Goldstein and Keohane make this explicit in the 
opening sentence of their work, Ideas and Foreign Policy: 'This book is about how 
ideas, which we define as beliefs held by individuals, help to explain policy 
outcomes ...' (1993: 3; emphasis added).
Blyth argues that this emphasis on individuals results in rationalist 
institutionalists having the 'toughest time' with ideas. Their pre-commitment to
4 John Kurt Jacobsen notes that the categories are not mutually exclusive, and that actors 'often try 
to alter ends to fit the means they favor' (1995: 287). But this does not adequately cover the point 
that changes to ideas on means may inadvertently, or deliberately, change the ends. See, for 
example, King (1999: ch. 8).
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methodological individualism inescapably leads them to prioritise individuals 
over ideas, such that while '[ijdeas may be Weber's "switchmen of history," ... in 
this version of events they must be reducible to the individuals in the signal box' 
(Blyth 1997a: 240). Blyth's criticism is justified, but, in the end, even rationalist 
institutionalists conform to the general definition of ideas as 'shared beliefs' in 
that, ultimately, an individual's belief must be shared by at least some others in 
order to be implemented as policy. Goldstein and Keohane acknowledge this 
when they note that their work focuses on the 'impact of particular beliefs -  
shared by large numbers of people -  about the nature of their worlds' (1993: 7; 
emphasis added). They go on to explicate three types of beliefs: principled 
beliefs, causal beliefs, and world-views. Principled beliefs, they contend, are the 
'normative ideas' of right and wrong, and just and unjust, that underpin 
particular policy decisions, while causal beliefs are beliefs about means-ends 
relationships, 'which derive authority from the shared consensus of recognized 
elites' (1993: 10). They also argue that: 'Causal beliefs imply strategies for the 
attainment of goals, themselves valued because of shared principled beliefs, and 
understandable only within the context of broader world views' (1993:10; 
emphasis added).
Elsewhere, Blyth proposes his own definition of ideas. Economic ideas, he says, 
are: 'ideologies which agents use to restructure domestic institutions, shift 
political boundaries and alter patterns of distribution' (1997b: 232).56 He sees 
'economic ideology' as:
an interpretive framework which attempts to describe and 
systematically account for the workings of the economy by defining 
its constitutive elements and providing a general understanding 
regarding their 'proper' and therefore 'improper' relations 
(1997b: 234; see also Heilbroner 1990: 101-116).
Thus, he contends, the framework provides 'a vision that specifies how these 
elements should be constructed' (Blyth 1997b: 234; emphasis in original). Such 
'interpretive frameworks', like those in Hall's work, are still 'shared beliefs' in
5 Blyth's specification of 'economic' ideas does not preclude the application of his definition more 
broadly, especially as he himself argues that: 'what we believe to be possible or desirable in the 
political world depends a great deal on what we believe about the nature of the economic world' 
(1997b: 232).
6 Blyth's definition of ideas as ideologies and subsequent use of the latter term (albeit sometimes 
interchangeably with 'ideas') has the potential to be confusing in my discussion of his argument. 
To avoid this confusion, I will use the term 'idea' unless in a direct quotation.
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that they provide their adherents with definitions and understandings of 'the 
way the world works'. Desmond King pursues a similar theme, arguing that 
policy-makers require an 'evidential' or 'knowledge' base to devise policies, and 
that ideas, promulgated by experts and politicians, underpin the 'knowledge' 
that policy-makers use to identify policy choices (1999: 28-29). Again, ideas in 
this context can be understood as 'shared beliefs' in a particular construction of 
how the world works.
THE ROLE OF IDEAS IN POLICY-MAKING
(Wh at  d o  Id e a s  d o ? h o w  d o  id e a s  A ffect po lic y?)
In the Introduction to this chapter, I claimed that ideas matter to policy -  but 
how exactly do they matter? Scholars appear divided on the issue, with the 
literature reflecting considerable debate over whether ideas have an 
independent role in policy or whether they are reliant on other factors, such as 
interests and institutions. Earlier, I noted that, after a hiatus, scholars have 
returned to focus on the role of ideas in policy-making, and I observed that 
much of this research looks to factors external to ideas for explanations, such as 
institutional structures, elite interest groups, and historical policy choices (that 
is, earlier solutions to policy problems). Blyth reviews some of this literature on 
the role of ideas in policy-making and argues that the renewed interest in ideas 
is not a 'serious examination of the role of ideas in the realm of political 
economy' (1997a: 229). Rather, he contends, this new 'cottage industry' is: 'little 
more than an ad hoc attempt to account for theoretical problems apparent in the 
two main schools of institutionalist theory [historical and rationalist]' 
(1997a: 229). He contends that neither school asks, 'what are ideas?' and 'what 
do they do?', looking instead at 'what stabilises?' and 'what causes change?' 
(1997a: 231). As a result, historical institutionalists focus on how ideas become 
embedded in institutions, structuring and constraining future policy options to 
particular paths, while rational institutionalists focus on how individuals use 
ideas as devices to further their interests.
Thus, some scholars prioritise interests over ideas in policy-making, while others 
prioritise institutions. The focus on these issues has overshadowed factors 
internal to the ideas themselves and how these factors influence policy options. 
That is, analyses of the role of ideas in the policy-making process have focused 
on how policy-makers use ideas as tools to achieve their goals or they have
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looked to restraints imposed by existing ideas becoming embedded in 
institutions. As a consequence, these analyses have paid insufficient attention to 
the impact on policy options of factors intrinsic to the particular ideas, such as 
their associated discourse and their informal institutions. By informal 
institutions, I mean the norms, values, attitudes, implicit codes of conduct, and 
so on that underpin human interaction. The difference between formal and 
informal institutions is explored in the next chapter.7 The result of this 
inattention, as Blyth contends in his review, is that many scholars 'reduce ideas 
to "filler" ... rather than treat them as objects of investigation in their own right' 
(1997a: 229). In this section, I want to canvass some of the debates on the role of 
ideas in policy-making, especially those relating to ideas and interests and ideas 
and institutions, although I will reserve a more detailed discussion of the latter 
for the next chapter. Here, I want to lay the groundwork for my claim that 
prioritising either interests or institutions underestimates the impact of the 
content of the ideas themselves on the options available to policy-makers.
Desmond King, in his book, In the Name of Liberalism, examines how liberal 
democracies have introduced a range of social policies that, more correctly, may 
be described as 'illiberal' in nature. He concludes:
Some policies -  pursued by governments for political reasons -  
assume illiberal characteristics insofar as they violate the two core 
principles of liberalism, that is equality of treatment and respect of 
individual freedom (1999: 24).
His most recent examples are the 'workfare' policies of the United States and 
Britain, which, he argues, have mobilised the 'idea of obligations' at the expense 
of the previously dominant idea of social rights. According to policies based on 
this 'idea', there are: 'no rights without responsibilities' (Giddens 1998: 65). 
Those receiving unemployment benefits are obliged to look for work, and 
policies are aimed at ensuring that welfare systems do not discourage 
individuals from this search.8 Thus, he contends, workfare schemes are based
7 I suggest that many of the theorists looking at ideas and institutions over-emphasise the stability 
of institutions because they focus too much on formal institutions (that is, rules, laws, structures, 
organisations, and so on) and pay insufficient attention to the informal institutions (that is, norms, 
values, attitudes, implicit codes of conduct, and so on) that underpin human interaction.
8 King attributes many of these ideas, which underpin the 'third way' policies of British Labour 
Prime Minister Tony Blair (among others), to Anthony Giddens. In this instance, he cites Giddens 
(1998), 'W e're in the family way', The Times Higher Education Supplement, 18 September (King 
1999: 252). More generally, see Giddens (1998).
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on a 'new contract between the citizen and the Government based on 
responsibilities and rights' (1999: 252). King concludes that this contractualist 
workfare, by emphasising the obligations and responsibilities of the individual 
over the rights enjoyed by that person, contravenes liberal principles by treating 
some people unequally (1999: 256). The sanctions associated with the workfare 
regimes 'relegates unemployed persons, and some other recipients of assistance, 
to second-class status in the polity' (1999: 257).9
In building this argument, King looks to the role of ideas in policy-making, 
remarking that democracy 'permits debate and the diffusion of ideas ... in a way 
which few political systems can emulate or contemplate' (1999: 30). He argues 
that ideas are important to the policy process, with the employment of ideas and 
expertise in public policy programmes 'central' to policy-making. He notes that 
he concurs with Deborah Stone's view that 'the essence of policy making in 
political communities [is] the struggle over ideas. ... Ideas are at the center of all 
political conflict' (Stone 1997:11, cited in King 1999:30). But, in making this 
claim, King is careful to differentiate between the ideas themselves and the way 
that interest groups use ideas, and expertise, to achieve their objectives. King 
challenges what he calls the 'dominant view' in political science that self-interest 
alone explains policy choices, with ideas and arguments 'merely the material 
exploited by politicians for electoral gain' (1999: 32). He acknowledges that 
politicians 'willingly use ideas to serve their ends', but argues that focusing only 
on self-interest fails to provide a complete account of the policy-making process 
and 'marginalizes ideas ... excessively from political decisions' (1999: 32, 35). He 
argues that, while ideas may be used as instruments for political ambition, 'they 
are far from irrelevant analytically', and such use 'does not ... dispel their 
significance as legitimators and, on occasions, stimulants of policy decisions' 
(1999: 35, 32-33).
King draws attention to the importance of the content of the ideas. He notes that, 
even when ideas are the instrument of political ends, 'they must be intellectually 
plausible' (1999: 3). More precisely, ideas used to promote particular policy 
options must be both persuasive and credible, 'since both citizens and policy­
makers in liberal democracies value rationality highly and expect coherent
9 Contrast King's view with Jacobsen's argument, noted earlier in this chapter, that a shift in the 
means to achieve policy has no impact on ends.
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explanations for policy choices' (1999:3). Ideas, therefore, must contain a 
convincing explanation for policy actions that the political combatants can use to 
justify the superiority of their choices over those that their opponents put 
forward. Interest groups and elites may use ideas, but the ideas are also able to 
stand on their own, 'legitimated and rationalized' by claims about what King 
terms their 'intrinsic validity' (1999: 32). In other words, the content of ideas 
matters just as much as the competition over the ideas, a point that John 
Kingdon made some years ago in his work on agenda setting. Kingdon 
observed that political scientists would 'miss a great deal' if they used only such 
concepts as power, influence, pressure, and strategy to understand public policy 
(1984:131). He argued that a preoccupation with power and influence meant 
that political scientists 'sometimes neglect the importance of content' (1984:133). 
Yet, he continued:
The content of the ideas themselves, far from being mere 
smokescreens or rationalizations, are integral parts of decision 
making in and around government. ... Both the substance of the 
ideas and political pressure are often important in moving some 
subjects into prominence and in keeping other subjects low on 
governmental agendas (1984: 131, 133).
In a similar vein, Hall argues for greater emphasis on the ideas themselves, 
noting that:
it is not necessary to deny that politics involves a struggle for power 
and advantage in order to recognize that the movement of ideas 
plays a role, with some impact of its own, in the process of policy­
making (1993: 292).10
The differentiation between the content of ideas, the way that ideas are used, 
and the independent role accorded to the former in policy-making, counters the 
work of those researchers who present ideas simply as tools of interest groups; 
that is, those who understand ideas to have no independent standing (see the 
discussions in Blyth 1997a and Jacobsen 1995). According to this line of 
reasoning, ideas cannot influence policy unless they are adopted by elites, who 
use the ideas as political tools to achieve their interests, which exist prior to the 
ideas. In the words of Goldstein and Keohane: 'ideas are just hooks: competing
Hall offers as an example the events in Britain in the 1970s, observing that:
The contest for electoral power that brought [Margaret] Thatcher to office was 
certainly central to the triumph of monetarism. ... [However,] the play of ideas was 
as important to the outcome as was the contest for power (1993: 289).
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elites seize on popular ideas to propagate and to legitimize their interests, but 
the ideas themselves do not play a causal role' (1993: 4).11 Blyth believes that 
such an approach sells ideas short. He argues that economic ideas are 'much 
more than post hoc rationalisations for pre-existing interests'; rather, ideas 
determine the content of individual preferences (1997b: 231; 2002: 309).12 He 
claims that ideas must exist prior to interests because ideas are used to form (and 
change) interests, to make choices and to act (1997b: 235). For this reason, he 
rejects the conclusion that Jacobsen reaches in his review of some of the 
literature on the role of ideas in policy-making: that the 'pervasive flaw' in the 
'power of ideas' arguments is that they fail to recognise that ideas and interests 
are 'not separate entities' (Jacobsen 1995: 309). Jacobsen argues that economic 
ideas matter because they are 'clusters of ideas/interests' that define productive 
arrangements (1995:309). Blyth rejects this assessment, arguing that 
it: 'reinforces the view that what matters are not ideas themselves but how they 
are used to "reconcile the interests of elites'" (1997a: 247, fn 11).
In contrast, Blyth argues that: 'Ideas are interesting precisely because they define 
tastes and preferences and give content to "objective material interests'" 
(1997a: 247, fn 11). We need to recall here Blyth's definition of an economic 
ideology or set of ideas as an interpretative framework that describes and 
accounts for the workings of the economy (1997b: 234). The framework outlines 
the 'optimal state of economic and, by derivation, political affairs' by defining 
what elements constitute the economy and the polity, the roles of the individual 
and groups within these elements, and policy goals and the methods to achieve 
these goals (1997b: 233; 1997a: 246). As noted above, Blyth argues that the 
framework provides an understanding of the 'proper' and 'improper' inter­
relations between constitutive elements of the economy and a 'vision which 
specifies how these elements should be constructed' (1997b: 234, emphasis in 
original). In this way, he suggests, ideas 'serve to redefine existing interests and 
even create new ones among agents' in that they can 'create a common world­
view between economic and political agents who have very different life 
chances' and 'can build bridges across class and consumption categories'
H On this understanding, the amount of influence an idea has on policy simply reflects the amount 
of influence of the elites promoting it. As Jacobsen pithily observes: 'the more powerful the 
sponsors of ideas, the more powerful the ideas' (1995: 295).
I2 I do not take this to mean that ideas can never be used as rationalisations for pre-existing 
interests; rather, their role cannot be reduced solely to this.
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(1997b: 233). Thus, Blyth contends, the framework is: 'the means through which 
agents' expectations of, and preferences for, certain policy choices and political 
and economic goods are constructed' (1997b: 233). The result, he argues, is that 
while ideas may provide a rationale for competing interests, they 'also, more 
importantly, are the medium through which interests are created, social coalitions are 
forged and distributional struggles are depoliticised' (1997b: 235; emphasis in 
original). Schön and Rein make a similar argument somewhat more succinctly 
when they observe that it is the ideas, which they discuss as 'structures of belief, 
perception, and appreciation' or 'frames', held by policy actors that 'determine 
what they see as being in their interests' (1994: 29; emphasis in original). On this 
understanding, ideas cannot simply be the tools that elites use in a contest to 
achieve their interests, because the ideas establish what those interests can be. 
Ideas must exist outside, and prior to, interests.
King argues that ideas and debate, which politicians seek to influence, are 
among the general features of liberal democracy that contribute to the formation 
of (social) policy.13 Ideas are important because they supply the 'evidential' or 
'knowledge' base that King contends policy-makers require in order to devise 
policies (1999: 28). This 'knowledge' is influential because it forms 'part of the 
intellectual and political discourse within which politicians operate', and it is the 
'basis for detailed policy initiatives' (King 1999: 28-29). That is, ideas supply the 
interpretative framework of how the world works, what is possible within this 
world, how goals can be achieved and so on, and it is within this framework that 
policy-makers discuss and formulate policy. King notes two other features of 
liberal democracy that influence policy that I want to bring into the discussion of 
ideas: I) the privileged position accorded expertise or specialist knowledge; and 
II) the constraints imposed by political institutions and policy legacies (1999: 29).
I) Expertise
King argues that the influence of experts and expertise has grown, especially 
since World War II, as the 'professionalization of social research' and the 
'proliferation of a "problem-oriented knowledge elite'" has facilitated a 'greater 
role for expertise or knowledge in social policy' (1999:34; see also Haas
13 As noted above with regard to Blyth's focus on 'economic' policy, I would argue that, although 
King focuses on social policy, his arguments are equally relevant more generally.
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1992: 7-12).14 Experts acquire influence, enhanced reputations, 'and sometimes 
fame', when policy-makers accept and implement their ideas (King 1999: 35; 
Haas 12-16); that is, when policy-makers come to share the experts' version of 
how the world works and the associated interpretation of what policy goals and 
problems are within the realm of what policy-makers can consider and resolve. 
Once again, the content of the ideas being put forward is important in that, as 
noted above, the ideas have to be intellectually plausible to policy-makers. They 
must have an intrinsic validity that provides a convincing explanation for what 
is going on in the world, what actions are possible and the likely outcomes if 
these actions are pursued. Understood in this way, the ideas provide, as Blyth 
observes, a 'scientific' and 'normative' critique of the existing economy as well 
as how it could -  and should -  be (1997b: 234).
King contends that political endorsement validates one set of expertise, or one 
set of ideas, by excluding others from the decision: 'political choice constitutes a 
signal about confidence in the selected knowledge' (1999: 36). Winning the 
argument about political ideas matters, he concludes, 'since it enables those 
successful to dominate the content of political discourse', which, as noted above, 
is the basis for policy initiatives, establishing the boundaries of what can and 
cannot be considered within the realm of policy goals and action (1999: 292). 
Haas raises this notion in his discussion of epistemic communities. Here, we 
need to recall his argument, outlined in the previous chapter, that decision­
makers consulting epistemic communities for an understanding of the 'reality' 
or 'truth' of a situation, receive 'knowledge' based on the communities' 
interpretation of 'reality' according to its beliefs and notions of validity 
(1992: 21). Haas argues:
While epistemic communities provide consensual knowledge, they 
do not necessarily generate truth. The epistemological impossibility 
of confirming access to reality means that the group responsible for 
articulating the dimensions of reality has great social and political 
influence. It can identify and represent what is of public concern,
44 As noted in the previous chapter, Haas makes a similar observation in his discussion of 
epistemic communities when he argues that the 'expansion and professionalisation of 
bureaucracies', which regard themselves as technicians, policy-makers, and brokers, rather than 
advocates and partisans, has combined with the 'growing technical nature of problems' to foster an 
'increase in the deference paid to technical expertise' (1992:11).
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particularly in cases in which the physical manifestations of a 
problem are themselves unclear (1992: 23).15
When policy-makers endorse an epistemic community's set of ideas, they are 
accepting the broader world-view enshrined in those ideas. As will be discussed 
below, the endorsed set of ideas establishes a 'regime of truth' against which 
other options are judged and dismissed.
A difficulty with the influence of experts and expertise is that, as noted with 
regard to the OECD in the previous chapter, there is a tendency to view their 
'scientific' (or 'technical') knowledge as politically neutral. Experts are seen as 
professionals whose work is not in favour of one political arrangement or 
another; their work simply describes what is, according to their particular body 
of 'scientific' knowledge. However, Blyth is emphatic that the choice of the 
ideas underpinning economic management cannot be simply a choice between 
value-neutral models. Instead, he contends: 'Economic policy is inherently 
political in that economic issues, for example, what constitutes the fulfilment of 
policy criteria such as "efficiency", are ultimately derivative of previous 
theoretical/ideological statements' (1997b: 234-235). Ideas, he argues, construct:
what Keynes termed that all-important "conventional judgement" 
about how the economy works, and therefore, what the appropriate 
roles of the state, capital and labour should be and what policy 
should attempt to do (1997b: 240).
These assumptions about the nature of the economy 'privilege the claims to 
resources of one group over the claims of another' in that they justify and 
demand particular allocations of resources (Blyth 1997b: 235). The result is that 
competing agents can use their different ideas, with their associated different 
understandings of roles and allocations, as 'a resource to attack and restructure 
existing institutional and distributional arrangements ... challenging the 
"accepted" view of the economic world on which such institutions are based' 
(Blyth 1997b: 235, 233).16
15 Here, Haas offers the example of threats to the ozone layer (1992: 23).
16 Haas offers a similar argument, noting that, even when an issue is considered to be 'technical':
policymaking decisions generally involve the weighing of a number of complex and 
nontechnical issues centering around who is to get what in society and at what cost. 
Despite the veneer of objectivity and value neutrality achieved by pointing to the 
input of scientists, policy choices remain highly political in their allocation 
consequences (1992:11).
However, Haas then contradicts some of his own observations by arguing that:
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Blyth uses his account to explain a shift in the political 'middle' to the right over 
the past 20 years, in the context of a move within OECD states away from 
Keynesian principles of economic management towards monetarism 
(1997b: 232). He argues that the monetarist propositions that refuted some of 
Keynesianism's key claims were 'highly political' in that they also provided the 
ideological underpinning for fundamental shifts in policy direction. Monetarism 
not only offered ideas that directly attacked Keynesianism, but also included 
'other politically "useful" ideas', such as the natural rate of unemployment and 
the primacy of inflation, which supplied a new view of state-society relations 
that 'allowed the depoliticising of distributional conflicts and the abandonment 
of long-standing policy commitments, such as full employment' (Blyth 
1997b: 233). Again, it is the content of the ideas that is important, with the ideas 
themselves justifying, among other things, the emphasis on some policy goals 
over others. Blyth contends that monetarism's ideas were more than 'hooks' for 
pre-existing interests because, in moving away from the Keynesian emphasis on 
redistribution and growth towards the monetarist emphasis on inflation and 
monetary stability, the ideas reconstructed 'expectations of, and preferences for, 
certain policy choices and political and economic goods' (1997b: 233). 
Ultimately, Blyth claims, the political 'middle' is not a fixed point, but represents 
'a particular understanding of the world which is contestable' (1997b: 240). 
Parties and politicians, then, can 'shift the middle' to their advantage, if they can 
win the contest to define the 'reality' of that world (Blyth 1997b: 240). Thus, 
while the influence of experts and their expertise may have grown, it is 
important to note that experts do not offer politically neutral models of the 
world; rather, each community of experts offers a set of ideas that favours a 
particular political arrangement of state and society.
Especially in cases in which scientific evidence is ambiguous and the experts 
themselves are split into contending factions, issues have tended to be resolved loss 
on their technical merits than on their political ones (1992:11).
This statement suggests that Haas is arguing that, generally, when 'scientific evidence' is not 
'ambiguous', issues are resolved with reference to 'technical' evidence. The confusion here is that, 
according to Haas's own argument, the interpretation of 'technical' differs according to the set of 
ideas and the associated construction of 'reality' that is being used. The group winning the 
political contest is able to define what counts as 'technical' according to its own beliefs and notions 
of validity (ideas). This is not to argue that 'technical' comparisons are never possible; rather that 
we should be cautious about assuming that they are always possible.
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II) INSTITUTIONS
The role of institutions and policy legacies, and whether or not they impose 
constraints on the acceptance and implementation of new ideas, is the subject of 
a considerable amount of debate in the literature on the role of ideas in policy­
making. The main argument, which will be touched on here and canvassed in 
more detail in the next chapter, is that ideas are hard to change once they are 
incorporated into the institutions that implement and enforce policy; that is, 
ideas become absorbed into 'reinforcing organizational and normative 
structures', such as the regulatory apparatus of the state, thus becoming 
'embedded in institutions' (Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 13, 12). Once 
embedded, ideas continue to have effects on policy by becoming the taken-for- 
granted or unconscious assumptions behind policy discourse and policy practice 
(Blyth 1997b: 236). In this way, the endorsement of one set of ideas constrains 
policy-makers' choices by eliminating or overshadowing other sets of ideas. 
Policy-makers are seen as 'path-dependent', or confined to examining current 
problems with reference to past solutions. According to this argument, Colin 
Hay and Daniel Wincott summarise:
the order in which things happen affects how they happen; the 
trajectory of change up to a certain point itself constrains the 
trajectory after that point; and the strategic choices made at a 
particular moment eliminate whole ranges of possibilities from later 
choices while serving as the very condition of existence of others 
(1998: 955).
Simply stated, the argument is that 'history matters' because policy-makers are 
tied both to previous interpretations of policy problems and solutions that have 
become embedded in institutions and to the policy courses set by earlier choices 
and their associated longer-term commitments. Thus, the role of ideas in policy­
making is limited once a set of policy ideas is selected, and this results in a 
degree of policy inertia.
Proponents of the notion of ideas becoming embedded in institutions privilege 
the role of institutions over that of ideas in policy-making, a privilege that other 
scholars dispute. King, for example, argues that scholars emphasising 
embedded ideas and path dependency are guilty of overstating the solidity of 
administrative arrangements and underestimating the role of ideas in policy 
changes. In his view, such a perspective 'marginalizes the importance of ideas 
and exaggerates the rigidity of institutional arrangements for policy-making and
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implementation' (1999: 43). While these arguments and counter-arguments will 
be explored further in the next chapter, King's point about the alleged rigidity of 
institutions needs to be emphasised here. Arguments for embedded ideas and 
path dependency suggest that policy-makers find it difficult, if not impossible, to 
implement radical change because they are tied to existing policy options 
delineated by the ideas embedded in institutions. Yet, as Blyth rightly 
observes: 'Radical, rapid [policy] changes occur' (1997a: 245).
An example of such radical change, in which ideas were considered to play a 
significant role, comes from Hall, who compares the responses of the 
Conservative governments of Edward Heath (1970-74) and Margaret Thatcher 
(1979-83) to unemployment and recession (1993: 290). He notes that, while both 
Conservative Party leaders had promised to lower inflation, cut taxes, and 
reduce the role of the state in the economy, Heath responded to the economic 
problems by returning to Keynesian reflation and interventionist policies, while 
Thatcher held fast to her government's promised course. Hall attributes the 
difference partly to Thatcher having learned from Heath's mistake, but mostly to 
the content of the monetarist ideas in which she believed. He contends that, 
whereas the policy platform on which Heath was elected had no underpinning 
in an alternative economic theory, Thatcher could appeal to the 'more fully 
elaborated' monetarist paradigm for authoritative arguments with which to 
resist a return to 'failed' Keynesian policies. Thus, Hall concludes, when faced 
with recession, Heath had nothing to offer except a return to Keynesian 
reflation, while the coherent monetarist paradigm supplied Thatcher with 
'authoritative arguments' with which to resist pressure to return to the ailing 
Keynesian ideas enshrined in the prevailing institutions.17
Blyth acknowledges the role that some scholars assign to ideas, 'in and of 
themselves', as causal factors of radical change, noting that ideas gain special 
salience at times of great change because such periods are 'typically highly 
ideological' and 'normal politics' no longer apply (1997a: 245). But, he highlights
17 Hall uses this example to suggest that his model of policy paradigms provides a basis for a 
better understanding of the variations in state autonomy. He claims that analyses that argue that 
institutional structures determine a state's capacity to resist societal pressures cannot explain 
periods when a state with an unchanging structure seems autonomous. However, a coherent 
policy paradigm can enhance state autonomy by placing policy-makers in a stronger position to 
resist societal interests (1993: 290).
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the contradiction in 'appealing] to ideas as simultaneously promoting change 
and stasis' (1997a: 245). The question, then, is how we can explain ideas as both 
a source of inertia, at the centre of a constrained, path-dependent set of policy 
options, and as a source of change. Hall offers one explanation, using a 
Kuhnian-inspired model of paradigms and paradigm shifts ('scientific 
revolutions').
Paradigms and paradigm Shifts 
(How and why ideas Change Over time)
Thomas Kuhn's work on paradigms and scientific revolutions has been 
described as the 'touchstone' for research into the influence of ideas on policy, 
although, as will be discussed below (and see footnote), its application to policy 
analysis has some, though not, I believe, insurmountable, limitations.18 
According to Kuhn, paradigms are accepted orthodoxies based on past scientific 
achievements that 'some particular scientific community acknowledges for a 
time as supplying the foundation for its further practice' (1970: 10).19 A
18 I acknowledge that Kuhn's model deals with the 'hard' sciences and that there is a need for 
caution when appropriating hard science models for use in the social sciences in two important 
respects. First, we cannot assume that the social sciences work according to a series of universal, 
immutable laws as we expect in the hard sciences. Second, as Hall notes, policy paradigms are 'by 
definition never fully commensurable in scientific or technical terms'. Each paradigm contains its 
own, different account of how the world works, which means 'it is often impossible for the 
advocates of different paradigms to agree on a common body of data against which a technical 
judgment in favor of one paradigm over another might be made' (Hall 1993: 280; see also footnote 
16 in this chapter). However, in response to the first point, using the framework of a 'paradigm 
shift' does not appear to be too great a sin in that I am using it only as descriptive shorthand to 
discuss how we might understand policy change over time. I make no claims that the model 
explains all policy shifts, and, in fact, will go on to argue that the choice between paradigms is 
inherently political. In response to the second point, Hall's observation does not negate the case I 
want to make about the influence of ideas themselves. Rather, it serves to support the case that 
there are factors intrinsic to ideas that add to their dynamism. If ä judgment between policy 
paradigms cannot be based on 'hard scientific evidence', then the selection of one set of ideas over 
another (or others) is a political contest over which paradigm (set of ideas) can gain the most 
adherents and become accepted as the most convincing in explaining particular policy problems. 
My argument is that this contest is not always about formal institutions or path-dependency or 
interests, but can reflect the content of the idea and its associated discourse. For example, the 
concept of 'there is no alternative' contained within the neo-liberal paradigm contributed to its 
success in becoming the dominant paradigm. This will be discussed later in the chapter.
Brian Easton's observation that a crucial difference between a natural science 'revolution' 
(paradigm shift) and a policy revolution is that the latter is contested and debated in a way that the 
former is not (1997a: 263-264), supports my first point and does not alter my second.
Kuhn later acknowledges that critics have underscored the Targe number of different senses' in 
which he uses the term 'paradigm' in his book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, and notes that 
one commentator found 'at least twenty-two different usages' (1977: 294). He argues, however,
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paradigm becomes accepted when it is seen as more successful than its 
competitors at explaining problems (or 'puzzles') that the scientific community 
concerned has come to recognise as acute (Kuhn 1970: 23). However, Kuhn 
argues, 'it need not, and in fact never does, explain all the facts with which it can 
be confronted' (1970:18). Scientists use the knowledge contained in their 
paradigm to solve 'puzzles' and the solutions are then added to the paradigm 
itself. Kuhn suggests that such 'mopping up' operations constitute what he calls 
'normal science' or the 'fact-gathering ... empirical work undertaken to articulate 
the paradigm theory' (1970:27). Such normal-scientific research resolves some 
of the paradigm's residual ambiguities and permits the solution of problems to 
which it had drawn attention (Kuhn 1970: 27).
However, an accepted paradigm can lose its dominant position to another when 
the number of problems that it cannot explain 'accumulate to the point of 
throwing the reigning model into crisis' (Jacobsen 1995:293; see Kuhn 
1970: chapters 6, 7, and 8). Kuhn describes such change as a 'revolution' because 
the transition from one paradigm to another is not an incremental, cumulative 
process, achieved by an extension of the old paradigm, but a 'reconstruction of 
the field from new fundamentals' (1970: 85). The reconstruction changes the 
field's basic theoretical generalisations as well as many of its methods and 
applications. As Kuhn observes: 'When the transition is complete, the profession 
will have changed its view of the field, its methods and its goals' (1970: 85).20 
An important point here is that the new paradigm is not simply a different view 
of how the world works, it is how the world works; that is, it is not that the 
paradigm's practitioners 'see something as something else; instead, they simply 
see it' (Kuhn 1970: 85; emphasis in original).21 The new paradigm introduces a
that the usages can be divided into two sets: one is 'global, embracing all the shared commitments 
of a scientific group; the other isolates a particularly important sort of commitment and is thus a 
subset of the first' (1977: 294). For my purposes, these difficulties do not undermine the general 
conception of Kuhn's work on paradigms and paradigm shifts that is summarised above and that 
can be seen as underlying many of the discussions of ideas.
211 Note the difference here with Jacobsen's argument, outlined above, which split methods (shared 
economic beliefs) from goals/ends (shared social beliefs). According to Kuhn's argument, and the 
one that I will elaborate in the next chapter, such a distinction would not be possible. To change 
one's view of methods inevitably affects one's view of goals. For example, changing the methods to 
achieve one goal (such as economic growth) may have consequences for other goals (such as social 
justice). This will be discussed further in Chapters 5 and 6.
91z-i In his discussion of ideas, King refers to political endorsement privileging a particular set of 
knowledge 'at that point in time', and acknowledges that, in this sense, although the content of 
knowledge or expertise employed in social policy-making changes, its role as source of policy
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new tradition of scientific practice 'conducted under different rules and within a 
different universe of discourse' (Kuhn 1970: 85).
Hall offers a Kuhnian model of paradigms and paradigm shifts as an analytical 
framework to explain the influence of ideas on policy, as well as how ideas 
change and how this affects policy.22 According to Hall, ideas matter in policy­
making because they provide a framework through which policy-makers 
understand the world and how it works. This 'interpretative framework', or 
common understanding of the world, is the means through which policy-makers 
discern policy problems and solutions.23 More precisely, Hall says, this 
'framework of ideas and standards ... specifies not only the goals of policy and 
the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature 
of the problems they are meant to be addressing' (1993: 279). The result is that 
policy-makers discuss and design policy within a 'system of ideas and standards 
which is comprehensible and plausible to the actors involved' (Anderson
formation does not (1999: 36). This reflects Kuhn's point that, 'though the world does not change 
with a change in paradigm, the scientist afterwards works in a different world' (noted in Euben 
1969: 25). The content of the ideas may change, bringing a new 'shared belief' in the way the world 
works, but the role of the ideas in the policy-making process (or the way a paradigm is used to 
underpin policy) remains the same.
22 There are, of course, other ways to understand ideas in the policy-making process. Blyth, for 
example, proposes a three-stage 'life-cycle' of an economic idea, with discursive, instrumentalist, and 
reconstitutive phases. In the discursive phase, agents 'contest the definition, meaning and solution of 
the problems identified by opposing economic ideologies'; in the instrumentalist phase, 'these ideas 
are co-opted and deployed by agents attempting to redefine distributional boundaries and reform 
institutional arrangements'; and in the reconstitutive phase, 'an economic ideology becomes 
embedded through policy practice in the apparatus of the state and the economy, and serves to 
reconstitute a "social bargain" ['a self-reinforcing compact between labour, capital and the state'] 
over time' (Blyth 1997b: 234). Blyth argues that his suggested three phases coincide with the effects 
he posits ideologies (ideas) as having. The discursive phase corresponds to the period when ideas 
alter agents' perceptions of interest; the instrumentalist phase to the period when ideas are used to 
facilitate new patterns of collective action; and the reconstitutive phase to when new ideas become 
embedded in state and economic institutions (1997b: 234).
King also suggests a three-stage pattern to policy-making: first, 'a political problem becomes too 
great to be neglected (such as unemployment) or a lobby group pushes an issue onto the political 
agenda', or problems 'arise as a result of earlier measures (such as the size of the welfare budget)'; 
second, the 'initial interest compels a systematic study or collection of relevant data to determine 
the scope of the problem and the best way to alleviate it' (1999: 39); and third, bipartisan support 
endorses a particular range of policy actions. King notes that the first two stages 'may well be 
structured to favour a particular interpretation ... and hence resolution of the issue' (1999: 39).
23 I am reading an interpretative framework in the terms outlined above: as a system of 'shared 
beliefs'.
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1978: 23, cited in Hall 1993: 279).24 Policy options formulated within this 
framework cannot be other than 'intellectually plausible', persuasive and 
credible, which, as noted above, King observes they must be in order to be 
accepted and implemented, because such options are based on the accepted 
world-view of what can be achieved through policy and how. Hall contends 
that the framework is embedded in the terminology that policy-makers use to 
communicate their work, 'and it is influential precisely because so much of it is 
taken for granted and unamenable to scrutiny as a whole' (1993: 279).
Hall describes these interpretative frameworks as 'policy paradigms', which he 
says are 'rather like the scientific paradigms that Thomas Kuhn has identified' 
(1993: 279). Using this 'Kuhnian' account to explain how one policy paradigm or 
set of ideas succeeds another, Hall argues that if 'economic' theorising is seen as 
Kuhn's puzzle-solving, then 'one theory succeeds another primarily because it 
defines and solves puzzles in a more satisfying way' (1989: 9).25 The successor 
theory is seen to be 'better at explaining the empirical observations that 
remained anomalous in terms of the earlier theory' (1989: 9).26 In simple terms, 
it offers policy-makers a more plausible account of the hows and whys of current 
problems and their possible solutions. Hall notes that, while attempts may be 
made to 'stretch' the terms of the existing paradigm to cover anomalies, such 
stretching 'gradually undermines the intellectual coherence and precision of the 
original paradigm' (1993: 280). Worse, he contends, if the existing paradigm is 
'genuinely incapable of dealing with anomalous developments', then the 
experimental adjustments to existing policy can result in policy failures that 
undermine the paradigm's authority even further. Hall believes his Kuhnian 
model of paradigms and paradigm change offers a conceptual framework for 
understanding the process of policy shifts and the 'characteristics that tend to 
render new ideas economically persuasive' (1993: 284; 1989: 8). That is, it offers 
a means of understanding why one set of policy ideas is chosen over another. 
According to the Kuhnian model, a policy paradigm (set of ideas) is selected as
That is, the paradigm sets the underlying conception of 'reality' that makes certain policy 
courses more 'rational' and 'realistic' than others (Euben 1969: 25).
25 Hall's emphasis on 'economic' theorising is important to the point made in footnote 31.
26 Discussing the rise of the Keynesian paradigm, Hall offers the prolonged unemployment of the 
inter-war period as one such anomaly that could account for the acceptance of Keynesian ideas; 
that is, Keynesianism's understanding of the causes of, and solutions to, unemployment were more 
plausible than those of the then-prevailing ideas (1989).
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long as it serves both to describe current policy problems and to offer plausible 
solutions ('normal science'). When the paradigm is no longer seen to do this, 
then another replaces it ('paradigm shift').
Hall elaborates his Kuhnian analogy by disaggregating the policy-making 
process into three levels, which he argues can be used to identify three distinct 
kinds of changes in policy: the overarching goals that guide policy (third-order 
change), the techniques or policy instruments to achieve these goals (second- 
order change), and the precise settings of these instruments (first-order change) 
(1993: 278). He maps these policy changes on to Kuhn's model of paradigm 
shifts, claiming that first-order and second-order change can be seen as 'normal 
policy-making', or a 'process that adjusts policy without challenging the overall 
terms of a given policy paradigm', much like Kuhn's 'normal science'. Third- 
order change, however, is 'marked by the radical changes in the overarching 
terms of policy discourse associated with a "paradigm shift"' (Hall 1993: 279). 
First-order and second-order changes can be understood as preserving the 
general pattern or direction of policy, while third-order change is a 'disjunctive 
process associated with periodic discontinuities in policy' or a complete change 
in policy direction (Hall 1993: 279). Thus, Hall's model can be used to answer 
Blyth's question, noted above, about ideas as a source of both inertia and great 
change; first-order and second-order change can be seen as inertia while third- 
order change (or a paradigm shift) represents radical change.27
Hall applies this model to explain the shift from Keynesianism to monetarism in 
Britain between 1970 and 1989, arguing that British macro-economic policy­
making in this period 'clearly revolved around this sort of policy paradigm', 
with events displaying 'many of the features a Kuhnian model would lead us to 
expect' (1993: 279, 284).28 The Keynesian paradigm was dominant in most of the 
post-war period:
22 Michael Howlett argues that the speed of the paradigm shift depends on whether or not there is 
an accompanying change in key actors/interests (2002: 244). The shift is rapid when there are new 
ideas and new actors, and slow when there are new ideas only. I find this claim unconvincing 
because it suggests that existing actors cannot change their ideas, and hence their policies.
28 Hall's account is not uncontested. Peter Kerr and David Marsh, for example, advance what they 
call a 'multidimensional approach' to explain Thatcherism, arguing that Thatcherism is not as 
'transformative' in terms of undermining and replacing the post-war consensus as some authors 
claim. See Kerr and Marsh (1999) and, more generally, Marsh et al. (1999).
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[Keynesian ideas] specified what the economic world was like, how 
it was to be observed, which goals were attainable through policy, 
and what instruments should be used to attain them. They became 
the prism through which policy-makers saw the economy as well as 
their own role within it (Hall 1993: 279).
Hall argues that, throughout this period (1970-1989), policy-makers made first- 
order changes every year, sometimes more than once a year, adjusting the 
settings of fiscal and monetary instruments in response to policy outcomes and 
new developments. They also made second-order changes at 'less frequent 
junctures', with changes in policy instruments in this period including a change 
in the system of monetary control and a new system for controlling public 
expenditure. However, he contends, the election of Margaret Thatcher's 
Conservative government in 1979 brought an 'intense break' in policy when, 
'[n]ot only were the settings of policy changed but the hierarchy of goals and 
sets of instruments employed to guide policy shifted radically as well' 
(1993: 283-284). The Thatcher government made a third-order change, altering 
policy goals according to a monetarist set of ideas: inflation replaced 
unemployment as the pre-eminent concern of policy-makers, balanced budgets 
and tax reductions replaced macro-economic efforts to reduce unemployment, 
monetary policy replaced fiscal policy as the principal macro-economic 
instrument, and state regulatory interventions (including incomes policies and 
exchange controls) were eliminated (Hall 1993: 284).
Hall argues that such changes exemplify a paradigm shift, with the monetarist 
paradigm, based on different policy prescriptions and a 'fundamentally different 
conception of how the economy itself worked', replacing the Keynesian 
paradigm. This replacement, he contends, brought an associated 'radical shift' 
in the order of goals guiding policy, as well as the policy instruments and 
settings of those instruments used to achieve the new order.29 Moreover, Hall 
argues, 'these changes were accompanied by substantial changes in the
29 Here, Hall underplays his own Kuhnian analogy, talking of a shift in the order of goals and not 
recognising that the full implication of Kuhn's comment, noted above, that a paradigm shifts alters 
the view of 'the field, its method and its goals'. The new paradigm's view of goals could mean that 
some goals have changed so that they are not necessarily the same as they were under the previous 
paradigm or have been eliminated altogether. In this way, a paradigm shift may change more than 
the order of goals; it may change the goals themselves. For example, the prioritisation of economic 
growth over social justice issues may make it impossible to achieve the latter, or may result in new 
understandings of what achieving social justice means. See King's comments, noted above, re 
workfare, and Chapter 6 of this thesis.
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discourse employed by policymakers and in the analysis of the economy on 
which policy was based' (1993: 284). Policy-makers came to believe that the 
Keynesian paradigm had failed to 'fully anticipate [or] explain' economic 
developments in this period, including inflation and stagnating levels of growth 
and employment. These 'anomalies' raised doubts over the adequacy of 
Keynesian analyses of the economy such that the 'Keynesian doctrine gradually 
lost coherence and credibility in the eyes of politicians, officials and the public' 
(Hall, 1993: 285). In contrast, the monetarist paradigm was seen as a 'coherent 
and highly developed alternative', and thus became the principal challenger to 
the ailing Keynesian paradigm (Hall 1993: 286).30
IDEAS: DISCOURSE, FRAMES, AND NAMES
So far, I have discussed in this chapter a broad definition of ideas and examined 
some of the views on the role of ideas in policy-making. In the previous section, 
I outlined Hall's use of a Kuhnian model of paradigm shifts to explain the 
change in policy ideas over time. Hall's framework, which he uses to analyse
30 Hall argues that monetarism had 'substantial' political appeal in that it offered a 'coherent 
challenge to the policies of the Labour government' and public appeal in that it offered a 'simple 
but appealing prescription' to resolve both economic problems and the government's much- 
publicised difficulties with the unions (1993: 286). However, its appeal was not universal. Mark 
Wickham-Jones discusses a letter signed by 364 British economists who specifically rejected 
monetarism, arguing that there were alternatives that should be considered (1992:171-185). 
Wickham-Jones uses the economists' statement as a basis for rejecting the 'idea of a Kuhnian 
paradigm failure' as an explanation for the shift to monetarism, arguing that there was 'no 
consensus on the failure of the existing paradigm or what should replace it' (1992:183). However, 
this ignores an important component of the monetarist set of ideas: the notion that 'there is no 
alternative'. Wickham-Jones himself notes that a major criticism that the Thatcher government and 
others could level at the dissenting economists was their lack of an elaborated alternative to the 
government's monetarist line:
It was not enough to suggest that alternative policies would work better without
specifying what the alternatives would be. But the economists couldn't spell out policy
details because they didn't agree as to which policy would lead to recovery ...
(1992:179).
Such a statement suggests that a Kuhnian model of paradigm failure and replacement does offer a 
way of understanding the shift, as Hall claims. Faced with a number of worsening economic 
problems, monetarism's opponents could not agree on a coherent, plausible answer, including 
Keynesianism. That is, while there may not have been a consensus that Keynesianism had failed, 
there was also no consensus that it was working. Thus, the Keynesian paradigm was failing in that 
it was no longer seen as the dominant world-view. To labour this point, in the social sciences, a 
dominant paradigm does not have to be the only paradigm, but it must attract enough adherents to 
its world-view to make it dominant. While Keynesianism achieved this for a time, this consensus 
broke down enough for it to lose its dominance. Monetarists, on the other hand, were not only 
suggesting a coherent paradigm that explained both problems and solutions, but a paradigm 
containing a specific rejection that any other understanding of the world would work.
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the shift in ideas in Britain between 1970 and 1989, offers one explanation of how 
ideas can be agents of both policy inertia and radical policy change. Ideas 
promote policy inertia when they form the accepted paradigm that policy­
makers use to understand the world; the paradigm (set of ideas) provides the 
conventional wisdom and underlying assumptions used to define problems, 
assess their severity and formulate solutions. Ideas promote policy change 
when they are perceived as being either significantly better or significantly less 
able than an alternative paradigm at explaining policy problems.
However, as outlined so far, the model appears to treat ideas and their role in 
policy-making as apolitical: a paradigm change occurs because, on a scientific- 
technical judgment of economic processes and outcomes, a new paradigm is 
technically more proficient at achieving the desired goals. Yet, such an 
understanding surely is misleading. Paradigms in the social sciences are 
inherently political, not only in the sense noted above (in which they form and 
align interest groups which then use them to attack and change conventional 
wisdom), but also in the more intangible sense in which the paradigm itself 
'frames' policy problems and solutions. In the latter, both the content of the 
ideas themselves and the discourse used to express and implement them act to 
constrain (or enhance) the options available to policy-makers. It is to these 
issues that I now turn.
I noted above (footnote 18) that there are some limitations to the application of 
Kuhn's work to policy analysis and I drew attention to Hall's qualification 
regarding his drawing on the Kuhnian image of scientific progress to examine 
the dynamics of the policy process. In his discussion of policy paradigms, Hall is 
careful to note Kuhn's point that paradigms are not scientifically or technically 
commensurate, and observes that this means that the replacement of one policy 
paradigm by another is likely to be 'political in tone' or 'more sociological than 
scientific' (1993: 280). Each paradigm offers its own, distinct, understanding of 
how the world works, which means the advocates of different paradigms may 
find it 'impossible ... to agree on a common body of data against which a 
technical judgment in favor of one paradigm over another might be made' (Hall 
1993: 280).31 This means that, not only is the selection of one paradigm over
31 Hall later contradicts the argument he makes here. Although he has acknowledged that the 
selection of one paradigm over another will be 'political in tone' because each paradigm's different
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another (or others) a contest between policy agents for political dominance, but 
that issues of authority, such as whose advice policy-makers should believe, are 
central and also become a contest (Hall 1993: 280).
This suggests a return to the claim that ideas are not important in themselves, 
but are simply the tools of interests. Blyth is dissatisfied with this account and 
criticises Hall's model for casting the transition between paradigms as an 
'essentially elite process' in which '[i]nsulated bureaucratic and political elites 
become the bearers of different "policy paradigms" [sets of ideas]' (1997a: 237). 
As noted above, he argues that placing emphasis on elites misses the way such 
ideas, or 'ideological schemas', serve to discredit existing patterns of collective 
action and to develop new ones. Such emphasis tells us about process, or the 
way ideas are used, but not about selection, or the way one set of ideas comes to 
dominate. It tells us nothing about the content of the ideas themselves and 
whether this has any impact in the dominance of one set of ideas over another. 
Or, as Blyth contends: 'The elite game may tell us how the ideas get from the 
blackboard to the party, but not how or why certain ideas come to be accepted 
over others' (1997a: 237). He wants the mechanism through which ideas pass 
'from academic debate to popular consciousness' clarified (1997a: 237). That is, 
to return to Keynes's eloquent terms noted at the beginning of this chapter, he 
wants to know more about the means by which 'madmen in authority' and the 
general public come to accept the ideas of some 'academic scribbler[s]' over 
others.
One way that ideas may filter through to popular consciousness is via a 
constitutive part of the ideas themselves: their discourse. By this, I mean the 
discourse with which a paradigm articulates policy problems and solutions; that
world view makes scientific and technical comparisons between paradigms impossible, he still 
treats paradigms as though they are only technical and not political constructs. He argues that 'not 
all fields of policy will possess policy paradigms as elaborate or as forceful as the ones associated 
with macroeconomic policy-making' (1993:291). Indeed, such paradigms 'are most likely to be 
found in fields where policymaking involves some highly technical issues and a body of 
specialized knowledge pertaining to them' (1993:291). These statements imply that a judgment 
between competing paradigms can be made on the basis of their 'technical' and 'knowledge' 
content. Yet, Hall has already noted that the incommensurability of the scientific and technical 
aspects of paradigms makes such a judgment impossible. Thus, his use of the 'elaborate' and 
'forceful' macroeconomic paradigms ignores the fundamental disagreements over the 'technical' 
aspects of competing economic paradigms that make the choice of dominant paradigm not just 
'political in tone', but extremely political.
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is, the interpretative structures it provides to make known, contextualise, and 
give meaning to policy issues. My argument here is that ideas have an inherent 
range of articulatory practices that serve to 'frame' and 'name', outlining a view 
of policy problems and solutions that is based on the ideas' understanding of 
'reality' and the construction of state-society relations. The discourse of a 
paradigm articulates the way that the ideas constitute and organise social and 
political relations, expressing the inherent underlying assumptions and ensuring 
their passage through the broader community. As this discourse is adopted and 
used, it comes to permeate society as the values, attitudes, beliefs, and social 
mores that support the paradigm's established order. It becomes the taken-for- 
granted, common-sense context through which ideas are interpreted and 
understood. That is, it becomes the uncritical and largely unconscious way in 
which a person perceives the world (Simon 1982: 25). As the paradigm's norms 
and values permeate society and the paradigm becomes dominant, the existing 
order as established in the paradigm becomes natural and inevitable; it becomes 
the unspoken and unchallenged norm.32 Other options become 
incomprehensible, as they do not fit within the paradigm's construction of 
reality. Thus, when the paradigm's order of things is accepted, it can 'prevent 
demands from becoming political issues or even from being made' (Lukes 
1974: 38). In the following section, I will elaborate on this argument, noting that 
the content of the ideas themselves and their constituent discourse act to 
constrain (or enhance) the options available to policy-makers, setting limits (or 
offering opportunities) that policy-makers then use to their advantage. I begin 
with a general discussion of discourse before moving on to 'frames', or the 
interpretative structures through which ideas portray policy problems and 
solutions, and 'names', or the terms of the ideas.
As outlined above, Hall describes a policy paradigm as an interpretative 
framework through which policy-makers understand the world and how it 
works. Paradigms specify policy goals and the methods to achieve them, as well 
as the 'very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing' (Hall 
1993: 279). However, the paradigm also constructs the world it purports to 
explain. This occurs in the way that the paradigm includes and excludes 
'problems' from its explanation, and the way it portrays or 'frames' the policy
32 Or, at least, unspoken and unchallenged by those who benefit from it. I am indebted to my 
colleague Angela Pratt for discussions on this topic. See Pratt (2003: ch. 2) with regard to 
hegemonic discourse and concepts of sovereignty, nationhood and 'whiteness'.
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problems it aims to explain, their severity, and their possible solutions.33 A 
paradigm defines what can be seen as a policy concern, and, conversely, what 
cannot. Kuhn himself acknowledges that a paradigm allows the scientific 
community to include some problems within their purview while rejecting 
others. He explains that a paradigm, while it is dominant, or taken for granted 
as supplying the explanation of how the world works, gives a scientific 
community 'a criterion for choosing problems that ... can be assumed to have 
solutions' (1970: 37). He goes on:
To a great extent these are the only problems that the community 
will admit as scientific or encourage its members to undertake. ... A 
paradigm can, for that matter, even insulate the community from 
those socially important problems that are not reducible to the 
puzzle form, because they cannot be stated in terms of the 
conceptual and instrumental tools the paradigm supplies (1970: 37).
This suggests that, when scholars apply a Kuhnian paradigm model to policy­
making, they need to pay attention to how the paradigm represents the policy 
problems, what it includes and what it leaves out.
One way to discover this is to look at the discourse of a paradigm, or the way it 
articulates policy problems and solutions. A discourse approach to ideas is 
sensitive to language, which is 'not seen as a series of terms which reflect some 
aspect of reality, but is regarded as constitutive of realities' (Outshoorn 2000: 5). 
Or, as Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon note: 'the terms used to describe social 
life are also active forces shaping it' (1997: 78). Thus, discourse affects 'what is 
seen and how [it] is described' (Bacchi 1999: 10). I raised the importance of 
being able to define reality in the previous chapter in the discussion of the 
OECD as an epistemic community. I noted that an epistemic community has its 
own world-view, which underpins its interpretation of policy issues and what is 
real and/or valid, and that policy-makers receive this 'reality' or 'truth' when
33 For example, according to the Keynesian paradigm, substantial and prolonged unemployment 
was an inevitable outcome of the capitalist process. Given this 'frame' or understanding of the 
problem of unemployment -  that left to its own devices, capitalism inevitably produced 
unemployment -  the fault was seen to lie with market, not individual failure. The Keynesian 
solution, then, was for the state to intervene to minimise the instability of the business cycle, thus 
keeping unemployment to a minimum. The monetarist paradigm frames the problem and the 
solution in a different manner. According to the monetarist paradigm, markets are held to clear 
(supply equals demand), thus the level at which the market clears is the level of full employment 
or the 'natural rate' of employment that the economy can support. This 'frame' means that 
'unemployment, whatever its level, is by definition voluntary' (Blyth 1997b: 232). That is, it is not a 
problem that the state can resolve through intervention in the market, but one of individual choice.
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they consult an epistemic community. As part of this discussion, I quoted 
Haas's use of Schattschneider's comment that, The definition of the alternatives 
is the supreme instrument of power', to underpin his observation that an 
epistemic community can affect policy outcomes because it can limit the choices 
available to policy-makers (1992:16). While decision-makers retain the actual 
choice of policies, community members can influence the options from which 
they choose, 'pointing out which alternatives are not viable on the basis of their 
causal understanding of the problems to be addressed' (Haas 1992: 16).
Here, I want to use a similar argument with regard to a paradigm's discourse; 
that is, discourse is part of the process through which a paradigm constructs 
reality and highlights particular issues for attention while ignoring or 
disregarding others. As Jacobsen observes, the way to gain some control over 
outcomes is to persuade players to accept a definition of the situation, 'because 
how a problem is defined determines the nature of the solution' (1995: 292). 
However, as noted above, Jacobsen's argument is rooted in his prioritising 
interests over ideas, whereas I would argue that a preoccupation with the links 
between ideas and institutions, interest groups or elite groups pays insufficient 
attention to the effects of the discourse intrinsic to a set of ideas. The control 
over definition is not confined to institutions, interests or elites; rather, the 
discourse of a paradigm allows it to define (or 'frame and name') policy issues in 
a way that is comprehensible to that set of ideas and that may add to their 
independent influence. That interests and elites may then use these ideas does 
not undermine the point that the ideas have an internal capacity to define 
'reality' or 'truth'.
In pursuing this approach to ideas, I am following Albert Yee, who states that an 
adequate explanation of how ideas become policy requires an analysis of the 
'causal mechanisms or capacities' of ideas that 'render the meanings of ideas and 
beliefs compelling to actors' (1996: 102). Yee argues that viewing 'networks of 
ideas and systems of belief' as languages or discourses can illuminate the factors 
that enable ideas and beliefs to affect policies. Among these factors are the ways 
that discourse 'gives meaning to the way that people understand themselves and 
their behaviour', 'generates the categories of meaning by which reality can be 
understood and explained', and 'makes "real" that which it describes as 
meaningful' (George 1994: 29-30, cited in Yee 1996; 99; emphasis in original).
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Yee notes that these discourses or discursive practices are also seen to form and 
reinforce 'knowledge disciplines and regimes of truth' (1996: 99). Keeley makes 
this point clear when he observes:
A dominating or hegemonic discourse provides a 'regime of truth', a 
means of assessing not only whether statements are true or false but 
also whether they have a meaning at all or are mere nonsense. ... A 
regime of truth goes beyond agenda setting and 'decisions and non­
decisions.' It endorses certain language, symbols, modes of reasoning 
and conclusions (1990: 91).
He goes on to note that those who do not use these languages, modes of 
reasoning, and so on, 'may seem unintelligible, mad, or at least beyond the pale 
of accepted argument' (1990: 91). Formulations found outside this dominant 
discourse 'either have never gained formal recognition as regimes of truth or 
have lost that status', and can be understood as 'subjugated knowledges' 
(1990: 91).
A dominant paradigm, then, can be seen as setting the 'regime of truth' through 
which policy issues are viewed; the regime has a construction of state-society 
relations that sets what can intelligibly be understood as a policy problem and 
what solutions can be considered. Thus, Hall describes political discourse as a 
prevailing set of political ideas that includes:
shared conceptions about the nature of society and the economy, 
various ideas about the appropriate role of government, a number of 
common political ideals, and collective memories of past policy 
experiences (1989: 383).
These ideas 'provide a language in which policy can be described within the 
political arena and the terms in which policies are judged there' (Hall 1989: 383). 
Hall argues that new sets of economic ideas (such as Keynesianism or 
monetarism) enter this 'universe' of political discourse when they become the 
'object of official scrutiny and debate' and they are 'accorded a particular niche 
within the web of meaningful concepts and associations' that make up the 
political discourse (1989:383). He then contends that the nature of the 
prevailing discourse can 'have a major impact on the likelihood that a new set of 
policy ideas will be accepted', working to the advantage or disadvantage of new 
policy proposals. That is, the prevailing political discourse 'lends representative 
legitimacy to some social interests more than others, delineates the boundaries 
of state action, ... and defines the context in which many issues will be
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understood' (Hall 1993: 289). Thus, the prevailing discourse privileges some 
policy lines over others, because 'some proposals will be immediately plausible, 
and others will be barely comprehensible' (Hall 1989: 383; 1993: 289).
This returns us to the arguments of both King and Hall noted earlier; that the 
success of a policy agent in the contest over ideas matters as much as attaining 
formal power, because winning the argument over ideas 'enables those successful 
to dominate the content of political discourse' (King 1999: 292). Hall notes that a 
perennial feature of politics is the 'struggle both for advantage within the 
prevailing terms of discourse and for leverage with which to alter the terms of 
political discourse' (1993: 290). For Hall, policy paradigms are only 'one feature 
of the overall terms of political discourse' (1993: 290), and are, therefore, one of 
the levers that policy actors can use in their quest for dominance. Again, this 
suggests that ideas are simply the tools of interests, with no causal impact in 
their own right, yet this underplays the influence of the constituent discourse of 
a set of ideas. Hall himself notes that, when '[organized interests, political 
parties, and policy experts' are successful in the struggle over ideas, they can 
affect policy 'without necessarily acquiring the formal trappings of influence' 
(1993: 290). He offers as an example a political party's arguments during an 
election campaign, which 'may push forward political debate in such a way as to 
advance particular lines of policy', even when the party loses the election 
(1993: 295, fn 58). An additional example comes from King, who notes that, 
since the 1980s, the 'idea of obligations' has been incorporated into policy­
making lexicon, being marshalled in social policy debates in both the United 
States and Britain and becoming a widely accepted, and widely used, concept 
(1999: 21). The result, King contends, is that workfare, 'a classic expression o f ... 
contractual obligation', now has political support from both the political left and 
right, and '[e]ven political theorists' find obligations associated with workfare 
'an acceptable ... element of citizenship in a liberal democracy' (1999: 21).
I) Frames
Discourse provides 'frames' or interpretative structures through which ideas 
may be understood easily. At its simplest, a frame is a 'set of simplifying 
assumptions' that individuals use to process complex information (Costain et al. 
1997: 206). That is, a frame: 'provides a story that helps individuals interpret the 
world around them and their place in it' (Costain et al. 1997: 206; see also Snow
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and Benford 1992: 136-138). Frames make the story clear to observers: they 
outline 'the nature of the problem, the blame for the problem, and the solution to 
the problem' (Costain et al. 1997: 206). They are 'underlying structures of belief, 
perception, and appreciation' that determine 'what counts as a fact and what 
arguments are taken to be relevant and compelling' (Schön and Rein 1994: 23). 
Thus, frames construct a particular view of reality on a particular issue, or, as 
Donald Schön and Martin Rein note:
[frames] select for attention a few salient features and relations from 
what would otherwise be an overwhelming complex reality. They 
give these elements a coherent organization, and they describe what 
is wrong with the present situation in such a way as to set the 
direction for its future transformation (1994: 26).
In this way, then, frames can be seen as essential to 'making sense of social 
reality' because they are 'contextual cues giving order and meaning to complex 
problems, actions and events' (Schön and Rein 1994: 30; Norris 1997: 2).
Pamela Oliver and Hank Johnston argue that framing is the process through 
which a set of meanings or 'frame' is invoked to communicate the content of an 
idea, thereby indicating how the content is to be understood (2000: 8). On this 
understanding, frames can be seen as an integral, though distinct, part of a 
paradigm's discourse: the paradigm provides the overarching understanding of 
how the world works, and the frames provide the stories or contextual 
explanations that enable the ideas to be easily and immediately understood. In 
this way, frames act to reinforce the beliefs, values and norms inherent in the 
ideas because they are the lens through which actions are interpreted and 
accepted. As noted above, policy-makers base their actions on a particular 
understanding of how the world works, or, more specifically, as Hall notes:
Policymaking in virtually all fields takes place within the context of a 
particular set of ideas that recognize some social interests as more 
legitimate than others and privilege some lines of policy over others 
(1993: 292).
That said, policy-makers still have to 'rationalize their actions in terms that will 
draw popular support, provide a semblance of consistency, and motivate those 
who have to carry out the relevant policies' (Hall 1993: 291). Frames help them 
do this, utilising the conventional wisdom as set out in the political discourse to 
conjure a particular image of the problem and the appropriate solutions. Thus, 
as Hall observes, even when the motivation for policy is 'simply an overarching
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metaphor, such as the "war on drugs" or the "problem of welfare mothers", the 
metaphor and its attendant elaborations can structure many aspects of what is to 
be done' (1993: 292).34
Carol Bacchi explores the role of frames in policy-making, concluding that policy 
proposals 'frame' policy problems, in that they identify what is of concern and 
what can be done about it. Thus, Bacchi argues:'[policy] "problems" do not 
exist out there, in the social world, waiting to be addressed and answered, ... 
[rather], "problems" are created by the policy community' (1999: 199). She 
argues that policy issues cannot be understood as 'existing independently of the 
way they are spoken about or represented, either in political debate or in policy 
proposals' because '[a]ny description of an issue or a "problem" is an 
interpretation, and interpretations involve judgement and choices' (1999: 1). 
This leads Bacchi to conclude that the frame, or what she terms a 
'problematisation', of a policy issue is only one among many possible 
constructions. She notes that, if policy problems are 'inaccessible outside of the 
ways they are problematized', then policy analysis must focus on the 
problematisations rather than the problems, looking at what ideas lie beneath a 
problematisation. Bacchi suggests an analytical framework based on the 
overarching question, 'what's the problem?', which she breaks down into a 
number of component questions. These include:
• what is the 'problem' represented to be?
• what presuppositions are implied or taken for granted in the problem 
representation that is offered?
• what effects are connected to this representation of the 'problem'?
• what is left unproblematic in particular representations?
• how would responses differ if the 'problem' were represented differently? 
(1999: 2).
Warren Samuels suggests a similar approach when he observes that the 
'definition of reality is formulated and expressed' through the words and 
symbols that economists use, which means that, when looking at the discourse 
of economics, there is a need to examine the implicit theorising, preconceptions,
34 For example, King notes that 'the remorseless ascription of the poor as an underclass 
differentiated behaviourally from the mainstream of society played no small role in justifying 
workfare [policies]' (1999: 292).
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and normative assumptions that are 'deliberately or inadvertently entered into 
analysis by use of certain words' (1990: 13).
Bacchi argues that a 'focus on interpretations or representations means a focus 
on discourse', which she defines as 'the language, concepts and categories 
employed to frame an issue' (1999: 2). An examination of the discourse of policy 
'assists in identifying the frames used to construct "social" problems', with a 
'what's the problem?' approach supplying a tool for uncovering the frames 
(Bacchi 1999:199).35 Such an approach also usefully reflects Schön and Rein's 
point that frames are usually 'tacit', meaning that they are 'exempt from 
conscious attention and reasoning' (1994:23).36 This means that, although 
frames 'exert a powerful influence', they are rarely explicated; rather, 'they 
belong to the taken-for-granted world of policy-making' (Schön and Rein 
1994: 34). This suggests that, in order to understand the influence of a policy 
paradigm on problems and solutions, we need to make explicit the ideas 
comprising the paradigm as well as the implicit frames and assumptions on 
which the paradigm's policy proposals are based.
II) Names
An important component of discourse that is intertwined with framing is 
'naming', or the actual terminology used to articulate ideas. As noted above, 
language does not simply describe reality, it constructs reality. Nancy Fraser 
and Linda Gordon argue that, in the 'struggle to define social reality', particular 
words and expressions can become focal, 'functioning as keywords, sites at 
which the meaning of social experience is negotiated and contested' (1997: 78). 
They claim that:
Keywords typically carry unspoken assumptions and connotations 
that can powerfully influence the discourses they permeate -  in part 
by constituting a body of doxa, or taken-for-granted commonsense 
belief that escapes critical scrutiny (1997: 78).
33 Again, I would argue that it is possible to apply Bacchi's approach more broadly than social 
policy because asking 'what is the problem?' also serves to illustrate the frames underpinning, for 
example, interpretations of economic policy problems and solutions.
Oliver and Johnston also note that framing is often achieved 'tacitly', through 'subtle linguistic 
and extralinguistic clues' (2000: 8).
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In a similar vein, Schön and Rein highlight the importance of naming to 
discourse, when they note that: '[tjhings are selected for attention and named in 
such a way as to fit the frame constructed for the situation' (1994: 26; emphasis 
added). Thus, names and keywords may carry the same tacit assumptions that 
frames carry, adding to the uncritical and unconscious way that a person 
perceives the world. Names may not be queried because their meanings are 
common sense; people 'know' what the terms mean.
'Naming' includes the use in frames of the 'generative metaphor'; that is, the 
carrying over to a new situation a familiar understanding of a term 'with the 
result that both the familiar and the unfamiliar come to be seen in new ways' 
(Schön and Rein 1994: 26). For example:
• the use of the phrase 'blighted or slum area' when discussing urban renewal 
programmes. Schön and Rein argue that this term is based on a metaphor of 
disease and cure; the 'blight' must be removed and the area rebuilt (1994: 27).
• the use of the terms 'obligation' and 'mutual responsibility' when discussing 
social policies. As noted above, the 'idea of obligations' serves to strengthen 
the 'contractual obligation' of welfare recipients to work in return for income 
support (King 1999: 21, 22). The use of the language of contract reinforces 
the notion that it is legitimate to ask people to fulfil some obligations in 
return for the government providing benefits, training or other programmes 
(King 1999: 276).
• the use of the term 'crisis' with regard to ageing populations and public 
pensions when discussing public spending policies. The result is a fear of 
'national ruin' unless pension spending is immediately constrained. For 
example, Francis Castles notes that: 'National treasuries, irrespective of 
country-specific demographics, use the supposedly ineluctable consequences 
of a "greying” population as a mantra to be invoked against all proposals for 
enhanced public spending' (2002:141).37-38
37 However, Castles challenges the alleged inevitably of the 'national ruin' about to be wrought by 
the hordes of elderly in 'Europe, the OECD and, if the World Bank is to be believed, the world as a 
whole', arguing that there is no cause for such a 'moral panic' (2002:141-155; 2001:8-11). His 
analysis shows that: 'there is no unequivocal evidence of direct or indirect ageing effects [on public 
spending] that need be of serious concern' (2002:154). More precisely, he contends: 'The aged are 
not the problem; some pension systems are' (2001:11). Castles's work highlights the problem 
noted in the previous chapter of treating all OECD countries as though they had similar problems 
and similar approaches to policy. Castles notes that one reason for being sceptical of the ageing 
population 'crisis' is that most research has used 'highly aggregated data', and has not
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Whereas the above examples show the language being used to support frames 
that constrain policy options, there are also examples where the language is used 
to construct frames that enable particular policy directions. A striking example 
is an influential, but informal, element of the monetarist paradigm that has since 
been utilised in the neo-liberal and globalisation paradigms: the notion that 
'there is no alternative'. The effect of this language and the frame it constructs, 
which cannot be formalised into any rule or procedure, but is incorporated 
informally, albeit powerfully, into the discourse of these paradigms, is to 
privilege the paradigm's ideas over those of potential challengers. In making 
this claim, the paradigm claims a legitimacy that alternative ideas have to 
overcome before they can make their own claims. Alternative ideas first have to 
prove that they are legitimate or valid alternatives, worthy of consideration, 
before they can go further to prove their viability. Mark Wickham-Jones notes 
the impact of this expression when discussing Thatcher's single-minded pursuit 
of monetarism:
Mrs Thatcher ... would continue on course regardless of pressures 
from either advisers, or colleagues, or (indirectly) the electorate. 
Hence her famous phrase 'the lady's not for turning' at the party 
conference of 1980 and the widely touted acronym TINA -  'There Is 
No Alternative' (1992: 174).39
The 'TINA' concept became influential in a number of countries in the 1980s and 
1990s, including New Zealand and Australia (for discussions, see Kelsey 1999;
disaggregated spending in the manner required to establish a link between ageing and spending 
on pensions, health care, age services and debt financing (2002:143). In addition, 'while the policy 
forecasters' warnings for coming decades are almost invariably couched in universal terms, 
national expenditure and ageing profiles have varied widely in recent decades' (2002:143). His 
conclusion is that there is clear evidence of divergent patterns across countries, and 'to read lessons 
on the potential effects of population ageing from the experience of those countries with the most 
extensive and generous programs involves a distortion' (2002:155). Castles is not alone in his 
views; Hay, too, notes the uneven distribution of the 'demographic timebomb' (2001:13-16). See 
also the discussion in McDaniel (2003).
'Crisis' has been used elsewhere to justify action. Goldfinch notes with regard to economic 
liberalisation in Australia and New Zealand:
While the extent of the economic crisis has sometimes been overstated, perceptions of 
crisis played an important part in facilitating the introduction of far-reaching and 
rapid change by encouraging the belief that such change was necessary and that it 
needed to be introduced quickly (2000: 20).
39 Pierre Gelinas also notes the use of this phrase, observing:
Whenever Mrs Thatcher's government had to choose between these prescriptions 
[public spending cuts] and the welfare of its own citizens, she had the habit of saying 
'There is no alternative!' This phrase would be repeated so often in her speeches that 
some satirists christened her Mrs TINA (2003: 91).
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Stillwell 2000:7, 153; Easton 1997b: 226; Goldfinch 1997:73-74; James 
1992: ch. 15).40 In a similar vein, Matthew Watson notes that the Blair 
Government's use of the discourse of the inevitably of globalisation to justify a 
range of neo-liberal policies in Britain (1999:125-143; see also Hay 1998).41 He 
argues that this occurred despite there being 'limited evidence that Britain is 
locked into a globalised political economy' that leaves the government no choice 
in its economic policy (1999: 131-136). The result, he concludes, is that it is not 
the 'reality' of globalisation that is shaping British economic policy, but the 
'dominant discursive construction of that reality' (1999: 125). Thus, the terms 
that policy-makers use to discuss policy issues 'constrain and enable often in 
highly specific ways' (Hall 1993: 291-292), delineating and delimiting both policy 
problems and possible solutions.
An important point that must be noted here, however, is that the 
understandings of a particular term or phrase may vary over time depending on 
the dominant paradigm and its ordering of state-society relations. Thus, a word 
or phrase that has a particular meaning at one point in time may later have a 
significantly different meaning or interpretation. Fraser and Gordon offer an 
excellent example of this in their work tracing what they term the 'genealogy of 
dependency'; that is, they examine the different meanings accorded over time to 
a word that they describe as a 'keyword of politics'. They note that 
contemporary American understandings of dependency are dramatically 
different to earlier interpretations, such that, today, policy-makers from both 
sides of politics agree that 'dependency' is bad for people, undermining their 
motivation to be self-supporting, and isolating and stigmatising them (1997: 78). 
They observe that, today, the term has become a 'powerful ideological trope'
40 The term became so widespread and influential that critics have come to speak in this language, 
raising the question, 'is there an alternative?', see Stillwell (2000: 7); Kelsey (1997: ch. 14); Easton 
(1997a: ch. 8). See also the title of Bennholdt-Thomsen et al. (2001). Stillwell notes that what he 
calls the 'TINA syndrome', 'is a particular obstacle to the consideration, let alone the 
implementation, of an alternative political economic strategy' (2000: 153).
44 Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson discuss the alleged 'inevitability' of globalisation in their 
book, Globalization in Question, noting that the image of a global economy 'is so powerful that it has 
mesmerized analysts and captured political imaginations' (1999:1). The point I would emphasise 
here is encapsulated in their opening statement, in which they observe:
Globalization has become a fashionable concept in the social sciences, a core dictum in 
the prescriptions of management gurus, and a catchphrase for journalists and 
politicians of every stripe (1999:1; emphasis added).
That is, although globalisation has no single, defined meaning, it is a term that carries a wealth of 
meanings that can be used to justify particular policy directions.
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most often used to describe 'the Black, unmarried, teenaged, welfare-dependent 
mother' (1997:98). Fraser and Gordon conclude that this conception of 
dependency is opposite to its pre-industrial English usage, when dependency 
meant subordination or gaining one's livelihood by working for someone else, 
which meant it 'was a normal, as opposed to deviant, condition' (1997: 81). They 
record a number of shifts between these two extremes:
• The 18th and 19th centuries brought a period of 'industrial dependency', when 
white, male workers became 'independent', leaving 'paupers', 'colonial 
natives', 'slaves' and 'housewives' as dependants.
• Between 1890 and 1945, American 'welfare dependency' split non-wage- 
earning dependency into two: 'good' household dependency (wives and 
children) and an increasingly 'bad' or dubious charity dependency 
(recipients of relief) (1997: 85-87). They note that the development of public 
assistance in this period intensified the distinction 'between the deserving 
and the undeserving poor' (1997: 90).42
• In the post-industrial period, 'good' dependency has disappeared, with 
'everyone ... expected to "work" and to be "self-supporting"' (1997: 94). 
Thus, 'the honorific term "independence" remains firmly centered on wage- 
labour, no matter how impoverished the worker' (1997: 98).
The effect of the contemporary interpretation of dependency on policy options is 
significant. Fraser and Gordon argue that today's understanding of dependency 
divides into two streams when it looks to the cause of dependency: one contends 
that poor, dependent people have something more than a lack of money wrong 
with them, and the other that dependent people choose to take welfare rather 
than work (1997: 98-99). The result, they note, is a different approach to policies 
to resolve dependency: the former spurs policy-makers to look at means of 
improving self-responsibility among 'dependants', generally through work, 
while the latter prompts policy-makers to focus on the manipulation of 
incentives to encourage 'dependants' to choose work (1997: 98-99). Flowever, 
both approaches are predicated on a different conception of state-society
42 Fraser and Gordon note that the use of the term in the United States is complicated by a two- 
track welfare system that distinguishes between 'non-welfare' programmes, such as 
unemployment and age pensions, and 'welfare' programmes, such as aid to families. They argue 
that most Americans still distinguish between these forms of assistance, and see only the former as 
creating 'dependence' (1997: 91).
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relations and the associated roles and responsibilities of the state and society 
than earlier interpretations of dependency. Thus, the new world-view 
underpins a new vision of policy problems and possible solutions. I will argue 
in Chapter 6 that it is possible to see this shift in the OECD's understanding and 
treatment of social justice and related issues. I will explore the implications of 
the shift in that chapter.
Understanding the impact of a new dominant paradigm on pre-existing terms 
that are carried over into the new discourse is critical when examining policy 
discussions across time, and this is a main focus of my thesis. We should recall 
that issues to be examined include changes to the OECD's ideas over time, and 
the implications of these changes for the organisation's understanding and 
treatment of social justice and related issues. The argument is that, after a 
paradigm shift, people may not 'know' what they think they 'know' when they 
hear policy-makers such as the OECD using particular names and frames. As 
Robert Lieberman observes, changes over time in the interpretation and framing 
of 'deeply rooted' concepts may mean that terms such as 'liberty' or 'equality' 
may be invoked to support significantly different practices 'by people who all 
the while believe themselves to be upholding a timeless and unchanging 
political tradition' (2002: 702). For this reason, it is essential that the underlying 
assumptions about the meanings of what appear to be continuous terms are 
made explicit. The alternative is confusion, as could be seen, for example, in July 
2000 when World Economic Forum managing director Claude Smadja, 
commenting on protests outside a forum meeting, noted that protesters' 
concerns -  including social justice and inclusion -  had been on the forum's 
agenda 'for some time' (Powell 2000: 4). The problem is that, while both the 
forum and the protesters use the term 'social justice', their understanding of the 
term is not necessarily the same.43
43 The same point applies with regard to protesters and the World Bank and IMF. Preparing for 
major anti-World Bank protests in April 2000, Bank president James Wolfensohn said: 'It's a bit 
demoralising when you see that there is a mobilisation for social justice, when you think that that's 
what we're doing every day' (Forbes 2000: 15). Preparing for disruption to the half-yearly IMF 
meeting at the same time, acting head Stanley Fischer said: 'We have the same goal as the 
demonstrators. We want to reduce poverty' (Forbes 2000:15).
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I have explored a number of arguments regarding the role of 
ideas in policy-making. I have suggested that one approach to Blyth's question 
as to how ideas pass 'from academic debate to popular consciousness' (from 
'academic scribblers' to 'madmen in authority' and the wider public) is to focus 
more on the discourse intrinsic to a paradigm. When applied to an analysis of 
the influence of ideas in policy-making, a discourse approach helps to answer 
some of Blyth's dissatisfaction with Hall's model of paradigm shifts; that is, how 
ideas can be both the source of policy inertia, at the centre of a constrained, path- 
dependent set of options, and, at the same time, act as a source of change. A 
paradigm becomes dominant when policy-makers believe it to be better than the 
alternatives at explaining how the world works. The paradigm becomes the 
dominant world-view, containing the 'conventional wisdom' or 'common sense' 
understanding of how the world works and what can be done about it. 
However, a dominant paradigm not only has the ability to define policy 
problems and solutions, it also sets and dominates the discourse, which is then 
used to portray what can be seen as problems and solutions. To an extent, the 
paradigm becomes self-supporting by the way it frames and discusses policy 
issues and explanations.
Blyth recognises this to an extent when he observes that: 'Once embedded in 
institutions ... economic ideologies continue to have effects on policy by 
becoming the taken for granted or unconscious assumptions behind policy 
discourse and policy practice' (1997b: 236). But, this view is too narrow, given 
the standard understanding of institutions as formal rules, laws, and structures. 
Blyth does offer a slightly broader definition of institutions as: 'those 
organisational arrangements, accommodations and understandings between 
elements of a coalition which serve as the basis of the coalition and reconstitute 
the coalition as whole' (1997b: 236). However, this does not go far enough, given 
that he goes on to talk of institutions being 'erected in line with the economic 
ideology which underpins a particular coalition' (1997b: 237). I would argue that 
the ideas do not have to be 'embedded' or 'erected' informal institutions in order 
to have lasting effect.44 Their discourse, or the terms and concepts they use to
44 Hall appears to note a version of this argument in the introduction to his edited collection, The 
Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism Across Nations, when he says that, while the 'adoption
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describe policy issues, have an important impact on informal institutions, or the 
values, attitudes, social mores, and taken-for-granted, common-sense 
understandings that underpin human interaction. The paradigm establishes the 
'regime of truth', which gives the ideas a legitimacy that competing points of 
view cannot claim. Alternative conceptions of policy problems and solutions, 
couched in different terms and based on a different understanding of how the 
world works, can be dismissed as being outside the sphere of the current policy 
discussion. They are, in Keeley's terms, 'unintelligible' and 'beyond the pale of 
accepted argument'. For example, as noted above, the 'no alternative' frame 
adds to its influence because competing ideas first have to argue and somehow 
prove that they are a legitimate alternative, worthy of consideration, before they 
can begin to try to overcome whatever ideas 'TINA' is being used to support.
Thus, the discourse of a paradigm may add to its influence in a way that needs 
further examination. A final example serves to illustrate my point. In his study 
of Thatcherism, Stuart Hall highlights Margaret Thatcher's successful 
appropriation of monetarist ideas and their discourse to create a new philosophy 
that would appeal to the public. He notes Thatcher's 'disarticulation' of the 
Keynesian orthodoxy and her replacement of Keynesianism with a different 
orthodoxy of the 'free economy' and the 'strong state' (Hall 1983, cited in 
Howarth 1995: 125). He observes that:
Neither Keynesianism nor monetarism ... win votes as such in the 
electoral marketplace. But, in the discourse of 'social market values', 
Thatcherism discovered a powerful means of translating economic 
doctrine into the language of experience, moral imperative and 
common sense ...
Thatcher was able to translate and disseminate the abstract themes of 
neo-liberal economics into a new political 'philosophy' ripe for 
popular consumption (Hall 1983, cited in Howarth 1995: 126,125).
Thatcher's use of monetarist ideas and their discourse can be seen to target the 
informal institutions underpinning Britons' understanding of the world and 
how it works, and, in this way, change the 'common-sense' conceptions that
of Keynesian policies is one of the firmest measures of the influence of Keynesian ideas', the ideas 
also acquired influence in other ways. He continues:
In some cases, they transformed the intellectual environment of economics and, in 
others, they altered the terms of political discourse in such a way as to legitimate a 
variety of policies and make new combinations of political forces possible (1989: 7).
However, he does not develop this argument in the way that I am suggesting.
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people have of the constitution and organisation of state-society relations within 
that world. That is, changing the informal institutions changes the uncritical, 
unconscious perceptions that people have about their roles and responsibilities 
within the world and what they can and cannot expect from the state.
This highlights the importance of informal institutions to the acceptance and 
implementation of ideas. If a paradigm's discourse articulates the way the 
paradigm constitutes and organises social and political relations, and this 
discourse comes to permeate society, becoming the lingua franca in which policy 
issues are discussed and resolved, then it forms and maintains the informal 
institutions -  or the values, attitudes, beliefs, and so on -  that support the 
paradigm's established order. This suggests that those who argue that new 
ideas have little impact because old ideas are 'embedded in institutions' are 
paying insufficient attention to the impact that new ideas, and their constituent 
discourse, have on informal institutions. That is, the way that new ideas 
reconstruct the unspoken norms that underpin state-society relations and 
conceptions of acceptable policy problems and solutions. For this reason, any 
examination of the OECD's ideas must look to the organisation's discourse, and 
the 'names' and 'frames' that it contains. It must explore the informal 
institutions that the discourse constructs to render the ideas comprehensible. 
However, before turning to this examination, I first want to explore further the 
argument that ideas are embedded in institutions.
Chapter 3
Ideas and Institutions, 
Formal and Informal
Introduction
T  n the previous chapter, I discussed the role of ideas in policy-making, 
JL arguing that ideas are important, independent variables in policy-making 
and that their frames and discourse add to their influence. I looked at how and 
why ideas change over time, offering Peter Hall's Kuhnian-influenced model of 
paradigms and paradigm shifts as one way of understanding such changes, and I 
observed that a change in ideas on means to achieve goals could affect the goals 
themselves. According to Hall's model, ideas cause policy inertia, in which 
policy is constrained to a particular range of options, when they become the 
dominant paradigm, or the accepted way of understanding policy problems and 
policy solutions. Ideas bring radical change when a new paradigm becomes the 
dominant set of ideas, replacing the existing paradigm and offering a different 
framework to interpret the world, the policy problems allowed within this world 
and the possible solutions to such problems. However, some of the literature on 
ideas suggests that ideas seldom bring radical change because the old ideas are 
embedded in institutions, making policy change difficult to effect. This line of 
reasoning is used to argue that the shift from the Keynesian paradigm to a neo­
liberal paradigm, although expected to bring a dramatic change in terms of 
policy goals, instruments, and outcomes, has, in fact, had little impact. Thus, 
some scholars claim that the ascendancy of neo-liberal ideas, with their negative 
views of the welfare state, has had little effect in practice on the Keynesian
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welfare state. They argue that, despite 20 years of alleged 'attacks', the welfare 
state remains relatively unchanged, with continued high spending and 
incremental, rather than radical, policy reforms pointing to a considerable level 
of welfare-state resilience. Such assertions suggest that a paradigm shift, or shift 
in the dominant set of ideas, while dramatic in terms of world-view, has had little 
effect in practice.
If the argument about the resilience of the welfare state is true, how can we 
explain such an apparent contradiction between a major shift in ideas and a 
minor shift in practice? Those arguing for the tenacity of the welfare state tend to 
highlight the role of institutions and institutional stability. They claim that ideas 
become incorporated into the institutions that implement and enforce policy, and 
that this makes policy options hard to change. Policy-makers are 'path 
dependent' because they not only inherit policy responsibilities from previous 
administrations, but they are tied to the solutions outlined by earlier ideas. These 
responsibilities, problems, and solutions have become embedded in a particular 
set of institutions, to which, importantly, the public has become attached. Thus, 
these arguments contend, policy-makers are caught by previous policy choices 
(and their associated longer-term commitments) and by public opinion. New 
ideas are considered to have little impact because of the difficulties in changing 
the existing institutions.
However, I suggest that such arguments over-emphasise the stability of 
institutions because they focus too much on formal institutions (that is, rules, 
laws, structures, organisations, and so on) and pay insufficient attention to the 
informal institutions (that is, norms, values, attitudes, implicit codes of conduct, 
and so on) that underpin human interaction. A paradigm shift, or change in 
dominant ideas, brings with it a new set of informal institutions that construct a 
particular arrangement of social and political relations that is consistent with the 
way that the new set of ideas understands how the world works. By this, I mean 
that new ideas offer a new interpretation of the world, which changes the way of 
thinking about policy problems and solutions, and the way of thinking about 
government and the nature and scope of legitimate authority, as well as who and 
what is to be governed and how. These changes in the underlying view of the 
organisation of state-society relations modify or overturn existing institutions, 
making radical policy change inevitable. As noted in the previous chapter, the
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prevailing set of ideas defines what elements constitute the economy and the 
polity, the roles of the individual and groups within these elements, and policy 
goals and the methods to achieve these goals (Blyth 1997b: 233; 1997a: 246). That 
is, the paradigm provides an understanding of the 'proper' and 'improper' inter­
relations between constitutive elements of the economy and a 'vision which 
specifies how these elements should be constructed' (Blyth 1997b: 234, emphasis 
in original). Viewed in this way, the effect of a paradigm shift on practice 
becomes more obvious: the new ideas have a profound effect on the view of the 
state and its role, and on the assumptions that underpin economic and social 
policy. While, superficially, formal institutions may appear to remain relatively 
static, they inevitably shift when there are changes in the informal institutions 
providing their raison d'etre. That is, the changed reasoning underpinning the 
existence of formal institutions results in new policies and new formal 
institutions. Again, this is consistent with Kuhn's observation of the effect of a 
paradigm shift, noted in the previous chapter: that a shift changes the view of the 
field, the method, and, importantly, the goals.
In this chapter, I will explore the link between ideas and institutions, focusing on 
the impact of new ideas on the informal institutions that underpin state-society 
relations, and arguing against a view of institutions as wholly path dependent. I 
will first examine the argument that ideas become embedded in institutions, thus 
constraining policy options, before contending that such claims overlook the 
longer-term impact of incremental change to policy and pay insufficient attention 
to the informal institutions underpinning policy. I will then suggest that policy­
makers are less path dependent and 'locked in' to existing policy options than 
arguments for embedding allow, and are less vulnerable to a potential electoral 
backlash than such arguments claim. Rather, the discourse and informal 
institutions of a new dominant paradigm offer policy-makers a number of ways 
of effecting change.
Institutions and Institutional Stability
David Henderson's treatise on economic liberalism opens with a forward from 
economists Milton and Rose Friedman in which they make the following claim:
Judged by practice, we have, despite some successes, mostly been on 
the losing side. Judged by ideas, we have been on the winning side.
The public in the United States has increasingly recognised that
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government is not the universal cure for all ills ... The growth of 
government has come to a halt, and seems on the verge of declining 
as a fraction of the economy. We are in the mainstream of thought, 
not as we were 50 years ago, members of the derided minority 
(Friedman 1998, cited in Henderson 1998: 8-9).1
This succinct statement reflects a broader view that, despite a shift over the past 
two decades in ideas about the role and worth of the 'welfare state', from a 
positive view to a negative view, in practice there has been no radical change in 
the welfare state, and retrenchment has been pursued only cautiously.2 Many 
scholars note that, judged by aggregate expenditure, the welfare state has been 
remarkably resilient, and state spending as a percentage of gross national 
product has not, in fact, declined significantly (Castles 2001; Keating 2000a: 35; 
Keating and Mitchell 2000: 129; Kuhnle 2000: 235; Kuhnle and Alestalo 2000: 3; 
Pierson 1996: 174-175, 1994: 4; Wilding 1992: 203). Francis Castles, for example, 
contends that, contrary to the notion of a wholesale retreat of the state in the 
1980s and 1990s, 'even the most cursory examination of the relevant data' reveals 
that welfare state expenditure represented a larger proportion of total public 
expenditure in this period than it had previously (2001: 3, 5).
The continuity of welfare spending supports Pierson's view (1994, 1996) that, 
although former United States president Ronald Reagan and former British 
prime minister Margaret Thatcher are accused of 'dismantling the welfare state' 
in the 1980s, both achieved only 'occasional successes' (Pierson 1994:164). 
According to Pierson, the 'more frequent outcome was one of initially aggressive 
efforts giving way to embarrassed retreat', meaning that, ultimately, 'the welfare 
state remains largely intact' (1994:164, 179). More recently, looking at Australia, 
Michael Keating contends that, when assessed by what governments are actually 
doing, the Australian welfare state is not doing any less than previously, and the 
most that can be said is that it is expanding less rapidly (2000b: 58, 59). Further 
afield, the very title of Stein Kuhnle's edited collection, Survival of the European
1 The forward is an extract from the 'Epilogue' to their memoirs: Milton and Rose D. Friedman 
1998, Two Lucky People: Memoirs, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
2 The term 'welfare state' here denotes a general concept of some level of state, rather than private, 
provision. This fits with what Gosta Esping-Andersen has called the 'common textbook definition' 
of a welfare state as involving 'state responsibility for securing some basic modicum of welfare for 
its citizens' (1990:18-19). I acknowledge the work of Esping-Andersen (1990) and Castles and 
Mitchell (1993), among others, on types of welfare-state regimes, but such a detailed specification is 
outside the scope of my current discussion.
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Welfare State, notes the endurance of the welfare state, which 'remains strong', 
with empirical evidence for an alleged collapse in the welfare state 'usually 
meagre or entirely absent' (Kuhnle 2000: 235; van Kersbergen 2000: 19).
The general conclusion of these scholars is that the welfare state has been under 
economic, political and social pressures, but these strains have generated only 
minor, incremental changes in policy rather than fundamental shifts (Pierson 
1996: 172; van Kersbergen 2000: 30).3 This is not to argue that this is the only 
view of what has been happening to the welfare state over the past two decades, 
or that claims for the stability of the welfare state are uncontested. Rather, it is 
one view that is advanced with regard to developments in the welfare state, and 
it is based on a particular line of reasoning that I want to discuss here. The 
reasons advanced for policy 'stability' in the tenacious welfare state centre on 
two main themes: I) path dependency and institutional lock-in, in which current 
policies are constrained by institutional structures, pre-existing policy 
frameworks or long-term commitments tied to earlier policies; and II) the 
electoral hazard of going against public opinion, which remains generally in 
favour of the welfare state.
I) Path  D ependency
A common argument about the function of ideas in policy-making is that ideas 
are hard to change once they are incorporated into the institutions that 
implement and enforce policy. According to this view, ideas create institutional 
structures of various kinds that commit policy-makers to particular policy 
choices or paths, thus making them path dependent. Policy-makers are tied to 
previous interpretations of policy problems and solutions, as well as the paths set 
by previous policy choices and their associated longer-term commitments, which 
they have inherited from previous administrations. Such 'path dependency' 
leads to policy stability (or inertia) because the same ideas as used previously are
3 Pierson studies four countries (Britain, the United States, Germany, and Sweden), which he says 
'vary widely' in the design of their pre-existing welfare states, and concludes that, judged by 
'reforms that indicate structural shifts in the welfare state', there is a 'surprisingly high level of 
continuity and stability' in all four countries (1996:157, 159). The measures he uses to assess the 
amount of change in the welfare state include whether or not there have been significant increases 
in reliance on means-tested benefits, major transfers of responsibility to the private sector, and 
dramatic changes in benefit and eligibility rules that signal a qualitative reform of a particular 
program (1996:158).
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again utilised to solve existing and new problems. The argument is that 'history 
matters', which means both that previous policy options constrain today's 
choices, and that it is not possible to understand today's policy choices without 
reference to the norms, conventions, and so on, on which they are built. In this 
section, I will explore the notion of path dependency in two sub­
sections: I-I) informal institutions and 1-11) institutional lock-in.
I-I) Path dependency: informal institutions
Debates about ideas and institutions share the notion that ideas (or shared 
beliefs) can be preserved by becoming absorbed into the regulatory apparatus of 
the state and economy, thus becoming 'embedded in institutions'. By 
institutions, scholars mean formal and informal structures that guide human 
behaviour and organise life. These structures include the obvious political and 
bureaucratic institutions of government, such as the legislature, executive, 
electoral system, courts, agencies to implement and enforce policies, laws, rules, 
and so on. However, they are also defined more generally to include less 
obvious elements such as the 'arrangements, accommodations and 
understandings' that serve as the basis of a society's organisation (Blyth 
1997b: 236). Douglass North, in his book Institutions, Institutional Change and 
Economic Performance, defines institutions as the 'humanly devised constraints 
that shape human interaction', and says they can be formal, such as rules, or 
informal, such as conventions and codes of behaviour (1990: 3, 4). The major role 
of institutions, he claims, is to 'reduce uncertainty by establishing a structure to 
everyday life' (1990: 3). Robert Goodin repeats this theme, proposing what he 
calls a 'minimalist definition' of institutions as 'a stable, valued, recurring pattern 
of human behaviour', or, more fully, 'organized patterns of socially constructed 
norms and roles, and socially prescribed behaviors expected of occupants of 
those roles, which are created and re-created over time' (1996:1, 21, 19).4 In a 
similar vein, James March and Johan Olsen view institutions as 'collections of 
standard operating procedures and structures that define and defend values, 
norms, interests, identities and beliefs' (1989:17).5 They expand this in a later
4 See also Michael Hill, who observes that institutions are: 'regularized practices structured by rules 
and resources "deeply layered in time and space"' (J.B. Thompson 1989, cited in Hill 1997: 63; 
emphasis in original).
5 Many scholars acknowledge March and Olsen's definition of institutions. Those who accept it 
include Goldstein and Keohane (1993: 20) and Hill (1997: 85); those who reject it include Rose 
(1993:123).
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work in which they argue that 'life is organized by sets of shared meanings and 
practices' or 'rules and practices which are socially constructed, publicly known, 
anticipated and accepted' (1996:249). They contend that the '[a]ctions of 
individuals and collectivities occur within these shared meanings and practices, 
which can be called institutions and identities' (1996: 249).
Broadly speaking, then, institutions include the formal institutions of government, 
bureaucratic agencies, and laws and rules, as well as the informal institutions of 
norms, values, attitudes, implicit codes of conduct, and operating procedures.6 
Some scholars contend that ideas become embedded in these institutions, 
becoming incorporated both into the formal institutions of rules, laws, and 
structures, and into the informal institutions of societal expectations and 
understandings of why particular formal institutions and policies are necessary. 
Thus, the institutionalised ideas become both the official, and enforceable, 
structures and laws of a polity and the 'taken for granted or unconscious 
assumptions behind policy discourse and policy practice' (Blyth 1997b: 236;
6 Such a broad definition can be contested, but many of the criticisms do not withstand scrutiny. 
Richard Rose, for example, argues that broad definitions 'confuse the organizations delivering 
programs with informal behaviour patterns and the programs themselves' (1993:123). He pithily 
observes: 'Lumping everything together encourages the false belief that changing institutions 
necessarily changes program outputs' (1993: 123), which suggests that he views the link between 
institutions and outputs as complicated, rather than straightforward. Rose favours a narrow 
definition of institutions as public agencies, or the 'formal organizations of government involved in 
implementing and delivering programs', and argues that these are necessary, but are not 
necessarily important (1993:123). Rather, he contends, they are simply the intervening variable or 
the 'black box between program outputs and the demands of the public and elected politicians for 
action' (1993:123). It is at this point that his argument begins to fall apart. From here, he goes on to 
contend that institutions 'represent clusters of political interests and values', which means they can 
mobilise opposition to policy options that they perceive as 'inconsistent with their established 
interests' (1993:124). In Rose's words: 'Strictly speaking, it is not the institution's form but its 
political clout that constitutes an obstacle [to whatever policy is being suggested]' (1993:124). But 
this means that Rose's 'black box' is more complicated than his narrow definition of 'institutions' 
allows. Institutions cannot simply be unbiased, bureaucratic, technical organisations processing 
demands into outputs, but must be structures comprising bureaucratic processes, values and 
interests that can affect policy outcomes. Thus, when Rose argues that new programs cannot be 
adopted where there is no 'institutional capacity' to do so, he cannot mean only 'the default of an 
organization with the capacity to deliver a service' (1993:125) because factors such as norms and 
conventions affect institutional capacity as much as formal structures. For this reason, I follow 
Hill's logic that the 'mixing of informal and formal is justifiable', because we cannot treat 
'constraints built into rule books as if they are necessarily firmer than custom and practice' (Hill 
1997: 89). Hill supports his viewpoint with reference to Philip Selznick, who emphasises the need 
to study organisations as institutions because the term 'organisation' suggests 'a certain bareness, a 
lean no-nonsense system of consciously coordinated activities ... [whereas an] "institution" ... is 
more nearly a natural product of social needs and pressures -  a responsive adaptive organism' 
(Selznick 1957: 5, cited in Hill 1997:165).
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Berman 1998a: 26-27). The implications of this will be explored further below. 
The important point here is that policy options arise from what North calls 'a 
mixture of informal norms, rules, and enforcement characteristics [that] together 
defines the choice set and results in outcomes' (1990:53). Thus, policies are 
'manifestations of powerful institutional rules which function as highly 
rationalized myths' that are built into society as reciprocated interpretations and 
that are underpinned by public opinion, the views of important constituents, 
knowledge legitimated through the education system, social prestige, laws, and 
court interpretations (Meyer and Rowan 1977: 343, 341).
What this means, as North highlights, is that formal institutions are only a small 
('although very important', he notes) part of the constraints that shape choices, 
with the 'governing structure' of interactions 'overwhelmingly defined by codes 
of conduct, norms of behavior and conventions' (1990: 36). Informal institutions 
are pervasive in that they extend, elaborate, and modify formal rules, reinforcing 
or undermining them, partly by shaping the categories used in official rules, as 
well as the interpretation and enforcement of these rules in practice (North 
1990: 40; Stone 1997: 283)7 They socially sanction norms of behaviour, and 
internally enforce standards of conduct, which allows policy-makers to predict 
behavioural responses with a 'high probability of accuracy' because they supply 
the codes of conduct ('especially [those] that determine which actions are not 
allowed') that make sensible the formal rules and procedures (Kerremans 
1996: 223).* 8 While informal institutions pose problems for scholars in that they
 ̂Deborah Stone uses the term 'unofficial rules', which she defines as social customs and traditions, 
informal norms, moral rules and principles, and by-laws and private associations (1997: 283). Of 
course, the term 'rules' suffers from the same multiplicity of meanings as the term 'institutions', as
Elinor Ostrom observes (1986:3-7). Ostrom eventually plumps for an understanding of rules 
as: 'prescriptions commonly known and used by a set of participants to order repetitive,
interdependent relationships' (1986: 5). She adds that rules are the result of 'implicit or explicit 
efforts by a set of individuals to achieve order and predictability within defined situations ... [and]
are thus artifacts that are subject to human intervention and change ... [and] should not be equated
with formal laws' (1986: 5, 6; emphasis in original). This is not to suggest that informal institutions
are not enforceable; in fact, the opprobrium following the breaking of a social code may be as
effective in controlling say, aberrant behaviour, as a formal law.
8 See also the discussion in March and Olsen (1996: 251-253) on institutions and the interpretation 
of a 'logic of appropriateness'. Claus Offe notes that institutions:
establish standards, both normative and cognitive, as to what is to be held normal, 
what must be expected, what can be relied upon, which rights and duties are 
attached to which positions, and what makes sense in the community or social 
domain for which an institution is valid (1996:199-200).
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are harder to describe and be precise about than formal institutions, North warns 
that this does not diminish their importance (1990: 36). He cautions scholars 
against examining only formal institutions, saying that doing so gives 'an 
inadequate and frequently misleading notion about the relationship between 
formal constraints and performance' (1990: 53; see also Stone 1997: 283).9
The symbiotic nature of formal and informal institutions is considered to 
constrain the influence of new ideas on policy options because it complicates the 
process of institutional, and thus policy, change. Formal institutions cannot 
successfully be changed without an associated change in their supporting 
informal institutions. Attempts to alter only the former give rise to an 
unsustainable tension as the new formal institutions clash with society's norms 
and expectations. Such tension can manifest itself in protests against the 
changes, flagrant breaches of the new formal institutions, or voter backlash, a 
topic to which I will return below. The argument is that informal institutions are 
harder to change because they are deeply ingrained within a society's culture 
and have 'tenacious survival ability' (North 1990: 45; see also March and Olsen 
1996: 258). Values and beliefs incorporated into informal institutions 'determine 
what is or is not acceptable politically; they also create symbolic attachments that 
cannot be easily abandoned' (Rose 1993: 39). As North states:
Although formal rules may change overnight as the result of political 
or judicial decisions, informal constraints embodied in customs, 
traditions, and codes of conduct are much more impervious to 
deliberate policies (1990: 6).
He contends that the tension between 'discontinuous' or 'radical' change in 
formal rules and the 'survival tenacity' of informal institutions eventually 
resolves itself through more limited change, with compromise or 'restructuring' 
of the overall institutions producing a new outcome that is less revolutionary 
(North 1990: 91).
The argument here is not that formal and informal institutions are motionless; 
they evolve and continually alter the choices available to policy-makers (North 
1990: 6). However, institutional change is understood to occur through small 
steps taken slowly. Institutions change in response to changes in society, and 
when policy-makers perceive that they could do better by altering the existing
9 Hermann and Lorenz agree, noting that socio-political and cultural factors underpinning the 
European welfare state 'may not be visible through the study of formal institutions' (1997:13).
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institutional framework at some margin, thus leading to marginal adjustments to 
its complex of rules, norms and enforcement (Kerremans 1996: 224; North 1990: 8, 
83). But the changes are slow, Kerremans contends: 'because they have to be 
realized by socialization, a restructuring of routines and sometimes the 
redefinition of codes of conducts' (1996: 224).10 The result is what North argues 
is the 'single most important point' about institutional change: that it is 
'overwhelmingly incremental', with fundamental change 'an aggregation of 
literally thousands of specific small alterations' (1990: 89). To return to the 
paradigm model advanced in the previous chapter, such incremental change fits 
with Kuhn's notion of 'normal science', which shifts to accommodate new 
puzzles, eventually leading to paradigm failure and replacement; that is, the 
fundamental change that North discusses (see Easton 1997a: 263). The eventual 
fundamental change is not disruptive to institutional stability because it has 
occurred very, very slowly. It is this stability that provides important elements of 
order in politics and is said to make change to the complex of institutions 
possible across both time and space (March and Olsen 1989: 54, cited in Boase 
1996: 289; North 1990: 83). Policy-makers are path dependent because they are 
tied to options supported by informal institutions, which can be changed only 
incrementally and, therefore, slowly.
I-II) Path dependency: institutional lock-in
Another argument for path dependency centres on the notion of institutional 
lock-in. One obvious example of such lock-in is that policy-makers inherit from 
their predecessors both the formal, bureaucratic structures that implement and 
enforce policy and the longer-term policy commitments that these contain. These 
institutional structures and commitments impose constraints on the options 
available to policy-makers, with, for example, a newly elected government path 
dependent in many of its policy choices because it inherits the responsibility of 
administering the programmes that its predecessor enacted. This means that 
most programmes are 'not of [the new government's] own choice, but inherited 
from administrations that left office decades or even generations ago' (Rose 
1993:39).11 'Pay-as-you-go' public pension schemes are examples of such
19 As March and Olsen observe, change 'occurs through mundane processes of interpretation, 
reasoning, education, imitation and adaptation' (1996: 257).
1 * Even where policy-makers are not newly elected, but simply have new ideas, the problem 
remains: options are constrained by earlier or inherited commitments.
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inherited, long-term policy commitments, and thus have been the cause of 
considerable anxiety to those seeking to reform the welfare state (Pierson 
1996: 153; Hay 2001: 15).1 *2
The path dependency constructed by these institutional structures and 
commitments leads to arguments that governments are 'prisoners' of their 
institutions and 'immobilised by the dead weight of past commitments' (Boase 
1996: 290; Pierson 1996, cited in Pollack 1996: 442). Policy-makers find that they 
cannot simply abandon formal institutional structures and commitments 
because, as noted in the previous sub-section, they are underpinned by informal 
institutions embedded in society's culture and, as importantly, public 
expectations (a point to which I will return).13 They are also hard to change 
because courses of action, once initiated, are difficult to reverse. Formal 
institutions, policy-makers, organisations, and individuals adapt to particular 
arrangements, and make commitments that render the costs of change, even to 
potentially more efficient arrangements, higher than the costs of continuing 
along the same path (Pierson 1996: 175).14 Rose contends that previous
circumstances thus determine both the specific content of the program and lock 
in commitments to a course of action that current policy-makers may regard as 
inferior to practices elsewhere, yet are unable to change (1993: 39; see also 
Pierson 1996: 175).
Many scholars illustrate this point with the work of two authors, W. Brian Arthur 
and Paul David, on technology and the way that historical 'accidents' in the 
process of development can lock in one technology over another (North 1990: 93; 
Pierson 1994: 43; 1996, fn 86; Rose 1993: 39).15 According to this argument, the
1 9 See the discussion in Castles (2001) with regard to the alleged 'crisis' of ageing populations in
the OECD. Castles argues that the potential problem is not one of demographics but of
institutional design: 'The aged are not the problem; some pension systems are' (2001:11). See also
the discussion in McDaniel (2003).
13 Offe notes: 'institutions provide actors with socially validated standards as to what preferences
and goals are licensed and can be expected to meet with approval' (1996: 200).
14 They develop skills, knowledge and information based on a particular configuration of
institutional arrangements (North 1990: 112).
13 Paul David examines how the QWERTY typewriter keyboard became standardised and fixed
(1985), while W. Brian Arthur examines the 'circumstances under which the economy might
become locked in by "historical" events to the monopoly of an inferior technology' (1989:117).
Arthur explains the process in the following way:
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more that one technology is adopted, the more experience is gained with it, and 
the more it is improved (Arthur 1989: 116). Once initial steps have been taken 
down a particular technological track, increasing returns from each new 
development make the adoption of alternative technologies less and less likely. 
Eventually, this may lead to one technology winning over another, 'even when, 
ultimately, this technological path may be less efficient than the abandoned 
alternative would have been' (North 1990: 93).16 It is on this point that scholars 
argue that history matters, and that it is not possible to understand current 
institutions and their embedded policy options without reference to what has 
gone before (North 1990:100; Berman 1998a: 32-37; March and Olsen 1996: 256; 
Goodin 1996: 10).17 Pierson notes that lock-in processes accelerate momentum 
behind one policy path, 'rendering] previously viable alternatives inaccessible' 
(1994: 44). This is not to suggest that policy-makers are left with only one option 
in a 'story of inevitability in which the past neatly predicts the future' (North 
1990: 98-99). Rather, path dependence narrows the set of choices facing policy­
makers, and links their decisions through time (North 1990: 98). On this point, 
Joan Price Boase notes that policy choices are path dependent, but not path 
determined (Boase 1996: 290).18 Returning again to the notion of paradigms 
outlined in the previous chapter, such path dependency sits with a concept of
When two or more increasing-return technologies 'compete' ... for a 'market' of 
potential adopters, insignificant events may by chance give one of them an initial 
advantage in adoptions. This technology may then improve more than the others, so it 
may appeal to a wider proportion of potential adopters. It may therefore become 
further adopted and further improved. Thus a technology that by chance gains an 
early lead in adoption may eventually 'corner the market' of potential adopters, with 
the other technologies becoming locked out (1989:116).
A more recent example of this is the advantage that Microsoft's Internet interface, Explorer, has 
enjoyed over its competitors, such as Netscape Communicator. The packaging of Explorer with 
Microsoft's Windows computer operating system, which is installed on nearly 90 per cent of the 
world's personal computers, makes it extremely difficult for competitors to attract users to their 
browser software. The potential adverse consequences of Explorer's dominance in terms of 
denying consumers choice has led to court actions against Microsoft over its abuse of its monopoly 
position (see Courier Mail 2000).
16 North argues that it is possible to extend the argument of technological change to institutional 
change because the contest between competing technologies is only indirectly between the actual 
technologies themselves but is directly between organisations embodying the competing 
technologies (1990: 94).
L/ As Goodin succinctly comments: 'institutions are in essence just ossified past practices', which 
means that emphasising the importance of institutions amounts to 'emphasizing the importance of 
things past as determinants of present... choices' (1996:10).
1® North observes: 'Alterations in the path come from unanticipated consequences of choices, 
external effects, and sometimes forces exogenous to the analytical framework' (1990:112).
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'normal science', or as noted in Chapter 2, scientists use the knowledge contained 
in their paradigm to solve 'puzzles', and the solutions are then added to the 
paradigm itself.
The process of technological path dependency can be used to explain how a set of 
ideas becomes embedded in institutions. The ideas of a dominant paradigm 
function as what Goldstein and Keohane term 'invisible switchmen' and 'road 
maps', ordering the world by determining the tracks along which action is 
pushed (1993: 12).19 They argue that ideas:
put blinders on people, reducing the number of conceivable 
alternatives ... not only by turning action onto certain tracks rather 
than others, ... but also by obscuring the other tracks from the agent's 
view (1993:12).
These 'blinders' constrain policy-makers in their choice of policy options because 
the endorsement of a particular set of ideas overshadows and eliminates, or 
makes incomprehensible, other sets of ideas.20 Once a particular set of ideas or 
'road map' is selected, Goldstein and Keohane contend, an array of 'reinforcing 
organizational and normative structures' or institutions is created to implement 
and enforce them (1993:13).21 The ideas become embedded in these institutions 
('rules and norms') and 'take on a life of their own', with the institutions acting as 
the mechanisms via which the ideas shape policy-makers' preferences and 
choices, driving decisions down one path rather than others (Goldstein and 
Keohane 1993:12; Berman 1998a: 25-27; Kerremans 1996: 221). The institutions 
constrain future policy choices by setting the boundaries around the options that 
policy-makers can consider, 'shaping] the definition of alternatives and
The authors attribute the 'ideas as switchmen' analogy to Max Weber 1913, Social Psychology of 
the World's Religions, in Gerth and Mills (1958: 280). Goldstein and Keohane contend that ideas 
guide behaviour by 'providing compelling ethical or moral motivations for action' (1993:16).
20 We should recall here the discussion in the previous chapter with regard to a dominant 
paradigm setting the 'reality' or 'regime of truth' of how the world works and what policy 
problems and solutions are legitimate and comprehensible.
21 Here, Goldstein and Keohane are prioritising ideas over institutions; that is, the ideas come first 
and institutions are then created to implement and enforce them. I noted in Chapter 2 that they 
prioritise elites over ideas, treating ideas as 'hooks' for existing interests. Peter Hall also separates 
ideas and institutions, arguing that a paradigm or set of ideas has a status 'somewhat independent 
of institutions that can be used', but notes that ideas and institutions 'often reinforce each other 
since the routines of policy-making are usually designed to reflect a particular set of ideas about 
what can and should be done in a sphere of policy' (1993: 290). The distinction is blurred in some 
ways, given that informal institutions can be understood as shared beliefs.
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influencing] the perception and construction of the reality within which action 
takes place' (March and Olsen 1996: 251). Institutions become a constituent part 
of, and maintain, the dominant paradigm, specifying the goals of policy, the 
instruments to be used, and the very nature of the problems to be addressed. 
Policy problems or options outside of this embedded framework are implausible 
and incomprehensible.22 Thus, institutionalised ideas dominate policy-makers' 
motivations and perceptions of what is possible when it comes to policy 
problems and solutions, committing them to particular paths, even if -  to an 
extent -  they may want to take a different approach (Berman 1998a: 26-27).23
In this way, institutions are said to come to shape the agenda, creating the path 
for policy-makers to follow. Path dependency commits policy-makers to 
interpreting the world through the existing paradigm or set of ideas embedded in 
the institutions, and the existing practices that these institutions have put in 
place. According to this view, policy-makers are constrained by 'past practice 
and intellectual inertia' to choosing future options with reference to those that 
have gone before (Berman 1998a: 14-37; Boase 1996: 289). This means that policy 
choices made at time T influence the choices made at time T + 1 (Berman 
1998a: 33), both in terms of the policy commitments they engender and the ideas 
on which they are based. Sheri Berman argues that policy-makers are bound by 
'internal cognitive pressures' to interpret policy problems and solutions 
according to what they know, with their ideas and programmes 'shaping the way 
decision-makers [understand] challenges and the potential responses available to 
them' (1998b: 380).24 One result is that the 'simplest place' for policy-makers to 
search for solutions to new or existing policy problems is 'in their own past' 
(Rose 1993: 51). Decisions are 'fitted to existing rules, norms and traditions', with 
policy-makers Tean[ing] heavily on preexisting policy frameworks, adjusting
22 That is, the dominant paradigm sets the world-view and the interpretation of how the world 
works.
23 For example, when they are faced with a policy problem ('puzzle') that the dominant paradigm 
cannot resolve.
24 In her study of Swedish and German social democratic party responses to the Great Depression, 
Berman argues that party decision-makers were path dependent in the way they approached 
potential courses of action. The parties 'tried to identify and interpret challenges within existing 
frameworks and tried to match problems with solutions they had used in the past, rather than 
search for politically or economically "optimal" solutions' (1998b: 380). They rejected potential 
courses of action that differed from previous behaviour, and legitimised alternatives only when 
'practical or intellectual precedents for them could be found' (1998a: 33).
133 Institutions
only at the margins to accommodate distinctive features of new situations' 
(Kerremans 1996: 223; Pierson 1994: 42).25
II) Public Opinion and Electoral Hazard
In the previous two sub-sections, I outlined the arguments for path dependency 
and institutional lock-in, stating that policy is based on a complex mixture of 
formal and informal institutions, and noting that the latter are said to be 
especially difficult to alter. The ideas embedded or locked in to the institutions 
supply the interpretative framework within which policy problems and solutions 
are viewed, ruling out alternative approaches such that the ideas themselves 
become ossified into a particular set of institutions, forcing policy-makers to 
follow the policy path determined by those institutions. The result of path 
dependency and lock-in is said to be institutional stability because formal and 
informal institutions are confined to a slow, incremental pace of change. In this 
section, I want to outline another argument for institutional stability and 
incremental change: public opinion and electoral hazard. According to this view, 
policy-makers are reluctant to change current policy structures and practices 
because they fear a backlash from voters who have been inculcated with the 
dominant paradigm's understanding of the world and who have become 
attached to the existing policy stance and its associated policy programs. The 
argument is that policy-makers avoid implementing dramatic changes for fear of 
being held accountable for unpopular new initiatives arising from a new 
paradigm (Pierson 1996: 161). That is, new initiatives based on the new 
paradigm are likely to be unpopular because they are based on an understanding 
of the world incomprehensible to those living under the existing paradigm.
As discussed above, informal institutions include values, norms, conventions, 
codes of conduct, beliefs, and so on that function as 'powerful myths' that 
reinforce, modify, and extend formal institutions. They are 'deeply ingrained in, 
and reflect, widespread understandings of social reality' that have come to have a
25 The implications of this for policy-making are not always interpreted negatively. Offe, for 
example, argues that such path dependency enables as much as it constrains policy-makers because 
the institutions 'are commonly known frameworks of regulation that help [policy-makers] to 
develop the "right" understanding of situations and to anticipate what is likely or unlikely to 
happen' (1996: 206). In addition, in this way, they can be seen as saving energy and decreasing 
transaction costs.
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'rulelike status in social thought and action' (Meyer and Rowan 1977: 343, 341).26 
Policy-makers who want to succeed in introducing major policy reform based on 
a new paradigm must, therefore, tackle the informal institutions underpinning 
and reinforcing existing formal institutions, changing the embedded public 
attitudes and expectations. However, such change is said to be difficult to 
achieve because of the self-reinforcing nature of these informal institutions. 
Claus Offe argues:
Not only are institutions man-made, but also men [sic] institution- 
made -  they are socialized by the educational or 'hidden curriculum' 
effect of institutions into the values, norms, and rules embodied in 
them, and as a consequence they know, expect and anticipate that 
institutions can be relied upon and reckoned with (almost like the 
objects of nature) (1996: 208).27
Thus, existing formal institutions 'incorporate societally legitimated rationalized 
elements in their formal structures', which act to 'maximize their legitimacy and 
increase their resources and survival capabilities' (Meyer and Rowan 1977: 352). 
When formal institutions change according to a new dominant paradigm, but 
informal institutions remain embedded in society, the result is a tension that 
policy-makers must overcome in order to have society accept, and conform to, 
the new policy demands. Overturning or radically altering these existing 
informal institutions thus requires the reconstruction of some of their component 
elements to make them illegitimate or irrelevant in the eyes of the public.28
Stone observes that formal rules are interpreted according to 'informal rules of thumb' provided 
by informal institutions that can become 'so widely known and accepted that they are considered 
more legitimate than the formal rules that spawned them' (1997: 301). She notes that, when officials 
'suddenly stop observing informal rules and instead "go by the book", citizens feel their rights 
have been violated' (1997: 299). The introduction of new policy that goes against these 'rules of 
thumb' attracts a similar feeling of rights being violated. In New Zealand, for example, many 
people rejected attempts to introduce asset-tested charges for overnight stays in public hospitals, 
refusing to pay for what had traditionally been 'free' health care in New Zealand's public hospitals 
(see Kelsey 1999: 372).
27 See also March and Olsen: 'Political actors act on the basis of identities that are themselves 
shaped by political institutions and processes' (1996: 259).
28 For example, policy-makers seeking to introduce policies that, say, reduce the eligibility for 
unemployment benefits are attempting to change not only the formal rules of entitlement, but also 
the informal institutions of the understanding of state-society roles and responsibilities. To succeed 
in reducing state support for all unemployed, they must first convince the public that it is not a 
state responsibility to support all unemployed regardless of differing circumstances. That is, they 
must change the public expectations of what the state should provide and to whom, and what 
individuals should do for themselves. This will be explored in later chapters.
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Such a task is complicated where public attachment to both the formal 
institutions and their underlying informal institutions remains strong, as many 
scholars note with regard to the welfare state. Kees van Kersbergen observes that 
numerous studies have documented the 'considerable and persisting support of 
national publics for their welfare states', which are 'well entrenched in national 
political cultures' (2000: 23). As a result, while the welfare state has been 
subjected to considerable criticism by those seeking reform, it is said to retain 
solid basic support from voters and major political parties who remain attached 
to its central features (Kuhnle 2000:235; Pierson 1994:181; van Kersbergen 
2000: 23). Pierson, for example, argues that the evidence does not uphold 
scholarly speculation about declining popular support for the welfare state. 
Rather, he contends:
the recurrent pattern in public-opinion polls has been a mild swing 
against the welfare state in the wake of poor economic performance 
and budgetary stress, followed by a resurgence of support at the first 
whiff of significant cuts (1996: 175,161).29
He notes that, in Britain, public opinion 'has run strongly, and increasingly, in 
favor of maintaining or even expanding social provision' (1996:162). Kelsey 
offers similar evidence from New Zealand, observing that studies in 1989, 1993, 
and 1998 showed solid and continuing support for the 'conservative values of the 
welfare state', despite (at the time of the last survey) nearly 15 years of neo-liberal 
reforms (1999: 372-373).30
One explanation for the strength of public support for the welfare state is that it 
has become entrenched in formal and informal institutions. That is, the welfare 
state is firmly established, not only in specific programs, but also in the attitudes 
and expectations that underpin policy. Using the logic of 'embedded 
institutions', as outlined above, the argument is that policy legacies and policy 
feedback associated with the welfare state have altered the political context in 
ways that are difficult to reverse, with 'expectations and patterns of interaction'
29 Pierson cites the example of British public opinion on social policy, which showed 'a modest 
decline of support for the welfare state preceded the arrival of the Thatcher government but 
rebounded at the first hint of serious retrenchment' (1996:162).
30 Jane Kelsey notes that the surveys of Massey University researchers Paul Perry and Alan 
Webster show 'remarkable consistency across the decade', with 90 per cent of respondents saying 
they would be prepared to pay more tax to increase government spending on health and education, 
and 60 per cent wanting more taxpayer assistance for the unemployed (1999: 373).
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being shaped by, and also evolving within, its institutional structure (Pierson 
1996: 153; 1994: 39; Boase 1996: 290; March and Olsen 1996: 256). Pierson argues 
that the most important aspect of this altered, or what he calls 'new ', political 
context was the 'emergence of extensive patterns of government intervention in 
social and economic life' (1994: 39). He contends that large social programmes 
are now 'central features of the political landscape', and the political 
environment and public expectations have altered accordingly, demonstrating 
the prescience of Schattschneider's 1935 observation that, 'new policies create a 
new politics' (Pierson 1994:8; E.E. Schattschneider 1935, cited in Pierson 
1994: 39).31 Thus, the informal institutions underpinning the welfare state have 
come to include not only public acceptance of state intervention, but also public 
expectations that the state will intervene. In this way, the formal institutions of the 
welfare state are based on powerful underlying informal institutions that include 
assumptions about the state's role in the polity. Without first tackling these 
informal institutions, policy-makers seeking to introduce policy reform based on 
a new paradigm 's understanding of state-society roles and responsibilities run 
the risk of alienating voters inculcated in, and attached to, the institutions of the 
welfare state. Alienation may lead to electoral backlash.
The fear of voter backlash also relates to the perceived electoral power of interest 
groups. Pierson argues that the new politics of the welfare state has included the 
formation of dense interest-group networks and strong popular attachment to 
particular policies, which have created a level of support that presents a 
'considerable obstacle to reform' (1996: 146; 1994: 8).32 He contends that the new 
institutions have shaped group identities and interests, 'enhancing the 
bargaining power of some groups while devaluing that of others' (1994: 31) 33
This shift will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 in the context of Peter Hall's claim that 
Keynesian ideas redefined the boundary between the public and private spheres and resulted in a 
'major transformation' in the role of the state that was 'one of the hallmarks of the 20th century' 
(1989:4).
32 These interests are not confined to external interest groups. Offe observes that institutions 
'generate vested interest in their own preservation' (1996: 208).
33 Pierson refers explicitly at this point to formal institutions, such as the rules of electoral 
competition, the relationship between the legislative and executive branches of government, the 
role of the courts, and the place of sub-national governments in politics (1994:31). He says these 
institutions 'establish the rules of the game for political struggles, shaping group identities and 
their coalitional choices, enhancing the bargaining power of some groups while devaluing that of 
others' (1994:31). Although Pierson makes passing reference to informal institutions, 
acknowledging that some scholars are identifying the ways that 'formal and informal rules of the
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This means that policy-makers wanting to reform the welfare state are no longer 
on the same playing field as they were when the welfare state was expanding. In 
Pierson's words:
Welfare state expansion involved the enactment of popular policies in 
a relatively undeveloped interest-group environment. By contrast, 
welfare state retrenchment generally requires elected officials to 
pursue unpopular policies that must withstand the scrutiny of both 
voters and well-entrenched networks of interest groups (1996: 143- 
144; emphasis in original).
Reform in the form of retrenchment thus becomes a 'treacherous', electorally 
risky, path because 'it imposes tangible losses on concentrated groups of voters 
in return for diffuse and uncertain gains' (Pierson 1996:145; van Kersbergen 
2000: 29). The fear is that recipients of social benefits are 'relatively concentrated 
and generally well-organized', and are prepared to punish policy-makers for any 
negative alteration in their circumstances, whereas taxpayers are unlikely to 
reward policy-makers for lowering costs (Pierson 1996:175). Policy-makers thus 
avoid attempts at radical reform of the welfare state because they fear paying a 
high cost at the polls (Pierson 1996: 175; 1994: 180-181 ).34
Pierson argues that policy-makers are left so fearful of electoral backlash by 
affected groups that, even where there is no on-going organised activity in 
support of claims against the welfare state, policy-makers respond to the 
'potentially mobilised' (1996:151; emphasis in original).35 Thus, they are prisoners
game in political and social life influence political behaviour' (1994: 40), he fails to comprehend 
how much of his subsequent argument is predicated on the role of informal institutions in shaping 
society's acceptance and defence of the welfare state. That is, his emphasis on 'interest-group 
networks' defending their interests pays insufficient attention to the underlying source of 'strong 
popular attachments' to particular policies.
34 Pierson claims that 'even halting efforts to dismantle the welfare state have usually exacted a 
high political price' (1996:174-175). On this point, Esping-Andersen notes the interesting paradox 
that, despite beliefs that the backlash against the welfare state ignites when social spending 
burdens become 'too heavy', anti-welfare-state sentiments in the 1980s were generally 'weakest 
where welfare spending has been heaviest and vice versa' (1990: 33).
Pat Troy offers an example of this phenomenon in his discussion of Australia's Whitlam Labor 
government of 1972-75. He notes that one of the pressures on the Coalition parties (then in 
Opposition) shortly before the Whitlam government's dismissal in November 1975 was that 'they 
could not afford many of the Government's policies and programs to continue much longer' 
(1993:159). He observes:
From their point of view there was a real danger that the processes and the programs 
of the government could become embedded and be seen by the population as the 
correct way to approach and order public life (1993:159).
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not only of political and bureaucratic institutions, but also 'societal institutions' 
such as public opinion, 'specific interests and patterns of interaction' (Boase 
1996: 290). While these 'societal institutions' may not be 'perfectly fixed', 'in the 
short period that politicians have in office, they must be taken as a given' (Rose 
1993: 39).36 The result is that policy-makers find it difficult to move beyond those 
policy options considered acceptable within the previous dominant paradigm's 
framework, which is embedded in existing formal and informal institutions. 
Thus, even when policy-makers favour a new paradigm, they are cautious about 
pursuing new policy options; rather, in a similar way to the path dependency 
described above, they are confined mainly to the options embedded in existing 
institutions. These options may include less extensive reforms than policy­
makers may prefer, which also helps to avoid another source of electoral hazard 
-  voter anger at a party's reversal of its traditional policy stance. Berman argues 
that policy-makers in individual political parties have difficulty changing policy 
programs because voters use a party's ideas to identify what a party stands for 
and what policies it will pursue.37 Voters may regard the actions of a party that 
contradicts or abandons its earlier ideas as a 'loss of integrity or responsibility' 
(Berman 1998a: 28), and may respond by withdrawing their support, thus 
affecting the party's electoral chances. Hence, the reluctance of policy-makers to 
expose themselves to the electoral risk of radically changing policy.
These arguments for institutional stability offer one explanation for what appears 
to be the limited impact of new ideas on the welfare state. Policy-makers are said 
to be path dependent in their policy choices because they are locked in to the 
institutions and policy commitments inherited from their predecessors, and to 
the set of ideas and policy approaches embedded in formal and informal 
institutions, including public expectations and opinion. Informal institutions are 
said to be more difficult to change than their formal counterparts, with changes 
requiring resocialisation, a restructuring of routines, the formation of new codes 
of conduct and so on. These difficulties mean that new ideas are seen to have 
little dramatic impact. Change does occur, but it is slow and incremental, which 
makes for institutional stability and seeming inertia in the welfare state. These
36 Unless, of course, political parties of different hues agree on the need for a new direction.
37 King also notes that politics in liberal democracies 'place a premium on ideas (or ideologies) as a 
source of differentiating between parties and politicians', although he adds that, 'in practice, the 
differences are rarely as real as is sometimes claimed' (1999: 33).
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arguments, either on their own or in combination, help to explain why several 
studies conclude that the welfare state has not been abandoned, but is being 
'adjusted incrementally and reconstructed partially' (van Kersbergen 2000: 22).38
Institutions and Institutional Instability
The arguments outlined in the previous section suggest that the Friedmans are 
correct in their claim that, 'judged by practice', they and their pro-market (neo­
liberal) ideas have, indeed, 'mostly been on the losing side'. According to these 
arguments, path dependency and fear of electoral backlash have constrained 
policy-makers seeking to reform the welfare state to incremental change such 
that, in practice, there is little real change, with policy development confined to 
tinkering at the margins. In terms of the paradigm shift model outlined in the 
previous chapter, this means that a new paradigm has little effect on policy in 
practice. That is, although there may a new set of ideas through which to 
interpret the world and policy problems, policies and goals remain largely the 
same because policy-makers can implement only small changes. The result is 
policy stability, with the shift in paradigm from Keynesianism to neo-liberalism 
making no significant difference to policy options and policy-making in practice. 
Yet, this is not the case, as the close examination of the OECD's major policy 
documents in subsequent chapters will reveal. The disparity occurs because the 
Friedmans underestimate the implications of their second claim, that: 'judged by 
ideas, we have been on the winning side'.39 In the paragraph from their work 
cited above, the Friedmans themselves offer two ways in which their ideas have 
been successful: that government is no longer perceived as the 'universal cure for 
all ills', and that 'the growth of government has come to a halt'. Such claims, if 
true, suggest not only that there have been dramatic changes in practice such that 
'growth of government' has stopped, but that there are likely to be more radical 
changes in practice in the future because policy-makers will no longer look on 
government action as the 'universal cure for all ills'.
In this section of the chapter, I will begin to counter the arguments for 
institutional inertia, arguing that claims for institutional stability based on path
38 For a list of these studies, see van Kersbergen (2000: 31, endnote 2).
39 However, not all of their admirers accept this degree of success. For example, David Henderson 
laments that, while what he calls economic liberalism has made 'significant gains', it is 'too soon to 
declare victory' for these ideas (1998: 66).
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dependency underestimate the impact of incremental policy changes and pay 
insufficient attention to the effect of new ideas on the informal institutions 
underpinning policy options. Such claims exaggerate the stability of institutions 
and fail to explain how and why radical change occurs. Institutional stability 
arguments also assume that change in informal institutions is one way, from the 
'bottom up' (society to policy-makers). This ignores 'top down' pressure to 
change that occurs when policy-makers using a new set of ideas, and thus a new 
interpretative framework of policy problems and solutions, deliberately target 
existing informal institutions that may impede new policies and/or policy 
reforms based on the new ideas. Such claims also assume that once a new 
paradigm has been adopted, no further major changes are possible. That is, 
although Pierson argues that Keynesian ideas changed the political landscape, 
with 'new policies creating] a new politics', he then ignores the possibility that 
this could (and did) happen again. He is not the only scholar to do this, as has 
been noted above in the sections on path dependency and institutional lock-in. 
These scholars fail to explain why the Keynesian paradigm should be the only 
one to create 'new politics'.
In the following sections, I will argue that institutional (and thus, policy) stability 
has been overstated because, first, incremental change is less path dependent, 
and has more impact, than is assumed, and second, that new ideas have a greater 
impact on informal institutions than is assumed. New ideas act to undermine 
institutional stability by changing the very foundations on which formal 
institutions are built and maintained, especially public understandings of state- 
society relations and their expectations of the state and of themselves. Thus, neo­
liberal ideas have fundamentally altered the way of thinking about government 
and the understanding of state-society relations that underpinned Keynesianism; 
they have acted to undermine public support for the welfare state. As Paul 
Wilding succinctly notes in his discussion of the impact of Thatcherism: 'To the 
casual observer, not much has changed since 1979. In reality, a great deal has 
changed' (1992: 202).
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I) O ne Sm all Step for  a Policy  ...
At the beginning of this chapter, I noted claims from some scholars that the 
welfare state remains remarkably intact after 20 years of alleged 'attacks', with 
continued high levels of spending and little 'radical' policy change. These claims 
suggest that while some reform has occurred in response to talk of the welfare 
state being in 'crisis', over-all there has been a 'persistence rather than ... 
"breakdown" of the major institutions of the welfare state' (van Kersbergen 
2000: 20). I noted that the reasons advanced for the tenacity of the welfare state 
centred on the notions of path dependency, in which policy-makers are 
constrained by the welfare state's institutional structures, policy frameworks, and 
long-term policy commitments, and continued popular support for its policies. 
Such claims suggest that policy-makers in the welfare state are tripping merrily 
along a path of continued state provision and 'state responsibility for securing 
some basic modicum of welfare for its citizens' (Esping-Anderson 1990:18-19). 
According to this view, incremental changes in policy signify nothing more than 
the continued resilience of the welfare state's formal and informal institutions.40 
In this section, I want to explore a counter-argument to these claims: that 
incremental changes, while small in themselves, can have major effects on the 
formal and informal institutions of the welfare state, altering the 'path' along 
which policy-makers tread when choosing policy options. With regard to formal 
institutions, the use of aggregate figures when describing the size and actions of 
the welfare state can conceal the significant impact of small policy steps. In 
addition, and perhaps more to the point, seemingly minor alterations in one area 
can compromise other policy areas such that they are no longer viable or no 
longer have the same aims. The effect on informal institutions may be equally 
dramatic in that small changes may reflect a considerable shift in the underlying 
way of thinking about state-society relations, which has a sizeable effect both on 
what the state provides and what society expects. The result of allegedly minor 
change is considerably less institutional stability than path-dependency theory 
suggests.
As outlined above, claims for institutional stability rest on the notion of slow, 
incremental change along a path set by ideas embedded in a range of formal and 
informal institutions. Policy-makers are said to be path dependent because, once
40 Pierson observes: 'there is no reason to think that the importance of institutional structures and 
the legacy of previous policy choices has declined' (1996:155).
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a set of options is selected, various mechanisms reinforce the direction that these 
policy choices have set. Policy-makers are forced to take small steps slowly along 
a path determined by ideas embedded in a range of institutions because they are 
hobbled by the link between these fairly intractable formal and informal 
institutions. Radical changes in formal institutions are not possible because they 
are underpinned by the 'deep-seated cultural inheritance' underlying informal 
institutions, which are tenacious and thus much harder to change (North 
1990:91). Policy-makers, therefore, are said to be constrained to making 
incremental changes based on existing institutions and policy-solving 
frameworks, adjusting only at the margins to accommodate new policy problems 
and solutions. Fundamental change may occur eventually as a result of 
'thousands of specific small alterations', but discontinuous institutional change, 
or 'a radical change in the formal rules', is unlikely because the tension between 
the new formal rules and the existing informal institutions resolves itself in a 
'new equilibrium that is far less revolutionary' (North 1990: 89, 91). The result is 
relative institutional stability because change is 'overwhelmingly incremental'.
However, not all scholars are convinced of the veracity of such arguments for 
institutional stability. Their central criticism is that ideas and institutions can, 
and do, change quickly and dramatically, and that theories of institutional inertia 
cannot adequately explain such change (Blyth 1997a: 245; King 1999:43-45; 
March and Olsen 1996: 257). These critics argue that scholars emphasising path 
dependency are guilty of exaggerating the solidity and rigidity of institutions 
and underestimating the role of ideas in policy changes.41 They suggest that, 
contrary to the claims that policy-makers are confined to using existing policy 
frameworks to interpret new policy problems and solutions, policy-makers also 
look to new ideas outside the existing approaches.
These criticisms are valid, but they do not go far enough. They focus on large 
shifts or 'important institutional changes ... associated with cataclysms and
41 King challenges the emphasis that some researchers place on the 'solidification of ideas', the role 
of institutions, and the alleged 'inflexibility of policy-making processes to new ideas once a course 
of action has been established' (1999: 43). He contends that institutions embody 'certain principles 
and assumptions which may constrain later options', but these arrangements are not unchangeable 
(1999: 45). In a similar vein, March and Olsen argue that change can be 'discontinuous, contested, 
and problematic', and linked to 'performance crises' that 'stimulate departures from established 
routines and practices' (1996: 257).
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metamorphoses at breaking points in history' (March and Olsen 1996: 257), 
ignoring the significant impact that smaller changes can have on formal and 
informal institutions. Van Kersbergen contends that theories of institutional 
stability are 'biased so heavily towards conceptualising and theorising the 
institutional mechanisms of persistence and resistance ... that evidence of 
institutional change is difficult to recognise' (2000: 26). He is sceptical of the 
alleged 'powerful mechanisms against radical change', arguing that an 
examination of what he calls 'creeping disentitlement' reveals that the 'resistance 
argument is stretched too far' (2000: 26, 28). Specifically, he contends: 'Radical 
transformation does not necessarily result from radical measures' (2000: 28). 
Rather, what appear to be minor alterations can have significant effects on policy 
and policy outcomes both immediately and over the longer term, especially 
when the 'host of small-scale measures' is combined.42 He offers as examples the 
weakening or relaxing of indexation in major social schemes as well as raising the 
retirement age, reducing pensions, introducing means tests, and increasing the 
number of earning years for assessment (2000: 28). Such actions, he claims, 'are 
by themselves perhaps not drastic measures, but their combined effect may be 
harmful, particularly for those who depend on a public pension only' (2000: 28).
Van Kersbergen continues his criticism with the observation that an 
accumulation of small measures may result in a social programme 'ceasfing] to 
offer the level of protection for which it was originally designed' (2000: 29). That 
is, to the casual observer, the programme may appear to remain intact, but, in 
fact, it is no longer the same as when it was initiated. Ultimately, this means that 
efforts to leave the basic policy framework intact while restraining expenditure 
by 'nicks, chips and slices ... to different elements of the current and future 
programme' (Wilding 1992: 203) are not as innocuous as they first appear. 
Rather, the (perhaps) unanticipated consequences can include 'institutional 
transformation' as the original 'institutional logic' or purpose of the policy is 
either replaced with a new logic (van Kersbergen 2000: 27) or eroded to the point 
where it is effectively defunct.43 In a similar vein, abolishing or redefining a
42 Of course, as van Kersbergen observes, much can depend on one's definition of 'change', 
especially 'radical change', 'fundamental transformation', and 'drastic reform' (2000: 26). See, for 
example, Pierson's understanding of 'radical' reform, noted below in footnote 46.
43 For example, reforms to the domestic purposes benefit (DPB) in New Zealand in the 1990s 
dramatically altered the underlying raison d'etre of the benefit. It was originally introduced in 1975 
for (among others) sole parents and 'recognised the statutory right of sole parents to income
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single core goal programme, while on its own an apparently minor change, can 
have major implications both in that policy area and in related areas.44 Van 
Kersbergen argues that incremental reforms in one area of social policy may 
undermine the financial viability of other policy areas as they become flooded 
with the former clientele of the targeted area. He contends that the inevitable 
eventual result is a greater reliance on means-testing or other forms of restriction 
in order to control the level of social assistance (2000: 29).
Van Kersbergen's observations on the substantial consequences of tinkering at 
the margins of policy reveal that institutions may not be as stable as some 
institutional theorists suggest. Incremental changes to formal welfare institutions 
dramatically alter conditions for the individual recipient of welfare, with gradual 
retrenchment policies producing 'dramatic results in terms of a decreasing level 
of social protection and rising poverty among specific groups' (van Kersbergen 
2000: 30; see also Kelsey 1997: 271-296). But, as importantly, they also undermine 
the informal institutions on which such social provision is based. The 
superficially minor changes to benefit eligibility and levels, or the replacement of 
universal provision of services with means-testing and user charges for some 
services, affect fundamental underlying assumptions, such as how much 
responsibility the state should bear for its citizens, who should be eligible for 
state help, how much should the state provide, and so on. Maurice Mullard 
offers an example, noting: 'The move away from universal to selective benefits is 
based on the assumption that certain groups are not entitled to benefits and are
support, irrespective of fault' (Rudd 1997: 258; emphasis in original). Subsequent reforms targeted 
not only eligibility and the level of the benefit, but the underlying reasoning behind its existence. 
Kelsey notes that benefit cuts were intended to send a message to existing and potential parents 
about choices and family responsibilities, and were based on a new image of DPB recipients as 
young women who deliberately became pregnant in order to cheat the state and their fellow 
citizens (1997: 282, 281). In addition, she observes:
Moves to tighten the accountability of (primarily) fathers for on-going maintenance 
of their children through the liable parent contribution scheme were prompted by a 
desire to cut costs and punish recalcitrant fathers, not to improve the quality of life 
for the custodial parent and her children (1997: 282).
44 Chris Rudd notes that the New Zealand Treasury's prioritising of inflation as 'the overriding 
objective of government policy' in 1997 was accompanied by a statement that any adverse effects 
on employment that resulted were unfortunate, but unavoidable in the short term and would 
resolve themselves in the long term (1997: 261-262). Thus, changing the priority of inflation vis-a- 
vis employment as a government goal had negative implications for employment, especially when 
the 'unfortunate adverse effects' were occurring at a time when unemployment benefits were being 
cut and subject to other control mechanisms such as targeting and means-testing.
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making fraudulent claims on the welfare state' (1997a: 260). This argument will 
be examined in more detail below.
Incremental change, then, can have larger effects than arguments for path 
dependency, and thus institutional stability, acknowledge. In fact, small steps 
may not lead policy-makers along the same path as previously, but may, instead, 
force them off the beaten track on to a path quite different to their earlier route. 
Wilding illustrates this with reference to Margaret Thatcher's 'enduring legacy' 
in Britain, arguing that, 'in reality', more has changed than casual observers 
perceive (1992: 203). He claims that the result of Thatcher's incremental reform 
of the welfare state is a 'new lower base-line of expenditure and a new lower 
level of service provision' (1992: 203). That is, he argues, while a 'couple of years 
of restraints or cuts can be restored, [a] dozen years of such policies cannot' 
because of the high economic and political cost of doing so (1992: 203). Thus, 
Wilding contends, the enduring legacy of ' l l  years of creeping Thatcherism' is 
major institutional change because succeeding governments do not feel able, or 
compelled, to undo so much minor change, especially if they accept the new 
policy direction (1992: 211). He concedes that the Labour Party did not adopt all 
of Thatcher's policies, but argues that it did move its positions 'significantly and 
substantially' (1992: 209). Chris Rudd makes a similar claim with regard to the 
situation in New Zealand in 1990 at the end of the fourth Labour Government's 
six years of neo-liberal reforms (1984-1990). He argues that Labour: 'altered the 
"rules of the game", or the political environment, in such a way that long-term 
retrenchment of the welfare state was facilitated' (1997: 263). He notes that, when 
the National Party won government in 1990, it both retained the previous Labour 
government's neo-liberal reforms and took them further (1997: 263-265).
Both of these statements on the impact of anti-welfare state policies suggest an 
element of path dependency that Wilding and Rudd apparently reject with 
regard to Keynesian ideas. That is, they are arguing that neither Thatcher's 
Conservative government nor New Zealand's Labour government were tied to 
Keynesian ideas, but that subsequent governments have been tied to the new 
directions. However, their claims may say less about path dependency than they 
do about the impact of a new dominant paradigm on the major parties from both 
sides of the political spectrum. The adoption of a new set of ideas may result in a 
degree of policy convergence between opposing parties, partly because the
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situation in which policy-makers find themselves has changed. In this sense, 
incremental change results in policy-makers once again working in a new 
political environment, just as Pierson claimed they were as a result of the rise of 
the Keynesian welfare state. Retrenchment policies, even those that make only 
small changes, alter the political context within which policy-makers discuss 
policy problems and solutions, ruling out some previously acceptable options 
and endorsing new approaches. The result is that policy-makers are not 
constrained to the paths set by the existing ideas embedded in institutions. 
Rather, the new ideas underpinning retrenchment of the welfare state have 
shifted the grounds, and terms, of political debate and allowed policy-makers to 
pursue new policy paths.
I-I) Lies, damned lies, and aggregate statistics
One reason that some scholars have produced little empirical confirmation of the 
profound effects of incremental policy change on the welfare state is their 
tendency to use aggregate spending figures when describing the size and actions 
of the welfare state. However, as other scholars note, aggregate figures conceal 
the substance of policies and the nuances of policy change. Costa Esping- 
Andersen succinctly observes: 'By scoring welfare states on spending, we assume 
that all spending counts equally' (1990: 19). Importantly, spending aggregates 
fail to capture the impact of incremental reform; that is, those 'reforms that are 
designed to introduce retrenchment only indirectly or over the longer term' 
(Pierson 1996: 157). They also fail to reveal the changing composition of social 
expenditure; for example, 'rising unemployment may sustain high spending 
even as social rights and benefits are significantly curtailed' (Pierson 1996: 157; 
Hay 2001: 7). The result may be a false picture of welfare-state resilience, or, as 
Colin Hay notes, quantitative continuity may mask qualitative discontinuity. He 
contends that, while the welfare state may have grown in size, 'this in no way 
excludes the possibility of a quite fundamental transformation in its very form 
and function' (2001:7). Hay challenges the notion that unchanged or slightly 
higher spending levels reveal little change in the welfare state in the past 20 
years, and claims that, if analysis focuses on policy detail, rather than on 
aggregate statistics, then there has, in fact, been significant welfare retrenchment 
and reform (2001: 6).45
In this, he echoes Wilding's earlier claim that, while at one level, there were no cuts to British 
welfare expenditure under Thatcher, with total spending increasing in real terms between 1979 and
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A focus on the amount of spending, rather than the type of spending, creates the 
impression of a static welfare state and an unchanged policy direction. An 
obvious solution, then, is for analysis of retrenchment to focus on both 
qualitative and quantitative measures. However, this is not as straightforward as 
it appears. Pierson, for example, claims to use a 'combination of quantitative 
data on expenditures and qualitative analysis of welfare state reforms' to probe 
structural shifts in the welfare state (1996: 157). He looks for 'significant increases' 
in the use of means-testing for benefits, 'major transfers' of state responsibility to 
the private sector, and 'dramatic changes in benefit and eligibility rules that signal 
a qualitative reform of a particular program' (Pierson 1996: 157; emphasis 
added). But he overlooks the significance of minor changes in benefit and 
eligibility rules to the overall direction of the welfare state. This leads Pierson to 
conclude (incorrectly) that, while change has occurred, with many programmes 
experiencing a tightening of eligibility rules or reductions in benefits, it is hard to 
'find radical changes in advanced welfare states' (1996:174; emphasis in 
original).46 Rather, he contends, '[retrenchment has been pursued cautiously' 
(1996:174). Thus, Pierson ignores the over-all impact on the type of welfare 
spending arising from incremental adjustments in benefit rules and levels, and 
the potentially large flow-on effects to other social programmes. He also 
disregards the impact on underlying state-society relations and the expectations 
that people have of the state, and of themselves and others. Hay rightly observes 
that minor adjustments have had an important effect on welfare state spending. 
He argues that, given the rise in unemployment, spending would have increased 
dramatically were it not for:
a noticeable tightening of eligibility criteria, a greater emphasis upon
benefit targeting and means-testing, and the ... development of a
1988, at another level the growth in resources did not match the growth in need and demand 
(Wilding 1992: 203). Hence, Wilding's claim, noted above, that Thatcher's legacy 'is a new lower 
base-line of expenditure' (1992: 203).
46 Pierson acknowledges in a footnote the difficulty in establishing what constitutes 'radical' 
reform and notes that 'it is impossible to say definitively when a series of quantitative cutbacks 
amounts to a qualitative shift in the nature of programs' (1996:179, fn 39). However, he goes on to 
claim that such a qualitative shift occurs:
when because of policy reform a program can no longer play its traditional role (e.g., 
when pension benefits designed to provide a rough continuation of the retiree's 
earlier standard of living are clearly unable to do so) (1996:179, fn 39).
Again, this overlooks both the way that cuts compromise existing programs and the effect on 
informal institutions. See, for example, Rudd's discussion of the impact of a series of seemingly 
minor reforms on both existing programmes and the 'welfare consensus' underpinning New  
Zealand's welfare state (1997: 256-267).
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'conditional' welfare state stressing the obligations and duties of 
claimants (2001: ll).47
This last point demonstrates that, far from being constrained to particular 
policies because of path dependency and institutional lock-in, seemingly 
incremental changes allow policy-makers a fair degree of latitude in their policy 
options. As will be explored further below, these minor changes have a dramatic 
impact on the informal institutions underpinning policy options, such that larger 
changes in policy direction become possible as public understanding of state- 
society relations shifts.
I-II) Taming the voters
As outlined above, those arguing for institutional stability and welfare-state 
resilience also claim that the fear of a backlash from interest groups and voters 
attached to the formal institutions of the welfare state constrains policy-makers in 
their choice of policy options. Mature social programmes are said to have 
produced new organised interests in the form of 'consumers and providers of 
social services', who are 'usually well placed to defend the welfare state' because 
they are more concentrated than those who gain from retrenchment (Pierson 
1996:175, 145). Retrenchment policies are seen as electorally risky because of 
their tangible losses on these interest groups and their uncertain gains for 
taxpayers. Thus, policy-makers have yet another reason to make only 
incremental changes and avoid straying too far from the policy paths accepted -  
and demanded -  by these seemingly powerful interest groups.
However, such claims for the sway of interest groups may overstate both their 
level of organisation and their power vis-ä-vis business and other groups, which 
may be equally 'well placed' to attack the welfare state. While some groups, such 
as aged pensioners, may be concentrated enough (and may have the capacity and 
resources) to exert influence on policy-makers, other groups, such as solo 
parents, sickness beneficiaries, or the long-term unemployed, may not be in the 
same position. It is these groups that policy-makers are likely to target because
47 Hay uses income replacement ratios as an example, saying they: 'display a common and marked 
downward trajectory from a range of start dates ... and a variety of initial levels' (2001: 11-12). 
Rudd offers evidence from New Zealand, arguing that, although social welfare expenditure 
increased in the 1980s, the demand for benefits increased more, such that 'real expenditure per 
benefit recipient actually fell for a number of welfare benefits' (1997: 261).
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the 'poorly organised and electorally harmless' are the easiest groups to hit 
hardest in the campaign for welfare-state reform (van Kersbergen 2000: 29). 
Pierson claims that interest groups linked to particular social policies are now 
prominent political actors (1996:151), but he confuses prominence as a group 
with the capacity and resources to function as a political actor. Prominence by 
itself does not necessarily make a group powerful enough to act in the political 
process.48 In addition, the attachment of groups to the continuation of particular 
policies, rather than to policy continuity more generally, makes them vulnerable 
in that policy-makers can use these different interests to play groups off against 
one another (Pierson 1996:147), and against those groups in favour of welfare- 
state reform.
These arguments for institutional stability also suggest that interests formed 
under Keynesian welfarism are static, with new ideas having no impact on 
existing interests. In fact, as noted above, Pierson argues that welfare-state 
institutions have shaped group identities and interests, enhancing the power of 
some while devaluing others. Pierson appears to be arguing that these interest 
groups do not change once institutions have formed them. Yet, recall Blyth's 
argument from the previous chapter that new ideas are more than 'hooks' for 
pre-existing interests in that they reconstruct 'expectations of, and preferences 
for, certain policy choices and political and economic goods' (1997b: 233). In 
specifying the nature of the world and how it works, and the role of the state and 
society in this world, the ideas set new 'conventional judgments' about the 
allocation of resources. As a result, new interests are formulated. Rudd offers an 
example of this in his discussion of the result of economic reforms in New 
Zealand in the 1980s and 1990s. He observes that tax breaks given to both 
middle and high-income earners created a 'sizeable majority of voters who have 
little incentive to support policies which result in their paying more taxes'
48 For example, in 1997, New Zealand's Social Welfare Department convened a major $1700-a-head 
conference on welfare reform ('Beyond Dependency'), and included representatives from the 
government, state agencies, private-sector providers, business groups, and overseas welfare 
reformers, but no representatives from beneficiary groups; see Bradford (1997) and Masters (1997). 
Bradford, the co-ordinator for the Auckland Unemployed Workers' Rights Centre, wrote that: 'As 
far as we are aware, no representatives of unemployed and beneficiary organisations have been 
invited to speak despite our polite request to do so' (1997). Thus, although beneficiaries are a 
prominent group of concern to policy-makers, their prominence does not mean that their 
representatives are included automatically as policy actors in the policy-making process.
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(1997: 263). Thus, the ideas underpinning the reforms reconstructed the interests 
of middle and high-income earners, or as Rudd notes:
The 'welfare consensus', whereby those fortunate enough to be able- 
bodied and have employment paid to fund a welfare system which 
both they and the less fortunate could enjoy, has been seriously 
compromised (1997: 263).
Similar results have been noted elsewhere, as will be discussed below. Policy­
makers, therefore, may have more flexibility with their selection of policy options 
-  and thus, may be less path dependent -  than electoral hazard arguments allow.
II)... One Giant Leap for Ideas
In the previous section, I presented some counter-arguments to claims that 
institutions are relatively stable because policy-makers are both path dependent 
and fear an electoral backlash from interest groups attached to existing 
conditions. I argued that incremental change has a more significant impact on 
institutional stability than those arguing for the resilience of the welfare state 
allow. Small steps can lead policy-makers on to new policy paths, with resulting 
profound effects for the individual welfare recipient and for the various policy 
programmes and frameworks. As part of this discussion, I suggested that 
arguments for policy inertia based on a fear of voter backlash overstate the 
power of interest groups. In addition, such arguments overlook the power 
differentials between the various interest groups receiving welfare and between 
those in favour of the welfare state and those against it. However, a second, and 
perhaps more important, reason that arguments for institutional stability are 
exaggerated is that they pay insufficient attention to the impact of a shift in ideas 
on informal institutions, and especially the way in which new ideas affect public 
opinion, expectations, and behaviour. The arguments outlined above suggest 
that informal institutions are relatively immune to change, and that their 
relationship with formal institutions makes radical change almost impossible. 
However, informal institutions can, and do, change, either unconsciously or 
deliberately, and it is the role of discourse in effecting and reflecting change in 
informal institutions that is a central concern of this thesis. In this section, I want 
to argue that new ideas, even when introduced allegedly incrementally, have a 
dramatic effect on the informal institutions underpinning the welfare state, 
undermining public support, changing state-society relationships, and leading,
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ultimately, to a new raison d'etre for formal institutions and a new type of welfare 
state.49
The arguments for institutional stability and path dependency canvassed so far 
present informal institutions as relatively immutable. We need to recall here the 
discussion above that informal institutions are said to have 'tenacious survival 
ability' because they are part of a 'deep-seated cultural inheritance' built on 
ideas, attitudes and beliefs that are entrenched within society (North 1990). 
According to this formulation, informal institutions are 'rationalised myths' that 
are 'socially constructed, publicly known, anticipated and accepted' (Meyer and 
Rowan 1977; March and Olsen 1996: 249). They are built into society and are 
reinforced over time through repetition and routinisation until they become 
'deeply ingrained ... [and] widespread understandings of social reality' that have 
'a rulelike status in social thought and action' (Meyer and Rowan 1977: 343, 341). 
While informal institutions are not static, their very nature means that they are 
slower to shift than formal institutions. The intertwining of formal and informal 
institutions complicates the process of change, constraining the influence of new 
ideas and making dramatic change difficult, if not impossible, in the short term 
because change can occur only slowly and incrementally.50 Change cannot be 
dramatic because the entrenched nature of the existing institutional structures 
means that change can be realised only through the lengthy process of 
resocialisation into new values, routines, customs, traditions, conventions, codes 
of conduct and so on. Change, then, occurs mainly through 'accidents, learning 
and natural selection' as well as the 'mundane processes of interpretation, 
reasoning, education, imitation and adaptation' (North 1990:87; March and 
Olsen 1996: 257).
An important aspect of these arguments is the extent to which they imply that 
society has a significant amount of control over policy change. New ideas are 
judged -  and accepted, altered, or discarded -  according to institutional 
structures that are deeply entrenched in society. Policy-makers seeking to
49 I say 'allegedly' incremental because I do not accept that policies based on a new vision of state- 
society relations, roles, and responsibilities can be incremental in terms of being minor changes.
50 YVe should recall here North's argument, noted above, that the tension between 'discontinuous' 
change in formal institutions and tenacious informal institutions resolves itself through a 
'restructuring ... in both directions' that results in change that is 'far less revolutionary' (1990: 91).
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implement new policy ideas have to contend with an existing set of ideas 
embedded in both informal institutions and the formal institutions that they 
modify, supplement, and expand, and to which, importantly, the public is 
attached. Again, this is not to argue that change does not occur; society's values 
and beliefs are not static. Rose, for example, observes that values can change 'as 
one generation replaces another', with a new generation's substantially different 
views, on say, abortion or social policy, bringing dissatisfaction with existing 
policy and demands for a new policy course (1993: 152).51 In this way, policies 
that once seemed controversial or unacceptable become accepted as 
commonplace -  or vice versa (Rose 1993:152). In a similar vein, 'various changes 
to economic, technological and social relations, values and ideas, and the general 
public mood' can affect informal institutions (Keating 2000a: 34). However, 
according to the 'embedded in institutions' arguments, while informal 
institutions change, the existing institutions, and the ideas embedded within 
them, affect how much of an impact new ideas can have and how much change 
policy-makers can pursue.52 New policies are judged against the 'unconscious 
assumptions behind [existing] policy discourse and practice' (Blyth 1997b: 236).
According to this view, which, as noted above, Pierson uses to explain the 
growth and resilience of the welfare state, society changes to incorporate 
alterations in its ideas, values, beliefs, and so on, and institutions change in 
response in order to 'cope with this changing society' (Kerremans 1996: 224). The 
changes arise from within, and are controlled by, society. In this sense, Pollack 
contends that the arguments for institutional stability centre 'not on the
For example, Kelsey notes that, although some surveys in the 1990s have shown that New 
Zealanders have not 'shifted their values to accommodate the free market regime ... the values of 
the new generation of the "children of the market" remain largely unknown' (1999: 373).
52 North notes the effect of institutions on ideas when he observes that, while ideas matter, 
institutions determine 'just how much they matter' in that the way institutions structure human 
interactions affects the price that individuals pay for their actions when they follow their ideas 
(1990: 111, 22). He explains that ideas, and they way they take hold, matter to institutions because 
they shape the subjective mental constructs that individuals use to interpret the world and make 
choices (1990: 111). In turn, institutions act to decrease uncertainty, structuring daily life so that 
individuals know what to expect in response to their actions. This means that institutional 
structures can lower the price that individuals pay for acting on their ideas because they allow 
individuals to predict likely responses. Thus, formal institutions can 'provide the freedom to 
individuals to incorporate their ideas ... into the choices they make', and to make their choices 
become effective (North 1990: 111). New ideas, then, can alter the interpretative mental constructs, 
changing the understandings of price, taste, and, ultimately, choices, which can then flow through 
to change institutions. Again, however, the point is that change via new ideas occurs slowly 
because the cost of introducing radically new ideas is too high.
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institutional constraints from above ... but rather on the incremental build-up over 
time of constraints from below, as societal actors develop a vested interest in the 
maintenance of ... policies' (Pollack 1996:442; emphasis in original). Society is 
seen to cling to its existing institutions, rejecting any notions that are inconsistent 
with its current interpretative framework for understanding the world, including 
the roles and responsibilities of the state and individuals. Hence, the argument 
that policy-makers are prisoners of both formal institutions and informal 
institutions, such as public opinions, interests, values, and patterns of 
interaction.53 However, such arguments underestimate the extent to which 
change can be orchestrated from the top; that is, they fail to account for a 
paradigm containing compelling ideas and mechanisms (such as discourse) that 
policy-makers can use to attack and replace existing formal and informal 
institutions.
The arguments outlined suggest that the relationship between formal and 
informal institutions results in institutional stability because change can occur 
only slowly and incrementally. Policy-makers seeking to implement new ideas 
cannot do so via radical policy change because they are confined to small steps 
along paths determined by existing institutions and policy frameworks. 
Institutions, their structures, and the ideas embedded within them determine 
what policies are possible. Yet, such arguments are limited because policy­
makers seeking to pursue the policy options suggested in the new paradigm are 
not passive actors completely at the mercy of existing institutions and 
institutional structures. Rather, they retain 'significant discretion ... in 
fashioning and responding to the ideas and values that are structuring the 
political debate' (Keating 2000a: 34). By targeting the factors that comprise and 
influence informal institutions, thus altering the structure of the institutions and 
the design of policies, policy-makers can -  independently of society -  alter 
institutions substantially. In the words of March and Olsen:
53 Jacobsen uses a formulation of this argument to reject the notion of reducing ideas to the tools 
used by elites to further their interests. He argues that ideas-based approaches to policy analysis 
cannot assume a 'passive public' that elites 'haplessly' manipulate with respect to economic ideas 
(1995: 309). Instead, Jacobsen claims that non-elites 'can help shape the preferences of other actors 
regarding the framing of a situation and, consequently, the "correct" policy solution' (1995: 309). 
Understood in this way, he contends: 'Economic ideas are programs for action that must appeal not 
only to crucial interest groups but also to deeply felt if incompletely articulated social needs' 
(1995: 310). Thus, ideas reflect more broadly held societal views, and cannot be said to occur solely 
at the elite level where they are used only to pursue elite interests.
154 Institutions
Politics is not simply a matter of negotiating coalitions of interests 
within given constraints of rights, rules, preferences, and resources. 
Politics extends to shaping those constraints, to constructing accounts 
of politics, history and self that are not only bases for instrumental 
action but also central concerns of life (1996: 257).
Policy-makers are not restricted only to those actions consistent with society's 
informal institutions, but can act to shape public attitudes and expectations, 
thereby changing the way of thinking about state-society relations to that which 
conforms to, and supports, the new paradigm. Importantly, policy-makers 
themselves can be the source of demands for change. As Hill observes: 'far from 
arising autonomously in the community, political demands may be 
manufactured by leaders, who thereby create conditions for their own action' 
(Edelman 1971, cited in Hill 1997: 20). In this way, policy-makers can use new 
ideas and their new view of state-society relations to overcome opposition to 
policy innovation in that they can 'create opportunities ... to prevent or limit the 
mobilization of program supporters' (Pierson 1994: 166). Restructuring 
institutions -  that is, changing the 'rules of the game' in favour of retrenchment -  
can lead to significant reform.
The implications of the orchestration of top-down change to informal institutions 
are considerable, and introduce important new considerations into the argument 
for the stability of welfare state institutions. Keating argues that what citizens 
expect from the state and how it should meet its responsibilities are 'highly 
dependent on citizens' political values', which are 'partly determined by history 
and the inherited institutions of governance' (2000a: 23). These values change 
over time in response to a range of pressures, including higher levels of 
education, increased cultural diversity, increases in material wealth, 
globalisation, technology, new ideas and changing political philosophies 
(Keating 2000a: 8-40). But they can also be changed by policy-makers 
themselves. Claims that policy changes simply reflect changes in society's values 
and what society wants are too simplistic in that they fail to recognise that values 
can be manipulated.54 If popular support is viewed as a sizeable obstacle to
54 For example, the argument that governments have had to act on child care and aged care in 
response to more women entering the work force because women want to work overlooks an 
argument that more women may now need to work in order to support their families. That is, 
families may require the income from two earners to survive or they may find that two earners are 
better than one in times of uncertainty. Keating and Mitchell observe that a second earner is good 
insurance in the event of the primary income-earner becoming unemployed or in the event of
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reform, with policy-makers forced to retreat from the new paradigm's preferred 
reforms in the face of hostility from a public attached to the welfare state, then an 
obvious solution for policy-makers is to target the obstructive attitudes. Rather 
than waiting for society's expectations to change of their own accord, policy­
makers can actively orchestrate such changes, 'shifting] the balance of political 
power' in their favour by 'restructuring] the ways in which trade-offs between 
taxes, spending, and deficits are presented, evaluated, and decided' (Pierson 
1996:177; emphasis added). That is, returning to the discussion of discourse in 
the previous chapter, policy-makers can use the discourse and interpretative 
frameworks (frames and names) of the new paradigm to change society's 
underlying informal institutions such that the new policy options become 
acceptable. In so doing, policy-makers can avoid unpopular direct attacks on 
formal institutions, instead using incremental change and a discourse that 
supports the new policies to undermine underlying perceptions and expectations 
of the welfare state.55 Small alterations can be used to chip away at the informal
family breakdown or divorce. In addition, they note:'empirical evidence ... shows that the 
addition of a second earner helped to redress the rising inequality observed among the distribution 
of wages throughout the 1980s' (2000:128). For a (depressing) first-hand account of the need that 
many low-paid workers have to hold more than one job or have more than one earner in a 
household, see Ehrenreich (2001).
55 An example here is the New Zealand government's 1997 bid to introduce a 'code of social 
responsibility' for beneficiaries, which imposed the following conditions on those receiving 
welfare:
• those able to work must actively look for it
• those getting taxpayer support must look after their children properly, by ensuring, for 
example, that they go to school, and
• those getting extra taxpayer support because of difficulties managing finances must seek and 
follow budgetary advice (Taylor 1997).
Introducing the code in a Budget speech, Treasurer Winston Peters said that nobody begrudged 
state support for those in need, but it was important to realise that support did not excuse people 
from their responsibilities to themselves and to their families (Taylor 1997). He noted that the code 
was a 'form of contract between a welfare recipient and the State' and that the government would 
introduce 'reasonable pressures' to ensure that obligations were met (The Press 1997). While the 
proposed code may appear to be a relatively small measure in terms of welfare reform, its 
implications in terms of the informal institutions underpinning New Zealand's welfare state are 
significant. As Rudd notes: 'a basic premise of the Keynesian welfare state was acceptance by 
citizens of a collective responsibility to help disadvantaged members of society' (2001: 418). Under 
the neo-liberal welfare state of which the 'code' is a part, individuals are considered to be self- 
responsible, but are also considered to be irresponsible such that they have to be coerced into 
correct behaviour. Hence, the code of social responsibility. The code offers an interpretative frame 
of a beneficiary that portrays welfare recipients as voluntarily unemployed and seeking to live off 
the work of others (ergo lazy), and as bad parents and profligate with taxpayer money (ergo 
irresponsible). Such a frame targets the informal institutions that support collective responsibility, 
replacing them with those that support a new vision of the limited state (as opposed to the 
interventionist state) and the self-responsible individual.
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institutions of the welfare state, with the minor changes to institutions and their 
associated policy programmes raising large questions about their role, changing 
their raison d'etre, and leading to a new set of institutions and policy programs.56
Hill argues that a common way to change public perceptions and expectations 
has been through discourse or 'the manipulation of language' (1997: 20). In the 
previous chapter, I discussed the role of discourse in portraying a paradigm's 
construction of reality or 'regime of truth'. I noted Jacobsen's argument that the 
way to gain some control over outcomes is to persuade players to accept a 
definition of the situation, 'because how the problem is defined determines the 
nature of the solution' (1995: 292). However, I then noted that the control over 
definition is not confined to institutions, interests or elites; rather, a paradigm's 
discourse allows it to define (or frame and name) policy issues in a way that is 
comprehensible to that set of ideas and that may add to their independent 
influence. A paradigm's discourse is a causal mechanism that renders the 
meanings of the constituent ideas compelling and comprehensible; it gives 
meaning to the way that people understand the world, themselves and their 
behaviour. Thus, discourse forms and reinforces 'knowledge disciplines and 
regimes of truth' (Yee 1996: 99). A dominant paradigm, then, sets the 'regime of 
truth' through which policy issues are viewed; the regime has a construction of 
state-society relations that sets what can intelligibly be understood as a policy 
problem and what solutions can be considered. Informal institutions are part of 
this 'regime of truth' in that they help to establish the frames and names (or 
interpretative structures) through which policy issues are discussed and 
understood. The argument I want to make in the final section of this chapter is 
that the discourse of a new dominant paradigm acts to break down existing 
informal institutions in order that these change to reflect and support the policy 
options of the new paradigm. In other words, the constituent discourse of a new 
paradigm both undermines the existing informal institutions and replaces them 
with a new set that reflects the new paradigm's understanding of state-society 
relations.
56 For example, returning to the example in the previous footnote, the code, while a seemingly 
small move in and of itself, serves to question the role of welfare; that is, it raises such questions as 
why hard workers should be expected to support bludgers and bad parents. Answers may lead to 
a significant reorientation of the informal institutions underpinning the welfare state.
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As will be discussed in later chapters of this thesis, a major shift in the discourse 
in which policy issues were portrayed and discussed accompanied the 
replacement of the Keynesian paradigm with that of monetarism and, later, neo­
liberalism. An examination of this discourse reveals a new set of informal 
institutions predicated on a new understanding of state-society relations. 
Contrary to the claims of those who argue that neo-liberal ideas have had little 
impact on the welfare state over the past 20 years, significant shifts in the 
informal institutions underpinning the welfare state have occurred and these 
have substantially altered public expectations of, and attitudes to, the welfare 
state. Some of these have been mentioned in passing above, notably the move 
from collective to individual responsibility and the associated shift in attitudes 
towards beneficiaries. Viewed in this way, the shift from Keynesianism to neo­
liberalism has brought dramatic changes in practice, in that the incremental shifts 
in institutions and policy design are built on new ideas that aim to secure a 
fundamental change in the existing culture of support for the welfare state. The 
objective is to change society's perceptions and expectations of the roles of the 
state and individuals to those of the new paradigm. As noted above, many 
scholars claim that support for the welfare state remains so strong that attempts 
at retrenchment have not only failed, but have cost reform advocates dearly. One 
reason for this support is that the Keynesian framework remains the standard 
through which people interpret their roles and responsibilities and those of the 
state. As Butler observes: 'Keynesianism gave mass publics and their informants 
in the media and academia a simple framework for appraising government 
performance' such that citizens believed they understood 'what their 
government was doing, why, and even how well' (2000:157).57 This framework, 
he contends, gave citizens a 'model of causes and effects that related the 
government's intentions to the effects of its actions' (2000: 157). Those arguing 
for the resilience of the welfare state argue that this underlying framework 
through which society interprets the actions of the state, and its own roles and 
responsibilities, remains today. That is, in effect, Keynesianism remains society's 
dominant paradigm with regard to informal institutions, establishing the
According to this framework:
A good government used its policy instruments to minimise unemployment, 
inflation and external deficit. Its values were expressed in the trade-off it 
purportedly chose between unemployment and inflation. It might also be praised or 
blamed for the quality of public services and for the compassion and efficiency of the 
welfare state (Butler 2000, fn 4:158).
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conventional judgment or common sense understanding of the world through 
which it interprets policy issues and judges acceptable solutions.
However, such an understanding ignores the considerable shift in society's 
perceptions of the welfare state and what it can, and should, provide. A driving 
force behind this change is the content of the neo-liberal ideas themselves and the 
discourse in which the ideas are expressed. Neo-liberalism understands the 
individual to be a rational, self-interested maximiser, who is largely asocial. In 
addition, it views the welfare state as having a negative influence on individual 
behaviour, eroding an individual's sense of personal responsibility. That is:
Neo-liberals identify welfare states with a decline in personal and 
social morality resulting from the displacement of freely assumed 
personal responsibility by an ethos that substitutes coercion for 
liberty and undermines personal responsibility (Morrow 2001: 527).
In response, neo-liberal ideas focus on the promotion of independence and 
responsibility, and stress that policy-makers 'must avoid taking steps that will 
encourage dependence and sap individuals' determination to be self-reliant' 
(Morrow 2001: 528). Thus, the ideas and their constituent discourse highlight 
individual responsibility, and in so doing, give policy-makers a causal 
mechanism with which to change existing informal institutions.
An example of this can be seen in New Zealand, where, in 1984, the then Labour 
government began implementing a wide range of neo-liberal reforms. Penelope 
Brook Cowen argues that, since then, neo-liberal ideas 'have become a part of the 
fabric of political and policy debate in New Zealand' (1997: 341). She notes that, 
while the most obvious impact of the ideas has been in the economic reforms of 
the past two decades:
they have also had a more subtle effect on how political debate is 
conducted, altering the questions that are routinely asked about what 
policy should look like, and what the role of government should be 
(2001: 341).
Rudd highlights the result of this subtle shift on the attitudes of New Zealanders 
to the welfare state. He notes that, whereas once they accepted the Keynesian 
welfare-state notion of a collective responsibility to help disadvantaged members 
of society through active state intervention to redistribute resources, now they 
accept policies based on the notion of individual self-responsibility (2001: 418-
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427). Whereas once they supported the notion of a 'desirable' welfare state, he 
argues, now they are 'becoming attuned to thinking in terms of an "affordable" 
[welfare state]' (2001: 425).58 But it is Rudd's observation about the role of the 
government in this process that is important here. He notes that the National 
government, in its period in power (1990-96), ran a campaign specifically 
targeted at 'winning over the hearts and minds' of New Zealanders to its new 
vision of the welfare state (1997: 263). He observes that its policy statement on 
social assistance, Welfare That Works, aimed to 'encourage self-reliance (that is, 
reduce welfare dependency), and increase fairness and efficiency (that is, target 
and means-test benefits to ensure that only the deserving needy received state 
assistance)' (1997: 263-264). Thus, the ideas and discourse create an interpretative 
framework for welfare in which beneficiaries are dependent (in the negative 
sense of the word outlined in the previous chapter), and are claiming benefits 
that they do not really need. In response, the fairest and most efficient option for 
state and society is to make such individuals look to themselves, rather than the 
state.
A similar example comes from Keating and Mitchell, who note that a major 
development in Australian social policy has been a shift in focus to 'each 
individual's needs'. Policies now emphasise how individuals may best be 
assisted to help themselves (especially to maintain their 'participation in active 
society'), and how individual 'choice' in state help can be maximised (2000: 127). 
They then observe that the 'counterpart of this enhanced participation and choice 
is that people are expected to help themselves to the extent that they are able', 
which includes contributing for services through 'user pays' and saving towards 
their retirement (2000:128). In addition, 'while people are being assisted to 
return to work through labour market programs, they also incur a reciprocal 
obligation to actively pursue whatever work opportunities become available' 
(2000:128). After describing such policy issues as 'incentives and self-help', 
Keating and Mitchell then ask whether support for Australia's 'highly 
redistributive system' will weaken, and note 'public examples of "downward 
envy" and a tendency to blame the victim, which suggest some popular
ro
" ° Rudd contends that, in addition, those who have benefited from reforms -  middle-income New 
Zealanders -  attribute their ability to provide for themselves to 'individual responsibility and hard 
work' and feel no obligation to help those less well-off than themselves (2001: 425). The latter are 
'made to feel it is their own fault or, at least, that it is up to them as individuals to redress the 
problems' (2001: 425).
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antagonism to the present degree of redistribution' (2000: 146-147). They 
conclude that:
Society is likely to be more sympathetic to income redistribution if it 
is persuaded that assistance is being targeted to those who are in 
genuine need, that it is effective, and that the beneficiaries are being 
obliged to make adequate efforts to help themselves in so far as they 
can (2000:147; emphasis added).
This argument provides a useful example of the rhetoric being used to reshape 
understandings and expectations of the welfare state. The qualifying terms 
'genuine' and 'adequate' act to create an impression of social welfare recipients 
as preferring to live off welfare while making no efforts to support themselves.59 
My concern here is not with whether this is true, but with the impact of the 
discourse in creating and reinforcing a picture of beneficiaries as greedy dole- 
bludgers. That is, the assessment of what is 'genuine' and what is 'adequate' is 
made through a neo-liberal lens that offers a particular vision of state-society 
relations and the motivations of individuals. Such imagery targets the informal 
institutions of collective responsibility that have supplied strong support for the 
welfare state, and supplies new informal institutions reflecting a new vision of 
state-society relations, in which individuals are expected to do more for 
themselves.
The use of discourse to effect change in informal institutions and thus, in 
attitudes to the welfare state, can be seen also in the introduction of the language 
of contract and mutual obligation to the relationship between the state and 
society, and especially that between the state and welfare beneficiaries. The 
rhetoric of 'a hand up, not a hand out' and 'no rights without responsibilities' 
reinforces the interpretative framework, noted above, of a welfare recipient as 
someone who is voluntarily unemployed and who is choosing to live off the 
work of others (taxpayers). Policies arising from this vision include those based 
on 'contracts' between the state and the beneficiary about the obligation to seek
59 The rhetoric of 'generous benefits' juxtaposed with 'tax burdens' has a similar effect, as will be 
discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. This is not to argue that taxes have never been regarded as anything 
other than a burden; rather, that the context in which the burden is understood has changed. 
Notions of taxes being an instrument by which the collective can alleviate the problems of its less 
well-off members have been supplanted with notions that the state is over-paying the less well-off 
while taxpayers are struggling under the burden of providing for the lazier members of society. 
When combined with the language of 'dependency', the overall effect is to frame taxes and benefits 
as a situation in which workers are unfairly over-supporting those who choose to be dependent.
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employment in return for receiving benefits and schemes such as 'work for the 
dole', under which beneficiaries are required to undertake 'community work' for 
a set period each week in return for their benefits (see Rudd 2001: 424; Deacon 
2000: 11-13). It is important to note the absence of notions of state or collective 
responsibility in this rhetoric (see Dean 2004: 65-82). Thus, discourse may be 
used to set attitudes to policy. As will be outlined in Chapters 5 and 6, this tactic 
can be seen in the OECD's discussions of policy problems and solutions. The aim 
of this rhetoric is to manipulate and eliminate the informal institutions 
underpinning the Keynesian welfare state and to create new informal institutions 
that support the neo-liberal paradigm's interpretation of the world and how it 
works.60
Conclusion
Returning to the arguments made earlier, when looking for the impact of new 
ideas in practice, the important point is not the amount of reform, but the type of 
reform, its ideological underpinning and its effects on informal institutions. 
Neglecting these factors leads to incorrect conclusions about the ability of the 
ideas underpinning the Keynesian welfare state to resist the influence of a new 
set of ideas. As noted earlier, Pierson makes this error when he argues that 
neither Reagan nor Thatcher succeeded in significantly reforming the welfare 
state.61 However, Wilding, who also studies the impact of Thatcher on the British 
welfare state, comes to the following conclusion, in direct contrast to Pierson:
For example, the British Labour Party ('New Labour') is explicit about wanting to change public 
expectations and understandings of individual rights, responsibilities, duties, and obligations in 
order to change the 'welfare-state culture'. Alan Deacon notes that the British government's 1998 
Green Paper on welfare reform, A New Contract for Welfare, categorically states that the 
government's aim is to 'rebuild the welfare state around work' (2000:12). He notes the following 
quote from the paper: 'Our ambition is nothing less than a change of culture among benefit 
claimants, employers and public servants -  with rights and responsibilities on all sides' (Deacon 
2000:12, citing Department of Social Security: 23; emphasis added). Of course, on the state's side, 
responsibilities were to be much more limited.
61 Pierson claims that Thatcher and Reagan tried, but failed, to instigate reforms. He concludes that 
significant retrenchment occurred only 'where supporting groups were weak, or where the 
government found ways to prevent the mobilization of these groups' supporters' (1994: 6). That is, 
direct reform succeeded only where institutional features meant that a group's political resources 
were limited. Pierson advances an argument that Thatcher and Reagan were 'perhaps ... more 
successful in pursuing indirect strategies' with longer-term consequences, such as institutional 
reforms to 'strengthen the hands of budget cutters', weaken the revenue base and undermine 
interest groups in favour of the welfare state (Pierson 1994: 6, 7). However, he retreats from this 
claim, saying that, '[f]or the most part', neither leader was 'particularly effective in engineering 
such reforms' (1994: 7).
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The essential legacy of Thatcherism does not lie in the wholesale 
restructuring of the welfare state. Rather, it lies in its contribution to 
attitudes, ideas and approaches -  which does not make it less 
considerable (1992: 210; emphasis added).
In other words, the transformation occurred in the 'political and ideological 
debate about the value of welfare -  and thus about the nature of citizenship, the 
meaning of individual responsibility and the obligations of the state to the 
disadvantaged members of the community' (Waddan 1997: 168, cited in van 
Kersbergen 2000: 29).62
Wilding argues that Thatcherism's enduring legacy lies in the challenge to 
'conventional wisdom' under which '[m]any sacred cows have lost their odour of 
sanctity' (1992: 211). He contends that Thatcherism's challenge to collectivism 
resulted in a 'sea change' in opinion that has had 'enduring implications' in that 
those in favour of the welfare state 'will never look to collectivist answers with 
quite the simple enthusiasm of before' (1992: 202).63 A consequence of this 'sea 
change' is the wide acceptance 'across the political spectrum' of greater social 
division (1992: 204). That is, Wilding argues:
More people have been persuaded that social ills -  such as poverty -  
are inevitable, that ills such as unemployment are no longer as 
painful as in the past, and that, in any case, there is little that 
government can do about them (1992: 206).
The current and long-term implications of this 'sea change' for the welfare state 
are considerable. As van Kersbergen observes:
A new generation has been brought up in a context of declining 
expectations and with the political language of retrenchment. It is 
this generation which is now becoming economically, socially and 
politically active. ... This cohort, although raised in the welfare state, 
has been taught not to expect too much from it. ... [t]his generation
62 Another way of analysing these changes is through their impact on citizenship; that is, the 
changes are understood to redefine the rights of citizenship, discrediting the concept of universal 
citizenship rights in favour of a version that emphasises citizenship obligations. See, for example, 
Wilding (1992: 208-209) and Rudd (2001: 423).
63 Wilding concludes:
What we have seen is a firm challenge to the principle, scope and instruments of 
collective provision. That challenge has an important impact on those committed to 
welfare state-type policies. We are all less statist than in the past. We are all much 
more dubious about bureaucracy as an effective instrument. We are all more 
sceptical about the skills and disinterestedness of the professions (1992: 202).
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will be much less attached politically to the welfare state than the 
preceding generations that built it and profited from it (2000: 29).64
Thus, the effect of the myriad of small changes has been a fundamental change to 
attitudes and approaches, which has in turn had a dramatic effect on policy paths 
and problem-solving frameworks. Contrary to the Friedmans' claims that, 
judged by practice, they have been on the losing side, new ideas have brought a 
'major change not only in government policies, but in the economic and political 
culture in which those policies were implemented' (Marginson 1992: 3). Overall, 
the result is a change in ideas and practice because the informal institutions 
underpinning the welfare state have shifted significantly, reflecting a new vision 
of state-society relations.
64 On this point, see Ruth Lister et al., who found that young Britons now talked of citizenship in 
terms of 'responsibilities', rather than 'rights', and knew more of civil rights than political or social 
rights; 'Few saw social security rights as unconditional' (2003:251). Hartley Dean reports similar 
results in his survey:
The majority of participants interpreted responsibility in an explicitly individualistic 
manner. ... notions of shared responsibility or of responsibilities that are constituted 
through the individual's social context were rare' (2004: 77; emphasis in original).
Chapter 4
Ideas, Institutions,
AND THE OECD
Introduction
X 3  efore moving into an examination of the framework of ideas underpinning 
\ J  the OECD's more specific economic and social policy analyses, I want to 
draw together some of the strands from the first three chapters to set out the 
structure of the argument in the second section of my thesis. Thus far, I have:
• outlined the form and function of the OECD, and discussed the 
organisation's role as an epistemic community promulgating ideas to its 
members
• examined the role of ideas in policy-making, and put forward Hall's 
Kuhnian-inspired model to explain how sets of ideas may shift over time, and
• challenged the notion that policy-makers are path dependent and that ideas 
are embedded firmly in institutions, arguing that such claims focus too much 
on formal institutions and not enough on the impact of new ideas on informal 
institutions.
In the next two chapters, I want to use these notions to examine the shift in the 
OECD's framework of ideas over the past 40 years, and the implications of this 
shift for the organisation's understanding and treatment of social justice and 
related issues. This second section of my thesis, then, uses the OECD's economic 
and social policy discussions to examine the change that has occurred over time 
in the OECD's underlying framework of ideas, and how this paradigm shift has
165 OECD: Ideas and Institutions
affected the informal institutions incorporated in the OECD's social policy 
recommendations.
For my purposes, I am concerned only with what happens to policy ideas across 
time within the OECD. As noted in the Introduction, I am not interested here in:
• where the OECD's ideas come from (whether they originate in the OECD or 
whether the OECD absorbs them from member countries to refine and 
disperse to other members)1
• whether the OECD competes with other sources of ideas, or
• who promotes the ideas within the OECD or how they move through the 
OECD's internal policy development mechanisms.
These topics are both interesting and worthy of further study, as they all may 
have an impact on how ideas develop over time and how particular ideas come 
to be implemented. However, my interest in this section is an empirical 
examination of the change to the OECD's ideas over time, and whether the 
OECD's subsequent policy discussions reflect that its earlier ideas remain 
embedded in institutions or whether the new ideas have had an impact. As 
noted in Chapter 3, much of the literature discussing ideas and institutions 
privileges institutions over ideas, claiming that existing ideas become embedded 
in institutions, making them difficult to change. This would suggest that, even if 
there were a change in the OECD's underlying framework of ideas, there would 
be little change to its policy analysis and recommendations in practice because 
the earlier ideas have solidified, thereby confining policy-makers to existing 
paths. However, if my argument in Chapter 3 is valid, then such a suggestion is 
limited because it looks only at the way that ideas affect formal institutions and
1 It is worth noting here that the organisation has a view on the order of transfer that may or may 
not accord with actual events. As will be noted in the next chapter, Bakker argues that the OECD 
clung to its Keynesian views longer than did its members, 'nearly los[ing] the confidence of policy- 
makers' in its member countries in the process (1996: 3). However, in the organisation's official 
history, Sullivan makes the following observation about events after the OECD had shifted to the 
'supply-side approaches association with the University of Chicago': 'President Ronald Reagan and 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher launched programmes of structural adjustment that precisely 
reflected the new school of OECD thinking' (1997: 41; emphasis added). Later, he notes that the 
OECD's supply-side approach 'was reflected in scores of countries studies, and adopted as the new 
orthodoxy by member countries' (1997: 55; emphasis added). More recently, Bayne suggests that 
member governments look to the OECD as a source of 'good ideas they can then pretend they 
thought of themselves' (2003: 239). Such comments, which allege that ideas flow from the OECD to 
members, suggest that the direction of the movement of ideas may be a rich field for future study.
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not at the impact they have on informal institutions.2 The effect of focusing too 
narrowly on the mechanics of policy ignores what is happening to the underlying 
reasoning for policy (and the attitudes towards policy) and how this affects 
policy goals. An examination of the change to the OECD's framework of ideas, 
and the effects of this change on its attitude towards social issues, should add 
usefully to the debate about ideas and institutions, enhancing the understanding 
of the relationship between the two.
In Chapter 5, I will explore the OECD's underlying paradigm, using its main 
economic policy series, the Economic Outlook. The discussions in these documents 
reveal a fundamental shift in the OECD's thinking from what it has called 
Keynesianism to what it calls the 'supply-side', but what I understand to be neo­
liberalism. This significant change can be understood in terms of Hall's Kuhnian- 
influenced model of paradigm shifts, as outlined in Chapter 2. To recap briefly, 
according to Hall, ideas provide a framework or 'policy paradigm' through 
which policy-makers understand the world and how it works. Policy-makers use 
this 'interpretative framework' to discern policy problems and solutions, and the 
paradigm 'specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that 
can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are 
meant to be addressing' (Hall 1993: 279). The policy options formulated within 
this framework are intellectually plausible, persuasive, and credible because they 
are based on the accepted world-view of what can be achieved through policy 
and how. However, an existing, accepted paradigm can lose its dominant 
position to an alternative when the problems (or 'puzzles') that it cannot explain 
'accumulate to the point of throwing the reigning model into crisis' (Jacobsen 
1995: 293). The successor theory is seen to be 'better at explaining the empirical 
observations that remained anomalous in terms of the earlier theory' (Hall 
1989: 9).3
2 It may be useful to recall here my definition of formal and informal institutions: formal 
institutions are rules, laws, structures, organisations, and so on, while informal institutions are 
norms, values, attitudes, implicit codes of conduct, and so on.
3 The new paradigm offers policy-makers a more plausible explanation of current problems and 
their possible solutions. Kuhn describes such change as a 'revolution' because the transition is not 
an incremental, cumulative process, but a 'reconstruction of the field from new fundamentals' 
(1970: 85).
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This is not to argue that the OECD's shift from Keynesianism to neo-liberalism, 
or its paradigm 'revolution' (to use Kuhn's term), is simply a matter of the 
replacement of one set of technical ideas with another. As noted in Chapter 2, 
paradigms in the social sciences are inherently political, and Hall notes Kuhn's 
point that paradigms are 'by definition never fully commensurable in scientific or 
technical terms'. Each paradigm contains its own, different account of how the 
world works, which means 'it is often impossible for the advocates of different 
paradigms to agree on a common body of data against which a technical 
judgment in favor of one paradigm over another might be made' (Hall 1993: 280). 
Thus, paradigms are political, not only in the sense in which they form and align 
interest groups which then use them to attack and change conventional wisdom, 
but also in the more intangible sense in which the paradigm itself 'frames' policy 
problems and solutions. In the latter, both the content of the ideas themselves 
and the discourse used to express and implement them act to constrain (or 
enhance) the options available to policy-makers. As noted in Chapter 2, if a 
judgment between policy paradigms cannot be based on 'hard scientific 
evidence', then the selection of one set of ideas over another (or others) is a 
political contest over which paradigm (set of ideas) can gain the most adherents 
and become accepted as the most convincing in explaining particular policy 
problems. I have noted already that the political contest between policy agents is 
outside the scope of this thesis. My argument here is that the contest is not 
always about formal institutions or path-dependency or interests, but can reflect 
the content of the idea and its associated discourse. Consequently, my principle 
concern is with the changing content of the OECD's underlying framework of 
ideas, and the implications of such change. I contend that, allowing for the 
shortcomings in Hall's model, it remains a useful general schema with which to 
explain the events and consequences of a shift in the OECD's ideas over time. I 
argue in Chapters 5 and 6 that the result of the shift in the OECD's underlying 
paradigm is a transformation in the political arrangement of state-society 
relations, roles, and responsibilities.
The neo-liberal paradigm, or interpretative framework of ideas, brings with it 
new specifications of both policy goals and the kinds of instruments that can be 
used to attain them, based on a new understanding of the nature of the policy 
problems that are to be addressed. That is, the neo-liberal paradigm, or the 
'prism through which policy-makers [see] the economy as well as their role
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within it' (Hall 1993: 279), brings with it a new way of thinking about state- 
society relations that fundamentally alters the OECD's understanding and 
treatment of social justice and related issues. As will be outlined in Chapter 5, 
the OECD acknowledges the shift in its paradigm over the years since its 
inception, but it presents the change as an inevitable, unproblematic -  and non­
political -  response to the failure of Keynesian policies to resolve serious 
economic problems. In a special chapter in Economic Outlook 50 (1991b: 1-11), it 
explicitly acknowledges a change in paradigm, but without recognising the 
implications. It notes that the 'widespread confidence' in active demand 
management policies of the 1960s had, by the end of the 1970s, given way to the 
need for 'new solutions' and reforms of economic structures in the face of 
problems with high inflation and slow growth (1991b: 1, 6). It observes that the 
new policy orientation gives priority to inflation control, decreasing both the 
budget deficit and the weight of the public sector, and reversing the trend 
towards structural rigidities (1991b: 7, 8). In its 50th anniversary publication, From 
War to Wealth, the organisation notes that, in the wake of problems with the 
Keynesian economic model, it converted 'the house that Keynes built' into a 
'dormitory for supply-siders' (Sullivan 1997:50, 55).4 In the words of the 
history's author, Scott Sullivan: 'So moved the world' (1997: 41).
Sullivan's publication presents the move as a straightforward response to 
economic developments of the time, observing that 'Keynes's elegant model 
worked almost magically in the economic environment of the 1960s', but there 
were 'several worms in the apple' (1997: 35, 36). He argues that the 'comfortable 
consumer society' that OECD members had built in the post-war period had 
'failed to satisfy the psychological demands of many who benefited from it' 
(1997: 36). In addition, he claims, it was also unable to cope with the economic 
crisis brought about by the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement and 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) price rises (the 'oil 
shocks') of the 1970s (1997: 36-39). As inflation veered towards 'stagflation' and 
unemployment continued to rise, '[s]uddenly, the Keynesian economic model 
seemed no longer to fit the facts' (1997: 37). The state intervention of the 1960s 
and early 1970s was now seen as the disease rather than the cure, and Sullivan
4 The 1997 publication celebrates 50 years of the OECD, which formally came into being 36 years 
earlier (1961), because it traces the organisation's inception to the Marshall Plan of 1947, out of 
which came the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), which later became the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). For full details, see Chapter 1.
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notes that 'fmjore and more the Organisation's economists concentrated on 
monetary issues rather than the fiscal "fine-tuning" of the 1960s' (1997: 41). As a 
result, he contends policies associated with intervention came under scrutiny:
The experts began to look critically at the huge increases in public- 
sector employment and welfare programmes -  and to question their 
sustainability. The second oil shock in 1979 shifted the OECD's 
Economics Department further to the supply-side approaches 
associated with the University of Chicago (1997: 41).
In both Economic Outlook 50 (1991b) and From War to Wealth, the discussions 
suggest that the OECD considers its new framework of analysis to be nothing 
more than a change in the means to achieve its existing set of policy goals. That 
is, the move from Keynesian demand management, which was predicated on an 
actively interventionist state, to a supply-side approach, which favoured a much 
less interventionist state, simply offers new mechanisms to deal with old 
problems. Accordingly, the new thinking involves only a change in means, with 
the ends or goals of policy remaining the same. Such a view neglects the 
implications of a paradigm shift as outlined in Chapter 2: that a new paradigm 
incorporates new assumptions that change what policy goals can be, and that 
make the old paradigm's methods for attaining policy goals impossible. We need 
to recall here Kuhn's comments on a 'revolution' or 'reconstruction of the field 
from new fundamentals', such that 'the profession will have changed its view of 
the field, its method and its goals' (Kuhn 1970:85; emphasis added). The 
important point is that the new paradigm is not simply a different view of how 
the world works, it is how the world works; that is, it is not that the paradigm's 
practitioners 'see something as something else; instead, they simply see it' (Kuhn 
1970: 85; emphasis in original). In this sense, a new paradigm offers not a new 
understanding of how an existing world works, but a new interpretation of what 
the world is, how it works, and what can and cannot be considered as policy 
problems and solutions.
Although the OECD may present the shift as simply an unproblematic change in 
means to achieve the same ends, it is, in fact, more complicated, with a change in 
means changing the ends. The new paradigm affects 'not only the goals of policy 
and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very 
nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing' (Hall 1993: 279). Thus,
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the new framework brings with it a new interpretation of policy problems and 
solutions such that many old problems are now incomprehensible. Although it 
may appear that some policies are altered only at the margins (alongside other, 
new policies being introduced), the underlying reasoning for all the policies -  
new and existing -  is different, which may significantly alter policy aims and 
outcomes. As will be outlined in the next two chapters, the shift in the 
framework that the OECD uses for its policy analyses transforms the role of the 
state and its relationship with its constituent society. The result is that some 
previously accepted state roles and responsibilities are no longer acceptable or 
plausible.
A complicating factor here is that, although some of the discourse with which the 
OECD discusses policy solutions and problems remains the same, the meanings 
of the terms (and the plausibility of the various solutions that the terminology 
evokes) are understood through a new interpretative framework. Thus, the new 
lens may result in meanings that are significantly different to earlier 
interpretations.5 It is useful to recall here Robert Lieberman's observation, noted 
in Chapter 2, that changes over time in the interpretation and framing of 'deeply 
rooted' concepts may mean that terms such as 'liberty' or 'equality' are invoked 
to support significantly different practices. Those who use them, while differing 
in their understanding of the terms, may 'all the while believe themselves to be 
upholding a timeless and unchanging political tradition' (2002:702). The 
implication for the OECD's policy analyses is that many of the earlier terms it 
used to discuss policy problems and solutions are now either obsolete or 
interpreted in new ways. As a result, the former definitions of these old terms 
and descriptions do not necessarily apply when they are used under the new 
paradigm.
Another complicating factor is that the OECD appears to use the words 'equality' 
and 'equity' interchangeably, although the tendency is towards the latter from 
the about the time it turned to the 'supply-side approach'. According to the 
dictionary, 'equality' is the 'condition of being equal in quantity, magnitude, 
value, intensity, etc.', while 'equity' is 'fairness, impartiality' (Brown 1993: 841,
5 For example, poverty and dependency are among the myriad terms now understood in different 
ways: the root causes of these problems are seen differently, as are state and individual roles and 
responsibilities in resolving them. Chapter 6 will discuss these changes in depth.
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843). These are different, though in the context under review here, related 
concepts. That said, the subtleties of the distinction often are not clear in the 
OECD's discussions, perhaps because it has come to understand equality in 
terms of an acceptable distribution, rather than an equal distribution. Thus, it notes 
in a special chapter, 'Growth, Equity and Distribution', in Economic Outlook 60 
(1996b) that:
Excessive inequality of both income and wealth, which may arise from
unfettered play of market forces, is widely considered unjust (1996b: 36;
emphasis added).
In this chapter, the OECD uses the work of S. Kuznets (1955) to argue for a link 
between income distribution and growth, according to which the distribution of 
earnings is said to narrow as countries develop economically (1996b: 37). The 
tenor of this chapter is that 'policies that attempt to equalise income 
distributions' result in more harm than good because of their negative effects on 
the market and incentives to work. As a result of this view of redistribution 
programmes, the OECD looks towards employment as a solution to inequality of 
income distribution, arguing that: 'it is important to note that greater 
employment will tend to reduce inequality' (1996b: 39). For this reason, it urges 
members to implement the reforms recommended in its Jobs Strategy (1996b: 41). 
Thus, the chapter title is 'equity', but much of the discussion is about 'inequality'. 
To avoid confusion, I initially endeavoured to use the term 'equality' unless in a 
direct quote, because this appears to be the concern of the OECD's members; that 
is, the OECD cites its members' concerns about increasing 'inequality' as a reason 
that members give for not pursuing the OECD's recommended policy directions 
(for example, the OECD Jobs Strategy). However, the OECD's consistent use of 
the word 'equity' in its later policy discussions made this choice difficult to 
maintain, so I have used the term 'equality' where possible, and 'equity' where 
this clearly is the focus of the OECD's discussion.
The reconstruction of the world, its constituent problems and solutions, and the 
discourse used to discuss these problems has implications for the OECD's 
understanding and treatment of social justice and related issues that will be 
canvassed in Chapter 6. Here, however, it is worth noting that the shift in the 
OECD's underlying ideas and discourse is the key to understanding the dispute 
between the OECD and its critics over the organisation's attitude to social issues. 
The OECD claims to have gone beyond supply-side theory to blend it 'with a
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sense of social obligation' (Sullivan 1997: 59). Nevertheless, Sullivan notes, in 
France it was dubbed 'the house of the single policy' amid criticism that was 
'insensitive' to the negative consequences of its recommended policies on the 
jobless, the ageing, and 'those incapable of adapting to a harsh new world' 
(1997: 55). In addition, Secretary-General Donald Johnston has noted on several 
occasions that there is an 'impression' that OECD reforms placed 'too little 
emphasis on social objectives' (Johnston, quoted in Sullivan 1997: 9; Johnston 
1997: 9-11; 1999: 3-4). The OECD has rejected such criticisms as 'nonsense' on the 
grounds that '[njever before in its history had the Organisation been so deeply 
involved in analysing social issues and producing proposals to limit social 
damage' (Sullivan 1997: 55). The explanation for the dispute may lie in the 
different understandings of such terms as 'social justice' and the different 
underlying assumptions about the means and goals of policy. It is in this sense 
that the effects of a shift in the ideas underpinning the OECD's policy analysis 
and recommendations are more dramatic than the organisation comprehends or 
acknowledges. These issues are the focus of the next two chapters.
Looking for Ideas:
the Economic O utlook and Social Policy Documents
The clearest and most obvious exposition of the OECD's economic ideas is its 
biannual publication, Economic Outlook. The Outlook, which is published in 
June/July and December each year, first appeared in July 1967, and as at May 
2004, the organisation had published 74 volumes. The regularity of the series, 
and its appearance in the early years of the OECD, make it an ideal publication 
through which to trace changes in the OECD's ideas. The Outlook captures the 
changes in OECD thinking on economic and social problems and solutions, 
mostly within the OECD's membership area, but expanding over the years to a 
more 'global' context in keeping with the OECD's founding principles of making 
an active contribution to economic expansion and world trade.6 The following
6 The back cover of Economic Outlook 72 (2002b) notes that:
Developments in selected major non-OECD countries are also evaluated in detail. 
Together with a wide range of cross-country statistics, the Outlook provides a unique 
tool to keep abreast of world economic developments.
The previous few editions had been slightly more specific, noting on their back covers:
Recent measures and forthcoming developments in major non-OECD economies in 
East Asia, Central and Eastern Europe (particularly Russia), and South America are
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two chapters use material from all parts of the Economic Outlook except the 
country-specific sections in which the OECD analyses what is happening in each 
of its member countries. These sections have been excluded because the focus of 
the examination is the OECD's overview and assessment of general trends, and 
its subsequent across-the-board recommendations, rather than its specific advice 
to individual members. Although the publication is called the 'Economic' Outlook 
and ostensibly discusses economic issues, the discussion in the documents is not 
solely about economic policy per se, which means it is possible to use the Outlook 
as a source for OECD attitudes to social justice and related issues. The broader 
coverage reflects the fact that economic, social, and employment policies often 
overlap in a way that makes it difficult to separate each policy area into discrete 
policy units.* 7
The OECD's evaluation of social issues has not been the subject of such a neat 
sequence of documents as economic issues. In the early period, documents 
specifically on this policy area are sparse and I have had to rely on reports of 
meetings and decisions of the Manpower and Social Affairs Committee and 
Directorate published in the OECD Observer. From the early 1980s, however, 
when the OECD published the papers and proceedings of its 'Social Policies in 
the 1980s' conference as the now legendary (in this field) The Welfare State in 
Crisis (1981c), more detailed social policy discussion documents are available. As 
will be noted in Chapter 6, these documents, like the Economic Outlook, are not 
always confined strictly to social policy, and from the 1980s onwards place 
considerable stress on the interconnectivity of economic and social policy, and 
especially the impact that social policies have on the economy. For example, in 
1988, it argued that a lesson from the decade after the first oil shock in 1973 was 
the 'need to link social and economic policies more closely', with both sets of 
policies needing to 'take account' of the consequences on the other (1988c: 7). Or, 
as then OECD Secretary-General Jean-Claude Paye noted in 1985:
also evaluated in detail. Each edition of this Outlook provides a unique tool to keep
abreast of world economic developments.
See, for example, the back cover of Economic Outlook 68 (2000b). I find this an intriguing
interpretation of 'world'.
7 Secretary-General Donald Johnston notes that:
the concerns of social, employment and education policies are now very closely 
interwoven. No set of policies in one of these areas of responsibility will achieve its 
goals without a corresponding and supporting contribution from other policy sectors 
(1997:10).
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Because economic policies have social consequences and social 
policies have economic consequences, it is essential that OECD 
countries seek to achieve their economic and social objectives through 
the coordination of both sets of policies (1985c: 7).
It is for this reason that my examination of the implications of the change in 
paradigm for the OECD's understanding and treatment of social justice and 
related issues uses both the Economic Outlook and the social policy documents. 
This examination reveals that, by the mid-1990s, although the OECD talked of 
the need to achieve both economic and social goals, it understood the latter to be 
subordinate to the former.
Looking in more detail at the economic policy sequence, the Economic Outlook is 
the joint work of members of the Economics Department, although department 
head Ignazio Visco acknowledged in 1998 that the analysis 'also benefited from 
discussions with colleagues throughout the Organisation' (OECD: 1998a: iv). To 
what extent the views of these colleagues in other departments are included is 
not known, and is outside the scope of this thesis.8 The important point to 
observe here is that the Outlook, like the social policy documents I have 
examined, is published on the responsibility of the Secretary-General. This 
means that its contents represent an official view of the OECD rather than simply 
the opinions of an individual author (or authors), whichever department he, she, 
or they are from. Such independence of view is reinforced in the phrasing of the 
OECD in the Economic Outlook, when it refers to itself in the third person as 'the 
OECD Secretariat', with the assessments, suggestions, and recommendations 
being made by 'the Secretariat'. In a similar vein, an OECD Powerpoint 
presentation available through the organisation's web site reveals the 
independence of the Secretariat. In a slide, 'Who drives OECD work?', a diagram 
of a triangle puts 'the Council' at the top, 'the Secretariat' at one comer and 
'Committees' at the other (OECD 2004). The latter are described as 
representatives of member countries working with the OECD Secretariat on 
specific issues, while the Secretariat is described as driving 'analysis and 
proposals'. As discussed in Chapter 1, the control over analysis and proposals 
gives the Secretariat considerable influence.
8 As observed in the Introduction to this thesis, there are many future avenues of research into the 
OECD, including the process through which the organisation's policy recommendations are 
produced.
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Until 1989, the stated purpose of the Economic Outlook was to 'provide a periodic 
assessment of economic trends and prospects in OECD countries' (1967a- 
1989b: ii). Initially, the OECD also noted the economic importance of its 
members to the larger world, qualifying its opening statement with the 
observation that these developments within OECD countries 'largely determine 
the course of the world economy'. This additional clause was dropped in 
Economic Outlook 47 (1990a) and the word 'policy' was added to the list of what 
was being assessed, so that, from this edition, the Outlook examined members' 
economic trends, prospects and policies (1990a-1997b: ii).9 Every edition of the 
Outlook has noted that the assessments of member countries' prospects 'do not 
necessarily correspond to those of the national authorities concerned', a 
statement that reinforces the status of the Economic Outlook as containing the 
OECD's own, distinct view, and not simply a collation of individual members' 
views.10 That the OECD puts forward assessments in the Economic Outlook that 
may contradict those of its members is consistent with the OECD's claim to be an 
independent body that 'criticises less-than-best practice in members and non­
members alike' (Sullivan 1997: 49).11
The important point here is that the word 'assessment' implies that the OECD is 
examining and weighing members' policies according to its own set of ideas and 
criteria for good policy. That is, the OECD's assessment contained in its Economic 
Outlook is more than description; it is also a judgment approving or disapproving 
members' actions based on the OECD's evaluation of members' policies. As 
touched on briefly in a footnote in Chapter 1, the OECD has acknowledged this 
element in its analysis, noting in Economic Outlook 53 (1993a) in a special chapter,
9 We should note here that the assessment is not only of policies, but also of prospects. That is, the 
OECD is examining what is happening within member countries and giving its opinion on 
situations and outcomes assessed through its own interpretative framework. In addition, it must 
be noted that, although the papers may appear simply to be cross-country comparisons, discussing 
how members deal with policy problems such as unemployment and poverty, buried within these 
discussions are comments about what member governments should be doing and what policies they 
should implement. These recommendations for 'best practice' give a clear indication of the type of 
policy the OECD favours.
^  As noted above, such independence is reflected in the OECD's terminology when it refers to 
assessments, suggestions, and recommendations as coming from 'the Secretariat' and when it 
observes, as it did in Economic Outlook 19 (1976a), that the views of the 'national authorities of 
Member countries' on activities in the OECD area were 'very similar to that forecast by the 
Secretariat' (1976a: 9; emphasis added). That is, the OECD Secretariat's forecast is distinct from 
those of its members.
11 This was discussed in more detail in Chapter 1.
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'How Accurate are Economic Outlook Projections?', that any assessment of 
accuracy has to bear in mind that the projections are 'not purely model-based 
numbers'. Rather, it observes, projections are both conditional, being based on 
assumptions concerning exogenous variables and the stance of member policies, 
and judgmental, 'drawing on the expertise and knowledge of the OECD 
Secretariat in respect of factors that are not reflected in pure model-based 
projections' (1993a: 49). It is these assumptions and judgments that are of interest 
when tracing changes in the OECD's ideas because they reveal both the formal 
and informal institutions of the OECD's world-view.
In Economic Outlook 63 (1998a), the OECD changed the format of the documents 
to make them more 'user friendly' (1998a: iii). It added a 'Foreword' by Visco 
(renamed 'Editorial' from 2000a) that outlined what each Economic Outlook 
contained.12 In addition, in a new statement regarding the purpose of the series, 
it noted that it 'analyses prospective economic developments in OECD countries 
over the coming two years and provides recommendations on the economic policies 
needed to ensure sustainable economic growth' (1998a onwards; emphasis 
added).13 This statement, repeated since June 1998, formally acknowledges that 
the OECD uses the Outlook to make recommendations to its members about what 
they should do. That is, the Outlook has moved beyond its initial descriptive 
commentary and assessment of economic developments within member 
countries, and likely prospects, to take a more prescriptive position, outlining 
what it believes members should be doing in response to the OECD's assessment 
of the current situation.
Such acknowledgment reveals much about the shifting role of the OECD. The 
early editions were descriptive, cross-country comparisons of members' internal 
policies, and the general economic prospects for the coming 12-18 months. 
Forecasts then, as now, were 'built strictly on the basis of policies as at present 
known', based on existing or announced policies, and no changes in exchange 
rates or oil prices (1974b: 6; 1975a: 6). But comment on these 'present policies'
12 Since Economic Outlook 72 (2002b), Chief Economist Jean-Philippe Cotis has written the 
'Editorial'.
Only in the first of these revamped documents (Economic Outlook 63) did this statement make 
specific reference to the economic growth being 'within OECD countries', revealing the OECD's 
desire to concentrate on the broader state of international economic affairs (1998a: iii).
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was confined to the 'Introduction', and when the OECD did suggest alterations 
to policy, it couched its advice in conditional language that made heavy use of 
qualifiers. Rather than make outright recommendations, as in the later papers, 
the OECD Secretariat 'suggested' that particular policies 'may be desirable' or 
'would seem to be necessary' (1972b: 12, 13). It was also conservative in its 
assessment of its ability to make suggestions that were applicable to all members, 
noting that: 'Social and institutional conditions vary so widely between 
individual countries that general prescriptions for counter-cyclical fiscal policy 
risk being of limited validity' (1973a: 6). This is an explicit acknowledgment that 
its member countries were different, such that one policy would not fit all. In 
addition, the organisation observed that some areas were outside its range of 
comment.
Gradually, however, the descriptive, qualified commentary gave way to more 
overt prescription such that, in the more recent editions, member countries have 
been scolded for not implementing what the OECD has recommended.14 It 
appears in these later papers that the descriptive and prescriptive sections have 
been reversed, with the descriptive economic overview confined to a shorter 
'Introduction' (of two to three pages) and the prescriptive advice filling 
subsequent sections. After several years of having sub-sections in the 
'Introduction' on 'implications for policy' or 'policies for a better outcome', in 
Economic Outlook 44 (1988b) the OECD called this sub-section, 'policy 
requirements', and gave prescriptive policy advice to its members (1988b: xii; 
emphasis added). It eventually shifted this sub-section into its first chapter, 
'OECD Economic Outlook and Policies' (1993a to 1997b) -  later renamed 'General 
Assessment of the Macroeconomic Situation' (1998a onwards) -  making it into a 
major sub-section, 'Policy Requirements in OECD Countries' in the editions from 
Economic Outlook 63 (1998a) to Economic Outlook 70 (2001b). Since then, the 
section has been called, 'Economic Policy Challenges' (2002b), 'Macroeconomic 
Policy Challenges' and 'Stepping Up Structural Reform to Boost Growth and 
Resilience to Shocks' (2003a), and simply 'Policy Issues' (2003b).
14 Members have been told that 'more could be done' by way of reform (1988a: xi); that their 
'failure to move more boldly' in agricultural reform constituted a 'major shortcoming' in their 
structural adjustment programmes (1988a: 73); that they had not 'fully implemented' or 'fully 
exploited' commitments or possibilities to improve public finances (1992a: x); and that only a few 
countries had 'acted forcefully enough' in labour market and social policy reforms (1997a: 19).
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Whereas the earlier editions were short collations of commentary and statistical 
data, the later documents are lengthier and more sophisticated, containing 
detailed arguments for particular policy positions. This is not to claim that the 
early editions did not provide detail on favoured policy ideas. The Economic 
Outlook has always had the option of including 'special studies by members of 
the Department or other parts of the Organisation designed to assist the 
interpretation of economic trends' (1967a onwards: inside cover). In the earliest 
papers, these 'special sections', which were on topics of particular interest in the 
economic climate of the time (such as inflation and exchange rates), were only 
two to three pages long. By the late 1990s, they had become full chapters in their 
own right, commenting on everything from technical economic issues, such as 
'increased capital mobility' and 'liberalisation', to social issues, such as 'growth, 
equity and distribution' and 'income distribution and poverty'.
An obvious reason for the change is that the organisation itself has become more 
sophisticated; it has, in essence, 'grown up', becoming a more confident 
independent actor in the international arena. However, another possible reason 
for the change is that the later documents reflect the organisation's need to 
provide justification for the view of policy problems with which it is confronting 
its members and solutions that may not readily be acceptable. The comments in 
the earlier editions arose from an accepted policy consensus; this meant that 
lengthy explanations and justifications for particular policy recommendations, 
such as demand management, were not required. However, the later papers can 
be seen as endeavouring to build a new policy consensus, with the OECD 
attempting to formulate, and have accepted by its members, a new, mutually 
beneficial policy framework. This is a likely scenario given that the OECD 
acknowledged concerns that the negative effects of recommended reforms 'could 
exacerbate social problems and hardship in the short term' (1995b: 7). As a 
result, the documents have to supply members' politicians and bureaucrats with 
the information they will need to sway opinion and convince their home country 
audience of the need for the new policy direction, and the validity of suggested 
options. Johnston is particularly cognisant of the need to reassure the public, 
noting on several occasions his fear of a backlash against:
an economic strategy of prudent macroeconomic policy, including
fiscal consolidation, structural reform and market liberalisation ...
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because of the impression that it places too little emphasis on social 
objectives (1996: 9).15
The OECD's awareness of the need to sway public opinion so that it supports the 
new policy directions is discussed in Chapter 6. Here, it is worth noting 
Johnston's comment that, although the 'language of sacrifice is not designed to 
win hearts and minds', the 'message' that the OECD wanted to 'promote' was 
that controlling public-sector deficits and debt was a 'necessary condition' for 
maintaining social protection and social well-being in future years (1997:10).
The examination of the policy stance contained in the Economic Outlook does not 
aim to be an analysis of OECD policy, assessing the coherence or validity of the 
specific economic measures suggested by the OECD. Nor does it aim to give a 
detailed descriptive account of the OECD's policy analysis and recommendations 
as contained in the documents, although some description is inevitable in order 
to provide an outline of the OECD's policy framework and an overview of its 
policy. Rather, the aim is to use the contents of the Economic Outlook to 
demonstrate the OECD's understanding of particular policy issues, especially 
social issues and the attitude to social justice contained therein. For this reason, 
the examination focuses on the assumptions that underpin the policy framework 
on which the OECD bases its recommendations, and the justifications offered for 
pursuing particular policy options. When used to elaborate the OECD's 
assumptions and justifications, the documents provide a useful indicator of the 
OECD's thinking because they reveal how the OECD understands the various 
issues to fit together. The OECD's assumptions and justifications can be traced in 
the Economic Outlook through the issues that the OECD is prepared to discuss as 
policy problems, the subsequent policy options that it recommends, and its 
comments on the expected consequences of particular policy options. 
Accordingly, I am not especially concerned with the actual economics of the 
documents and a tedious noting of particular economic policies, but with the 
justifications offered for particular policy recommendations, the assumptions 
underpinning these justifications, and the implications they have for the OECD's 
understanding and treatment of social justice. The OECD itself has observed the 
importance of its underlying assumptions, noting in Economic Outlook 50, in a
See also Johnston (1999:3-4), and Sullivan's comment that Johnston has 'warned of a possibly 
violent popular "backlash" against too much austerity, too-rapid budget cutting, too little thought 
for the needs of ordinary citizens' (1997:108).
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review of economic policy-making since the 1960s, that the faith in demand 
management to achieve economic growth was 'implicitly reflected' in Economic 
Outlook 1 (1967a) in the way that it phrased its policy assessment (see OECD 
1991b: 1)
The focus of my discussion, then, is on the problematisations that the OECD uses 
to present its view of policy problems and solutions. As outlined in Chapter 2, 
Carol Bacchi argues that policy problems do not exist independently of the way 
they are represented, and any description of a policy issue is an interpretation, 
which, by definition, involves judgment and choices. The next two chapters 
apply this approach to examine the OECD's underlying framework of ideas. The 
argument is that the way that the OECD problematises a policy issue and the 
range of viable solutions reveals the ideas and assumptions on which its 
judgment and choices are based. Thus, my exploration of the OECD's policy 
discussions examines (in Bacchi's terms):
• what is the 'problem' represented to be?
• what presuppositions are implied or taken for granted in the problem 
representation which is offered?
• what effects are connected to this representation of the 'problem'?
I will argue in Chapters 5 and 6 that the OECD's new framework, neo-liberalism, 
understands policy problems to be the result of impediments that prevent the 
free market from achieving growth and prosperity for all who are prepared to act 
as responsible economic agents. According to this problematisation, many of the 
impediments are related to too much state intervention (of a particular kind) and 
too little individual self-responsibility. Social transfers, such as unemployment 
benefits, for example, create the wrong behaviour on the part of individuals, who 
are understood to be rational self-interested maximisers who prefer to gain the 
most for the least effort expended. Incorporated in this problematisation is a 
presupposition that all unemployment is voluntary and that individuals would 
rather accept hand-outs from the state than work.
The effects of this representation of the problem are to eliminate many of the 
previously accepted methods for achieving social goals and to change what can 
be considered to be acceptable or 'legitimate' social objectives. Both economic 
and social issues are subject to assumptions that the state's role should be limited
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to actions that do not interfere with the functioning of the market and that 
encourage individuals to become self-responsible economic agents. The 
assumptions of a decreased and limited role for the state, and an increased role 
for individual self-responsibility, leave no option but to reinterpret social policy 
objectives. State intervention to achieve equality or redistribution is no longer 
desirable, nor is it comprehensible, in a framework that understands inequality 
as providing incentives for individuals to better themselves and social transfers 
as having negative consequences for the economy and for individuals (creating 
disincentives to work or improve skills).
However, as noted in Chapter 3, achieving change in the formal institutions of 
policy that arise from these ideas requires an associated change in their 
supporting informal institutions. Attempts to alter the former without associated 
alterations in the latter give rise to unsustainable tension as the new formal 
institutions clash with society's norms and expectations. Such tension can 
manifest itself in protests against the changes, flagrant breaches of the new 
formal institutions, or voter backlash. As will be canvassed in Chapter 6, the 
OECD is aware of the impact of informal institutions on society's attitudes to its 
new range of policies, noting the difficulties of achieving expenditure reform 
because of the 'entrenched expectations of acquired rights and implicit social 
contracts' (1994b: xiii). Thus, additional effects of the OECD's representations of 
policy problems under its new paradigm include a reconfigured set of informal 
institutions designed to support neo-liberal policy solutions. Among these new 
informal institutions are frames and names that suggest:
• that former conceptions of social justice and related issues are no longer 
affordable
• that the unemployed are bludgers who choose to be without work and who 
need to be coerced back into work through cutting their 'generous' benefits, 
and
• that social transfers encourage some people to be lazy at the expense of those 
who are prepared to work.
Chapter 6 concludes that this shift in informal institutions suggests that there are 
problems with the arguments for path dependency and institutional lock-in with 
regard to the welfare state. That is, ideas are not embedded as firmly in 
institutions as some theorists would claim.
Chapter 5
Shifting Paradigms: 
Reconstructing 
'the House that Keynes Built'
Introduction
Y I * wo key questions occupy the final two chapters of my thesis: how have the 
X  OECD's ideas changed over time, and what have the implications been for 
the organisation's understanding (and treatment) of social justice and related 
issues. As will be examined in the next chapter, a striking feature of the OECD's 
discussions in its premier economic policy document -  the Economic Outlook -  
from the mid-1990s is the linking of economic and social issues in ways that 
suggest the organisation is equally concerned with both policy areas. That is, the 
OECD is not prioritising the economic over the social, but instead refers to the 
need to achieve both economic and social goals as well as economic and social 
well-being, with neither area being subordinate to the other. The OECD's 
discussions of the issues of equality of income and poverty alleviation are 
augmented with discussions of the need for member governments to ensure that 
they maintain 'social cohesion' by targeting not only poverty, but also 'social 
exclusion' and 'marginalisation'. The terms of such discussions may suggest that 
the organisation's concerns remain the same as they were in the early years of its 
existence when it talked of the need to tackle, for example, inflation because of 
the 'social inequities', 'social strains', and 'unfair' 'distortions of income and 
wealth patterns' it created (OECD 1970a: viii; 1973a: 8).
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However, such an observation overlooks the effects of changes in the ideas 
underpinning the OECD's policy analysis and recommendations over the past 40 
years. An examination of the OECD's policy documents since 1961 reveals a 
major change in the OECD's understanding of policy problems and viable 
solutions that dramatically affects what it means when talking of such things as 
social stability and its underlying causes. This change in thinking can be 
understood in terms of the Kuhnian-influenced model of policy paradigms 
outlined in Chapter 2, and can be described as a paradigm shift in which the 
dominant paradigm (or set of ideas) of the OECD's early years -  Keynesianism1 -  
was replaced with what the OECD called a 'supply-side approach' when the 
OECD came to consider Keynesianism to be less effective at explaining existing 
and arising policy problems than its replacement.
The organisation itself acknowledges such a shift in the ideas underpinning its 
policy. It freely admits to being Keynesian in its early years, observing in its 50th 
anniversary publication, From War to Wealth, that in the 'heyday' of 
Keynesianism, one of the OECD's 'nicknames' was 'the house that Keynes built' 
(Sullivan 1997:50). The organisation notes in this publication that, under 
pressure from a series of economic shocks, Keynesianism gave way to a new 
framework, as the 'expansionist Keynesian economic model which had guided 
OECD through its first 20 years was amended, attacked and ultimately discarded 
for the supply-side approach' (Sullivan 1997: 7). However, in acknowledging 
this shift in its policy paradigm, the OECD overlooks the consequences for policy 
goals. It presents the change as an inevitable, unproblematic -  and non-political 
-  response to what it perceives is the failure of Keynesian policies to resolve 
serious economic problems. The OECD's discussions suggest that it views its 
new paradigm as simply a change in the means to achieve its existing set of 
policy goals. That is, the move from Keynesian demand management, which 
was predicated on an actively interventionist state, to a supply-side approach, 
which favours a much less interventionist state, simply offers new measures to 
deal with old problems. Such a view neglects the implications of a paradigm
1 Keynesianism is, of course, a loose and contested term. As Peter Hall notes: 'Keynesianism has 
acquired a rather broad set of connotations ...' (1989: 5). I do not intend to enter the debate over 
how Keynesianism should be defined. I use it here because it is the term the OECD itself uses to 
describe its economic policies in this period, which were based on the accepted central tenets of 
Keynesianism: active state intervention in the economy to ensure full employment and prosperity. 
For a more extensive discussion of the interpretations of Keynesianism, see Hall (1989).
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shift as outlined in Chapter 2: that a new paradigm reconstructs the 
understanding of the world and how it works, which affects 'not only the goals 
of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the 
very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing' (Hall 1993: 279). In 
this instance, the consequences of the OECD's paradigm shift include a 
transformation in its views concerning state-society relations and the roles and 
responsibilities of the state vis-ä-vis individuals. Thus, the effects of a shift in the 
ideas underpinning the OECD's policy analysis and recommendations are more 
dramatic than the organisation appears to comprehend or acknowledge.
The purpose of this chapter is to lay the foundations for a subsequent 
examination of the OECD's treatment of social justice and related issues by first 
examining shifts in the framework of ideas within which the OECD locates its 
more specific policy analyses. As outlined in Chapter 4, I will use the OECD's 
Economic Outlook to trace these changes, looking at both the explicit and the 
implicit ideas of the OECD's paradigm. It is important to stress that I do not aim 
to offer an economic analysis, assessing the coherence or validity of the specific 
economic measures that the OECD recommends.2 Rather, I want to examine the 
OECD's main ideas as revealed in the justifications it offers for its policy 
evaluations and the policy actions it recommends to its members. These 
justifications reflect the taken-for-granted assumptions that are intrinsic to a set 
of policy ideas, but that are rarely made explicit. Exploring the assumptions 
should reveal more about the ideas themselves, especially their inherent 
discourse and their associated informal institutions.
In the first section of the chapter, I will trace some of the major changes in the 
OECD's ideas before arguing that the OECD's new paradigm is not simply a 
'supply-side approach', as the organisation claims, but can more correctly be 
understood as neo-liberalism.3 I examine this by looking at four key ideas of the 
OECD's new paradigm: that state intervention is bad for the economy, that 
public debt is bad for the economy, that public spending is bad for the economy, 
and that the public sector itself is bad for the economy. Underpinning these
2 Nor do I aim to assess the accuracy of the OECD's economic predictions, as this has been done 
elsewhere. See, for example, Ash et al. (1998).
3 I am not alone in making this claim. See, for example, Gelinas (2003: esp. 118-120); Schölte 
(2000: 2410; Crouch (1997: 357); Kelsey (1997:17); Martin and Schumann (1997:160).
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ideas is a neo-liberal way of thinking about government as described in 
Chapter 3. Neo-liberalism incorporates an understanding of state-society 
relations in which the state's role is limited to maintaining law and order and the 
infrastructure of the market, and individuals -  understood to be rational, self- 
interested maximisers -  are considered to be responsible for their own well-being 
through their own efforts and enterprise. While, on the surface, this appears to 
be merely a change in means to achieve existing policy goals -  for example, the 
responsibility for a particular outcome simply shifts from the state to the 
individual -  in practice, such a change in means has a profound effect on goals, 
especially social goals. For example, the shift in emphasis from equality of 
outcome to equality of opportunity means that any subsequent inequality in 
outcome is acceptable in a way that it would not have been under the previous 
paradigm. I will deal with these issues more fully in the next chapter. In this 
chapter, I will argue that the new way of thinking about government is revealed 
in the way the OECD interprets and discusses (or frames and names) policy 
problems and what it considers to be viable solutions.
Shifting paradigms:
From 'the House that Keynes Built' ...
For almost two decades after it was established, the OECD, like most of its 
members, 'marched to the music of Lord Maynard Keynes', such that its official 
history claims that in the heyday of Keynesianism, the organisation was 
nicknamed, 'the house that Keynes built' (Sullivan 1997: 34, 50). The Keynesian 
paradigm underpinned both the OECD's analysis of policy within its member 
states and in the world economy, and its suggestions for the policy actions it 
considered its members needed to take.4 As Peter Hall observes more generally 
of Keynesianism:
Keynesian ideas ... specified what the economic world was like, how 
it was to be observed, which goals were attainable through policy, 
and what instruments should be used to attain them. They became 
the prism through which policy-makers saw the economy as well as 
their own role within it (1993: 279).
This is consistent with Flail's view of a policy paradigm, as discussed in 
Chapter 2. That is, Hall claims that:
4 As noted in Chapter 4, it appears that, in this early period, the OECD couched its policy views as 
suggestions rather than recommendations.
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policy-makers customarily work within a framework of ideas and 
standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of 
instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature 
of the problems they are meant to be addressing (1993: 279).
The Keynesian paradigm, then, provided the OECD with a way of understanding 
the world and how it worked; it set out acceptable policy goals and the means to 
achieve them, and delineated what policy-makers could consider to be policy 
problems and the options available to resolve them.
An important aspect of the Keynesian world-view was the way that it structured 
state-society relations. The Keynesian paradigm incorporated what Hall 
describes as a 'rationale for more active government management of the 
economy' (1989: 19, 363). Hall contends that Keynesian ideas 'broke with 
classical views of the polity and economy as separate spheres and with the 
related view that the market economy was fundamentally stable or likely to 
function best when free from state intervention' (1989: 363). Rather, he notes, 
private markets were considered to be inherently unstable, but 'susceptible to 
correction through discretionary government action' (1989: 363). Hall argues 
that, through these ideas, 'Keynes provided a powerful justification for increased 
state intervention in the economy and contributed to a redefinition of the 
accepted boundaries between the public and private spheres in society' 
(1989: 363-364).5 Thus, Hall observes, the impact of Keynesian ideas was a 'major 
transformation' in the role of the state that was 'one of the hallmarks of the 20th 
century' (1989: 4).6
As noted in the Introduction, I do not intend to offer a discussion of the OECD's 
interpretation of Keynes's ideas, nor will I list in detail what those policies
5 Hall contends that Keynes's arguments became 'an important ideological pillar of the social 
consensus endorsing a managerial state and the mixed economy in the postwar world', in that they 
reinforced the belief that a 'middle way' could be found between socialism and capitalism 
(1989: 365).
 ̂Hall warns here that Keynes was 'by no means responsible' for the expansion of the welfare state 
often linked to his name, but claims that Keynes's theories placed more responsibility for economic 
performance on the state and loosened the fiscal constraint that prevented more generous social 
programmes (1989: 4). Margaret Weir notes that Keynesian economics provided the:
underpinnings for redefining the relationship between state and society in mature 
capitalist economies, and in so doing ... recast the terms on which major social actors, 
most notably capital and labor, confronted one another in the postwar world 
(1989: 53).
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entailed. Rather, I want to observe only that a central tenet of the OECD's 
Keynesian paradigm was that the state was responsible for achieving particular 
outcomes, such as full employment, and was expected to intervene directly in the 
economy, via such mechanisms as demand management, to achieve these 
outcomes, solving whatever economic problems stood in the way. A key 
assumption of this world-view, then, was that markets failed in some areas, and 
it was a state responsibility to intervene directly to correct such failures. 
Accordingly, the state was to intervene to manage the level of demand in the 
economy; that is, the idea was that 'prosperity and full employment could be 
maintained almost indefinitely if overall demand were deftly controlled within a 
given system' (Sullivan 1997: 34). The state was also responsible for resolving the 
problems that caused unemployment and, until such time as it had done so and 
the unemployed could find work, it was responsible for providing income 
support to those without jobs. In an explicit example of this thinking, the OECD 
noted in Economic Outlook 19 (1976a) that 'full reabsorption of the unemployed' 
would have to wait for lower inflation and higher growth, which meant there 
was 'clearly a strong case for continuing (and in some countries improving)' 
income maintenance programmes, or state provision of benefits to those without 
work (1976a: 129). Importantly, then, the paradigm did not blame individuals for 
being out of work or consider unemployment to be a result of individual choice 
(that is, individuals choosing to be jobless). Rather, governments were 
responsible for creating and ensuring the conditions that would lead to full 
employment. Thus, unemployment was not an individual fault or choice, but 
was caused by factors that were outside individual control and within 
government control.
The OECD recommended a similar approach to deal with inflation; the state was 
expected to intervene actively to resolve the problem. Demand management 
measures were obvious interventions, but when these did not have desired 
effects, the OECD argued for broader state action. However, such measures still 
were based on an underlying assumption of the state taking an active role in 
resolving economic problems. For example, in Economic Outlook 12 (1972b) the 
OECD began to suggest that members consider policies outside of demand 
management, saying that making an 'effective indentation' on inflation by 
demand management alone 'would require draconian measures of restraint' that 
no country would wish to impose (1972b: 6). It argued that, as '[responsibility
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for dealing with inflation rests with national governments', they should consider 
a 'multi-policy attack on inflation -  of supplementing control of aggregate 
demand by other steps' (1972b: 5, 6). In keeping with its world-view that direct 
state action offered the best solution to central problems of social and economic 
policy, the steps the OECD sanctioned for inclusion in such a 'multi-policy 
attack' involved direct state intervention, and approved policies included price 
and income controls and '[m]ore active manpower and regional policies' 
(1972b: 6). In a similar vein, the OECD noted that, with unemployment, there 
was 'disturbing evidence' of structural causes of unemployment that might not 
be removed by rising aggregate demand (1972b: 6). Consequently, it argued that, 
if demand management proved to be an 'insufficient tool' for decreasing 
unemployment, '[p]olicies of more direct intervention would seem to be 
necessary' (1972b: 15). Thus, although the OECD was suggesting that its 
members look beyond demand management, the new policies still were based on 
an underlying assumption of the state taking an active and direct role in 
resolving economic problems.
... to 'a D ormitory for Supply-Siders'
In its first decade, then, the OECD's Keynesian paradigm, with its central tenet of 
direct state intervention, provided the world-view through which the OECD 
interpreted and resolved policy problems. However, a series of events in the 
1970s, including the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979, and subsequent problems, such 
as stagflation and increasing unemployment, did not appear to the OECD to 
respond to Keynesian solutions. Such 'puzzles' (in the Kuhnian sense) prompted 
the organisation to begin to question the veracity of its paradigm. Scott Sullivan 
observes that, while 'Keynes's elegant model worked almost magically in the 
economic environment of the 1960s', the crises of the 1970s led to doubts, such 
that, in the OECD's view, 'the Keynesian economic model seemed no longer to fit 
the facts' (1997: 35, 37). He goes on:
Little by little, with frequent reversals and back-sliding, they [the 
OECD] came to the conclusion that their Keynesian presuppositions 
were, if not wrong, inappropriate to a new economic environment. 
Increasingly, their speeches and papers called for 'positive 
adjustment policies,' restructuring and fiscal tightening (1997: 55).
The OECD had discussed this shift in an edition of its Economic Outlook. It noted 
in a special chapter in Economic Outlook 50 (1991b) that the 'widespread
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confidence' in active demand management policies of the 1960s had, by the end 
of the 1970s, given way to the need for 'new solutions' and reforms of economic 
structures (1991b: 1-11). It observed that changes in both the American and 
British governments after the second oil shock had 'accelerated the process of 
trying out new solutions', with the new policy orientation giving priority to 
inflation control, decreasing both the budget deficit and the weight of the public 
sector, and reversing the trend towards structural rigidities (1991b: 7, 8).
The OECD searched for a new way to interpret and resolve the problems with 
which it was faced, and gradually it abandoned Keynesian ideas for what is 
claimed was a focus on a 'supply-side approach', or, as Sullivan pithily 
observed: 'The "house that Keynes built" had been converted to a dormitory for 
supply-siders' (1997: 55). This is not to argue that the shift from Keynesianism to 
a supply-side approach occurred overnight in a clean, obvious break. An 
examination of the Economic Outlook shows that the OECD continued to talk 
about Keynesian practices of active state intervention in the economy for several 
years after the main emphasis of its policy discussions shifted to the supply side. 
During this time, there was an overlap in policy advice. For example, in Economic 
Outlook 25 (1979a), the OECD argued for governments to improve competition 
and reduce income support in some areas. At the same time, it revealed doubts 
about the market, urging governments to take action to avoid potential excess 
demand for oil because taking little or no action, 'leaving the problem to be 
sorted out in the market', would result in an 'unacceptable' increase in inflation 
(1979a: 9). Similar overlap is seen in the later documents when the OECD turns 
its attention to social issues. Age Bakker argues that, in clinging to its Keynesian 
views, the OECD 'nearly lost the confidence of policy-makers' in member 
countries who now believed that Keynesianism 'risked seriously undermining 
budgetary discipline and engendering inflationary pressures' (1996: 3)7 Broadly
 ̂Bakker claims that the OECD did not abandon Keynesianism until 1980, when the secretariat 'had 
to change its ideas' in the wake of a failed 'locomotive strategy' in which Japan and Germany were 
to have acted as a 'locomotive for the stagnating world economy by providing a budgetary 
stimulus' (1996:115). He contends that the second oil crisis in 1979 'destroyed' the foundation for 
this plan so that, in 1980, the OECD Council of Ministers decided to pursue a comprehensive policy 
reorientation (1996: 115-116). While the OECD did not eliminate demand management from its 
recommendations, it relegates its importance beneath that of the new ideas. For example, in 
Economic Outlook 33 (1983a), the OECD explicitly stated that demand management alone was no 
longer sufficient to govern the economy. However, rather than urging more state intervention, as it 
had earlier (see above), it took a different approach. It noted that recent policy discussions on 
sustainable economic performance emphasised investment 'as well as the supply side of economic
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speaking, however, for the purposes of discussion in this chapter, supply-side 
approaches came to the fore from 1975 onwards.
The overlap in advice between the Keynesian and supply-side paradigms is 
consistent with Hall's model of paradigm shifts, in which a dominant paradigm 
loses its prevailing position as the anomalies or policy 'puzzles' it cannot explain 
accumulate to the point of throwing the paradigm into crisis. The overlap can be 
seen as the period in which the Keynesian paradigm was breaking down, with 
the OECD still attempting to use it to interpret policy problems and provide 
policy solutions, before deciding to abandon it for a new set of ideas that the 
organisation believed was better able to explain policy issues. This is not to 
suggest, of course, that the shift in ideas, from Keynesianism to the supply-side, 
was occurring only within the OECD or that the organisation was isolated from 
similar changes occurring in its member countries. Given the limitations of the 
Kuhnian model with regard to the political aspects of a shift in ideas, it is 
possible that the overlap in the OECD's ideas at this time reflects the contestation 
over which new paradigm was to be selected. However, my principle concern is 
with the changing content of the OECD's underlying framework of ideas, which 
means that the politics behind the shift is outside the scope of my thesis and must 
be put aside for a future research project.
The OECD's version of the new paradigm is a particular interpretation of supply- 
side ideas. Like Keynesianism, 'supply-side' approaches encompass a number of 
connotations. In their economics text-book, David Begg et al. define supply-side 
economics as: 'the pursuit of policies aimed not at increasing aggregate demand 
but at increasing aggregate supply' (1987: 554). They note that supply-side 
policies include 'cutting the rate of income tax', which they claim is 'designed to 
increase households' willingness to work' (1987: 554).* 8 However, Carles Boix
performance more generally', with 'little of the earlier faith that demand side policies alone can
ensure a satisfactory economic performance' (1983a: 8).
8 This is a common reading of supply-side economics. Bruce Herd describes it as the 'the classical 
"trickle-down" thesis', according to which lowering the taxes that wealthy people pay encourages 
them to work harder and thus create wealth and employment for others (1998: 283, fn 2). He notes 
that, according to this view, 'low taxes for the low-paid who then have too much money, 
discourages hard work'. He concludes:
The contemporary ideological argument for the paradigm change that occurred from 
the 1970s is that the welfare state with its high taxes and wages discouraged
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argues that this is only one version of the supply-side. He examines policy­
making in Britain and Spain in the 1980s and uses his findings to argue that there 
are two main alternative supply-side strategies (1998: 3). Under the first strategy, 
Boix contends, the government cuts taxes to encourage private savings, boost 
private investment, and accelerate the rate of growth, which means that it accepts 
that, as a result, 'at least in the short run', lower taxes may mean less social 
spending and more inequality (1998: 3). He then argues for a second supply-side 
strategy, the policies of which are almost opposite that of the first; that is, the 
government increases public spending in human and fixed capital to raise the 
productivity rate of both (1998: 3). Boix argues that the higher productivity 
encourages private agents to keep investing in the face of the higher tax rates 
needed to pay for social transfers and public investment programmes.
Boix notes that the choice between the two strategies depends on the blend of 
interests and ideas. On the former, he observes that, while all governments (or 
parties, which are the focus of his examination) seek to develop policies that 
maximise growth, they adopt different approaches depending on the 
redistributive consequences (1998: 5). Boix argues that the different strategies 
have distinct consequences on the level of economic equality and contends that 
the 'partisan preference' between them depends on the level of inequality that 
the government (or political party) is prepared to tolerate. Thus, he explains:
left-wing or social democratic parties, while still concerned about 
maximizing growth, especially care about the welfare of workers and 
the less advantaged social sectors and about equality in general. On 
the other hand, right-wing or conservative parties care about 
economic growth per se regardless of its distributive effects (1998: 5).
Boix emphasises that he is not implying that conservatives oppose the 
equalisation of incomes; rather, he says, they reject intervention to achieve such 
an outcome because they are concerned about the costs involved. That is, he 
contends, they suspect that intervention may damage growth, upset principles of 
merit or desert, or deteriorate the position of their electoral constituencies 
(1998: 5; fn 4: 232). Boix goes on to note that, should incomes become more equal 
as a result of a 'natural' process of market interactions with no state intervention, 
conservatives would welcome this result 'as a sign of the "good" behavior of
employers from investing in new capital thus leading to economic downturn 
(Wachtel 1990:181-182, cited in Herd 1998: 283, fn 2).
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markets (in rewarding, say, efforts and skills over time)' (1998: 5). On ideas, Boix 
argues that the choice of policy strategy adopted depends on the model or 
theories (or, as argued in Chapter 2, shared beliefs) the government (or, in Boix's 
discussion, party) has about how the economy works and what policies can be 
used to improve economic performance (1998: 5). Such models, he contends, 
posit 'certain causal relationships between the goals to be achieved and the 
instruments to be employed' to achieve them, and are 'indispensable to convince 
policy-makers about the feasibility of the goals they would ideally like to pursue' 
(1998: 5).
Boix argues that scholars investigating the move to supply-side policies 'have 
paid scant systematic attention to the political determinants of supply-side 
economic strategies', a deficiency that he claims to rectify in his book, in which he 
argues that 'partisan preferences have a key impact on the selection of the set of 
policies directed to shape the supply side of the economy' (1998:11). He 
contends that right-wing parties (and governments) use the first of the supply- 
side strategies outlined above: they reject state intervention, especially in the 
form of public spending on capital formation policies, and keep taxation low to 
avoid reducing private resources that can be invested in physical and human 
capital. Left-wing parties (and governments) take the opposite approach, 
looking to state intervention through spending on infrastructure, education and 
so on, to increase productivity, boost the economy, and, ultimately, achieve a 
more equal income distribution. Boix claims that a 'pointed employment- 
equality trade-off' faces governments in their search for growth, and summarises 
this problem in the following way:
Lowering taxes and decreasing social protection to boost profits, 
investment, and competitiveness may cause more inequality at home.
Yet an excessive commitment to public transfers, for the sake of 
maintaining social cohesion, may lead to a faltering economic 
performance (1998: 12).
What a government (or party) chooses to do reflects its partisan preference with 
regard to this trade-off.
An interesting, and important, question thus arises when applying Boix's 
argument to the OECD's claim that it has shifted to a supply-side 
approach: which of the two supply-side strategies outlined does the OECD
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pursue? The answer, which has considerable implications for its understanding 
and treatment of social justice and related issues (as will be discussed in the next 
chapter), is clear in an examination of the OECD's policy discussions in its 
Economic Outlook. The OECD's version of the supply-side paradigm, which 
Sullivan claims was 'adopted as the new orthodoxy by member countries', is 
based on a few simple notions: 'cut budgets, eliminate labour-market rigidities, 
free international trade of all remaining barriers, rationalise production and 
exploit new technologies' (1997: 55). These policy measures are not non-partisan, 
but fall within Boix's outline of the right-wing or conservative interpretation of 
the supply-side, which can also be understood as neo-liberalism (see Chapter 3).
Ostensibly, the OECD's new framework aimed for the same outcomes as its 
previous model; namely, the OECD's stated objectives in its 1960 founding 
Convention: 'to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and 
employment and a rising standard of living in Member countries, while 
maintaining financial stability ...'9 As noted above, the OECD's new paradigm 
grew out of its concern that the old methods of managing the economy, via direct 
state intervention, were not working and were, in fact, exacerbating economic 
problems. As its faith in state intervention faltered, the OECD's commentary and 
policy prescriptions began to urge members to reduce direct interventions in 
their economies in order to remove impediments to the effective and efficient 
functioning of the market. According to the OECD's new paradigm, its 
objectives (growth, employment and higher living standards) could best be 
achieved through the free market; that is: 'Open and efficient markets for goods 
and services, fully exposed to domestic and international competition, provide 
the crucial underpinning for high-employment, high-income economies' 
(1993a: xv). This idea led the OECD to recommend that governments, which had 
found it 'easy to over-burden an economy' with a 'plethora of regulations, 
controls and other impediments to the unfettered working of market economies', 
remove such controls (1979b: 11; 1980a: 5). Only then, the OECD argued, could 
the 'animal spirits upon which the dynamism of market economies ultimately 
depends' be freed (1985a: ix-x).
9 A statement of the OECD's founding principles is given on the inside front cover of each edition 
of the Economic Outlook.
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Key Ideas of the New Paradigm
The OECD's new paradigm includes four key, related ideas that have had a 
significant impact on its understanding and treatment of social justice and related 
issues. These are:
• direct state intervention is bad for the economy
• public debt is bad for the economy
• public spending is bad for the economy, and
• the public sector itself is bad for the economy.
In this section, I will outline these ideas, before arguing that they are based on a 
new way of thinking about state-society relations, roles and responsibilities and a 
new view of individual behaviour. The implications of these ideas for the 
OECD's treatment of social justice will be examined in detail in the next chapter.
I) D irect State Intervention is Bad for the Economy
As outlined above, according to the OECD's Keynesian ideas, the state was 
expected to intervene directly in the economy to resolve problems, and solutions 
were not confined only to the management of demand. Rather, the OECD 
suggested that a range of interventionist measures be pursued, including price 
and income controls and active 'manpower' policies. These interventionist 
measures were of a particular kind; that is, the state was to take direct action, 
actively managing the economy through an extensive network of rules and 
regulations. Under the OECD's new neo-liberal paradigm, however, 
intervention of this kind is considered to be part of the problem, interfering with 
the natural dynamism of the market and resulting in outcomes that are inferior to 
those that could be produced by markets unfettered by excessive rules and 
regulations.
This is not to argue that the OECD is no longer in favour of any state action; 
rather, it wants member governments to move from direct intervention to -  for 
want of a better term -  indirect intervention, in which they leave more to the 
market, acting only to create the right conditions and, importantly, behaviours 
for the market to operate freely and efficiently. Accordingly, when arguing in 
1979 for the 'imaginative identification of appropriate policy instruments and their 
determined use' (1979b: 11; emphasis added) in order to solve the broad range of
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problems facing member economies, the OECD's understanding of 'appropriate' 
no longer centres on measures of direct intervention.10 In fact, the OECD 
explicitly attacks such measures in Economic Outlook 26 (1979b) when it argues:
It is easy to over-burden an economy with a proliferation of 
government regulations, prohibitions, incentives, requirements and 
standards which, to meet specific ends, simultaneously work against 
well-functioning markets, efficient allocation of resources, 
appropriate investment in capacity creation and the mobility of 
labour (1979b: 11).
According to the new paradigm's world-view, direct intervention causes more 
problems than it solves. Thus, the OECD argues:
Impediments to the operation of the market mechanism and to 
international trade ... create undesirable distortions and rigidities, 
imposing a cost in terms of lost productivity and reduced 
adaptiveness to change (1980a: 5).
In a similar vein, it argues that stimulatory policy used to boost flagging growth 
may, 'of itself, have contributed to the inflation of the 1960s' and had certainly 
done so in 1972-73 (1981a: 8). The OECD notes that, in hindsight, it appeared 
that many policies had been adopted with 'too little regard for their consistency 
with a desirable and sustainable pattern of medium-term development', 
including the need for 'responsive labour and productive markets' and 'a public 
sector of appropriate size and structure' (1981a: 8). This latter point, and the 
meaning of the word 'appropriate' in this context, will be discussed below.
Thus, the OECD's new paradigm gives it a new understanding of policy 
problems, their causes and the viable range of solutions. From the late 1970s- 
early 1980s, the OECD's analyses and recommendations are based on a new set 
of ideas according to which members can best achieve their goals by reducing 
direct intervention and working with the market, using supply-side measures 
such as the removal of 'structural disincentives' and 'distortions and rigidities' to 
expand capacity and 'improve the operation of the market mechanism' (1980a: 9). 
The new paradigm, then, rejects the old paradigm's key assumption that markets 
fail in some areas, and the associated assumption that it is a state responsibility to 
intervene directly to correct such failures, because it no longer understands the 
world to work in this way. Rather, according to the new set of ideas, it is the
10Among those 'serious problems' with which the OECD claimed its members were 'afflicted' were 
those related to inflation, energy, labour markets, and productivity and investment (1979b: 11).
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unencumbered market that will achieve the OECD's main goals of high growth, 
employment and a rising standard of living, but only if governments constrain 
themselves to setting up the conditions by which the market can operate most 
effectively. Accordingly, the organisation repeatedly urges its members to 
remove the 'plethora of regulations, controls and other impediments to the 
unfettered working of market economies' (1980b: 11; 1980a: 5), advising them 
that 'it should be possible to devise instruments that achieve their desired aim in 
concert with market forces ...' (1979b: 11). That is, the new instruments are 
different kinds of interventions to those encouraged under the Keynesian 
paradigm. The new interventions are based on a different understanding of how 
the world works, and the roles and responsibilities of the state.
From the early 1980s, pro-market attacks on direct state intervention in the 
economy become commonplace in the Economic Outlook. The OECD argues that 
members should improve underlying economic structures through reforms in 
areas including taxation and public spending; the operation of product, labour 
and capital markets; industrial, regional and competition policies; and 
international trading relations (1984a: 11). It emphasises that, in pursuing such 
structural reforms, 'there is a clear need to ensure that the actions of governments 
are based, more consistently and effectively than is now the case, on the use of 
markets' (1984a: 11). The organisation argues that structural reforms, especially 
in its European member countries, would make economies more flexible, 
strengthen incentives, and improve the functioning of markets, which would 
help to restore business confidence and revitalise the 'animal spirits upon which 
the dynamism of market economies ultimately depends' (1985a: ix-x).11 By the 
1990s, the OECD has built these recommendations into a fully elaborated 
argument for governments to make greater use of the market and market 
mechanisms because it understands open, efficient, and competitive markets to 
be the key to high-employment, high-income economies. In fact, a dominant 
theme in the Economic Outlooks of this decade is structural reform and structural 
adjustments to enhance the flexibility of markets.12
11 Later, in Economic Outlook 44 (1988b), the OECD notes that economic conditions in the OECD 
area are 'more buoyant than at any time since the early 1970s', with strong investment indicating 
that 'animal spirits' have been raised in most OECD countries (1988b: vii, viii). However, it goes on 
to argue that this does not mean that sufficient reform has taken place.
12 See, for example the chapter in Economic Outlook 59 (1996a), 'Interactions Between Structural 
Reform, Macroeconomic Policy and Economic Performance'. This concludes that: 'well designed
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It is important to reiterate here that, in pushing for more use of the market, the 
OECD is not arguing that governments should take no action in their economies. 
In fact, in an important statement acknowledging the shift from direct to indirect 
state intervention, the OECD stresses that 'greater reliance on markets does not at 
all imply a passive or inert role for governments' (1984a: 11). It offers the 
example of capital markets, where, it argues, 'the role of governments is far from 
passive' because of the need for 'judicious market-conforming regulation' of both 
financial institutions and markets for debt and equity (1984a: 12). However, 
'judicious' regulation does not mean controlling competition or interest rates 
because, the OECD observes, 'broad, diversified and competitive' capital 
markets, which make for better economic performance, require a system of 
financial intermediaries that is 'free to provide a range of instruments' tailored to 
different needs (1984a: 11). Thus, governments are to provide the rules of the 
game, setting the conditions by which the market is to operate and creating the 
right types of behaviour among 'economic agents' -  a point that will be discussed 
further below -  but they are not to take part in the game itself.
On the surface, this appears to be no more than a change in the means to achieve 
an existing set of goals. That is, under the new paradigm, policy goals remain the 
same; the new view is simply that such goals can be attained most successfully 
through the market and not through the direct action of the state. However, 
when attacking the methods used to achieve particular outcomes, the OECD also 
begins to attack some of the goals themselves, especially social goals. The 
argument is that 'ambitious' or 'worthy' social goals have negative effects on the 
economy and, therefore, need to be rethought. In Economic Outlook 28 (1980b), for 
example, the organisation argues that, while the 'plethora of regulations, controls 
and other impediments to the unfettered working of market economies' may 
have been introduced 'to achieve worthy ends', they instead may have both 
weakened the ability of economies to undergo structural change and reduced 
their responsiveness (1980b: 11). It advances a similar position in the next 
edition, Economic Outlook 29 (1981a), when it observes:
There is now a widespread belief that the succession of policy actions 
taken over the past two decades with a view to the ... achievement of 
ambitious social goals has led to some congealing of the productive 
structure and decreased responsiveness in labour and product
and implemented reform across a wide range of areas could have significant positive effects on 
growth and jobs' (1996a: 55).
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markets, making OECD economies more inflation-prone (1981a: 8; 
emphasis added).
The OECD expands these views later in the same volume during a discussion on 
wages and inflation, when it makes a direct attack on the priority once accorded 
to social justice issues and outlines the negative effects that such policies have 
had on member economies. It notes that many OECD countries had, especially 
in the 1960s, introduced social legislation to 'improve social equity and working 
conditions (job security, safety standards, improved health and retirement 
benefits)' (1981a: 42). However, the organisation argues, these measures, along 
with longer holidays and increased fringe benefits, had resulted in 
'disproportionate growth in the share of non-wage labour costs' (1981a: 43). It 
observes that, in addition, in some countries, minimum wage and equal-pay 
legislation had squeezed traditional skill differentials and restricted the job 
opportunities of unskilled or inexperienced workers, and 'relatively high' 
unemployment benefits may have raised 'voluntary' unemployment. The OECD 
claims that all of this means that, 'despite the desirability of improving equity', 
some aspects of social legislation have had undesirable consequences, weakening 
the allocative efficiency of wage differentials and labour markets (1981a: 43). The 
organisation's thinking, then, is that, in order to avoid the negative effects of such 
policies, these goals can be sacrificed to the greater good of an unencumbered 
market. As will be elaborated in the next chapter, such beliefs lead the OECD to 
push its members both to avoid direct state intervention to achieve their social 
goals, instead leaving such goals to be resolved in the market, and to reconsider 
some of the goals themselves.
II) Public Debt is Bad for the Economy
According to the OECD's new paradigm, direct state intervention is not the only 
problem; public debt also now is considered to have a detrimental effect on the 
economy. Until the late 1970s, the organisation had not been especially 
concerned with rising public sector deficits, or the borrowing needed to cover 
them, because it considered such deficits and debt to show that governments 
were undertaking measures to fulfil their responsibilities (actively managing 
their economies). For this reason, the OECD had urged governments to do more 
to convince their populations of the need for such deficits, arguing in Economic 
Outlook 22 (1977b) that, Targe budget deficits are justifiable in present conditions'
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(1977b: 10). In this edition of the Outlook, the OECD offered an extensive 
justification for public sector deficits, arguing that it was an important task for 
governments to persuade financial and exchange markets and 'important 
sections of public opinion7, which found large deficits difficult to accept, that 
such deficits in the short term were 'desirable and feasible' (1977b: 10). It said 
that experience revealed that such temporarily high deficits were 'certainly not 
irreversible' and that 'frequently expressed concern about the financing of large 
government deficits is not borne out by recent experience' (1977b: 10). It noted in 
a special section, 'Public Sector Indebtedness and Government Financing', that 
the emergence of large public sector deficits in the aftermath of the 1974-75 
recession had drawn public attention, but argued that such deficits simply 
reflected state action, such as large public spending and tax relief programmes, to 
counter the recession (1977b: 41-42). The organisation contended that the 
recession itself had created the need for governments to borrow because it had 
reduced tax receipts while bringing an increased demand for unemployment 
benefits (1977b: 42).13 It feared that reducing public deficits before a recovery in 
private investment could itself have adverse economic consequences, creating a 
vicious cycle, in that lower demand could prevent investment and exacerbate 
unemployment, which would result in an increased demand for unemployment 
benefits and a need for more government borrowing (1978a: xi).
However, under its new paradigm, the OECD considers public debt to be a major 
problem for its members, with the organisation fearing the effects on the 
economy of both the level of debt and the interest payments required to service 
the debt (see 1984b: 32-33; 1985a: 6). In Economic Outlook 52 (1992b), it notes that 
the extent of government indebtedness had increased on average in OECD 
economies from 22 per cent of GDP in 1979 to 40 per cent of GDP in 1989 
(1992b: 20). A year later, in Economic Outlook 54 (1993b), it observes that, between 
1979 and 1992, average OECD gross public debt had increased from 41 per cent 
of GDP to about 63 per cent of GDP (1993b: vii). Initially, it fears that high debt 
negatively affects a government's ability to influence demand. This leads it to 
warn in 1979 that high budget deficits constrain state actions, leaving Tittle room
13 In an explicit recognition of 'government responsibility', the OECD noted that rising public debt 
in Germany and Japan, where government borrowing requirements had been small, reflected 
government action in the face of weak investment and higher household saving. It observed that 
the increased debt could 'thus be regarded as an inevitable consequence of generally recognised 
government responsibilities rather than an abnormal trend' (1977b: 43; emphasis added).
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for tax or expenditure changes to support aggregate demand' (1979a: 10). Later, 
however, the OECD considers public debt to harm the economy in other ways. 
For example, government borrowing could result in increased interest rates, and 
persistent deficits added to debt and interest payments, which increased pressure 
for tax increases or spending cuts and raised inflationary expectations (1984a: 29). 
Consequently, from the late 1970s, the OECD urges its members to reduce their 
levels of debt, and fiscal consolidation -  or the control of state spending -  
becomes a central tenet of the OECD's advice.
The way in which the OECD frames its discussions of public debt reveals much 
about the assumptions incorporated in the ideas of its new paradigm that 
generally are not made explicit. While the organisation's general comments 
about debt levels superficially remain neutral, its justifications for its specific 
recommendations with regard to public debt reveal an underlying view of state- 
society relations in which the state is to do much less than it has in the past. This 
is clear in the discussion in Economic Outlook 37 (1985a), when the OECD claims 
that its analysis suggests 'no obvious policy rule' about the 'ideal' level of debt 
that is applicable to all countries; rather, it says, the 'appropriate' level of debt 
depends on many factors (1985a: 8). These include the implications of various 
taxation-borrowing policy mixes for income distribution and efficiency, 
considerations of inter-generational equity, behavioural characteristics of the 
economy (such as social choices about the size of public-private sectors), and 
specific institutional factors (1985a: 8). This statement suggests that the OECD is 
prepared to allow for a degree of latitude in the 'appropriate' level of public debt 
among its members. That is, the organisation appears to be prepared to respect 
the diversity of the 'worlds of welfare capitalism' within its membership.14 But 
the OECD's policy recommendations, which continue to urge members to reduce 
their debts and balance their budgets, do not appear to allow for such variation. 
It wants all of its members to work harder towards reducing budget deficits, 
saying progress has been 'less than it might have been, given the rate of growth' 
because some countries had chosen to increase spending rather than pay off debt 
(1989b: ix). Thus, the OECD may not have had an 'obvious policy rule' about the 
'ideal' and 'appropriate' level of debt, but it has a less-than-obvious one: the most 
appropriate level of debt is no debt.
14 For a discussion of the 'worlds of welfare capitalism', see Esping-Andersen (1990) and Castles 
and Mitchell (1993).
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The OECD uses the fear of future demands on government expenditure, 
especially those related to pensions and the health-care needs of ageing 
populations, to argue for the need for further strengthening of public finances 
(1997a: l).15 It contends that its members can best prepare for the social-security 
demands of their ageing populations by aiming for surpluses rather than small 
deficits or balances in government accounts (1989b: ix). For similar reasons, it 
argues that low debt ratios in normal times would ensure that unexpected shocks 
did not drive debt to 'critical levels' (1985a: 8). In the early 1990s, the 
organisation pushes governments to pursue 'further strengthening of public 
finances' -  that is, decrease indebtedness -  on a larger scale than in the 1980s so 
that they can cope with future expenditure claims without raising taxes or debt 
levels (1992b: 20). It urges governments to ensure that retrenchment is achieved 
and to examine the 'quality' of their spending, 'which may have deteriorated in 
the 1980s' (1992b: 20).
The OECD eventually begins to scold those members who have not pursued debt 
reduction with sufficient vigour. In the early 1990s, it warns that the slowdown 
in economic growth is likely to have a negative effect on government budget 
positions and the debt burden in most member countries as tax bases constrict 
and the cost of transfer programmes increases (1991a: 19). The organisation 
observes that those governments that had failed to take advantage of the 
expansion of the late 1980s to make deficit and debt reductions would now have 
to constrain debt increases during a period of slower growth (1991a: 20).16 It 
urges governments to use any gains from lower interest rates and reduced debt- 
service payments to improve budget positions, thereby:
avoiding the kind of mistake made in the late 1980s when some of the
expected buoyancy of public revenues ... was used to reduce tax rates
15 The fear of the burden of ageing populations is a constant theme throughout the 1980s and the 
1990s, and is reiterated each time the OECD wants to argue for reduced public debt and reduced 
public spending. See OECD (1985a: 8; 1987b: 24; 1988a: 74; 1992b: 24; 1995a: 15; 1995b: xiii; 
1996a: 25; 1996b: xi; 1997a: 1). The OECD's paradigm is categorical in its belief that ageing 
populations will be a problem. For example, in Economic Outlook 61 (1997a), the organisation 
states:'... in most countries, further progress [in fiscal consolidation] is necessary if the long­
standing upward trends in public indebtedness are to be reversed before the pressures that ageing 
populations will create are felt' (1997a: 1). However, as I noted in Chapter 2, footnote 36, others are 
less convinced of the pending crisis.
16 The OECD makes the same point in 2002 about the lack of action to 'bring budgets into surplus 
or at least close to balance' in the late 1990s, lamenting that in 'a number of countries the 
opportunity was lost' (2002b: 19).
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rather than to ensure greater fiscal consolidation and to reduce debt 
(1993a: xi).17
Ill) Public Spending is Bad for the Economy
The two new ideas outlined so far are inextricably linked to the third key idea of 
the new paradigm, that public spending is bad for the economy, in that reducing 
public spending is considered to be a crucial element in reducing both state 
intervention and public debt. The OECD interprets the desire to reduce public 
deficits, and, therefore, public borrowing, as entailing a need for governments to 
reduce public spending, particularly social spending (1981b: 22). Only rarely 
does the OECD target defence spending when discussing the need to reduce 
public spending. In Economic Outlook 46 (1989b), it comments that, with the 
reduction in East-West tensions, a 'scaling down' of defence spending could be 
possible, with either lower levels of spending or a shift of funds towards 
expenditures that 'may be increasing in importance', such as education, 
infrastructure and the environment (1989b: x). It reiterates this statement in 
Economic Outlook 47 (1990a: ix), but such thinking does not reappear after this 
time. In fact, in Economic Outlook 51 (1992a), it notes that 'relatively little offset 
can apparently be expected from the "peace dividend'" (1992a: x), although it 
comments in passing in Economic Outlook 60 (1996b) that 'reductions in defence 
spending were important in several countries' (1996b: 14). The point here is that 
the OECD itself does not recommend defence spending as an area to be targeted 
for funding reform. On public spending more generally, the organisation notes 
without being specific that, 'in some quarters', it was felt that increased public 
spending and tax-system changes had been 'to a degree, uncontrolled and 
haphazard, with possible costs in terms of allocative inefficiencies and 
disincentives' (1982b: 25). It claims that many countries have problems with 
public spending that exacerbate the problems of public debt. In particular, it 
argues, the rapid growth of 'various categories', including 'many items of social 
expenditure', has caused public sector deficits to become 'an overriding problem, 
despite increases in the tax burden and reductions in public sector investment'
I7 Again, it makes a similar complaint in 2002:
Overconfidence about the permanence of tax receipts coupled with overoptimistic 
growth projections (reminiscent of the mid-1970s and late 1980s) served to justify tax­
cutting and new spending initiatives. ... the room for new tax cuts is now limited or 
non-existent, especially where spending is being allowed to rise rapidly (2002b: 19).
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(1984a: 8). Rising interest obligations on public debt compound these problems 
(1984a: 8).
The OECD does not consider raising tax rates to be an option to balance public 
spending because it has long considered taxes to be a 'burden' on individuals 
and to cause distortions in the economy through, among other things, their 
effects on the incentives to invest and work. As early as Economic Outlook 13 
(1973a), the OECD noted that increasing tax 'burdens' raised problems with 
inflation, and that there were 'serious' economic and political constraints on 
'substantially raising the burden of taxation' (1973a: 18, 45; 1975b: 10). However, 
the Keynesian paradigm had allowed public borrowing and public debt to cover 
the shortfall between what could be taken in tax and what was spent. At this 
time, the OECD recognised the need for public spending, noting: 'On the 
expenditure side, the need for improving social infrastructure makes any 
compression of expenditure plans difficult' (1973a: 45).18 Later, the new 
paradigm's opposition to borrowing and debt, and the continued negative view 
of tax as a 'burden', inevitably results in an attack on public spending. Now, 
taxes are understood to have 'disincentive effects' on investment and labour 
supply (1981b: 25; 1984b: 23). Taxation is considered to distort private decision­
making unless taxes are broadly based and tax rates are low and uniform 
(1985b: 6). The OECD begins to urge members to reform their tax systems, 
querying the 'appropriateness' of governments' use of taxation to meet goals 
other than revenue raising, such as income redistribution or investment in 
regions with high unemployment (1985b: 6). It argues that political resistance to 
tax-rate increases, and the economic distortions that taxes create, limit the scope 
for taxation increases, which means the burden of fiscal consolidation has to fall 
on expenditure (1995a: xiv). As will be discussed later, these arguments for 
spending cuts rest on a significantly different understanding of state-society 
responsibilities.19
18 This is not to argue that the Keynesian paradigm allowed governments to be all care and no 
responsibility, because the OECD was concerned with tax rates. However, its economic concerns 
were intertwined with social and political concerns in a particular way. That is, while the OECD 
did not want to increase tax rates, nor did it want to abandon social concerns in order to lower tax 
rates. Hence, the acceptance of public debt and/or borrowing until the economy improved and 
fewer people needed state assistance.
19 I want to stress here that the point is not that the new paradigm introduces the concept of tax as 
a 'burden'. Rather, the paradigm's interpretation of how much of a burden taxpayers should bear 
is new and demonstrates a shift from a recognition of collective responsibility to an emphasis on
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The OECD argues that there are two broad thrusts to containing public 
spending:
First, governments can sharpen their focus on spending areas which 
involve the provision of classic 'public goods' (e.g. defence, law 
enforcement) or where other market failures or social policy goals 
require intervention (e.g. (education, health and social assistance). 
Withdrawal from less essential activities would allow the process of 
improving public finances to proceed without compromising 
fundamental economic or social goals.
Second, governments can aim to improve public management 
systems in order to 'do more with less'. This could be achieved by 
better identification of, and targeting of funding on, human or 
physical infrastructure projects with high benefit-cost ratios and by 
re-designing transfer programmes so as to enhance their social or 
economic benefits (1997a: 31).
Thus, the OECD combines its drive for decreased public spending with an 
emphasis on getting value for money when spending cannot be avoided.20 It 
advises that measures to reduce spending will be most effective when they 
combine 'credible and binding limits on expenditure with efforts to improve the 
efficiency of public activities' (1995a: xiv; 1989: x). That is, the OECD's aim is not 
only to cut spending, but also to assess how efficiently and effectively state 
money is being spent. In the 1990s, it notes that the quality of public spending 
had not improved over the 1980s, and it urges governments to pay more 
attention to reviewing spending and taxation. Again, the argument is not that 
'efficiency' or 'effectiveness' are new concepts, but that the understanding of 
what these terms mean has shifted according to the new paradigm's world-view.
individual self-responsibility. As noted in Chapter 3, ideas play a critical role in convincing the 
public what is (and is not) an acceptable tax 'burden' (see Rudd 1997: 263).
Today, the strength of the idea of tax as a 'burden' can drive governments to make seemingly 
paradoxical decisions -  decreasing tax rates at the same time as needing the money. For example, 
Australian Treasurer Peter Costello warned in February 2004 that Australians faced substantially 
higher taxes, large public spending cuts or massive budget deficits unless older workers stayed in 
the workforce longer (Wade 2004a). Yet the Coalition Government has cut taxes twice in the past 
five years, despite numerous discussions of the potential negative effects of Australia's ageing 
population, and there is talk of further reductions in the 2004 Budget as part of a bid to win back 
electoral momentum before the 2004 election (Wade 2004b).
20 For example, commenting on concerns about increasing inequality in income and wealth in its 
members countries, the OECD notes that one response could entail 'a further expansion of 
redistributional programmes' (1996b: 36). However, it adds a footnote to this 
statement: 'Alternatively, such programmes could be made more efficient, especially in the sense of 
reducing the disincentive effects they entail' (1996b; 41, fn 1). The OECD's negative view of income 
transfers as encouraging 'a "culture of dependency", weakening incentives to work, save and 
invest' (1996b: 36) will be discussed further below and in the next chapter.
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While the OECD is not specific about its understanding of 'efficiency' or 
'effectiveness' under the new paradigm, its arguments suggest that it now 
understands both in terms of cost-effectiveness and doing more for less money. 
The organisation argues that improving the quality of public spending is a 
'promising way for budgetary policy to support present and future economic 
activity without compromising fiscal consolidation' (1992b: xii), and is, therefore, 
likely to be more politically palatable than spending cuts. It notes 
that: 'Improving the efficiency and effectiveness of public expenditure implies 
ensuring more competition in the provision of public services and greater 
managerial autonomy' (1992b: 20). Thus, the organisation places its faith in 
market mechanisms, rather than direct state control, as a means to ensure 
efficient and effective public spending.
The OECD elaborates this thinking in Economic Outlook 54 (1993b) in a special 
chapter entitled, 'Some Measures to Improve the Quality of Government 
Spending' (1993b: 32-42). In this chapter, the OECD notes that public spending is 
increasing again, and argues that, if expenditure is to be stabilised or reduced, 
governments have to cut back on programmes, 'which is often difficult 
politically', or make resources go further (1993b: 32). The latter, it observes, has 
been referred to as improving the 'quality' of spending', and comprises both 
'reducing the cost of programmes as well as increasing their effectiveness at 
reaching their goals' (1993b: 32; emphasis added). In this chapter, the OECD 
focuses attention on the 'use of various market-type mechanisms', which it says 
are 'particularly relevant as means of improving performance in the provision of 
public and merit goods' (1993b: 32).21 It later describes 'market mechanisms' as 
including charging for the provision of services ('user-pays') and contracting out 
the provision of services to the private sector (1995a: 13). This raises immediate 
problems for the OECD's argument, because, by their nature, both public and 
merit goods are difficult to subject to such 'market-type mechanisms'. The 
OECD had acknowledged this earlier, in Economic Outlook 11 (1972a), when it 
noted 'the absence (and to a large extent inapplicability) of a market price 
mechanism to limit demand and serve as an incentive to efficiency' in areas such 
as health and education (1972a: 91-92).
21 Public goods are goods such as clean air or defence that, even if consumed by one person, can 
still be consumed by another. Merit goods are those such as education and health that society 
thinks everyone ought to have, regardless of whether they are wanted by each individual. See 
Begg et al. (1987: 340-344).
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Throughout the 1990s, the OECD continues to argue that 'governance and 
management' reforms would help to ensure both that government programmes 
were 'responsive to social needs' and that the public received the 'best possible 
services at the least cost' (1996a: xiii). It describes New Zealand as a 'leading 
example' of reforms to 'improve the efficiency and effectiveness of all forms of 
public spending', noting that it has introduced initiatives to:
reverse trends towards public expenditures with low or negative 
social returns, and to get better 'value for public money' in areas of 
high social priority such as health and education (1992b: xiii).
The OECD then argues that its members have 'significant possibilities to reduce 
costs and to improve responsiveness to people's needs' (1992b: xiii).22 The 
emphasis of its new paradigm is on the increased use of market mechanisms and 
competition to reduce public spending (see OECD 1992b: 20; 1993b: 35; 
1995a: 13). Thus, the organisation recommends that countries take advantage of 
the 'considerable scope' for increasing public-sector efficiency, including 
charging for the provision of services, and contracting out the provision of 
services to the private sector (1995a: 13).
An example of this thinking can be seen in Economic Outlook 56 (1994b) when the 
OECD notes that the Secretariat's recent work provides some 'pointers' to the 
specific forms that corrective action to improve public finances could take. These 
forms include increasing the 'micro efficiency' of government programmes and 
services, the introduction of 'market-type instruments' such as user charging, 
'market testing', contracting out and the creation of internal markets, and policy 
actions to reduce the burden of future pension liabilities on public finances 
(1994b: xiv). It should be noted here, and will be explored further in the next 
chapter, that the OECD expects such reforms to face obstacles because spending 
reform such as that outlined 'confronts entrenched expectations and perceptions 
of acquired rights and implicit social contracts' (1994b: xiii). Additional measures 
that the OECD suggests will 'improve overall market efficiency' and decrease 
public spending include cutting industrial and agricultural subsidies, pursuing
22 What the OECD fails to recognise here, of course, is that the interpretation of 'needs' varies 
according to a number a factors, including the framework through which policy problems and 
solutions are interpreted. I suggest that the OECD's understanding of 'needs' has shifted in line 
with its new paradigm and is significantly different to the way it understood 'needs' when using a 
Keynesian framework. These issues will be explored in Chapter 6.
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further privatisation, and reassessing social transfers (1995a: 15).23 That is, 
governments should withdraw from 'less essential activities' and should improve 
public management systems in order to 'do more with less' (1997a: 31).
IV) The Public Sector is Bad for the Economy
The fourth key idea of the OECD's new paradigm reinforces the three outlined so 
far. The concern about the effect on the economy of direct state intervention and 
high levels of both public debt and public spending is attached to an associated 
underlying concern that has significant implications for the OECD's treatment of 
social issues: that the public sector itself has become too big. Looking at 
measures to improve economic performance in Economic Outlook 29 (1981a), the 
OECD notes the 'size of the public sector and its deficit' as a key area of concern, 
and argues for a 'public sector of appropriate size and structure' (1981a: 10, 8). 
That is, the Keynesian paradigm's recommended direct state intervention to 
manipulate economic outcomes, 'instead of being stabilising, has frequently had 
the opposite effect', and 'in the process, the public sector has got too big' 
(1981b: 6). Consequently, the OECD argues, many governments were trying to 
reduce public sector deficits, 'as well as ... the size and obtrusiveness of government' 
(1981b: 6; emphasis added). The OECD urges members to pay more attention, 
not only to spending and taxation, but also to public-sector management in order 
to 'improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector' (1993a: xvi; 
1992b: xiii). It recommends to members that:
Each of the main activities of the public sector should be reviewed 
systematically with a view to identifying efficiency gains both within 
in and across them (1993a: xvi).
The aim of the OECD's recommended reform is not only 'reducing distortions to 
incentives to work, save and invest by broadening tax bases while reducing
23 The latter, a particular concern of the OECD, will be discussed further in the next chapter. Here, 
however, it is worth noting the OECD's comments that a growth of transfer programmes, both to 
the working-age and the old-age population, accounts for much of the increase in public spending 
in most OECD countries (1995b: xii). For this reason, it targets welfare systems for reform, arguing 
that such systems:
could be better targeted to individuals in need if eligibility requirements were tighter; 
work-testing of the unemployed and the disabled was more effective; means-testing 
was more effective; programme co-ordination was improved; and integration of 
benefit and tax systems was better (1995a: 15).
A continuing theme of the OECD is that the reform of transfer schemes should focus on ways to 
'improve market incentives' (1995b: xiii).
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marginal rates', but also 'improving the efficiency of government itself' 
(1993b: xii).
In this sense, the new paradigm treats problems with the size of the public sector 
in the same way that it treats the size of public debt, borrowing, and 
spending: solutions are to be found in the market. The OECD recommends that 
members look more to the market and to the application of market mechanisms 
to public sector tasks where these cannot be shifted to the private sector. The 
increased use of the market includes the privatisation of state-owned assets 
(where possible), 'contracting out' the provision of public-sector tasks to the 
private sector, and charging for the provision of services ('user pays'). 
Privatisation is seen to be 'part of the general move towards greater reliance on 
market forces and a reduced role for the state' (1986b: 14). However, it can also 
mean a change in practices, with the withdrawal of subsidies and the elimination 
of non-commercial objectives 'improving! efficiency substantially' (1986b: 14) 24 
The organisation understands that a smaller role for the state has the effect of 
both reducing the size of the public sector and reducing the state's interference 
with the working of the market. Thus, it is clear that the OECD's understanding 
of the 'appropriate' size of the public sector is a public sector that is much 
smaller. In addition, the OECD understands the opening of the public sector to 
competition to have the effect of forcing state providers to become more efficient. 
That is, the OECD argues that: 'the efficiency of public sector agencies is likely to 
improve through an effective "threat" of competition from outside', although the 
agencies need to be run on a 'commercial footing in order to get the full benefit' 
(1993b: 35). Later, in Economic Outlook 66 (1999b), the OECD complains that, in 
most member countries, the public sector 'remains largely sheltered from the 
disciplining forces of competition ... though some countries have made progress 
in improving public-sector efficiency' (1999b: 31). The OECD's argument, then, is 
that privatisation and the use of market mechanisms are 'intended to let
24 Of course, the aspect that the OECD overlooks with this recommendation is that the state may 
engage in activities to meet 'non-commercial objectives' in order to supply goods and services that 
the market cannot supply or only at a prohibitive cost. That is, this argument places efficiency 
above all other considerations as to why the state may be engaged in meeting 'non-commercial 
objectives'.
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competitive pressures promote improvements in resource allocation and, 
consequently, in overall economic performance' (1986b: 14).25
The stress on reviewing the efficiency of public spending is inextricably linked to 
the need to review the public sector itself. In its special chapter on improving the 
quality of public spending, the OECD notes that its review is 'deliberately 
selective', given that improving the quality of spending is 'only one element' in 
the broader issue of 'improving the quality of government' (1993b: 32; emphasis 
added). It observes that other elements include strengthening the processes used 
to determine when governments should intervene, the form of such 
interventions, and whether current programmes meet government objectives in 
the most 'cost-effective' manner. The OECD explains that such topics, 'while 
crucially important', are also 'highly complex'. For this reason, it says, its chapter 
focuses more selectively on topics that, 'while not simple, may point more readily 
to specific policy actions' such as the application of 'market-type mechanisms' 
(1993b: 32). Later, it urges that reforms to the structure of spending be included 
as part of a 'wider effort' to improve the 'performance of the government sector 
more generally' (1996a: xiii). However, as will be discussed below, the point 
being overlooked here is the effect of the new paradigm on the assessments of 
what states can and should do. A crucial aspect of determining 'when 
government interventions are required' (1993b:32) is the framework through 
which state roles and actions are interpreted. In a similar vein, the assessments 
of whether programmes meet government objectives depend critically on the 
framework determining how the objectives are to be understood and what the 
assessment criteria will be.
A New Transformation
As discussed in Chapter 2, a new paradigm brings with it a new understanding 
of how the world works that carries with it a new interpretation of policy 
problems and the range of viable solutions. In Kuhn's terms, there is a new 'view 
of the field ... methods and ... goals' (1970: 85). The policy justifications of the 
old paradigm are no longer acceptable (or comprehensible) because they are 
interpreted through the new paradigm's replacement 'regime of truth', which
25 Again, there are aspects to state provision that the OECD is overlooking. It may be that the 
agency is supplying a good or service to which competitive practices are not applicable, which is 
why it has to be supplied in the public sector in the first place.
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sets out how the world works, what can be considered a policy problem (or 
solution), and what the state can and/or should do. That is, the discussion of 
policy issues within the new paradigm is comprehensible, and the policy options 
are plausible and credible, in a way that discussions according to the precepts of 
the former (and alternative) paradigms are not, at least to the holders of the new 
dominant paradigm. Thus, the OECD's new neo-liberal paradigm incorporates a 
framework for interpreting policy problems and solutions that renders 
Keynesian interpretations obsolete; they are not only 'inadequate and 
inappropriate' (Beeson and Firth 1998: 220), they are incomprehensible.
Under the new paradigm, as Barry Hindess observes, 'the distinction between 
the economy and other aspects of the life of the national community is less clear- 
cut' (1998: 223). That is, Hindess argues, whereas the economy was once seen to 
provide resources for the national state and society, an 'extravagant state and 
society' are now seen to 'undermin[ej efficient national economic performance' 
(1998: 223). In response, the neo-liberal paradigm demands that 'society and the 
state must be transformed to make them contribute to the drive for economic 
efficiency' (Beeson and Firth 1998: 221), or, as Hindess notes:
The pursuit of national economic security now seems to require that 
an overwhelming priority be placed on competitive economic 
efficiency. As a result, anything (welfare, health services, schooling 
and higher education) which might seem to have a bearing on 
economic life is assessed not only in Jterms of the availability of 
resources, but also in terms of their consequences for promoting or 
inhibiting the pursuit of national economic efficiency.
Thus, in what is often seen as an 'economic rationalist' or 'neo-liberal' 
attack on the welfare state, the concern is not simply to save money 
but also to promote more efficient patterns of individual and 
organisational behaviour by bringing market relationships into what 
had once been regarded as non-market spheres of allocation 
(1998: 223).
The result, as Beeson and Firth observe, is that neo-liberal ideas bring 'increased 
pressure to make relationships based on bureaucratic norms or ideas of the 
common good meet the standards of efficiency that are believed to characterise 
the impersonal forces of supply and demand' (1998: 221). Thus, the 'image of the 
market becomes the ideal' in all relationships, with 'governments and businesses 
... [increasingly] attempting to promote and inculcate specific "enterprising" 
values in the population at large' (Rose 1992, cited in Beeson and Firth 1998: 221).
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That is, Beeson and Firth argue, neo-liberalism attempts to 'enhance economic 
competitiveness by reconstituting not only national institutions but also the 
population itself (1998: 221). The result, then, is a transformation in state-society 
relations and the understanding of state-society roles and responsibilities that 
matches the earlier transformation of relations, roles, and responsibilities that 
occurred under the Keynesian paradigm. As will be discussed in detail in the 
next chapter, this transformation challenges the notion of path dependency that 
some scholars advance, and suggests that institutions are not as resistant to 
change as some academics believe.
Beeson and Firth conclude that the 'remarkable rise and consolidation of a 
neoliberal political rationality [way of thinking about government] has rapidly 
come to shape our "common sense" understanding of the world, and is ... all the 
more powerful for that reason' (1998: 229). An important point here, as noted in 
Chapter 2, is that a dominant paradigm is embedded in the terminology that 
policy-makers use to communicate, and 'it is influential precisely because so 
much of it is taken for granted and unamenable to scrutiny as a whole' (Flail 
1993: 279). A key element of the neo-liberal paradigm that is taken for granted is 
its new view of state-society relations and individuals. The paradigm 
incorporates a particular understanding of state-society relations and state- 
individual roles and responsibilities, as well as a particular understanding of 
individuals and their behaviour, that is seldom made explicit but which 
underpins and structures the interpretation of policy problems and solutions. 
These understandings are revealed in the OECD's discourse in the way in which 
it discusses state and individual activities. Broadly speaking, they are that:
• the state is doing too much (stultifying the economy) and individuals too 
little (crippling the state and undermining the economy); thus, the state 
should do less and individuals should do more, and
• individuals are rational self-interested maximisers, who make choices in 
response to incentives and disincentives.
According to these views of state-society relations and behaviour, the cause of 
many policy problems can be traced to the impediments that state and individual 
behaviour impose on the operation of the market.
We should recall here from the four key ideas outlined above that the OECD 
considers that high levels of spending and public deficits have negative effects on
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the economy that the increased use of the market would avoid. The organisation 
contends that, where governments consider that they have no choice but to stay 
involved in the provision of goods and services, they should examine the 
efficiency and effectiveness of their spending to ensure that they are receiving 
value for money. These arguments to decrease public spending, increase 
efficiency in spending, and increase the use of the market inexorably lead to 
arguments that governments cannot, and should not, do as much as they have in 
the past. According to the OECD, governments cannot afford to intervene 
directly in their economies; since such intervention is also bad for their 
economies, governments should, therefore, reconsider their involvement. In 
addition, governments need to be aware of the way that individuals respond to 
state actions and should base their policy options on a recognition of the way that 
individuals choose those options whereby they gain the most for the least effort 
expended. For example, the OECD argues in Economic Outlook 55 (1994a) that 
unemployment and related benefit systems had lowered work incentives, which 
meant that:
To limit disincentive effects ... countries should legislate for only 
moderate levels of benefit, maintain effective checks on eligibility, 
and guarantee places on active programmes as a substitute for paying 
passive income support indefinitely. Possibilities should be explored 
for making the transition from income support to work more 
financially attractive ... (1994a: 4).
The understanding of individual behaviour on which these recommendations are 
predicated is that individuals choose to remain on benefits rather than work, 
even when they are not entitled to benefits, but they can be encouraged back into 
the work force if benefits are kept low and eligibility checks raise the possibility 
of their being caught cheating. The state's manipulation of incentives and 
disincentives to encourage particular types of behaviour will be discussed further 
below.
The shift in approach to a focus on the market, and the problems of inappropriate 
state intervention and individual behaviour, shifts the notion of responsibility for 
policy problems and solutions. That is, the emphasis on the need to decrease the 
size and role of the public sector in order to reduce spending reflects a shift in the 
OECD's understanding of state responsibilities. If the state is to do less and the 
market is to do more, then the responsibility for outcomes can no longer rest with 
the state. Rather, the OECD urges governments to entrust outcomes to
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individuals acting for themselves in the market. This move has significant 
implications for its treatment of social justice, namely a shift in focus from 
equality in outcome to equality in opportunity, which will be explored in the 
next chapter. Here, the point is that the net effect of a paradigm shift is a new 
way of thinking about policy problems and solutions as well as a new way of 
thinking about government, the nature and scope of legitimate authority, and 
who is to be governed and how.
As noted in Section I: 'Direct state intervention is bad for the economy' above, 
none of this is to argue that the limitations that the new paradigm imposes on the 
state demand a non-interventionist state (as opposed to the Keynesian 
interventionist state). Such a view is too simplistic. The reality is more 
sophisticated: the OECD's neo-liberal paradigm is about intervention of a 
particular kind -  that which creates the right conditions for the free market and 
the right behaviours to ensure the smooth operations of the market. The right 
conditions for the operation of the free market include, as noted above, the state 
removing impediments infringing on the natural functioning ('animal spirits') of 
the market, such as minimum wages that hinder employment and create the 
wrong incentives for individual behaviour. For example, the organisation notes 
that, in the labour market, 'in this as in other areas of policy, greater reliance on 
markets does not at all imply a passive or inert role for government' (1984a: 11). 
Rather, governments are expected to set and enforce the rules by which the 
market operates. That said, for the purposes of my argument, I am not interested 
in the particulars of how the OECD envisages the market operating or the 
specific recommendations it urges members to pursue to achieve this vision. My 
interest is in the justifications the OECD offers when it recommends that states 
undertake interventions that are understood to encourage specific types of 
individual behaviour. These justifications reveal the OECD's new understanding 
of individuals as rational self-interested maximisers who can be encouraged via 
the manipulation of incentives and disincentives to become self-sufficient 
'economic agents' and to 'accept changes in work and, perhaps, life styles' 
(1980b: 11).
The OECD's discussions of 'active' versus 'passive' state intervention reveal 
many of these justifications. Throughout the 1990s, the OECD continually 
exhorts member governments to provide 'active' rather than 'passive' support,
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where 'active' is understood as the state requiring an individual to undertake 
training or work in return for a benefit and 'passive' is the payment of benefits 
without such requirements. As the OECD notes in Economic Outlook 52 
(1992b), given 'high and rising unemployment', governments need to consider:
the reorientation of public expenditures away from 'passive' policies 
of paying out unemployment benefits and associated income 
transfers towards 'active' labour-market policies geared to improving 
job prospects for the unemployed (1992b: xiii).26
The organisation argues that, 'active labour-market policies could raise 
employment, thereby reducing poverty and the need for passive income support' 
(1997b: 58). It notes that the benefits of such 'active' policies are that they give 
individuals the right attitudes and skills to move off benefits and into work. 
Thus, in Economic Outlook 59 (1996a), it states that 'active' labour market policies 
'could help to reduce unemployment by preparing the unemployed for jobs 
through training, by helping them find work, and by testing availability for 
work' (1996a: 45). The manipulation of behaviour involved in these policies will 
be canvassed below. Here, the point is that the OECD's promulgation of such 
'active' policies reflects the new understanding of state-society relations. That is, 
the new paradigm does not necessarily make the state less responsible for its 
citizens; rather, the understanding of responsibility has changed such that the 
duty of the state now is to ensure that its citizens are self-responsible, self-reliant, 
active market participants. In this sense, the state has moved from a direct 
responsibility to an indirect responsibility for its citizens. The result of this new 
view of state-society relations is new types of policies in which state intervention 
is confined to manipulating incentives to get individuals to do more for 
themselves (mainly through work).
These underlying assumptions of the new paradigm manifest themselves in the 
discourse (the 'frames and names') used to discuss policy problems and viable 
solutions. Two exemplars are the language of obligation and responsibility and 
the language of incentives and disincentives, which are predicated on a 
particular understanding of the world and individual behaviour (noted above) 
that is assumed, but seldom made explicit. These assumptions underpin a
26 Note here that, despite arguing for a form of 'active' state intervention, the OECD is careful to 
observe that: 'expanding these forms of public spending would require matching expenditure cuts 
in other areas' (1992b: xiii).
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particular range of policy options that are built on the new understanding of 
roles and responsibilities and that act to create behaviour of an accepted kind. 
For example, looking at the language of obligation and responsibility, it is clear 
that the policy point at issue when this discourse is used is that of individual, 
rather than state, obligations, and the actions that states must take to get 
individuals to recognise their responsibilities and behave accordingly. Thus, the 
OECD frames many of its discussions about unemployment and state-supplied 
benefits in terms of self-interested individuals who want to accept hand-outs 
from the state, rather than work, and who need to be reminded of their 
obligations and responsibilities to look after themselves.27 Hence, in Economic 
Outlook 50 (1991b), the OECD notes in a discussion of 'active' labour market 
policies that:
For these programmes to work, the now widely recognised 
disincentive effects of 'passive' income support, and especially of 
high and long-lasting unemployment benefits without an obligation to 
accept employment, need to be tackled (1991b: xi; emphasis added).
In a similar vein, in Economic Outlook 64 (1998b), it discusses policy lessons 
regarding those on low incomes and argues for: 'better monitoring to ensure that 
individuals receiving assistance shoulder their part of the responsibility for a return 
to work and increased self-sufficiency' (1998b: 18; emphasis added). An 
important point to note here is that the 'frame' (or 'problematisation') is that of 
the obligation to be self-responsible and the 'mutual' obligation to take nothing 
without recognising that something is owed in return.28 It is not about the 
obligation to help one's fellow citizens. That is, it is about self-responsibility, not 
collective responsibility or direct state responsibility.
Turning briefly to the other exemplar, the language of incentives and 
disincentives, here, too, the frames are based on an understanding of self- 
interested individuals whose behaviour and actions can be modified and 
manipulated through the options with which they are presented. A central 
concern of the OECD when it uses this language is that 'generous' state benefits,
27 Of course, the OECD is not the only user of this frame. The British Labour Party's 2001 
manifesto has Prime Minister Tony Blair promising to 'refashion the welfare state on the basis of 
rights and responsibilities, with people helped to help themselves, not just given handouts' 
(2001:3).
28 In the words of British Prime Minister Tony Blair, 'For every right we enjoy, we owe 
responsibilities. ... You can take but you give too' (cited in Deacon 2000:11).
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and the tax 'burdens' needed to pay for them, tempt people to stay on state- 
provided welfare. That is, they provide an incentive for people to claim benefits 
and a disincentive for people to find work. Thus, in Economic Outlook 59 (1996a), 
the OECD warns that:
in many cases, the design and generosity of transfer systems, as well 
as the taxes needed to pay for them, have undermined economic 
incentives, including the incentives to work, to hire workers and to 
acquire skills (1996a: xii).
Later in this edition, it argues that:
there is a wide consensus that the generosity of unemployment and 
other social benefits, in terms of both duration and level, raises 
structural unemployment by reducing the incentive to find and keep 
a job (1996a: 44).29
This theme is reiterated time and again throughout the 1990s.30 For example, in 
Economic Outlook 60 (1996b), the OECD cautions that, '[w]here efforts are made to 
reduce inequality', it is important that governments 'focus on measures that do 
not negatively affect employment opportunities or work incentives' (1996b: 21). 
In Economic Outlook 62 (1997b), it argues that, 'generous unemployment benefits 
distort labour-market behaviour', and goes on to observe that, 'in practice, it can 
be difficult to identify those who are "genuinely" unemployed (in the sense of 
not working but being available for work)' (1997b: 58).
The OECD's understanding, then, is that, rather than providing a temporary 
solution to unemployment, benefits have eroded work incentives for individuals
20 It offers this conclusion when suggesting reforms, despite noting in the previous sentence in this 
edition that 'evidence is mixed and there is still room for disagreement about the empirical 
importance of specific policy measures' (1996a: 44). It adds in a footnote to this chapter that there 
'seems to be accumulating evidence' from countries that had been 'particularly active in pursuing 
labour market reform', such as New Zealand and the United Kingdom, that structural 
unemployment had fallen (1996a: 56, fn 3).
Meanwhile, in explaining its argument, it notes that its publication, Making Work Pay (1997d), 
addresses the benefit-unemployment issue in details, recommending that:
benefits should not be excessively generous; low wage work should not be highly 
taxed; job search should be effectively policed for those receiving unemployment 
benefit; benefits not related to employment should be restricted to those entitled to 
them ... support programmes and their financing should be made more transparent, 
so workers and tax payers can better assess them; and incentives for part-time work 
and for work by spouses of the unemployed should be maintained (1996a: 44).
30 See OECD (1991b: 39; 1992a: xi; 1995b: xiii, 25; 1996a: xiii, 25, 51; 1996b: xiii, 36, 41; 1997a: 19; 
1997b: 51; 1998a: 36, 37, 159; 1999a: 159; 1999b: 158).
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and have become disincentives for people to work to support themselves. It 
considers the economic result to be soaring public debts and increased tax 
'burdens' on workers in order to pay for escalating public spending as more and 
more people choose not to work, but instead, to claim unemployment and related 
benefits. The OECD places the blame for this squarely on self-interested 
individual behaviour, noting that 'large parts of budgets are determined by 
behavioural response to the incentives created by the tax and transfer system' 
(1997a: 19).31 According to the OECD, 'generous' state transfers exacerbate 
economic problems. The solution, therefore, is to limit the state's role, shifting 
more responsibility on to the individual, who will respond to the 'disincentive' of 
a lower, or non-existent, benefit by changing the bad behaviour (living off the 
state) for good behaviour (finding work and becoming self-sufficient).32 A 
crucial point that must be made here -  one that is relevant also to the examples in 
the previous paragraph -  is that the OECD's arguments appear to be based on an 
understanding that most, if not all, unemployment is voluntary. That is, 
unemployment is a result of choice (individuals choose not to work), rather than 
a dearth of jobs. The 'problematisation' of unemployment as a policy issue, then, 
is as a problem of individual behaviour (choosing not to work) that can be 
resolved through providing the incentives for appropriate behaviour (choosing 
work and, thus, self-sufficiency).
31 This view is summarised in a comment in Economic Outlook 50 (1991b):
Cross-country analysis suggests that more generous unemployment benefit systems 
-  as measured by high 'replacement rates' (the ratio of benefits to previous earnings 
in employment), few pressures on the unemployed to accept available job offers and 
relatively open-ended duration of benefits -  prolonged the duration of 
unemployment, even though the relationship [between benefit level and 
unemployment] is not a simple one (1991b: 39).
32 Hartley Dean reports interesting work from Shane Doheny on the British New Labour 
government's construction of citizens who fit within this type of frame (Doheny 2004, cited in Dean 
2004: 73-74). Doheny has studied the government's press releases and advertising materials and 
argues that it constructs four kinds of citizens:
• recalcitrant citizens, who are artful and disobedient, and who wilfully cheat the welfare system 
without regard for the consequences
• passive citizens, who are overly dependent on state provision, apathetic, and unnecessarily 
risk averse, and who need to be guided in the right direction
• good citizens, who may be responsible, but who need to be persuaded to detach themselves 
from inefficient state systems, and
• heroic citizens, who are autonomous and responsible risk-takers, and who are willing to 
provide for their own welfare.
I would argue that the OECD's depiction of individuals falls into extremely similar categories, but a 
more specific investigation is outside the scope of my thesis. Doheny's work suggests an 
interesting topic for further research.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that a paradigm shift from Keynesianism to what 
can be described as neo-liberalism has occurred in the framework of ideas within 
which the OECD locates its more specific policy analyses. This shift occurred 
when the OECD lost faith in the ability of its Keynesian paradigm to explain an 
increasing number of policy problems and to offer viable solutions. It turned to a 
new set of ideas, based on a particular version of the supply-side -  that which 
favours less direct state intervention, less tax, and so on. The new paradigm 
brings a new understanding of the world and its constituent policy problems and 
solutions, and is based on a new 'regime of truth' according to which the market, 
and not the state, offers the best solutions to policy problems. Under the new 
paradigm, previously accepted policy actions are now considered to be part of 
the problem; thus, direct state intervention, public debt, public borrowing, and 
the public sector itself are all bad for the economy. As a result, the new 
paradigm gives primacy to the economic over the social because it understands 
that the former will eventually satisfactorily resolve policy problems in the latter. 
The new paradigm also brings with it a new understanding of state-society 
relations, roles, and responsibilities, according to which the state should do less 
for its citizens and individuals should do more for themselves. Both views (the 
primacy of market and the new vision of state-society relations, roles, and 
responsibilities) have implications for the OECD's understanding and treatment 
of social justice and related issues.
The OECD's new attitudes and understandings are clear in the discourse it uses 
to discuss policy problems and solutions. The examples given in this chapter 
reveal the importance of the OECD's discourse (in terms of 'frames and names') 
to conveying the taken-for-granted assumptions of the paradigm (that is, that the 
state is doing too much and individuals too little). The discourse and its 
'problematisations' outline the paradigm's understanding of policy problems and 
incorporate (often implicit) justifications for the pursuit of particular types of 
policies. The dominant paradigm's discourse becomes the accepted language for 
policy discussions and for communicating acceptable policy problems and 
solutions to the public; it is the 'regime of truth' under which alternative 
conceptions of problems and solutions are incomprehensible. Returning briefly 
to the discussion of ideas in Chapter 2, a paradigm's discourse is an internal 
element that adds to the influence of the ideas. That is, responding to Blyth's
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query as to 'how or why certain ideas come to be accepted over others' 
(19973:237), the argument here is that the discourse carries with it a set of 
implicit assumptions and rationalisations for actions. As policy-makers 
increasingly use the discourse to discuss the paradigm's interpretation of policy 
issues and to promulgate its solutions to the public, the ideas pass 'from 
academic debate to popular consciousness' (1997a: 237). In this way, 'madmen in 
authority' distil the ideas of 'some academic scribbler' and pass them on to the 
public. The new ideas carry with them new informal institutions based on the 
new understanding of state-society relations, roles, and responsibilities that are 
transferred to the public through the discourse. The result of the talk of the state 
doing too much, public spending being too high, the public sector being too big, 
individuals becoming 'dependent' on 'generous' benefits and so on, is a new 
picture of how much the state is prepared to do (and for whom) and how much 
individuals should do for themselves. An inevitable consequence of this revised 
picture is a new understanding of social justice and related issues. As the next 
chapter will explore in detail, Keynesian ideas related to social justice are not 
embedded as firmly in institutions, especially informal institutions, as some 
scholars claim.
Chapter 6
Social Justice in the OECD's 
Ideas and Institutions
Introduction
A striking feature of the OECD's discussions in its biannual Economic 
j l V  Outlook from the mid-1990s is the linking of social and economic goals in 
ways not considered for two decades or so. Whereas, from the mid-1970s, the 
OECD had talked solely of economic outcomes, from the mid-1990s, it begins to 
refer to the need for policy to achieve 'fundamental economic and social goals' 
and to realise aspirations for 'economic and social well-being' (1994a: ix; 1994b: xi; 
emphasis added).1 Equally noticeable in the later papers is an expansion in the 
range of social issues considered within the organisation's economic 
commentary. While the OECD once discussed social issues mainly in terms of 
poverty alleviation, equality, and distribution, from the mid-1990s, it augments 
these with talk of social cohesion, exclusion and marginalisation. It discusses its 
fears that, in the new 'global economy', growing numbers of people in its 
member countries are missing out on the new prosperity because of poverty, 
unemployment, a lack of education, ill health or a combination of such factors. 
Whatever the disadvantage, these individuals are increasingly 'excluded' or 
'marginalised' from taking a full and active part in society. Ultimately, the 
OECD comments, this could result in the 'unravelling of the social fabric,
1 It notes its members' fears for the effect of structural reforms and fiscal retrenchment on economic 
and social gains and policy, their fears that increasing income inequality will adversely affect social 
and economic outcomes, and its own concern that unemployment is a 'major economic and social 
problem'. See OECD (1996a: 50; 1997a: 31; 1996b: 21; 1999a: 141; and 1998a: 8; emphasis added).
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including a loss of authority of the democratic system' as 'social cohesion' is 
eroded (1994a: 3; 1996b: 36).
Both moves -  the linking of social and economic goals and the expanded range of 
social concerns -  could suggest that the OECD is now more concerned with social 
outcomes than it has been for many years, and that it understands social issues 
more holistically than it once did. For example, if the OECD considers that 
poverty and inequality 'marginalise' some to the point of threatening 'social 
cohesion', then the organisation may focus more attention on policies to resolve 
the myriad factors that can lead to poverty and inequality. However, a closer 
examination reveals that the picture is not as simple as it appears. Undoubtedly, 
the OECD is focusing more attention on the connections between social and 
economic goals than it has at any time since the mid-1970s, and, equally, the 
OECD has expanded the range of matters it is prepared to consider under the 
rubric of 'social' issues. That said, this increased emphasis on social issues must 
be understood in the context of the shift in the paradigm (or the framework of 
ideas) within which the organisation locates its analyses of policy problems and 
solutions.
As outlined in the previous chapter, an examination of the Economic Outlook 
reveals a clear shift in the framework of ideas within which the OECD locates its 
policy analyses, with Keynesian demand management abandoned in the mid- to 
late-1970s for what the OECD calls a 'supply-side' approach, which emphasises a 
limited role for the state and expanded roles for the market and individual 
initiative. This new paradigm changes the OECD's understanding of the world, 
the way it works, its constituent policy problems, and the plausible solutions to 
these problems. It rejects the Keynesian paradigm's key assumption that markets 
fail in some areas, and the associated assumption that it is a state responsibility to 
intervene directly to correct such failures, because it no longer understands the 
world to work in this way. Rather, it understands that it is the unencumbered 
market that will achieve high growth, employment, and increased living 
standards, but only if governments constrain themselves to setting the conditions 
by which the market can operate most effectively. This includes the state 
ensuring that individuals behave in an appropriate manner. According to the 
new world-view, the cause of many policy problems can be traced to the 
impediments that state and individual behaviour impose on the operation of the
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market. Thus, under the new paradigm, previously accepted policy actions are 
now considered to be part of the problem: direct state intervention, public debt, 
public borrowing, and the public sector itself are all bad for the economy. The 
new task for the state, then, is to reduce its direct interventions in the economy 
and, instead, focus on setting the rules governing market interactions and on 
encouraging individuals to change their behaviour and become active market 
participants.
The previous chapter also noted that the OECD presents its new 'supply-side' 
paradigm as an inevitable, unproblematic -  and non-political -  response to what 
it perceives is the failure of Keynesian policies to resolve serious economic 
problems. However, Boix's work examining supply-side strategies suggests that 
this claim can be contested. Accordingly, I argued in the previous chapter that 
the OECD has pursued the conservative (or right-wing) strand of supply-side 
theory, rejecting state intervention and looking to achieve economic growth 
through less state spending and lower taxes, regardless of the distributive 
consequences. This is not to argue that the OECD opposes equality; rather, the 
organisation rejects state intervention to achieve this end because it understands 
intervention to damage the market mechanisms underpinning growth. The 
OECD accepts any equality that arises out of market interaction as, in Boix's 
words, 'a sign of the "good" behavior of markets (in rewarding, say, efforts and 
skills over time)' (1998: 5). I use Boix's language here because the OECD uses this 
discourse of 'efforts and skills' when framing and naming the social aspects and 
implications of its economic and social policies. It is both the policies that the 
OECD suggests and, importantly, the discourse with which it makes its 
recommendations that reveal that the OECD's dominant paradigm is the 
conservative supply-side strategy.
Not only is the move to this paradigm more political than it appears (in terms of 
the content of the framework), it is also more problematic than it appears in terms 
of its effects on previously accepted goals. (I reiterate here that I am not 
examining the politics of the selection of this paradigm over others, which is 
outside the scope of this thesis.) The OECD's shift to its version of the supply- 
side approach has significant implications for the organisation's treatment of 
social justice and related issues, and inevitably changes its approach to both old 
(poverty and [redistribution) and new (exclusion and marginalisation) concerns.
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The new framework for interpreting policy problems and solutions incorporates 
several ideas and assumptions that both undermine many of the accepted 
methods for achieving social goals and change what can considered to be 
acceptable or 'legitimate' social objectives. As outlined in the previous chapter, 
explicit assumptions include the need to limit the role of the state by decreasing 
state intervention and reducing public debt and public spending, all of which are 
considered to impede the efficient functioning of the economy. However, these 
ideas incorporate two important implicit assumptions:
• that there is a need to shift the balance between public and private 
responsibilities in order to decrease state responsibility and increase 
individual responsibility, and
• that individuals are rational, self-interested maximisers, who look to obtain 
whatever advantages they can for themselves.
These assumptions reflect a considerably different interpretation of state-society 
relations, roles, and responsibilities that in turn affects the range of policy options 
that may be pursued. The policy justifications of the old paradigm are no longer 
acceptable (or comprehensible) because they are interpreted through the new 
paradigm's replacement 'regime of truth', which sets out how the world works, 
what can be considered a policy problem (or solution), and what the state can 
and/or should do. For example, under the new paradigm, if the state's 
responsibility is to be limited because individuals are expected to be more self- 
responsible, then policies that reduce direct state intervention, and therefore 
spending (and the taxes and increased public debt needed to pay for that 
spending), are justified. In a similar vein, if state transfers are considered to 
create disincentives for individuals to support themselves, because self-interested 
individuals prefer to live off benefits rather than earn their own income, then 
policies to reduce transfers (and, therefore, public spending and debt) are 
justified. Both types of policy undermine previous goals of state intervention, 
such as redistribution of income and equality, and make them illegitimate as 
state-sponsored goals on the grounds that they have undesirable consequences. 
(By this I mean that the paradigm is against state intervention to achieve such 
goals, rather than against the goals per se. Redistribution and, perhaps, equality
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are acceptable if they are the natural products of market interactions.)2 Thus, the 
change in means to achieve some goals may change some of the state's other 
goals (or ends) in ways that may not immediately be obvious, given that the 
OECD still talks of a decreased disparity of income as a social policy goal.
The OECD's new ideas and their inherent assumptions constrain the 
organisation's options for understanding a range of issues, including social 
justice issues, leaving no place for its earlier treatment of social justice, with its 
emphasis on equality and (re)distribution. Examined in this way, it is clear that 
the OECD's recent treatment of social issues is not as sympathetic to social justice 
as it first appears. Although the OECD talks of economic and social goals, its 
underlying assumptions leave it no option but to weigh its economic concerns 
more heavily than its social concerns. The organisation's primary objective is a 
productive, high-growth economy, which means that all other means and goals 
are assessed 'in terms of their consequences for promoting or inhibiting the 
pursuit of national economic efficiency' (see Hindess 1998: 223). As a result, any 
social policies that aim to improve social outcomes through state intervention 
that are judged to have a negative impact on the functioning of the market are no 
longer 'legitimate', even if it means the sacrifice of equality gains. In addition, 
although the OECD appears to have expanded its range of social concerns, its 
options for resolving these issues has narrowed such that increasing (non-state 
sector) employment has become the preferred, and only 'legitimate', solution to 
this broader range of issues. Thus, the OECD's understanding and treatment of 
social justice and related issues has changed under its new paradigm. The 
arguments that the organisation develops and refines from about the mid-1970s 
construct a framework that precludes consideration of previously acceptable 
methods of achieving social goals, and constrains what those goals can be.
This new understanding of social issues can be described schematically as a shift 
from a concern with end-points or equality of outcome (reducing income 
inequality through redistribution to achieve a degree of egalitarianism) to a 
concern with starting points or equality of opportunity (the ability to enter the 
labour market, which in turn enables participation in all aspects of life). These
2 I say 'perhaps' because it appears that an unspecified degree of inequality is acceptable on the 
grounds that it acts as an 'engine of growth', encouraging people to strive to better themselves. 
This point will be discussed further below.
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are significantly different approaches, and reflect an associated transformation in 
state-society relations and the understanding of state-society roles, and 
responsibilities that matches the earlier transformation of relations, roles, and 
responsibilities that occurred when the Keynesian paradigm became dominant. 
It is this transformation that challenges the notions of path-dependency and ideas 
'embedded in institutions'. The earlier concern with equality of outcome was 
based on an assumption that the market failed some members of society, and that 
it was a state responsibility to intervene in the market to repair the damage. The 
later concern is the opposite, and state intervention now is seen to interfere with 
the market, resulting in outcomes that are not optimal. Therefore, state 
responsibility is limited to ensuring that everyone has an opportunity to 
participate, after which individuals are considered to be self-responsible. 
Whatever outcome ultimately results is acceptable because it comes from 
individual interaction and free exchange in the market. Although equality of 
opportunity could imply more state intervention to ensure adequate education, 
health, housing and so on, an associated shift to an emphasis on self­
responsibility has put the onus on individual initiative and thus taking action for 
oneself, decreasing the state's role. These implications suggest that the ideas 
underpinning the welfare state are not embedded as firmly in institutions as 
many theorists claim. Rather, new ideas bring a new range of institutions, both 
formal and informal, that significantly alter the understanding and treatment of 
social justice and related issues.
This chapter examines some of the OECD's central assumptions and concerns 
with regard to social justice and related issues. It is not intended to be a narrative 
history of the details of the OECD's policy or the specific programmes it 
recommends, nor does it aim to offer an analysis of the coherence or viability of 
the specific economic and social policy measures recommended. Rather, it is an 
explication of some of the underlying ideas and assumptions on which the OECD 
bases its interpretation of policy problems and solutions. As such, this chapter is 
not about whether or not the OECD's recommended social policy options are 
viable, but about the ideas underpinning the policies and the assumptions that 
the organisation makes about how its policies will work and why. I turn first to 
the OECD's treatment of social justice in the period when Keynesian ideas were 
dominant. I then explore the period from about the mid-1970s to roughly the 
mid-1990s when the OECD's economic analysis focused on the harm that social
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policies could cause to the economy. In turn, its social policy analysis stressed 
the need to consider the ramifications of social policies for the economy. In the 
third major section, I explore the OECD's renewed focus on economic and social 
goals from the mid-1990s, arguing that the major impact of the shift in ideas is a 
move from a focus on outcomes to a focus on opportunity. In the final two 
sections, I draw out some of the implications of the transformation in the OECD's 
world-view, arguing that they provide evidence that institutions can be changed. 
That is, the OECD's discourse exposes a new set of informal institutions 
reflecting a shift in the view of state-society relations and the understanding of 
state-individual roles and responsibilities.3 The net effect of the new informal 
institutions is to justify policies that shift the emphasis of social justice from 
equality of outcome to equality of opportunity, and from state and collective 
responsibility for outcome to individual responsibility for making the most of 
opportunities. As noted in Chapter 4, I have drawn the evidence for my 
argument from both the Economic Outlook and the major social policy papers.
Social Policies in 'Civilised Countries'
The OECD's Keynesian paradigm governed the organisation's interpretation of 
social policy problems and solutions in the 1960s and most of the 1970s. 
According to the precepts of the Keynesian paradigm, the market was considered 
to fail in some areas and, to compensate, the state was responsible for intervening 
to resolve the subsequent problems of unemployment and inflation. These 
problems were understood to exacerbate inequality, and inequality was regarded 
as leading to social unrest. At this time, economic problems and their solutions 
were placed within a broader social and political context, and the implications of 
economic policies for social issues and the political environment were important 
considerations for the OECD. The organisation understood economic, political, 
and social issues to be inextricably linked, such that the economy could not be 
seen separately to the society in which it was based. Rather, economic decisions 
had to take into account the likely effects on society, and whether policies 
contributed to desired social outcomes, thereby maintaining social harmony. A 
healthy, vibrant (low inflation, high employment and growth) economy was not
°  We should recall here the definitions of formal and informal institutions that I offered in 
Chapter 3: formal institutions are rules, laws, structures, organisations, and so on, while informal 
institutions are the norms, values, attitudes, implicit codes of conduct, and so on that underpin 
human interaction.
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an end in itself, but a means to achieving a broader goal of a healthy, vibrant 
society (increasing living standards). If the economy had problems, then so did 
society and vice versa.4
An example of this thinking comes from the OECD's discussions of inflation, 
which reveal that its fears were not solely about the effect of rising prices on the 
economy. Of equal concern was inflation's impact on social and political issues. 
The OECD argued that inflation caused 'social inequities', and that 'certain 
categories of the population ... notably the unemployed and the retired' tended 
to suffer more than others (1970a: viii; 1974b: 9). It wanted inflation controlled 
because its negative effects on the economy -  including increased unemployment 
and prices -  flowed through to society at large, causing unrest as people rebelled 
against lower standards of living brought about by higher prices and 
unemployment.5 The organisation argued that policies to contain inflation had 
to both mitigate the 'self-defeating' tendencies of the wage-price spiral, and 
preserve 'basic economic and political freedoms' (1970a: viii). The OECD was 
particularly concerned with the impact of the wage-price spiral on the state's 
ability to redistribute income; that is, inflation created a wage-price spiral as 
wages rose to counter higher prices, and this, in turn, played havoc with the 
ability of the state to control income distributions. The organisation wanted to 
avoid increased income disparity because it feared that greater disparity would
4 To expand this point: The OECD feared that social unrest could lead to political instability, which 
would jeopardise economic stability. Therefore, economic decisions could not be made without 
considering 'political restraints' and social consequences (1970a: vii). For example, the OECD noted 
in 1976 that the need to restrain rising private and public consumption would require 'a degree of 
social consensus ... if such a temporary restriction on the rise in living standards is to be freely 
accepted without social conflict' (1976a: 129; emphasis added). But the OECD also was aware of the 
political difficulties in achieving such a consensus, noting that it might not be possible 'without 
determined action to help the less fortunate, to reduce inequalities of income and wealth', and the 
establishment or strengthening of increased consultative mechanisms (1976a: 129). That is, the state 
was expected to intervene to mitigate the effects of market. Another example comes from 1968 
when the OECD noted that governments faced difficulties managing balance-of-payments 
adjustments, not only because of the complex nature of adjustment, 'but because of the social and 
political problems it entails' (1968b: 5).
5 The OECD noted that inflation arose in part from the very successes of modern society in other 
directions:
The unparalleled success of modern economies in achieving high and rapidly rising 
living standards gives rise to high expectations for the future. The resulting pressures 
are difficult to control in a society which has succeeded in maintaining its open and 
decentralized nature, and where the distribution of incomes is determined by the 
interplay of complex economic and social forces (1970a: viii).
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lead to increased social tensions. Its concerns with unemployment and inflation, 
then, were about both the economic effects on wages and prices, and the 
consequences for income inequality. It noted in Economic Outlook 13 (1973a), for 
example, that high inflation rates 'entail distortions of income and wealth 
patterns which are not only unfair, but produce continuous social strains of a 
type that OECD countries are ill-equipped to handle' (1973a: 8). In the next 
edition, it noted that, with inflation rates in double figures, 'the possibility of 
social and political tensions emerging from real or imagined changes in the 
distribution of real income cannot be ignored' (1973b: 6).
Thus, the OECD's paradigm at this time led it to argue for direct state 
intervention both to resolve economic problems, such as unemployment and 
inflation, and to redistribute income in order to alleviate poverty and decrease 
income inequality. That is, there was a policy commitment to equality of 
outcome. The OECD's policy aim was not only to ensure full employment, 
which was considered to reduce the chance of poverty, but also to redistribute 
income. This goal reflected that a more equitable distribution of income was one 
of five basic national economic objectives that its members pursued (1967c: 21).6 
Intervention that the OECD suggested would be 'directly instrumental' in 
'achieving a more equitable distribution of income' included compensatory 
employment programmes, such as public works and public service projects that 
the state organised and funded when insufficient demand created 
unemployment (1967c: 22).
In addition, the OECD perceived that state provision of income maintenance for 
the unemployed smoothed fluctuations in consumer demand and achieved social 
justice. Elence, a 1967 report from a Manpower and Social Affairs Committee 
study of the long-term unemployed stated:
In all civilised countries people are supported out of public funds, 
when they are unable to provide for themselves, whatever the cause 
of their lack of income (1967d: 28).
This theme was reiterated at a 1969 conference, 'Employment Fluctuations and 
Manpower Policies', which noted the importance of social justice, 'since it is 
recognised that the changes in the economy which are necessary for economic
6 The other national economic objectives were: full employment, a high rate of economic growth, 
price stability, and a balance-of-payments equilibrium (OECD 1967c: 21).
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progress should not involve great sacrifices for a minority' (1969c: 21). That is, 
the state had a responsibility to intervene 'to counteract the tendency to let the 
least adaptable groups bear the greatest responsibility for adjustment in the 
labour market and to suffer the greatest insecurity in employment' (1969c: 22)7
The OECD made some of the clearest statements about state responsibility for 
poverty alleviation and social justice in a 1976 report on resource allocation, 
Public Expenditure on Income Maintenance Programmes (OECD 1976c). In this 
report, the OECD commented that 'the wider' objective of income maintenance 
was to ensure that: 'no individuals or recognisable groups in society are 
unacceptably poor. In other words, the aim is to reduce or eliminate relative 
poverty' (1976c: 88). It defined 'relative' poverty as:
some relative level of income (equal, for instance, to a given 
percentage of average family income), which would rise (though not 
necessarily in a proportionate way) as national income grows 
(1976c: 63).
The OECD then stated that poverty relief was a goal that, 'almost by definition, 
can only be tackled through a state mechanism' (1976c: 86). Accordingly, it 
argued against looking more to the market for the provision of income 
maintenance, saying that the state would not want to 'relinquish control over one 
of its main instruments for influencing overall income distribution' (1976c: 86). 
The OECD noted that reducing the poverty of those outside the labour force 
could only be achieved in the short run by increasing benefits (1976c: 83). For the 
working poor, policy options available to the state included making the 
distribution of primary incomes more equal and/or using incomes policies that 
included greater egalitarianism as a goal (1976c: 83). The policies that the OECD 
suggested that members implement in order to achieve the former were strongly
 ̂ The 1969 conference demonstrated an early concern with the exclusion of particular groups, 
noting:
In individual terms, those who drop out of the labour force not only fail to make 
their productive contribution to the economy but also may experience poverty, 
deterioration of skills, and general discouragement. As the group that is squeezed 
out consists to a large extent of those so-called marginal workers -  the unskilled and 
poorly educated, older or handicapped workers, those in declining regions -  a period 
of unemployment may make them really unemployable (OECD 1969c: 20).
The concern here is not only with the economic costs of unemployment in terms of lost production, 
but the personal costs of unemployment in terms of loss of self-esteem and future employment 
prospects. We should note that the term 'drop out' here does not mean individuals choosing to 
quit work; rather, employment circumstances change so they are 'squeezed out' of the work force.
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interventionist, and included minimum wage legislation, regional development 
plans, tariffs, education (both general and vocational), and affirmative action. It 
argued that egalitarian policies played a part in changing social attitudes to 
income differentials, 'and hence in helping other redistributive policies to have a 
more durable impact' (1976c: 83). That is, these policies would align society's 
informal institutions with those that supported egalitarianism and redistribution 
to alleviate poverty.
The 1976 report demonstrated the OECD's lack of faith in the market, with the 
organisation arguing that governments could not rely on the market to achieve 
desired outcomes. It noted, for example, that there were several reasons for 
doubting whether market mechanisms would satisfy society's objectives on the 
provision of old-age pensions (1976c: 85). A major difficulty was that many 
people might be 'unable to save much' during their working lives to supplement 
minimum state benefits. In addition, it observed, those with private insurance 
faced the problem that 'private companies themselves are subject to market risks 
and cannot be relied upon always to supply the benefits they have been 
contracted to provide' (1976c: 85).8 However, the OECD contended that a more 
important reason for public provision was that 'society may have a paternalistic 
view concerning the extent to which individuals behave in their own interests' 
(1976c: 85). That is, it argued, people might suffer from 'defective telescopic 
faculty', described as: 'an inability to allow sufficiently for future satisfaction or 
contingencies, so that they will not transfer to their old age as much as society 
deems desirable' (1976c: 85). The OECD considered the prevention of such an 
outcome, in which many elderly would be left in poverty, to be a state 
responsibility.9
8 A recent example of company failure in this area is the collapse in 2001 of Australian insurance 
giant HIH, which was $5.3 billion in debt. As at April 12, 2004, a taxpayer-funded compensation 
scheme had paid $323 million to 10,500 people. Some of the remaining 4500 claims were still being 
processed, while others had been withdrawn or ruled ineligible (Carson 2004).
9 Note here that the response to society's 'paternalistic view' about defective individual behaviour 
is state intervention to alleviate the negative outcome. That is, when people are considered not to 
behave in their own interests, the state acts to support them, thereby ensuring that society's desired 
outcome is met. Under the later paradigm, as will be discussed below, when people are perceived 
not to act in their own interest, the state acts to change their behaviour. These are significantly 
different responses to perceived personal failure and are based on significantly different views of 
individuals and their behaviour. According to the earlier view, 'defective telescopic facility' is an 
accident of behaviour; later, it is considered to be a deliberate choice.
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Social Policies as a Challenge to Efficient 
Economies
In the Introduction to this chapter, I noted that a striking feature of the Economic 
Outlook from the mid-1990s was the linking of economic and social goals in a way 
not seen for two decades or so. By this I mean that, from the late 1970s to the 
early 1990s, the OECD's discussion of social issues in its Economic Outlook centred 
less on social outcomes and more on the processes and costs of the various social 
policies. Social outcomes such as equality and distribution, which had been 
mentioned in the earliest editions of the Outlook (1972a: 82; 1973b: 6) were put to 
one side as the OECD focused on resolving the economic problems besetting 
member countries: low economic growth, burgeoning inflation, escalating public 
debt and rising unemployment. Thus, in this period, the OECD's focus on social 
objectives per se in these publications was somewhat muted, in that its major 
focus was the need for 'structural' reforms across the whole economy.10 The 
organisation's emphasis was on fiscal consolidation, and controlling deficits and 
debt. Social spending was (and is) a major component of public expenditure, 
which meant it attracted the OECD's attention. However, this was mainly in the 
context of current or future economic harm unless major reform was undertaken. 
Of particular concern were social transfers and a fear of the increased spending 
that its members' ageing populations would demand.* 11 Thus, a new approach to 
social policies was among the OECD's suggested solutions to the economic 
problems plaguing its members, with the OECD arguing that social programmes 
were interfering with the effective and efficient working of the market, and hence 
were contributing to the economic woes.
111 The OECD urged members to do more to implement structural reforms, listing taxation, 
financial markets, agriculture, trade policies, subsidies to industries, the labour market, 
government interference in domestic markets for goods and services, and social policies as areas that 
needed attention (1988a: xi).
11 In 1987, for example, it noted that the 'cost to government and society of supporting a greater 
number of elderly is expected to increase substantially' in the next few decades (1987b: 24). While 
the impact on economic welfare was uncertain, 'a higher dependency burden will place pressures 
on public sector social expenditures, particularly old age pensions, disability payments and medical 
care' (1987b: 24). The increase in outlays to the elderly would outweigh any decline in youth- 
related social expenditures, and the 'increased dependency ratio' would 'impose significant costs 
on society' (1987b: 24). In 1988, it noted that rising budget costs were straining major social 
programmes, a problem it expected to worsen as the share of older people in the population 
increased (1988a: 74).
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This is not to argue that the OECD ignored social objectives (as opposed to 
policies) in the Outlook; rather, the goals -  not the policies themselves -  were seen 
as peripheral to the more important task of solving the economic crises. For 
example, when the OECD discussed redistribution in the Outlook, it did so in the 
context of urging tax reform. It noted in 1987 that many governments were 
changing their tax systems because they were concerned that existing structures 
were 'unfair', 'unnecessarily complex', and imposed large costs on society by 
'distorting economic decisions' (1987a: 22). It observed that:
The sense of unfairness is twofold: individuals in similar 
circumstances are treated differently (horizontal equity); and there is 
a strong belief that, despite appearances of progressivity as 
exemplified by rising marginal personal tax rates, very little 
redistribution actually occurs (insufficient vertical equity) (1987a: 22; 
emphasis added).
It then noted that, despite these concerns, reforms so far had been limited, 
reflecting the constraints that governments faced in formulating reform 
proposals, including the 'conflict between efficiency and equity', and the 
'political and practical difficulties associated with tax reform' (1987a: 23). When 
examining the conflict between efficiency and equity, the OECD was driven 
towards a focus on the former. The OECD advanced an argument against using 
the tax system for redistribution, saying that taxation was inefficient at achieving 
equity. It noted that, while taxation often was regarded as one of the main 
instruments for achieving a government's income redistribution objectives, very 
little redistribution appeared to occur, so that 'substantial distortions and welfare 
costs' were incurred for 'uncertain and possibly slight benefits' (1987a: 23). As a 
result, it argued for 'careful reassessment' of the relative merits of the alternative 
means of redistributing income (taxes, social spending, and transfers) and 
suggested that it could be possible to 'design tax reforms that improve horizontal 
equity, are distributionally neutral, and still achieve significant efficiency gains' 
(1987a: 23).12 The conflict, and subsequent issue of trade-offs, between efficiency 
and equity will be discussed further below.
17 These statements arguing for a reassessment of alternatives away from taxes create considerable 
problems for the OECD. Elsewhere, it argues for members to avoid direct expenditure and 
transfers, which it considers to exacerbate debt levels and have negative effects on incentives to 
work. Combined with this suggestion for tax systems to be 'distributionally neutral', it indicates 
that the OECD is not clear how it intends redistribution to occur, other than through the market, as 
will be discussed below.
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Meanwhile, the OECD's social policy documents in this period also stressed the 
impact of social policies on the economy. That is, the OECD used these 
documents to emphasise the interconnection of economic and social policies, and 
the importance of paying attention to the effects of one on the other. For 
example, in 1988 it argued that a lesson from the decade after the first oil shock in 
1973 was the 'need to link social and economic policies more closely':
Social policies cannot afford to ignore any negative impacts which 
certain provisions may have on economic performance. Equally, 
economic policies need to take account both of the social 
consequences and of the social objectives of economic change, and of 
the positive contribution which effective social protection can make 
to economic dynamism (1988c: 7).13
Such statements suggest that the organisation continued to view economic and 
social issues as holistically as it did in the earlier period. However, a closer 
reading of the OECD's comments reveal that the weighting given to economic 
concerns has changed to reflect its new understanding of the negative effects on 
the market, and on individual behaviour, of state intervention undertaken to 
achieve social objectives. Under the OECD's new paradigm, economic 
considerations are dominant, and social goals are assessed using economic 
criteria.14 Discussions of state actions are couched in terms of efficiency and 
effectiveness, interpreted narrowly as cost, and they appear to be abstracted from 
any consideration of why governments might need to be involved in these areas.
13 OECD Secretary-General Jean-Claude Paye noted in 1985 that an earlier OECD conference on the 
welfare state had emphasised the link between economic and social policies:
Because economic policies have social consequences and social policies have 
economic consequences, it is essential that OECD countries seek to achieve their 
economic and social objectives through the coordination of both sets of policies. In 
particular the economic means to support a broad and flexible set of social 
programmes must be maintained, just as the programmes themselves must be 
effectively tailored to both social needs and limited resources (OECD 1985c: 7).
14 For example, when arguing that, 'The very size of social expenditure in most countries also 
makes it an important part of the economy in its own right, so that its impact and effects merit close 
attention' (1988c: 7), the OECD's framework for analysis demanded that the 'attention' focus on 
how much social spending contributed to, or hindered, the economy. By 1994, this had been 
refined to the following observation:
effective social policies are essential both for the individual and for society. Though 
economic constraints should not be seen as a reason to underestimate the importance 
of social objectives, social policies cannot be developed outside the reality of 
budgetary considerations. Social policy, too, has an obligation to ensure that 
resources are mobilised more efficiently and effectively, not only because of current 
economic difficulties, but also for the credibility of the policies themselves as 
investments in society (1994c: 8).
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That is, the OECD is operating under a new interpretation of social policy 
problems and solutions, and what the main concerns of social policy could be.
Under its old paradigm, the OECD understood the state to be an agent of social 
justice, one that was to undertake direct intervention to alleviate poverty and 
redistribute income. Such direct state intervention was not considered to have 
any significant detrimental effect on economic growth. However, as noted in the 
previous chapter, the OECD's new paradigm includes four key ideas that 
challenge those of the old paradigm. These are that direct state intervention, 
public debt, public spending and the public sector itself are all bad for the 
economy, interfering with the natural functioning of the market, thereby 
hindering growth, and discouraging individuals from acting as self-responsible 
economic agents. The strength of the influence of these ideas can be seen in a 
1985 paper on social spending, in which the OECD observes that, while there is 
no evidence of a link between declining economic performance and the increasing 
size of public sectors, and that any arguments attributing the former to the latter 
are 'difficult to substantiate', 'there is a ready willingness to adopt such a view, 
and in recent years it has been having a growing influence on economic policy' 
(1985c: 15). In other words, the idea that a large public sector and high public 
spending are bad for the economy is used to justify reducing the size of the state 
and its spending in order to stabilise the economy, regardless of the lack of 
evidence supporting the link.
According to the new paradigm, public expenditure competes for resources that 
could be used more efficiently in the private sector, and high tax rates -  used to 
fund welfare -  are a disincentive for individuals to work and save. For example, 
in a 1978 report of a study into public expenditure trends, the OECD comments 
on the 'politically difficult trade-off' between two conflicting 
pressures: increasing public spending and reducing taxes (1978c: 8). It notes that, 
although incomes had risen, social justice remained a concern among the public, 
in that:
Greater absolute wealth may also make relative inequalities less
tolerable and lead to strong pressure to redistribute incomes and to
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improve the equality of access to essential services such as health 
care, education and housing (1978c: 9).15
However, it goes on to warn that rapidly rising public spending is likely to 
reduce productive potential 'by increasing the likelihood of inefficient allocation 
of resources and lowering incentives to work and invest' (1978c: 12). The 
emphasis here, then, is that social policy is no longer solely about social 
objectives, but needs to concern itself with efficient economics.16
Within two years of this report, the OECD's new paradigm has become firmly 
established, with its new world-view supplying the theme for its conference, 
'Social Policies in the 1980s', which the OECD arranged 'in response to a concern 
that the relationship between economic and social policies needed more careful 
examination' (Podger 1981:39). The papers and proceedings from this 
conference were published as The Welfare State in Crisis (1981c), and, although the 
book includes papers from OECD staff, public servants, politicians and 
academics, it has come to be regarded as an OECD critique of the welfare state. 
As Bob Deacon notes: 'The association of the OECD with the "welfare as burden" 
approach stems from that publication' (1997: 71). From this time, the OECD's 
social policy analysis is focused more on the impact of various policy options 
(particularly direct state intervention) on the economy. Concerns raised in 
conference papers -  and elaborated in later publications -  include that:
• the state's egalitarian goals inhibit economic adjustment and growth because 
the interventions needed to achieve these aims interfere with the market, and
• policies such as overly 'generous' benefits can have adverse effects on 
economic efficiency, acting as disincentives to work or adapt to economic
The OECD quotes one of its economists saying that the higher level of public spending observed 
in member countries reflected a 'collective decision' about the use of the results of growth. While 
some of the increased spending was the result of governments supplying goods and services that 
were not produced by the market, 'part is a result of this pursuit of equity directed at welfare 
expenditures' (1978c: 9).
16 That said, the argument in this report reflects the overlap that occurs between paradigms when 
the old paradigm is breaking down and the new paradigm has not yet been settled, for whatever 
reason. In this case, the overlaps demonstrate why some regard the OECD as having retained its 
Keynesian ideas longer than others (see the discussion in Chapter 1). Having argued for a cautious 
approach to raising taxes in order to pay for higher public spending because of the disincentive 
effects on labour, the OECD concludes with a statement urging members to weigh decisions 
according to 'fundamental economic criteria and basic social choices rather than these being 
dictated by unduly rigid concerns about the virtues of "budget balance" or "fiscal responsibility"' 
(1978c: 12). That is, the OECD appears to be arguing that members do not need to prioritise 
economic concerns when doing so would override their social objectives.
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change, and can have adverse effects on labour costs, employment, and 
prices.
In addition, and perhaps more importantly, the OECD fears the 'sheer scale of 
expenditures on social welfare', which, it notes, averaged 25 per cent of gross 
domestic product and 60 per cent of total public spending by the end of the 1970s 
(1980c: 15).
The organisation's new world-view changes its understanding of policy 
problems and solutions, and leads it to question both the wisdom and the 
sustainability of the welfare state. Economic factors, such as cost containment 
and faith in the efficiency of the market's allocative mechanisms, dominate the 
OECD's discussions of social policy problems and solutions, reflecting the shift in 
emphasis from poverty alleviation and egalitarianism to cost-containment, 
efficiency, and effectiveness. The latter is understood mainly in terms of 
achieving more for less, rather than necessarily meeting social goals effectively. 
The OECD now questions policies to reduce income inequality, with a report on 
the 1980 conference noting that economic difficulties have weakened the 'implicit 
social consensus on the need to promote equality' that had existed in the 1950s 
and 1960s (1980c: 16). It observes that redistribution policies do not appear to be 
effective, in that 'the amount of net redistribution appears relatively small 
compared to the flow of resources involved' (1980c: 17).17 In addition, it argues, 
OECD members with 'very different patterns of income distribution' are 
prospering equally, which means that the relationship between economic growth 
and income inequality is not clear (1980c: 17). The organisation suggests that this 
raises the question of whether 'income equality has gone as far as it can' 
(1980c: 17).18
One conference speaker argued that this was not a problem in that the welfare system had 
'objectives other than to redistribute income'; thus, it was 'not necessarily inefficient if the welfare 
system spends a lot but redistributes only a little' (Professor Irwin Garfinkel, quoted in Podger 
1981: 41).
The puzzle for the OECD was that countries with a high level of income inequality did not 
necessarily have low rates of economic growth and vice versa. This led the OECD to raise the 
question of whether reducing inequality was worth the cost in terms of decreased efficiency, if 
doing so was subsequently ineffective in making a difference to outcomes. That the intervention 
required, such as high taxes, could itself have a negative impact on economic growth also counted 
against a continued concern with income inequality.
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As will be discussed further below, underlying these comments is the OECD's 
new understanding of individuals as rational, self-interested maximisers who 
alter their behaviour according to incentives and disincentives. This leads it to 
reconsider previously accepted mechanisms of welfare and distribution. The 
OECD was arguing in its Economic Outlook at this time that, 'despite the 
desirability of improving equity', some aspects of social legislation have had 
undesirable consequences (1981a: 43). Its thinking, then, is that, in order to avoid 
the negative effects of social legislation, the state should both turn to the market 
to achieve some of these goals and reconsider some of the goals themselves. 
Thus, the OECD's new paradigm gives primacy to the economic over the social 
because it understands that the former will eventually satisfactorily resolve 
policy problems in the latter.
The OECD's new emphasis on assessing social policy using economic factors 
such as efficiency and effectiveness continued throughout the 1980s, 'with 
correspondingly less attention devoted to issues of equality (or inequality)' 
(Saunders 1990:14). The first of the OECD's Social Policy Studies series, Social 
Expenditure 1960-1990: Problems of Growth and Control (1985c), set the pattern for 
the organisation's social policy documents, judging welfare by economic criteria 
and how well it contributed to the economy, rather than how well it met social 
objectives.19 The OECD noted that the strength of a state's commitment to equity 
objectives and the resulting social policies were the 'outcome of economic, 
demographic and political developments as well as social ones', with the future 
growth of social expenditure 'inextricably linked with parallel economic 
developments' (1985c: 26, 45). Thus, slow economic growth could mean either 
increased or decreased state spending, depending on the level of commitment the 
state had to equity objectives or expenditure control. In line with its new faith in 
the market and concern with cost-control, the OECD now considered it to be 
permissible to 'trade-off' equity goals in order to achieve economic efficiency. 
The OECD claimed in this paper that the 'most deep-seated determinant' of 
social spending growth was a state's commitment to equity objectives along with 
the 'prevailing judgement' as to the extent to which they could be pursued 'in the 
face of a trade-off between equity and economic efficiency' (1985c: 26). The
19 In this report, the OECD defines social expenditure as 'direct public expenditure on education, 
health services, pensions, unemployment compensation and other income maintenance 
programmes and welfare services' (1985c: 18).
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earlier belief that reducing income inequality could be achieved without harming 
growth had given way to a view that equity and efficiency could not be achieved 
together -  a gain in one unavoidably meant a loss in the other. The state could 
trade-off economic efficiency to attain its equity objectives, or it could sacrifice its 
egalitarian goals as inefficient. Much of the OECD analysis could be seen as 
giving intellectual justifications as to why member states should choose the latter 
course of action.
The OECD used the final chapter in this document to examine in detail the 
'effectiveness and efficiency of social expenditure'. Initially, it appeared to 
acknowledge the complexities of the issues surrounding social spending. It 
noted that spending priorities were 'inextricably linked with political 
considerations', and that 'unravelling the complex array of motives' that 
explained spending patterns and constructing a framework for setting such 
patterns was 'probably beyond the scope of this or any single report' (1985c: 54). 
Having raised that proviso, it then emphasised the 'importance of establishing a 
basis' for making spending decisions and noted that, rather than examine 
spending priorities, the final chapter would focus on the 'effectiveness and 
efficiency of the major social programmes'. Thus, it reflected on the potential for 
the reforms that would 'inevitably be required' if the welfare state was to 
'maintain levels of service but spend less, or extend its scope without spending 
correspondingly more' (1985c: 54). To an extent, the OECD tried to retain an 
emphasis on equity, acknowledging that income, wealth and social welfare were 
unequally distributed in all OECD countries, and that redistribution was an 
objective of society and the state (1985c: 57). But it made its efficiency goals 
primary when it said that, while there was a:
well established role for the Welfare State which is firmly rooted in 
the idea of market failure and the desire for distributional justice ... 
equally the State has a responsibility to society ... to pursue their 
shared objectives responsibly (1985c: 57).
This meant 'careful' monitoring of both the effectiveness and the efficiency of 
welfare mechanisms in meeting social objectives, especially given that both 
'Society and the State have largely failed to evaluate their social welfare policies 
thoroughly in decades past' (1985c: 57). The 'failure' of evaluation and the 
perceived incorrect weighting between social and economic considerations will 
be discussed in the final section of this chapter.
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The important point here is that the OECD's paradigm establishes a framework 
for assessing 'responsibility' and 'responsible' in a particular way. In the context 
of an equity-efficiency trade-off, 'responsibly' again can be taken to suggest that 
it is not possible to pursue both distributional justice and efficiency at the same 
time. According to the OECD's understanding, state policies to redistribute 
income would, in most cases, be less effective in achieving this outcome than the 
market, and 'responsible' pursuit meant choosing the economic over the social. 
In other words, it can be argued that the state's primary responsibility has shifted 
from it being morally bound to provide for those at the lower end of income 
distribution to being morally bound to taxpayers -  especially those in the middle 
and upper income brackets -  not to waste their resources. (Note here that I am 
talking of the state's primary responsibility. I am not arguing that Keynesian 
ideas had allowed the state to be profligate; rather, that the order of 
responsibilities was different.) In addition, 'responsible' pursuit meant looking 
to the market, rather than the state, for the provision and/or management of 
services.
An example of the OECD's giving primacy to the economic over the social when 
judging efficiency and effectiveness arises from its discussion of the provision of 
'merit goods'. Having described the 'tendency' to view education and health as 
'merit goods' that, for reasons of supply and quality, 'governments usually 
provide', the OECD then used an economic framework to assess the efficiency 
and effectiveness of state intervention in these areas (1985c: 56-58). We need to 
recall from the previous chapter that merit goods are those that society believes 
everyone ought to have, regardless of whether each individual wants them, and 
that, by their nature, they are difficult to subject to market mechanisms. The 
OECD's discussion noted 'three principal and related sources of inefficiency':
• collective provision supplied free or at a notional price, meaning benefits 
were divorced from costs
• allocation on the basis of 'mainly non-budgetary criteria', and
• domination of the services by 'well-organised supplying professionals', who 
the OECD described in a way that suggested these professionals acted with 
excessive self-interest (1985c: 58).
The OECD then argued that, because collective provision was 'unlikely to be 
wholly rejected in favour of the free market', the task of improving the
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effectiveness and efficiency of provision was a management problem that could 
be resolved through 'some retreat from the current level of State involvement' 
(1985c: 60). It noted that, for example, the state could limit the 'open-endedness' 
of some services (restricting access to some services and charging for others), or it 
could retain responsibility for funding, 'prudential regulation', and 'guiding ... 
specific outcomes', but pass the 'purely management function' to the private 
sector where it could be 'subjected to the disciplines of the market' (1985c: 60). 
As noted in the previous chapter, the move to the market contradicts the OECD's 
earlier view that, 'to a large extent', market mechanisms were inapplicable in 
these areas. The missing element in the OECD's discussion is an explanation for 
its argument that the market is better than the state at managing the provision of 
merit goods. That is, the first two sources for 'inefficiency' in the provision of 
education and health services are linked to the very reasons that the state, rather 
than the market, supplies these goods in the first place.20
In The Future of Social Protection (1988c), the OECD turned its attention to the 
legitimacy of a previous key component of social policy: income support. It 
claimed that it was 'accepted as legitimate' for the elderly to receive 'relatively 
generous degrees of public income support', and that this legitimacy extended to 
invalids and the handicapped. However, it argued, such legitimacy was 'either 
not present or exists only in diluted or very conditional form for most other non-
20 There are several other problems to consider when shifting the management and/or provision of 
some public services to the market. These include accountability issues and the difficulties of 
assessing efficiency and effectiveness in the commercial arena. For example, in 1996, Australia's 
conservative Coalition Government restructured the job placement market and replaced the 
Commonwealth Employment Service with a 'contestable and full competitive market in which 
private, community and public-sector agencies [were to be] contracted to place unemployed people 
into jobs' (Tingle 2000c). The results of the first 18-month contracts tendered in 1997 were 
unsuccessful, with many providers going out of business because their bids had been too low to 
cover the cost of service provision. A second tender sought to avoid such problems and aimed to 
award contracts on the basis of the quality of service provision. However, a report in 2000 noted 
that:
Despite the Government's general claims of success for its new scheme, there is little 
reliable information available about whether Job Network is doing a good job for the 
unemployed -  who seem to have been forgotten in much of the debate -  thanks 
largely to commercial-in-confidence rules and a Government with a scant regard for 
accountability (Tingle 2000c).
An additional problem for this particular scheme was that church groups won several of the 
tenders. Their success raised fears of religious discrimination in the services offered, especially 
when the Employment Services Minister defended the right of the groups to 'employ in the role of 
job-search helpers only those committed to a specific [religious] ethos'. See The Australian (2000a), 
Tingle (2000a, 2000b).
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elderly people' (1988c: 26). The OECD used this notion of the illegitimacy of 
public income support for the non-elderly as a basis for arguing for work over 
welfare. Thus, it observed, an adequate income for most of the non-elderly could 
only be secured if they were in:
an income unit which is in receipt of labour market income. Public 
income support may ensure survival and subsistence, and perhaps 
even the absence of poverty, but will very rarely provide adequacy 
(1988c: 26; emphasis added).
This view is significantly different from the OECD's earlier claim, noted above, 
that a main objective of income maintenance programmes was to 'reduce or 
eliminate relative poverty' (1976c: 88). Here, the idea is that income maintenance 
is no guarantee against poverty; rather, it simply ensures that an individual has 
enough on which to subsist. This is not to argue that the OECD was suggesting 
that the state had no role in poverty alleviation, but that its view of the 
responsibility for alleviation (beyond subsistence) had shifted such that 
individuals now were expected to do more for themselves. An 'adequate' 
income was an individual (or 'income unit') responsibility that was to be 
achieved via the individual gaining employment and receiving 'labour market 
income'. That is, the emphasis was on work (and wages) as the best form of 
welfare. As noted in the previous chapter, a key assumption of the OECD's 
paradigm here is that work is available to all and that being without work is 
related to individual choice and not external market conditions.
The OECD's justification for the shift in its attitude towards income maintenance 
(that it was not 'accepted as legitimate' for the non-elderly to receive income 
support) reflected a change in its underlying understanding of state-society 
relations, roles, and responsibilities. As discussed above, the earlier papers 
showed that the OECD considered poverty alleviation to be a state responsibility. 
However, the later papers emphasise individual responsibility. For example, in 
1988, the OECD argued that the need to restrict income support was:
not so much because of resource constraints on income support levels 
but because it is only in limited (and often time-limited) 
circumstances that the provision solely from public funds of income 
adequacy to the non-aged will be thought to be acceptable (1988c: 26).
This statement is revealing for several reasons. First, it suggests that economic 
factors, particularly the cost of income support, are not as important as the 
underlying attitudes towards the supply of taxpayer funds to the non-aged. That
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is, whether or not income support was seen as 'acceptable' was more important 
than 'resources constraints', suggesting that the justification for controlling the 
level of income maintenance arises from informal institutions defining what is 
acceptable and legitimate, rather than economic reasoning. The implication here 
is that public opinion on what is acceptable guides policy, yet earlier, the OECD 
had argued that policies 'played a part in changing social attitudes' (1976c: 83). 
Second, the statement exposes the major shift in the OECD's interpretation of the 
raison d’etre for income support. That is, the notion that in civilised countries 
people were supported out of public funds when they were unable to provide for 
themselves, 'whatever the cause of their lack of income' (1967d: 28), has been 
replaced. Except in particular, defined circumstances, it is no longer considered 
to be a legitimate function of the state to intervene to alleviate poverty or to 
redistribute income. Again, the new views are that the market is, in most cases, 
better at provision than the state, and that individuals are responsible for 
providing for themselves via participation in the market.
Social Policies Towards the New Millennium: 
Transformations and Implications
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, from the mid-1990s, social goals were 
back on the OECD's agenda in its discussions in the Economic Outlook. That is, 
the OECD continued to push for reform, but stressed that governments should 
concentrate attention on ensuring that longer-term policy was aimed effectively 
at achieving 'fundamental economic and social goals' (1994a: ix; emphasis added; 
1994b: xi; 1996a: 50; 1997a: 31; 1996b: 21; 1999a: 141; and 1998a: 8). The 
organisation had flirted with a focus on social goals when it raised the issue of 
'social problems and policies' in a short paragraph in the 'Introduction' to 
Economic Outlook 49 (1991a: xiv). Then, it listed the main problems as long-term 
unemployment, educational failure, poverty and deprivation in particular social 
groups, urban and rural decay, population ageing, and international migration. 
It placed these within an economic context saying that continued economic 
progress would have 'positive effects here as elsewhere'.21 But these issues then
21 In this discussion, the OECD noted that the average real income per head in the OECD was 
about 25 per cent higher at the beginning of the 1990s than it had been 10 years earlier, and that it 
expected a further advance in the next decade (1991a: xiv). But it then flagged its concerns about 
the 'persistence' of several social problems, and the possible emergence of others. It listed the main 
problems as those given above. Although it argued that economic improvements would help with 
these problems, it noted that some would need to be 'directly addressed', although doing so would
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dropped from the Economic Outlook until the mid-1990s when they returned, 
accompanied by what appeared to be an expanded range of concerns, including 
'social cohesion', 'social exclusion', and 'marginalisation'. At first glance, this 
may suggest that the OECD was now more concerned with social outcomes than it 
had been for nearly two decades and that it had a more holistic understanding of 
the problems it had raised in 1991. That is, the new terms encompassed all of the 
OECD's concerns and drew the connections between the problems. However, 
such a conclusion overlooks the implications of the OECD's new paradigm for its 
understanding of social justice and related issues. As noted in the Introduction, 
the OECD was undoubtedly focusing more attention on the connections between 
social and economic issues than it had at any time since the mid-1970s. Equally 
undoubtedly, the OECD had expanded the range of issues it was prepared to 
consider under the rubric of 'social' issues. But its new understanding of the 
world and how it works, and the state-society relations, roles, and 
responsibilities within that world altered how it perceived these problems and 
what solutions it considered to be viable.
The OECD's new interpretation of the division of responsibilities and its new 
understanding of individual behaviour limited its options when it began to 
emphasise the pursuit of 'economic and social goals' and to focus attention on 
social justice and related issues, including poverty alleviation, equality (equity), 
and redistribution.22 Its policy advice when discussing social cohesion, and the 
problems of exclusion and marginalisation, appeared to emphasise a concern 
with alleviating the 'disturbing degree of social distress' and the 'social hardship 
and demotivation' of prolonged unemployment (1994a: 1). That is, the OECD 
noted that there was an 'important social dimension' to such economic issues as 
preventing rigidities, making economies more innovative and adaptable, and 
allowing resources to move to their most profitable uses. It explained:
An adequate degree of social protection is necessary to reassure
workers, and encourage them to react positively to structural
require a 'careful blend of policies' (1991a: xiv). For example, the reform of social transfer systems 
would need to 'establish a better trade-off between relieving poverty and creating a culture of 
dependence on public support' (1991a: xiv). The OECD concluded its discussion by 
acknowledging that, within this, there were 'more fundamental matters at stake', concerning 
'perceptions of what is just and affordable' (1991a: xiv; emphasis added). These issues then dropped 
from the OECD agenda until the mid-1990s.
22 Editions of the Economic Outlook published in 1996, 1997, and 1998 included special chapters on 
these topics.
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changes. At the same time, it is necessary to provide a decent 
minimum standard of living for those members of society who are 
unable to adjust (1994a: 1).
It also argued that, while many people would need help to fit the requirements of 
high-skill jobs, some would be unable to meet these requirements and would be 
unable to find work or would be confined to low-skilled, low-paid jobs. It noted:
The commitment to support them will be a valuable investment 
towards a more cohesive and caring society. As OECD economies 
progress, it becomes all the more important to hone the support 
policies and mechanisms so that they provide effective help to those 
who most need it (1994a: 2).23
Later, when commenting on the need to reform the design and generosity of 
transfer systems, the OECD noted that it was important to ensure that fiscal 
consolidation was done in a manner that was 'fair and efficient'. That is, it 
stated:
Policies must ensure that the benefits of economic growth are shared 
by all and, in particular, those most in need must continue to be 
protected to prevent the emergence or exacerbation of poverty and 
social exclusion (1996a: xiii).
In addition to these concerns with social protection, the OECD also targeted 
equity, noting that all of its member countries were concerned with 
'employment, social cohesion and equity outcomes' (1997a: 12).24 It noted that 
market incomes had 'become less equally distributed over time' and that,
23 The section in which these views are discussed is a 'synthesis' of The OECD Jobs Study, which, 
the OECD notes in the 'Introduction' to this edition of Economic Outlook, examines 'the reasons for 
and the remedies to the disappointing progress in dealing with unemployment' (1994a: xi). 
Signalling that the OECD sees a broader application for this study, it notes, 'Although the 
structural-reform recommendations focus on unemployment, many of them would help to improve 
economic performance more generally' (1994a: xi).
24 It argued that the challenges for members as they moved out of recession included reducing the 
gap between 'aspirations for, and realisation of, economic and social well-being over the longer 
term' (1994b: xi). Meeting this challenge, it observed, would require that governments 'move 
forward with the structural-reform agenda ... while meeting domestic and international social 
(equity) objectives' (1994b: xi). (The OECD did not explain what it meant by 'domestic and 
international social (equity) objectives'; nor was it clear why it put the word 'equity' in brackets.) 
The OECD then noted that efforts to speed the pace of fiscal consolidation would need to 'take 
account of considerations of equity and the impact on living standards for low-income groups' 
(1994b: xiii). It reiterated the need for governments to ensure that 'rising living standards and 
increased prosperity are shared, both across countries and among individuals within countries' 
(1995a: xi, xvi). The OECD noted increased concern about the 'social consequences of rising 
inequality', even in those countries with favourable employment prospects, and commented that 
such developments could put pressure on social safety nets designed to minimise marginalisation 
and provide some protection against poverty (1995a: 8; 1996b: 36).
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'[ejxcessive' inequality of income and wealth that could arise from the 
'unfettered play of market forces' was 'widely considered unjust' (1996b: 36).25
Superficially, it appears that the OECD's concerns with the effects of social 
exclusion and marginalisation reflect a return to its earlier concerns with the 
social and political implications of economic policy, but a closer examination of 
the OECD's arguments reveals that this is not the case. The concerns of the 1960s 
and the early 1970s were used to justify either economic actions that took the 
resulting social impact into account, or state intervention to ensure particular 
outcomes. That is, if pursuing a particular policy direction was considered likely 
to have negative social and political consequences then the OECD advised that it 
should not be pursued. The renewed concern with social consequences in the 
1990s is not about justifying state intervention to achieve particular outcomes, 
but instead is about justifying why states should not intervene and, in fact, 
should continue with reforms to free the market from its 'plethora' of distorting 
regulation. Hence, the OECD's argument for better economic performance 
providing the economic basis for 'improved social cohesion' (1994a: xi). This 
understanding gave the OECD ammunition to use against those of its members 
who wanted to adopt a cautious approach to reform because they feared that the 
suggested reforms may damage social cohesion as much as did high long-term 
unemployment. In the OECD's view, faster implementation of market-based 
strategies would resolve problems such as decreased social cohesion, not create 
or exacerbate them. Even when the OECD acknowledged the legitimacy of these 
fears, noting government reluctance to act because of concerns that negative 
effects 'could exacerbate social problems and hardship in the short term', it 
warned that the costs of not taking action could be high (1995b: 7).
25 The latter quotes come from a special chapter, 'Growth, Equity and Distribution' in Economic 
Outlook 60 (1996b). It opened another special chapter, 'Income Distribution and Poverty in Selected 
OECD Countries', with the observation that, in the past 20 years, 'pressures tending to widen wage 
and income distributions appear to have intensified in many OECD countries' (1997b: 49). As a 
result:
Market incomes have become less equally distributed over time, with the percentage 
going to the low-income group falling in almost all countries and that going to the 
high-income group rising in all countries (1997b: 53).
On this issue, it later noted that 'inequalities of disposable income have not generally narrowed 
since the 1980s' and that technology and, 'perhaps', globalisation were 'tending to increase income 
inequalities, increasing demands for more extensive income redistribution' (1998a: 158,157).
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While the concerns with social tensions appear similar to those of the earlier 
period, the OECD's methods of 'soothing' individuals have changed 
considerably. State responsibility has shifted from the state being an agent of 
prevention and protection to the state providing a safety net of last resort, with 
individuals expected to act for themselves. That is, the OECD's new framework 
for policy analysis shifts the balance between public and private responsibilities 
and moves much of the responsibility for alleviating social distress from the state 
to individuals and their market interactions.26 The result is a transformation in 
the OECD's treatment of social justice and related issues. Earlier methods to 
achieve the state's social goals are now considered to have negative consequences 
for the economy, impeding its efficient functioning, and for the individual, 
encouraging the wrong type of behaviour. This means that, for example, 
although the OECD acknowledges its members' concern with 'widening income 
distributions' and the 'social consequences of rising inequality', it fears the 
negative effects of redistributive policies on the economy. It argues that the taxes 
needed to pay for enlarged redistribution programmes could discourage work 
and saving, and the programmes themselves could 'encourage a "culture of 
dependency", weakening incentives to work, save and invest' (1996b: 36). Thus, 
it cautions that where efforts are made to reduce inequality, it is 'important that 
they focus on measures that do not negatively affect employment opportunities 
or work incentives' (1996b: 21).27
26 As noted above, until about the mid-1970s, the OECD's Keynesian paradigm considered the 
state to be responsible for ensuring that society's desired social outcomes, such as equality and 
redistribution of wealth and income, were met. The state also was responsible for directly 
intervening to resolve economic problems, such as inflation and unemployment, that could prevent 
these outcomes, and for supporting those affected by such economic problems until they were 
resolved. But from about the late 1970s, the OECD substantially shifted its view, and placed 
considerable responsibility for attaining society's desired social outcomes on to individuals. Under 
the new framework of ideas, the state still is responsible for resolving economic problems, but its 
means of doing so have been restricted mainly to ensuring that individuals can function as self- 
responsible 'economic agents' in the market.
22 The OECD argues that targeting transfers 'more precisely to those in need' could allow 
governments to meet equity goals while avoiding the 'economic inefficiencies' arising from higher 
tax burdens, but it acknowledges that targeting could also result in high marginal effective tax rates 
(1997b: 58). That is, the withdrawal of benefits (cash and otherwise) as income rises acts as another 
tax, 'discouraging work effort' (1997b: 58). (We should note here that the OECD does not 
acknowledge that the definition of 'need' varies according to the framework being used for 
assessment.) In addition, the OECD fears that increased spending on redistributive polices could 
'reduce overall economic prosperity by distorting economic decisions' and the increased taxes 
needed to pay for expanded income distribution could raise labour costs (1997b: 57). The OECD 
argued that higher labour costs would increase unemployment in countries where wages were 
inflexible, and reduce wages and labour supply in countries with more flexible wages.
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With social outcomes no longer solely a state responsibility, the focus of the 
social side of economic policy shifts from equality of outcomes (or end points) to 
equality in opportunity (or starting points), after which outcomes depend on 
personal effort in the market. For example, the OECD considers that ensuring 
that an individual has access to education improves that person's chances of 
finding a job. In a similar vein, low-paid work allows an individual to gain work 
experience and a 'foothold on the job ladder' that would provide the basis for 
'moving up the ladder to higher-paid employment' (1994b: xv). This 'toehold in 
employment via a low-wage job' is expected to have a 'beneficial impact on that 
person's lifetime income' (1996a: 26). Justifications for this approach are 
developed and refined from about the mid-1970s until, by the mid-1990s, the 
OECD presents a comprehensive argument in which employment and education 
to obtain that employment are cast as the solutions to a myriad of social 
problems. It argues that 'broader employment and educational opportunities' 
are 'equitable in their own right' and 'promote greater social inclusion and 
cohesion' (1997b: 57).28 This leads it to claim, when discussing 'income 
distribution and poverty', that:
lifetime opportunities, rather than ex post incomes, might be 
distributed more equally by policies to improve education and 
training, to help the young and the long-term unemployed to secure 
jobs, and to reconcile work and family responsibilities (1997b: 58-59).
Thus, the OECD's focus on economic and social goals is not as sympathetic to 
social justice and related issues as it first appears, in that these issues are no 
longer understood in the same way. In effect, previously acceptable means of 
achieving social goals now are seen as root causes of economic and social 
problems, and changes to these means inevitably alters the desired outcomes. In 
addition, the goals themselves may no longer exist.
Evidence for this transformation can be found in both the OECD's Economic 
Outlook and its major social policy documents. From these publications, it is clear 
that the organisation's social policy in the decade before the new millennium is 
based on a transformed relationship between the state and the individuals 
comprising society, with a new emphasis on partnership, responsibilities, and
28 It considers that education and training programmes not only could raise overall productivity 
and output, but 'ultimately' also could reduce the need for 'remedial tax and transfer programmes', 
which the OECD now believes cause more problems than they resolve (1997b: 59).
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obligations. According to the OECD's new paradigm, direct 'passive' state 
intervention has had negative consequences for society and the market, 
interfering with the incentives and disincentives governing the choices and 
actions of individuals. As outlined above, this understanding of individual 
behaviour is based on the notion of 'homo economicus', according to which 
individuals are considered to make rational choices about their actions based on 
their own economic self-interest.29 On the basis of this understanding, social 
policy is assessed in terms of the incentives and disincentives it gives people to 
act in particular ways.
Such assessments lead the OECD to argue that, in the past, state provision has 
been too 'generous' and has encouraged people -  understood to be rational, self- 
interested maximisers -  to become dependent on state benefits rather than taking 
initiatives to become self-sufficient. As a result, the OECD seeks to reduce the 
role of the state, noting in New Orientations for Social Policy in 1994 that, while 
policy prescriptions may be familiar, the way in which the role of the state is 
perceived is new:
Governments can no longer be thought of as providers of largesse but 
instead, as partners that enable and empower people to take 
initiatives on their own behalf and to exert greater control over the 
circumstances of their lives (1994c: 12).
Again, such a statement is revealing in that it exposes the underlying 
assumptions of the OECD's new understanding of policy problems and 
solutions. An obvious, and questionable, assumption is that governments 
previously were (and still are) considered to be 'providers of largesse'. The 
question here is whether state support for the victims of market failure (recall the 
OECD's earlier comments, noted above) can be deemed 'largesse', in the sense of 
the dictionary definition: a 'liberal bestowal of gifts' (Brown 1993:1533).
However, an equally important assumption is that earlier forms of state action 
have had negative consequences for individuals, preventing them from acting on 
their own behalf or having control over their lives. This assumption reflects a 
significant shift in the understanding of the impact of state support. Under its
9Q As outlined in the previous chapter, according to this view, people try to obtain the most at the 
least cost to themselves, meaning that they will choose to accept state-supplied benefits over 
exerting themselves in the market. This will be discussed further below.
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Keynesian paradigm, the OECD had considered state income support to allow 
those suffering 'temporary misfortune' to maintain their independence by giving 
them the means to continue making decisions for themselves. This is not to 
argue that welfare was once seen as acceptable, but that the reason for its 
provision was understood in a different way. Then, the OECD considered state 
intervention as a means of enabling individuals to make choices for themselves 
and to continue to participate in society and achieve their potential, even if they 
were the victims of economic circumstances (market failures) that were outside 
their control. However, now it considers state intervention, especially 'passive' 
income support, to inhibit individual choice and participation. According to the 
new paradigm, state provision is not a means to independence, freedom, choice, 
and dignity, but rather a road to dependence that inhibited individual freedom.30 
That is, the OECD argues:
to have people dependent on benefits is preferable to their being 
destitute, but the next step could be to break the cycle of dependency 
and low income which limits their scope for independent choice and 
activity (1988c: 27).
To the extent that these [social protection] systems may lead to 
persistent reliance on the State, a poor alternative to self-sufficiency is 
created; policies which fail to promote the realisation of individual 
potential and greater personal control over the circumstances of life 
may hamper rather than help society (1994c: 10).
Under the new policy agenda, people are to be encouraged to look after 
themselves, thereby giving them maximum freedom through their self- 
sufficiency. Of course, as noted in the previous chapter, choosing to remain on 
welfare is not the type of 'individual choice' that the OECD aims to encourage.
The OECD denied that the 'new partnership' it envisaged between 'the 
government and the people' was 'simply an effort to shift responsibility'
30 it is worth noting here the work of Neil Gilbert, who discusses the change in the paradigm 
underpinning the welfare state as a 'shift in central tendencies from welfare to enabling state' 
(2002: ch. 2). According to this interpretation of 'enabling', it is the removal of state intervention in 
its citizens' lives that 'enables' them to pursue their life choices. Gilbert notes that: 'the enabling 
state emphasizes a market-oriented approach that targets benefits that promote labor force 
participation and individual responsibility' (2002: 44). Gilbert does not contradict the overall point 
I make here; rather, his work (in his book, Transformation of the Welfare State: the Silent Surrender of 
Public Responsibility) serves to reinforce my argument that neo-liberal discourse frames welfare in 
ways that support its new vision of state-society relations, roles, and responsibilities.
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(1994c: 12). Rather, it claimed, the new partnership aimed to 'maximise human 
potential and the choices available to individuals, thereby increasing personal 
dignity and the resources available to the economy' (1994c: 12). That is, it 
argued, the new relationship would make better use of the resources available to 
society by:
attaining a balance between public and private responsibilities that 
takes advantage of what each can do best; [and] encouraging and 
facilitating the development of human potential, individual initiative, 
and self-sufficiency (1994c: 18-19).
Here, the OECD overlooks the fact that the assessment of what each does best 
depends on the framework being used. We should recall here that Keynesianism 
had a cynical view about the private sector, believing that markets failed and that 
the state had to be ready to intervene to correct such failures. The result was a 
particular view of the boundaries of the public and private sphere that is 
significantly different to that underlying the observation above.
Meanwhile, the development of human potential and individual initiative meant 
a new emphasis on participation. Notions of the need for the state to encourage 
participation were based on an understanding of welfare as dependence, as 
noted above. In a 1988 report, the OECD noted that policy in the 1990s would 
have to cope with 'long-term dependency' and 'those who remain excluded from 
the patterns of opportunity and mobility which are among the important 
characteristics of open societies and dynamic economics' (1988c: 21).31 That is:
Whatever the ideological or value basis of governments in different 
OECD countries, this long-term dependence presents the challenge of
31 The OECD noted that the terms used to describe this 'excluded' group included 'persistent 
poverty', 'welfare dependence' and the 'underclass' (1988c: 21). It continued:
However termed, the concern generally is not so much those whom the welfare state 
fails to reach but rather those who are, so to speak, within the system ... but whose 
prospects seem little better than subsistence dependency, without an active role in 
society (1988c: 21).
This is a narrow view of the 'excluded', given the OECD's emphasis on active participation in 
society and social activities, in that it takes no account of the working poor, who may lack both time 
and money to take part in broader social activities. Interestingly, it contrasts with the definitions 
that OECD members themselves provided in a 1998 survey of social and health policies. The 
survey report notes that the groups that countries identified as at most risk of social exclusion 
included: people with disabilities, drug abusers, homeless people, refugees and immigrants, 
indigenous populations, former prisoners, women, children, young people, and the long-term 
unemployed (Kalisch et al. 1998: 22). Not all of these would be 'within the system', nor would the 
factors contributing to their exclusion necessarily be resolved through their being employed, as the 
OECD seems to suggest with its emphasis on employment as the answer to exclusion. The OECD's 
view of social exclusion will be discussed further below.
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how to eliminate this pattern of exclusion from activity, opportunity 
and mobility (1988c: 21).
The OECD's solution to dependence was the 'development' of social protection 
policy objectives so that they were 'aimed at contributing to ensuring for each 
individual the possibility of an active role and participation in that society' 
(1988c: 30). For 'most people, most of the time', it claimed, this would be 
achieved through 'their own work and social activities' (1988c: 30).
However, despite having stressed the importance of 'active social roles', which 
may suggest a broad interpretation of what it means to participate in society, the 
OECD's focus in the 1990s directed attention to employment as the key to 
participation and inclusion. The OECD's theme was that, whereas welfare 
sapped personal initiative and misused human resources, work allowed people 
to regain their autonomy. In the OECD's words:
When dependency on public income transfers persists among those 
who, in principle, are capable of working, then the State 
(unintentionally) may be facilitating a loss of human potential 
(1994c: 16).
The organisation urged a 'new orientation' towards an employment-oriented 
social policy and its members' ministers responsible for social policy endorsed 
this view, stating that:
social policy should be guided by orientations which: ... Contribute 
to society as well as to market efficiency by facilitating employment, 
rather than perpetuating reliance on public income support alone 
(1994c: 52).
That is, the shift in focus is from passive income support to an opportunity to 
participate in the work force. As noted above, a key underlying assumption here 
is that, while work is available, individuals are choosing to depend on state- 
provided benefits rather than their own efforts. The fault for individuals not 
working when they are capable of doing so lies with the individuals and their 
behaviour, rather than with market failure.
A similar assumption underlies another aspect of the OECD's new orientation, 
which called for income maintenance programmes to be 'consistent with the 
objective of encouraging individuals to achieve self-sufficiency through earnings' 
(1994c: 52). That is, the OECD argued:
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Transfer programmes were put in place to meet genuine social needs 
and goals, and the challenge will be to reform them in order to 
continue to meet those needs while mobilising the available labour 
supply to the maximum and avoiding excessive and possibly 
unsustainable budgetary pressures (1995b: xiii).32
The organisation noted that this required greater coherence between labour- 
market, education and social policies so that, for example, 'policies which aim to 
enhance equity and social protection ... structure their incentives so that 
workforce participation is encouraged' (1994c: 7). Again, this statement is 
predicated on an understanding of unemployment as voluntary and on an 
understanding of individuals as rational maximisers who choose not to work, but 
who can be persuaded (or 'encouraged') through the judicious use of incentives 
and disincentives to rejoin the work force. An additional underlying assumption 
is that beneficiaries do not participate in either the labour market or in society 
more generally. The OECD considered work to be the solution to resolving the 
problems of participation, and it linked social activity to work activity. It argued, 
therefore, that the role of the state was to:
design interventions so as to maximise both the number of people 
who have opportunities for active social roles, and the durations of 
their lives over which they can experience such activity (1988c: 30).
Of course, while these 'interventions' were to be based on an 'active' rather than 
'passive' state approach, this did not mean direct state intervention of the kind 
promoted under the earlier paradigm. That is, the 'active labour market' policies 
that the OECD has in mind to enhance an individual's employment prospects do 
not include the 1960s strategies of state-organised and state-funded public- 
employment schemes, which it now understood to have the opposite effect to 
what it assumed in the earlier period. Rather, 'active' policies were indirect 
interventions and included such measures as reducing benefits and other 
activities considered to function as 'disincentives' for people to act on their own 
behalf. Thus, policy solutions were based on the understanding of individuals as 
rational maximisers whose self-interested behaviour could be manipulated in 
order to achieve the desired ends.
An obvious example of this approach was the OECD's emphasis in its social 
policy papers in the 1990s on 'making work pay'. Here, the organisation's central
32 The issue of 'genuine' social needs and goals will be discussed below.
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concern was that 'generous' benefits would lead to the unemployed choosing to 
take welfare over low-paid employment.33 It observed: '"generosity" as a 
priority in programme structures may itself conflict with work incentives -  and 
with another goal, minimising public expenditures' (1994c: 17). The fear was that 
the existence of social protection altered people's behaviour, with rational 
individuals calculating how they could obtain the most for the least effort. In the 
OECD's words: 'For those who are expected to move from dependency on public 
income transfers into employment, the structure of income transfer programmes 
may not always provide appropriate signals' (1994c: 17). That is, it claimed that 
'programmes may not always be reaching their intended goals and, in some 
cases, may be making things worse -  for example, by promoting long-term 
dependency on benefits' (1995b: 25). It offered two examples:
• unemployment traps: where income support was 'adequate', payments might 
match what low-paid workers earned, which could discourage beneficiaries 
from taking such jobs and obtaining the work experience necessary for them 
to increase their earnings capacity (1994c: 13). The OECD believed that, 
where the lack of a job was the criterion for the receipt of transfers, there was 
a 'risk' that people would choose to stay on a benefit rather than accept work, 
and thus become 'trapped in unemployment' (1996a: 25). As noted above, 
this was not the type of individual 'choice' that the OECD wanted to 
encourage. In a pithy summation of this theory, it observed: 'if work does not 
pay, people will be reluctant to work' (1999c: 92).
• poverty traps: where benefits were reduced when income from earnings was 
present, 'particularly if the loss equals or exceeds the value of the money 
earned', such penalties could encourage beneficiaries 'to ignore his or her 
long-run interest in acquiring work experience and enhanced earnings 
capacity' (1994c: 17). Such 'high marginal effective tax rates' could cause a 
'poverty trap' (1999c: 92; 1996a: 25; 1995b: 26).
The OECD argued that shifting transfers towards more income-testing could 
weaken the unemployment trap, but would strengthen the poverty trap 
(1996a: 25). It noted that possible solutions to these problems included offering 
stronger financial incentives for claimants to take up work, targeting wage
33 The OECD argued in 1992 that the 'more generous' benefits of the 1970s appeared to have 
reduced the incentives for retraining and finding work in newly emerging jobs and skills 
(1992a: xi).
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subsidies at the long-term unemployed, and providing in-work benefits 
(1995b: 26). An interesting point here is that these solutions are not necessarily 
cheaper than providing benefits. As OECD social policy directorate head Peter 
Scherer notes:
Reform of systems of social protection is often represented as being 
synonymous with reductions in public expenditure. But ... the short- 
run budgetary costs of the measures to increase opportunities for the 
disadvantaged are unlikely to be less than those of the transfer 
systems they are intended to supersede (1997: 55).
This suggests that, despite the emphasis on the need to reform social transfers in 
order to control public spending, a clear aim of the reforms is changing 
individual behaviour.
In itself, the notion of benefits as 'disincentives' to work is not new, nor is the 
notion that there are people in society who are what the 1967 report (mentioned 
above) termed 'work shy' (1967c: 27).34 But the new paradigm's understanding 
of the causes of, and solutions to, the problem are quite different; the OECD's 
assumptions about individual behaviour leave it little option but to argue against 
such measures as income transfers. The OECD had noted the 'adverse incentive 
effects' of income support in its Public Expenditure on Income Maintenance 
Programmes in 1976. However, it also noted in this report that attitudes to the 
'problem of work disincentives' depended on 'value judgments concerning 
individualism versus social responsibility' (1976c: 91). It argued that, while there 
were cases of abuse of income maintenance programmes:
34 The 1967 report on help for the long-term unemployed demonstrates the different 
interpretations that the two paradigms under review have of a similar policy problem: long-term 
unemployment. The 1967 study examined the best means of achieving an 'active manpower policy' 
that would help the long-term unemployed 'become fully productive, self-dependent members of 
the society' (1967d: 28, 25). It noted:
If some proportion of them [those who cannot support themselves] could be checked 
from falling into such hopeless apathy as to accept their unemployment as 
permanent and beyond their control, the larger the contribution that would be made 
to both social welfare and the national economy and the smaller the number to be 
support by the [public] funds (1967d: 28).
On the surface, this appears to be a similar approach to that which the OECD advances to deal with 
unemployment in many of its more recent documents, and it is couched in similar terms, such as 
'active' and 'self-dependent'. However, where this discussion differed from those in the OECD's 
later documents was in the understanding of the responsibility for the problem and the solution. 
Although this report acknowledged that a proportion of those interviewed for the study (a quarter 
of the sample in the Netherlands), were 'work shy', the discussion did not suggest that this 
appellation applied to all long-term unemployed.
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the central question ... is how far any such cost ... is acceptable as a 
price that society is prepared to pay in return for such benefits as the 
relief of genuine hardship (as well as the reduction of industrial strife 
and social tensions), resulting from the existence of large scale 
programmes for income maintenance (1976c: 91).
In 1976, the doctrine of market failure and the understanding of the state having 
a responsibility to intervene directly to alleviate poverty weighted the equation 
towards social responsibility. The OECD's new paradigm prompted it to shift 
towards an emphasis on individual self-responsibility, especially in view of a 
growing belief that individuals were 'failing to behave in a socially responsible 
manner' (1999c: 101 ).35 As a result, the OECD's interpretation of what price 
society is prepared to pay is assessed through a framework that has a new 
understanding of roles and responsibilities and the impact of state action on 
individuals.
However, the OECD also justifies its emphasis on reducing social transfers on the 
grounds that it is simply pursuing a new means of achieving equity. That is, the 
OECD argued that, in urging members to reform the system of transfers in order 
to push people into work, it was simply achieving an old goal, equity, via a new 
means, employment, rather than income transfers. For example, it acknowledged 
that reducing the 'generosity' of transfers, while weakening both unemployment 
and poverty traps, 'may conflict with equity objectives' (1996a: 25).36 It argued 
that, for this reason, there 'may be a need to see the equity objectives pursued 
through social transfers in a more dynamic light' (1996a: 26). The 'dynamic light' 
was to see employment as a means of achieving equity. Thus, the OECD's 
solution to the lower benefits-lower equity dilemma was to encourage people to 
take jobs because it claimed that evidence from its member countries suggested 
that 'mobility of individuals over the earnings scale is substantial'. That is, 
people may start work in low-paid jobs, but would eventually move up the job 
ladder and earn more, thereby resolving the equity issue. The OECD 
argued: 'The implication [of earnings mobility] is that for some workers, getting a 
toehold in employment via a low-wage job may have a very beneficial impact on
The OECD noted in A Caring World that, in many countries, such a view had led to social 
assistance being made 'conditional on individual behaviour taking a certain form. Policy in many 
countries is moving towards reciprocity, with assistance ... being made conditional on efforts of the 
assistance recipients' (1999c: 101,102; emphasis in original).
36 That is, they may reduce the amount of redistribution.
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that person's lifetime income' (1996a: 26). It recognised that this result did not 
occur in all cases, and that some workers might experience 'extended periods of 
low pay'. However, it argued that this problem simply highlighted 'the 
importance of developing skills and competencies in order to enhance the 
earnings capacity of all members of the workforce' (1996a: 26). Here again, the 
OECD highlighted the negative consequences of social transfers, noting that 
transfers to boost the income of the low-paid created disincentives for them to 
better themselves and, hence, lowered their chances of finding higher-paid work. 
That is:
... where transfers and taxes lead to a significant compression of 
disposable income as compared with earnings, incentives for 
investing in human capital formation through education and training 
will become muted (1996a: 26).
The policy challenge for 'a caring world', then, was to balance income adequacy 
with incentives to be self-responsible and get a job, providing for the needy 
without encouraging dependence (Kalisch et al. 1998:130). Thus, the OECD 
argued, while assistance had to be at a level that ensured an 'adequate living 
standard' for the family requiring help, it also must be set at a level that was 
consistent with families regaining their autonomy by (re)entering the labour 
market (1999c: 101).37 The framework through which policy problems and 
solutions are interpreted remains consistent: the problem is that individuals are 
losing their autonomy because they choose to-receive benefits rather than work, 
thereby limiting their independence. State provision is not alleviating poverty, 
but is contributing to beneficiaries becoming stuck in 'poverty traps' of 
dependence on subsistence benefits. This means they are unable to 'enjoy' what 
the OECD calls 'the fruits of affluent societies' (1994:19). The OECD's solution, 
therefore, is to restore their autonomy by changing the incentives underpinning 
their choices and encouraging them to alter their behaviour. For example, tighter
37 The switch here from talking in terms of 'individuals' to talking in terms of 'families' may be 
related to the OECD's findings that 'households' with two earners were less likely to have incomes 
below the low-income threshold, were more likely to have shorter spells of low income, and were 
more apt to rise above the low-income threshold (1998b: 184). Thus, the OECD argued: 'Situations 
in which low wages are earned by [individual] members of households with adequate income overall 
are not necessarily inconsistent with the equity objectives' (1994b: xv; emphasis added). The OECD 
outlined similar arguments in its special chapter, 'Income Distribution and Poverty in Selected 
OECD Countries' (1997b: 49-59).
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eligibility for lower benefits would encourage people either to use their own 
resources or to intensify their search for work.
By the late 1990s, societies in the OECD's member countries were more affluent, 
but the 'fruits' were not evenly shared, and income gaps in most countries had 
widened considerably.38 Scherer claimed in 1997 that the 'change in income 
distribution and the growth of concern about its implications is new', noting 
that: at the time of the 'Welfare State in Crisis' conference in 1980:
concern about the distributional consequences of changes in tax and 
transfer systems was not high on the agenda, and is not raised in the 
discussion in The Welfare State in Crisis (OECD, 1981), other than in 
the context of suggesting that the egalitarian goals of the welfare state 
were inhibiting economic adjustment and growth (1997: 26, 28).
This overlooks the OECD's concerns with income distribution in the 1960s and 
the early 1970s. However, Scherer is not overly concerned with wider income 
distributions, stating:
It is a matter of debate whether a broadening in income distribution 
in itself -  provided it is not accompanied by an absolute fall in the 
incomes of poorer households -  is a matter of policy concern 
(1997: 28).
This view sits in decided contrast with the earlier concern to not only address 
absolute poverty, but to ensure that relative poverty was reduced or eliminated. It 
appears that, in the new economic environment, income inequality is not 
regarded as a serious problem; rather, it is considered, to an extent, to function as 
an engine of economic growth, encouraging people to strive to improve their 
situation. This is not to argue that the OECD ignored the broader income 
distribution. In fact, the increasing income disparity created two new policy 
concerns -  a decline in social cohesion and increased social exclusion -  that were 
reminiscent of the concern of the 1960s that an unhappy society is a volatile 
society.
38 In chapter three of A Caring World, the OECD gives a breakdown of income distribution in 13 of 
its member countries (1999c: 65-80). It notes that inequality in market income rose over time in 12 of 
the 13 countries, and inequality in disposable income rose in 10 of the 13 countries (1999c: 67). It 
observes: 'in all countries, inequality of disposable income is much less than that of market income, 
demonstrating that tax-transfer systems play a strong redistributive role' (1999c: 67).
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The concern with social cohesion had two components: one, noted by Secretary- 
General Donald Johnston, was the backlash against economic reforms as those at 
the bottom of the income distribution responded with social unrest and protests 
to an 'impression' that reforms placed 'too little emphasis on social objectives' 
(1997: 9). Johnston's solution was what he called a 'triangular paradigm' that 
gave 'proper recognition to each of the three crucial elements of progress ... 
economic growth, social stability and good governance' (1999: 3). The other 
component to social cohesion, noted by Scherer, occurred at the other end of the 
scale where the 'economic interests' of those who paid for income transfers 
diverged more from those of beneficiaries, 'leading to a loss of social cohesion' 
(1997: 14). The second new policy concern was the social exclusion of those 
suffering multiple disadvantages that went beyond poverty and included 
education, health, employment, race, housing, and family structure. The OECD 
observed that those marginalised by these factors were outside the mainstream, 
'dependent on benefits and excluded from the labour market and even from 
society' (1999c: 91). It noted that there were multiple costs to failing to prevent 
long-term exclusion in that those who were excluded could not 'fully contribute 
either in the labour market or in systems of family and social support' 
(1999c: 138). Nor were they able to participate in the active society, which 
contributed to a loss of social cohesion.39 A noteworthy point here is that social 
exclusion from the active society is interpreted as something that happens to the 
disadvantaged, but not the advantaged. That is, when the wealthy opt out of 
collective ventures in favour of private health, education, and so on, this is 
interpreted as contributing to a loss of social cohesion, but is not viewed as social 
exclusion, although the wealthy effectively are excluding themselves from 
participating in broader society.
Suggested policies to combat exclusion reflected the shift in social policy focus, 
and emphasised the need for increasing opportunities for the excluded to enter 
the labour market. For example, in A Caring World, 'Policies Against Exclusion' 
were discussed in subsection three of the chapter, 'Policy Challenges in 
Implementing Employment-Oriented Social Policies', following subsection two, 
'Making Work Pay' (1999c: 92-103). Although I have described social exclusion
39 We should note here that poverty has been subsumed into exclusion -  those who are denied 
opportunity for a variety of reasons. The aim of dealing with exclusion is to remove barriers to 
participation, not to ensure an equitable outcome. Once individuals can participate, they are on 
their own.
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as a 'new' problem in the late 1990s, I should note that the OECD first discussed 
it as a potential problem in 1988, noting in Fixe Future of Social Protection that it 
would have to be a major policy focus in the 1990s. However, the OECD 
mentioned social exclusion only fleetingly in 1994's New Orientations for Social 
Policy, before returning to the topic in the 1997 and 1999 papers quoted above, 
and in two separate volumes called Fixe Battle against Exclusion (1998c, 1998d).40 
These latter publications carried a statement on their back covers noting that 
poverty could 'tear at the fabric of society', but preventing hardship while 
reducing exclusion and marginalisation was 'no easy task'. Central questions, 
however, were:
How can social assistance best balance these goals, minimising 
disincentives to paid employment? What can be done to promote 
independence and individual responsibility?
The implication here is that, somehow, exclusion is a matter of individuals not 
taking responsibility for their actions, although the connection between some of 
the factors contributing to exclusion (for example, race and/or poor health and 
education) and self-responsibility is not necessarily clear. The OECD's 
statements continue in this vein, mentioning 'efficient use of resources' and 
stating that benefits 'cannot be raised too high because this would harm work 
incentives'. Thus, the thrust of policy solutions to exclusion is based on the new 
vision of state-society relations and human behaviour. The state's responsibility 
is limited to ensuring that rational individuals recognise their self-responsibility 
and choose the path to independence. All of which suggests that people choose 
to be excluded and can include themselves again when they elect to take a job.
To conclude this section, the OECD's discussions indicate that it has undergone a 
major shift in its central assumptions and concerns about social policy. This can
40 A 1998 report, compiled from member countries' responses to the OECD 'Caring World' 
questionnaire, noted that nearly all countries had highlighted that combating social exclusion was a 
policy concern, 'although the specific terminology of social exclusion was not widely used in a 
number of countries' (Kalisch et al. 1998:21). The authors note that:'Most countries did not 
provide a functional definition of "social exclusion", and many noted the absence of such a 
definition' (1998:21). However, they observe, the responses from both those countries which 
provided a working definition and those which did not 'indicated a broadly shared understanding 
of the concept' (1998: 22). In a footnote, they state that, although the term social exclusion has been 
used for some time, especially in Europe, 'it is rarely defined' (1998: 22, fn 6). That said, since this 
report was published, social exclusion has become an oft-used term, though it is still rarely defined. 
In Australia, The Australian newspaper organised a conference, 'Australia Unlimited', in May 1999, 
at which attendees heard a range of speakers give their views on this topic.
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be described schematically as a shift from a concern with outcomes 
(egalitarianism and reducing income inequality) to a concern with starting points 
(increasing opportunities to enter the labour market, which enables participation 
in society). These are different approaches, and reflect an associated shift in the 
understanding of the responsibilities of the state and the individual. In the 
words of the OECD's social affairs ministers in their communique after a meeting 
in June 1998, social policies today involve:
striking a balance between dignified self-reliance and social solidarity 
... individuals are increasingly expected to take as much 
responsibility for their lives as is possible (1999c: 148).
The 'frames and names' here reveal a new understanding of state-provided 
assistance: relying on others in this way (that is, not being 'self-reliant') is 
undignified. This view is in marked contrast to the earlier understanding of 
benefits as a means of allowing individuals to maintain their dignity and self­
responsibility. That is, in the past, benefits were seen to ensure that individuals 
were not forced to rely on the charity of others, especially that which may be tied 
to particular actions in return, and that they had the means to make and pursue 
their own choices.
Whereas, in the 1960s, the OECD would have backed state intervention to 
redistribute and decrease the inequality of income, the later focus has been on 
improving equality of opportunity. While this could suggest more state 
intervention in the areas of, say, health and education in order to resolve the 
multiple problems of the excluded, this is not possible within a framework that 
understands state intervention as inhibiting self-initiative and self-sufficiency. 
As Scherer comments about social exclusion:
The problem from a public policy perspective is that the proper 
boundaries of public concern are unclear: how is isolation resulting 
from individual choice to be distinguished from isolation imposed by 
lack of opportunity? (1997: 28).
Social policy, therefore, is now framed in terms of measures to encourage 
individuals to act on their own behalf.
In the late 1990s, the OECD considers increased social spending over the past 
30 years to have 'alleviated poverty', but claims that some of these social 
programmes had also 'distorted economic incentives', reducing employment and
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output (1996b: xiii). While it understood the importance of redistribution to 
alleviating poverty, it was anxious that redistribution also had negative effects. 
In its view, distributions of disposable income partly reflected the 'redistributive 
effects of taxes and transfers, and are central to the questions of poverty and the 
distribution of economic resources' (1996b: xiii). However, it fears that 
redistributive measures that 'heavily distort economic decisions' have adverse 
economic effects, and 'blunt growth'.41 From these arguments, it appears that the 
OECD has considerable trouble reconciling its claimed desire for better social 
outcomes with its understanding of the need for a limited role for the state.
For example, we should recall that, reflecting its new emphasis on 'social 
cohesion', the OECD argues that the commitment to support those who will 
never be able to hold well-paid, highly skilled positions 'will be a valuable 
investment towards a more cohesive and caring society' (1994a: 2). But it goes on 
to criticise the very policies that such a stance would suggest, saying that the 
capacity of economies to adjust had been progressively diminished over the past 
20-30 years, 'often as the unintended and unexpected side effect of policies put in 
place to regulate markets and to provide social protection' (OECD 1994a: 2). For 
example, it argued:
In the areas of labour market and social policies, benefit levels and 
structures have variously: encouraged a disproportionate share of the 
labour force in some countries to become registered as disabled; and 
reduced work incentives for the unemployed and low-wage workers 
through the interaction of tax and benefit systems (1994a: 2).
The organisation claimed that rigidities in member economies had inhibited 
growth and made economic recovery more inflation prone, and the 'ways in 
which most OECD countries sought to extend and deepen social protection have 
played an important role in this respect' (1995a: ix). In addition, it claimed that 
inflexibility had weakened the pace of potential growth in output and living 
standards, 'making it increasingly difficult to achieve social goals, and 
contributing significantly to rising unemployment' (1995a: ix). Thus, it argues 
against the very social protection it claims is needed, on the grounds that it 
results in more harm than good.
41 They also, however, have positive effects. A report in Family, Market and Community (1997c) 
notes that poverty rates are lower in countries with higher levels of social spending (Cantillon 
1997c: 121).
262 Social Justice
Transformation and the Implications for Social 
Justice
As noted in the opening sections of this chapter, under the OECD's Keynesian 
paradigm, markets were assumed to fail in some areas and the state was 
responsible for resolving consequent economic problems and supporting affected 
members of society until such problems had been fixed. In addition, the state 
had a range of social goals, including social justice objectives such as the 
redistribution of income. As a result, the paradigm linked social and economic 
policies in a particular way; economic policies were assessed in terms of what 
they contributed to society and how they affected the state's ability to meet 
society's desired goals. That is, under this framework, the economy was the 
servant of society. However, the OECD's new neo-liberal paradigm reversed this 
world-view, making society the servant of the economy. As a result, the 
organisation assessed social policies according to what they contributed to the 
economy and how they affected the functioning of the market and the behaviour 
of individuals acting within the market. For about two decades, from the mid- 
1970s to the mid-1990s, the OECD's economic analyses, as published in its major 
economic series, the Economic Outlook, ignored the specific achievement of social 
goals and focused on measures to mitigate the harmful effects of social policies 
on the economy. The implicit assumption was that removing impediments to the 
natural functioning of the market would lead to improved social outcomes, 
without direct state intervention.
By the mid-1990s, the desired social outcomes had not been achieved: income 
distribution was wider, poverty rates had not diminished, and there were new 
social concerns. Thus, when the OECD again focuses attention on social 
outcomes in the mid-1990s, it uses both old terms, such as poverty, and 
introduces new terms, such as social cohesion, social exclusion and 
marginalisation. It now subjects social goals to extensive commentary in the 
Economic Outlook, not only in the editorial, introduction and 'general economic 
assessment' sections of the documents, but also in separate 'special sections' or 
chapters. Its social policy documents emphasise the interconnections between 
'family, market, and community' and argue for policies to ensure 'a caring 
world'. On the surface, these discussions suggest that the OECD has returned to 
its earlier social concerns. Its explicit emphasis from the mid-1990s on economic 
and social goals suggest it is not subsuming the latter into the former as neo-
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liberal ideas would demand. That is, it would appear that, although the OECD is 
suggesting new means, it retains the same ends. The OECD itself presents its 
paradigm shift as an unproblematic change in means only (that is, it is still 
concerned with social issues and outcomes). It notes that its single-minded 
pursuit of the supply-side approach resulted in criticism of the organisation for 
being 'insensitive' to the negative consequences of such policies on the jobless, 
the ageing, and 'those incapable of adapting to a harsh new world' (Sullivan 
1997: 55).42 But it rejects such criticisms as 'nonsense' on the basis that '[njever 
before in its history had the Organisation been so deeply involved in analysing 
social issues and producing proposals to limit social damage' (Sullivan 1997: 55). 
It claims it has gone beyond supply-side theory to blend it with a sense of 'social 
obligation'.
However, the organisation overlooks the fact that the social issues on which it is 
focusing are not the same as before, despite the similar terminology, because they 
are interpreted through a new framework predicated on a new understanding of 
the world and its constituent state-society relations, roles, and responsibilities. 
That is, the OECD may believe that it is focusing more intently than previously 
on the social impact of its policies, but its understanding of problems and the 
range of viable solutions is guided by its new world-view. This is not to argue 
that old problems necessarily simply disappear or are no longer considered, but 
that the approach to these problems has shifted dramatically, resulting in a new 
vision of old problems such that they may be neither recognisable nor 
comprehensible (this will be explored further below). As outlined in the 
previous chapter, the new framework -  neo-liberalism -  interprets policy 
problems and solutions through a lens that understands problems as related to 
too much state intervention (of a particular kind) and too little individual self­
responsibility. In addition, the neo-liberal paradigm casts the blame for many 
problems on impediments to the working of the free market. Both economic and 
social issues are now subject to assumptions that the state's role should be 
limited to actions that do not interfere with the functioning of the market and 
that encourage individuals to become self-responsible economic agents. These 
assumptions eliminate many of the previously accepted methods for achieving 
social goals, and also change what can be considered to be acceptable or 
'legitimate' social objectives. The assumptions of a decreased and limited role for
42 Sullivan notes that, in France, the OECD was dubbed 'the house of the single policy' (1997: 55).
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the state, and an increased role for individual self-responsibility, leave no option 
but to reinterpret social policy objectives. State intervention to achieve equality 
or redistribution is no longer desirable, nor is it comprehensible, in a framework 
that understands inequality as providing incentives for individuals to better 
themselves and social transfers as having negative consequences for the economy 
and for individuals (creating disincentives to work or improve skills).
Thus, although the OECD talks about economic and social goals, its neo-liberal 
paradigm subordinates the latter to the former. Economic and social issues are 
not seen to have equal weight, because the lens through which social objectives 
are viewed is distorted by a paradigm that filters the priority of such objectives 
by how much they contribute to a positive economic performance. The paradigm 
gives priority to economic considerations, with social concerns coming second. 
We can recall here, for example, the OECD's claim that: 'Society and the State 
have largely failed to evaluate their social welfare policies thoroughly' 
(1985c: 57). That is, according to the OECD, public spending and too much state 
intervention are problems in and of themselves, and contribute to the problems 
of rising numbers of poor and excluded in that they create the wrong incentives 
for individuals. Given this interpretation of the problems, the only option 
comprehensible to the OECD is to urge greater reliance on the market. This is 
not to argue that the OECD demands no state intervention to deal with poverty 
and social exclusion, or that it ignores former goals such as equality and a 
narrower distribution of income. Rather, the point is that, when evaluating and 
weighing social and economic concerns, it gives greater weight to the latter 
because it understands this path to be the better route to resolve the problems in 
the former. For example, the OECD complains in Economic Outlook 60 (1996b) 
that, when governments try to resolve the conflict between social and economic 
objectives, 'the line of least resistance too often gives economic objectives and ... 
intergenerational equity too little weight' (1996b: 22). That is, the OECD accepts 
that the 'the weight that is given to competing considerations in making policy 
decisions is ultimately political', but it then laments that the 'complexity of most 
political situations' makes it difficult for governments to prioritise the most 
economically efficient options (1996b: 22).43
43 The OECD notes in Economic Outlook 58 (1995b) that meeting existing and medium-term 
challenges would require 'politically difficult decisions':
265 Social Justice
Later in this edition of the Outlook, the OECD acknowledges member concerns 
that income inequality is increasing, and their fears for subsequent adverse social 
and economic consequences, but it is more concerned that any efforts to reduce 
inequality do not 'negatively affect employment opportunities or work 
incentives' (1996b: 21). The measures it recommends that states pursue in order 
to encourage individuals to take jobs, such as decreasing benefits and lowering 
minimum wages to ensure that more work is available, may exacerbate income 
inequality. In a similar vein, its focus on 'the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
major social programmes' (1985c: 54), inevitably shifts its policy goals because it 
concentrates on an economic assessment of individual programmes rather than 
the overall objectives of policy. In doing so, the more general concern with 
income equality is subsumed into specific concerns with efficiency. As Saunders 
notes:
The concepts of efficiency and effectiveness are used to refer to 
aspects internal to the operation of specific programs, rather than in 
relation to more general, societal concerns. This increasing focus on 
individual programs has been reinforced by the replacement of 
concerns about equality -  issues of relevance in a broad social context 
-  fwithj the concern with effectiveness -  an issue which is again of 
more immediate relevance to individual social programs (1990:15).44
Such a shift enables a new focus on the market as the most 'efficient' means for 
achieving social goals, allowing the transfer of more of the state's previous roles 
to the market, without any recognition that the shift also significantly alters the 
goals themselves. Thus, the OECD's framework modifies its views of the state's 
overall social policy concerns. The organisation's discursive shift from the term 
'equality' to that of 'equity' can be seen as an indication of this modification. It 
may also reflect that such goals are now subordinate to economic goals.
The neo-liberal paradigm transforms the OECD's understanding of social 
problems and how they are to be addressed in that its vision of state-society 
relations changes the understanding of responsibility for the cause and resolution 
of such problems as well as the range of policy options that can be considered.
Concerns that fiscal retrenchment may have a negative impact on activity and 
employment and that it could exacerbate social problems and hardship in the short 
term often lead to reluctance to act (1995b: 7).
44 An additional point here is that minor or incremental changes to achieve efficiency in a specific 
programme may have more significant effects than is recognised. See the discussion in Chapter 3 
on the impact of incremental change.
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We should recall from Chapter 2 Mark Blyth's claim that ideas set out the 
optimal state of affairs by defining what elements constitute the economy and the 
polity, the roles of individuals and groups, and proper and improper 
relationships. These definitions underlie what is deemed to be possible in terms 
of means and goals. Thus, the neo-liberal way of thinking about government 
offers a new understanding of what the state should and should not do. The neo­
liberal interpretation affects both the definition of policy problems and the range 
of plausible remedies (that is, it offers a new 'regime of truth'). Accordingly, the 
OECD's suggested policy solutions are based on a decreased level of 
responsibility for the state and an increased level of responsibility for 
individuals, especially in light of its new understanding of individuals as 
rational, self-interested maximisers looking to take advantage of state generosity. 
That is, there is a new view, as discussed earlier, of individual behaviour. As 
Nikolas Rose observes: 'All aspects of social behaviour are now reconceptualized 
along economic lines -  as calculative actions undertaken through the universal 
human faculty of choice' (1999:141; emphasis in original). The state can 
manipulate the elements factored into these calculations, thereby shaping 
individual choices (Rose 1999:142).
The result of the paradigm shift, then, is that the OECD's understanding and 
treatment of social justice and related issues changes in two fundamental ways. 
First, social outcomes are no longer considered to be the preserve of the state. 
Rather, the state is to focus on ensuring that individuals have the opportunities to 
achieve the desired outcomes for themselves. For example, equality is no longer 
considered to be solely a product of market failure that the state must intervene 
to resolve; rather, it is a problem of individuals not having an opportunity, or 
failing to take advantage of an opportunity, to increase their potential. Thus, the 
solution is not a state responsibility, but an individual one. In a similar vein, the 
state's responsibility for poverty alleviation is to be constrained to ensuring that 
individuals have the opportunity to participate in the market. Second, and 
perhaps more important, previously accepted goals, such as equality and income 
redistribution, are no longer considered to be as desirable as they once were. In 
fact, the new paradigm understands an (unspecified) degree of inequality as 
being good for both individuals and the economy, at least in the short run, in that 
a 'wider distribution' of income provides individuals with incentives to improve 
their positions. We have already noted the OECD's observation that ‘[e\xcessive
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inequality of both income and wealth, which may arise from unfettered play of 
market forces, is widely considered unjust' (1996b: 36; emphasis added). The 
interpretation of 'excessive', of course, depends on the assessment criteria of the 
framework being used. According to the OECD's framework, any initial 
disparity of income would be offset, either fully or partially, in the long term 
through higher employment, increased scope for people to gain an initial 
foothold in the labour market, and stronger incentives for 'human capital 
formation' (1997a: 12). This is not to argue that the OECD is against a more 
equitable distribution of income; rather, it is against state intervention to achieve 
such an outcome.
Frames, Names, and Informal Institutions
Thus far in this chapter, I have presented an argument for a transformation in the 
OECD's understanding and treatment of social justice and related issues. In this 
final section, I want to argue that this transformation reveals that ideas can be 
changed. The renewed focus on social issues in the 1990s, as outlined at the 
beginning of this chapter, can be seen as a re-framing of the issues to allow the 
pursuit of policies based on the new understanding of problems and solutions. It 
may also reflect that the informal institutions of the new paradigm are 
considered to have infiltrated social consciousness such that the public now 
accepts the new mechanisms to handle new understandings of social problems 
and solutions. That is, the public now accepts the frames and names that suggest 
(among other things):
• that former conceptions of social justice and related issues are no longer 
affordable
• that the unemployed are bludgers who choose to be without work and who 
need to be coerced back into work through cutting their 'generous' benefits, 
and
• that social transfers encourage some people to be lazy at the expense of those 
who are prepared to work.
This shift in informal institutions from those underpinning collective 
responsibility to those of individual responsibility suggests that there are 
problems with the arguments for path dependency and institutional lock-in with 
regard to the welfare state. That is, institutions are less resistant to change than
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some scholars argue.45 The OECD's new ideas mean that its old understandings 
of social justice -  and previously accepted policies and actions to achieve social 
justice -  are no longer plausible to the organisation or to the wider public because 
the foundations on which they were based have changed. Thus, when the OECD 
talks of social issues and outcomes, including those related to social justice, it is 
generally not talking about the same issues with which it was concerned 30 and 
40 years ago, in terms of either methods or goals. Nor does the public necessarily 
still understand social justice in the same way, although the resistance that the 
OECD reports to its reform agenda suggests that there may be some residual 
impact from the earlier informal institutions (see below).
The neo-liberal understanding of state-society relations, and its associated view 
of individuals and their likely behaviour, rules out many of the earlier methods 
and goals. For example, as discussed above, 'generous' state benefits and/or 
transfers to redistribute income are now regarded negatively because they are 
considered to be outside the state's area of responsibility and to create the wrong 
incentives for individuals to make efforts on their own behalf. As a result, state 
redistribution can no longer be considered a social policy goal. Thus, although 
the OECD talks of the aim of economic reform as being to improve economic 
performance, thereby 'generating the resources needed to achieve better 
redistribution of income and other social goals' (1996a: 23), it cannot mean state 
distribution of such resources. Rather, it must be a vision in which those who 
participate in a healthy economy can obtain their share of resources as a reward 
for their own efforts. In addition, the paradigm constrains what the state can do 
when it tries to comprehend and resolve 'new' social issues, such as social 
exclusion, and when it tries to deal with the effects of some of its economic 
policies on issues such as equality and fairness and on social cohesion.
The changes described above cannot be divorced from informal institutions in 
that the new understanding of state-society relations incorporates and reinforces 
a new set of informal institutions that underpin the new policy directions. The 
OECD's new informal institutions are revealed clearly in the discourse it uses to 
discuss policy problems and solutions; that is, in the 'frames and names' it uses 
to portray policy issues and describe potential solutions. Using Bacchi's notion
45 YVe should recall here the arguments for the tenacity of the welfare state canvassed in Chapter 2. 
Scholars cited included Pierson (1994,1996), Keating (2000b: 58, 59), and Kuhnle (2000).
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of 'problematisations', as discussed in Chapter 2, these 'frames and names' are 
revealed in how the OECD presents the answers to two major questions: 'what is 
the problem?' and 'who has the problem?'. As outlined above, the OECD 
considers the problem to be too much direct state intervention and too little 
individual self-responsibility. Thus, the state and individuals have the problem, 
which can be resolved through rearranging state-society roles and 
responsibilities. It is through using these 'frames and names' that the OECD 
shifts public understanding of policy problems and solutions to that of the new 
paradigm. That is, discussion that frames many formerly accepted social goals as 
'illegitimate' or the result of state aid being too 'generous', thereby creating 
'disincentives' for individual self-responsibility, attacks the previous informal 
institutions underpinning support for the old policies and replaces them with the 
new informal institutions underpinning the new policies. In a similar vein, the 
discourse of 'rights and responsibilities' replaces former notions of an extensive 
range of social rights with a new set of norms, values, and attitudes that 
emphasise individual responsibilities.46
Informal institutions are important to the implementation of new policy 
directions because a disjuncture between informal institutions and policy 
proposals creates public discontent with policy, as described in Chapter 3. Some 
of the OECD's discussions suggest that it is aware of the need to change society's 
informal institutions in order to facilitate the acceptance of the new policy 
directions. I have already noted the organisation's concern with social cohesion 
and Johnston's fear of a backlash from those who have the 'impression' that 
reforms place 'too little emphasis on social objectives' (1997: 9). Such a backlash 
can be seen as reflecting the tension between policies based on a new 
understanding of state-society relations and society's existing norms and 
expectations. The OECD acknowledges that its members are facing problems 
with poverty and exclusion and that there is concern that 'rising wage and 
income inequality have had adverse social consequences' (1996b: xii-xiii). It also 
acknowledges that there is concern that pressures for fiscal consolidation and
46 On this point, see the discussion in Dean (2004). See also Jacob Torfing, who argues for a 
discursive shift in which the 'enterprising society' has replaced 'full employment' and 
'independence and opportunity' have replaced 'solidarity and equality' (1999: 240). It is also useful 
to recall here Chris Rudd's observation, noted in Chapter 3, that, in the wake of several years of 
neo-liberal reforms, New Zealanders have shifted from supporting a 'desirable' welfare state to 
thinking in terms of an 'affordable' welfare state (2001: 425).
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other reforms may affect 'the public sector's ability to deal with social problems' 
(1996b: xiii).47
These observations indicate that the OECD is aware of public concern over both 
social issues and the impact of economic reform measures on social objectives. 
But it is also aware of the difference between the old and new informal 
institutions, and the need to shift the public between the two. It noted in 
Economic Outlook 56 (1994b), for example, the difficulties of achieving public 
expenditure reforms in the face of 'entrenched expectations of acquired rights 
and implicit social contracts' (1994b: xiii). Later, Johnston explicitly 
acknowledged the need to change such 'entrenched expectations'. He noted in 
1997 that, although the 'language of sacrifice is not designed to win hearts and 
minds', the 'message' that the OECD wanted to 'promote' was that controlling 
public-sector deficits and debt was a 'necessary condition' for maintaining social 
protection and social well-being in future years (1997: 10). Thus, its suggested 
method to tackle the public concern over social issues and economic reforms is to 
shift public opinion and the framework of informal institutions on which it is 
based. That is, it argues that the acquiescence of governments to the line of least 
resistance:
points to the importance of improved communication and informed 
public debate in order to enhance public understanding, and to 
develop a broad consensus that cuts across the political spectrum, 
about the need to give adequate weight to both micro- and 
macroeconomic consequences of various policy decisions. This is 
particularly important where decisions are largely driven by non­
economic objectives (1996b: 22).
In other words, it wants more efforts made to convince the public of the need to 
focus more on the economic concerns because it believes that the market is the 
best means to raise both living standards and generate the means to support 'the 
displaced and the excluded' (1996b: xii). According to the OECD's world-view, a 
flexible, productive economy reduces the number of those seeking state support
47 That is, it notes that, social transfers are such an important part of budgets that measures to 
restore sound public finances are likely to 'puf pressure on governments' ability to pursue social 
objectives' and policy-makers face problems 'finding ways to manage the social aspects of carrying 
through effective reform' (1996b: 21).
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and provides the resources to support those who are not active market 
participants.48
Conclusion
The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that the OECD's new ideas have 
transformed the organisation's understanding and treatment of social justice and 
related issues, which counters the claim in the literature that new ideas have little 
impact because they cannot overcome old ideas embedded in institutions. The 
OECD's new paradigm has brought a new interpretation of state-society 
relations, roles, and responsibilities and a new range of informal institutions that 
underpin this interpretation and make it comprehensible to the public. Under 
the new framework, the OECD takes a different approach to social policy, 
assessing policies in terms of what they add to the economy, how they affect the 
market, and whether they reflect the right balance between state and individual 
responsibilities. As a result, the new ideas constrain the available options for 
both the means and ends of social policy, including those related to social justice. 
The result is a new conception of social justice, based on a profoundly different 
understanding of state-society relations and the inherent obligations, rights, and 
responsibilities of state and the individuals comprising society. The new 
informal institutions reflect the new paradigm's understanding of the world and 
provide justifications for -  and an acceptance of -  a new range of policies. Thus, 
neo-liberal ideas have had a more profound effect on policy means and goals 
than the literature suggests, which means that ideas are not embedded as firmly 
in institutions as many scholars claim.
In the OECD's words:
The adverse effects on particular groups or individuals of the rapid changes 
sometimes associated with competitive markets and technological advances can be 
addressed by enhancing OECD societies' capacity to adapt constructively, rather 
than attempting to slow the pace of change. In the final analysis, the productivity 
improvements which competitive processes and technological advance generate are 
the main source of rising living standards. They will also provide the means for 
increased support for the displaced and the excluded, and in particular for 
programmes to help re-integrate them (1996b: xi-xii).
Conclusion
T T  aving spent much of the previous chapter exploring the implications of a 
JL -L paradigm shift on the OECD's understanding and treatment of social 
justice and related issues, I need hardly repeat that discussion here. Instead, I 
want to return to the more general context of the OECD and the need to pay 
more attention to both the organisation and its ideas. As noted in the 
Introduction to this thesis and in Chapter 1, the OECD is one of the most well- 
known, but least studied, of the world's inter-governmental organisations. A 
quick glance through any library catalogue reveals a large number of works by 
the OECD or about its member countries, but almost nothing on the organisation 
itself. What material is available tends to be buried within broader analyses of 
multilateral organisations and is usually a cursory discussion of the OECD's 
major functions.1 Even the spectacularly disastrous Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment, which was vilified, ultimately, by anti-globalisation protesters and 
governments alike, failed to catapult the OECD into the centre of scholarly 
endeavour. Rather, the organisation remains a convenient grouping with which 
to study a broad range of topics. In a similar vein, the media has spumed the 
OECD itself in favour of a focus on the organisation's seemingly endless stream 
of statistics, surveys, and reports, which it covers without reference to the context 
of their sponsor. It appears that Cinderella, having tripped the light fantastic 
with the MAI, has turned back into a scullery maid.
It is difficult to understand why the body representing many of the world's 
richest countries should attract so little attention. In a recent work examining 
globalisation, David Held and Anthony McGrew note that: 'the structure of the
1 The recent volume from Nicholas Bayne and Stephen Woolcock, for example, incorporates its 
discussion of the OECD in a chapter on 'plurilateral' and multilateral organisations, including the 
G-7/G-8, the Commonwealth, the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank. See Bayne (2003).
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world economic activity is dominated (and increasingly so) by the OECD 
economies and the growing links between them' (2002: 40). They cite sceptics of 
globalisation theory as arguing that the world remains divided into 'core and 
periphery', with 'institutions of liberal global governance, such as the IMF and 
the WTO', policing 'this pattern of international economic activity' (2002: 84-85). 
Given the OECD's mechanisms of multilateral surveillance and peer pressure to 
keep its members 'in step', I see no reason to discount the OECD's role as an 
international sheriff. In addition, Nicholas Bayne argues that the OECD is one of 
the international organisations which sets standards in the international 
economy, whose endorsement governments value, and which governments do 
not like to go against (2003:230). Further, he argues that its 'underlying 
motivation is political, to support the open democratic system', and that it 'goes 
deep into domestic policy-making' (2003: 238-239; emphasis in original). He also 
claims that it has 'the gift of supplying governments with good ideas they can 
then pretend they thought of themselves' (2003:239). Why, then, has the 
organisation been subject to so little scrutiny?
I noted in the Introduction the arguments that some of the organisations created 
after World War II, including the OECD, have 'had their day'. In Chapter 1, I 
examined claims that the OECD is a toothless watchdog that has no powers that 
it can use to force its members to pursue its recommended policies; rather, it is 
'all bark and no bite', using accumulated evidence to shepherd its members into 
taking the desired action. Such an image of an out-dated organisation that has no 
real influence may explain why both academics and journalists have chosen not 
to waste time investigating the OECD. If it serves no useful purpose, and it has 
publicly demonstrated through the failed MAI that it cannot get its members to 
agree to a binding deal, then why should anyone care what it says or does? My 
argument, as outlined in Chapter 1, is that an interpretation of the OECD as an 
organisation without 'fangs' neglects the impact of the mechanisms noted above 
(multilateral surveillance and peer pressure) and the fact that 'technical' advice 
and measures may not be as benign as they appear. Much depends on what is 
being measured, how, and in what context; details that the media usually fails to 
report.
However, both of these reasons for being more 'alert and alarmed' (to twist a 
current Australian phrase) about the OECD relate to its role as an ideas monger
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or epistemic community whose ideas may come to both construct the 'reality' or 
'truth' of the situations that face policy-makers and delineate the options from 
which policy-makers select solutions. That is, states are increasingly turning to 
international organisations as independent, authoritative sources of ideas and 
solutions to help them cope in an increasingly complex, interdependent world. 
As a result, epistemic communities such as the OECD have the ability to 
stimulate policy discussions and, importantly, to set both the parameters of what 
may be discussed and the terms of the discourse. Its opinions carry weight 
because it is seen to offer the professional, scientific, rational, and technical 
advice that has come to be associated with modern bureaucracies, and that 
appears to respond to the 'growing technical nature of problems' (Haas 1992: 11). 
This view returns us to Bayne's observation that the OECD is a source of 'good 
ideas' for its members. My concern here is with Bayne's further observation that 
the OECD is not as accountable or transparent as it would appear at first glance. 
Bayne claims that the organisation's transparency is in output, rather than input:
Since the OECD produces voluntary cooperation rather than formal 
agreements, very little of its work actually has to go to parliaments. 
Hardly anyone gets into the meetings where deals are struck except 
government officials (or sometimes ministers) and OECD staff 
(2003: 239).
Given the OECD's role as an ideas monger, and the fact that at least 40,000 senior 
officials from national administrations attend OECD committee meetings each 
year to 'request, review and contribute to' the Secretariat's work (OECD 2001c), 
not to mention take the resulting work home with them, this would strongly 
suggest that further investigation of the OECD's ideas is imperative.2
Of course, such a demand for further investigation of the OECD's ideas rests on 
the assumption that ideas matter to policy-making. I noted in the Introduction 
and in Chapter 2 that the role of ideas in policy-making is the subject of some 
discussion in the literature. Key debates include whether ideas are an 
independent variable or whether their impact depends on interest groups, elites, 
or institutional structures. I placed my examination of the OECD's underlying 
framework of ideas within the debate over the role of institutions, using it to 
explore the claim that new ideas have little impact in practice because existing
2 I say 'at least 40,000 senior officials' because the OECD says 40,000, but critic Pierre Gelinas claims 
that, each year, 'some 60,000 senior civil servants and politicians of all kinds file into its Chateau de 
la Muette offices in Paris to retrain themselves in neoliberal policy and management' (2003:120).
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ideas are 'embedded in institutions'.3 As outlined in Chapter 2, the argument 
here is that 'history matters': policy-makers are tied to an earlier set of ideas 
because these ideas have been incorporated into the institutions that implement 
and enforce policy. These institutions include formal organisational structures 
(rules, laws, departments, and so on) and informal normative structures (the 
taken-for-granted or unconscious assumptions behind policy practice and 
discourse). Such institutions are said to make policy-makers path dependent; 
that is, allegedly they are confined to examining current problems with reference 
to past solutions. As a result, they find it difficult, if not impossible, to 
implement radical change because they are tied to existing policy options 
delineated by the ideas embedded in institutions. Yet, as was noted in Chapter 2, 
this does not explain how and why radical, rapid policy change occurs. (On this 
point, it is interesting that those scholars who use 'embedded' arguments to 
explain the alleged tenacity of the welfare state fail to explain the radical change 
in ideas that brought about the welfare state in the first place. That is, they 
appear to accept an initial transformation in ideas, but do not allow that such an 
event could recur.)
It is here that my examination of the shift in the OECD's underlying framework 
of ideas may offer some insights to advance the debate over the role of ideas in 
policy-making vis-ä-vis institutions. Looking at the OECD, there has been a 
distinct and obvious shift in the framework of ideas within which the 
organisation locates its analyses of policy problems and solutions, from 
Keynesianism to what it calls the 'supply-side approach', but what I (and others) 
have called neo-liberalism. I described this change in framework, using Hall's 
Kuhnian-influenced model, as a paradigm shift. We should recall that Kuhn 
describes such a shift as a 'revolution': 'When the transition is complete, the
3 These debates are still current and, in some senses, look to be no closer to resolution. Two recent 
articles, for example, come to opposing conclusions. Ian Bartle examines telecommunications and 
electricity reforms in Germany, France, and Britain, and rejects path dependence and the 
importance of initial choices on the grounds that the three countries reviewed took different paths 
and made different choices, yet all have 'moved to full liberalisation and, where appropriate, 
privatisation' (2002: 22). Martin Powell and Armando Barrientos examine welfare regimes in the 
wake of the introduction of 'active labour market policies' and argue that the differentiation 
between welfare state regimes (a la Esping-Andersen) is stronger in the 1990s than in the 1980s, 
'suggesting welfare regime path dependence' (2004: 96). That said, they note that they have looked 
at aggregate spending and observe that they do not know how 'decomposing' aggregate spending 
would affect their analysis (2004: 97-98). I discussed in Chapter 3 the inaccurate conclusions that 
may arise from looking only at aggregate expenditure.
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profession will have changed its view of the field, its methods and its goals' 
(1970: 85). Thus, the new paradigm is not simply a different view of how the 
world works, it is how the world works. In this way, it acts as a 'regime of truth', 
which gives the ideas a legitimacy that competing points of view cannot claim. 
Alternative conceptions of policy problems and solutions, couched in different 
terms and based on a different understanding of how the world works, can be 
dismissed as being outside the sphere of the current policy discussion. They are, 
as noted in Chapter 2, 'unintelligible' and 'beyond the pale of accepted 
argument'.
As outlined in Chapters 5 and 6, the OECD presents the shift in its world-view as 
an unproblematic, and non-political, change in the means by which it achieves 
the same set of ends (or goals). I have argued, on the contrary, that the move 
should be considered political, both because it has transformed the political 
arrangement of state-society relations, roles, and responsibilities and because it 
was the result of political contestation. I do not intend to repeat here the 
implications of this shift for the OECD's understanding and treatment of social 
justice and related issues, which I canvassed in detail in Chapter 6. Rather, I note 
only that the shift is much more problematic for the organisation's treatment of 
social issues, including social justice, than it acknowledges. That is, the OECD's 
new attitude to social justice is not as sympathetic as it appears at first glance, or 
that those who look only at a scattering of its publications often assume.4
My broader point in relation to the effect of ideas on institutions is that those 
who argue that ideas are embedded in institutions need to pay more attention to 
the informal institutions associated with a set of ideas. As noted in Chapter 3, a 
new paradigm brings with it a new set of informal institutions (or norms, values, 
attitudes, implicit codes of conduct, and so on) arising from its particular 
arrangement of social and political relations. These informal institutions change
4 See, for example, Neil Gilbert, who finds that the OECD's 'advice to limit or redefine entitlements 
is often qualified by an affirmation of social rights' (1995: 66), a claim that is difficult to support if 
more than a few of its publications are examined and the context of its framework for analysis is 
taken into account. In a similar vein, John Donald claims that the OECD (among other multilateral 
organisations) has shifted back from its neo-liberal stance towards a 'middle way' (2000:1). 
Unfortunately, he cites only the OECD's A Caring World, which results in his missing the broader 
context of the organisations understanding of social issues and thus misinterpreting the 
organisation's statements.
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the way of understanding government, the nature and scope of legitimate 
authority, and who and what is to be governed and how. This new 
understanding means that interpretations of policy problems and solutions are 
based on a new set of assumptions about state and society, and the roles and 
responsibilities of each sphere. Thus, new ideas change the very foundations on 
which formal institutions are built and maintained, including public 
understandings of state-society relations and the expectations that citizens have 
of the state and of themselves. Even when policy changes introduced under a 
new paradigm appear to be incremental, which some scholars take to indicate the 
resilience of existing ideas and institutions, such changes reflect the larger shift in 
the framework within which the understanding of policy problems and solutions 
is located. Again, I do not intend to reiterate the implications of such incremental 
changes, which I canvassed in Chapter 3. I note only Kees van Kersbergen's 
useful summary of this hypothesis: that small adjustments 'weaken vested 
interests, change ideas and approaches, alter public attitudes, transform the 
normative and political discourse on the welfare state, and cause instability and a 
greater susceptibility to fundamental change' (2000: 29). Viewed in this way, a 
new paradigm can be seen to undermine institutional stability, thereby 
challenging the notion that earlier ideas are embedded firmly in institutions.
Some of the arguments for institutional stability canvassed in Chapter 3 
suggested that fears of electoral backlash from existing interests are another 
reason that new ideas have little effect in practice. One problem with this 
explanation is that it assumes that interests are fixed, taking no account of the 
ways in which, as Mark Blyth argues, ideas act to redefine existing interests, and 
even create new ones. Moreover, claims that changes to institutions, and 
especially informal institutions, are driven from the 'bottom up' (from society to 
the state) overlook the impact of a paradigm's intrinsic discourse, or the 'frames 
and names' it uses to describe policy issues. These 'frames and names' help to 
establish and reinforce the 'regime of truth' through which both policy-makers 
and citizens understand the world and what is possible within it. As this 
discourse is adopted and used, it comes to permeate society as the values, 
attitudes, beliefs, and social mores that support the paradigm's established order. 
It becomes the taken-for-granted, common-sense context through which ideas are 
interpreted and understood. That is, as outlined in Chapter 2, the discourse that 
articulates the paradigm's organisation of social and political relations permeates
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society, becoming the lingua franca in which policy issues are discussed and 
resolved. Alternative conceptions of policy problems and solutions, couched in 
different terms and based on a different understanding of how the world works, 
can be dismissed as being outside the sphere of the current policy discussion.
Thus, the discourse intrinsic to a set of ideas forms and maintains the informal 
institutions that support the paradigm's established order and its associated 
formal institutions, and attacks and replaces the informal institutions of the 
earlier paradigm.* 5 An approach to the role of ideas in policy-making that pays 
attention to their discourse is likely to prove a useful addition to the explanations 
of how ideas matter. For example, it may offer insights for those scholars, 
including Mark Blyth, who seek clarification of the mechanism through which 
ideas pass 'from academic debate to popular consciousness' (1997a: 237). That is, 
to return to Keynes's eloquent terms noted in Chapter 2, Blyth wants to know 
more about the means by which 'madmen in authority' and the general public 
come to accept the ideas of some 'academic scribblerfs]' over others. I suggest 
that it may be beneficial to explore the effect of discourse in this process. Second, 
it may add to the explanations of scholars who see ideas as important, but who 
offer only partial explanations of how and why they are important. John 
Kingdon, for example, argues that, although ideas 'sweep policy communities 
like fads, ... government does not act on ideas quickly. To become a basis for 
action, an idea must both sweep a community and endure' (1984:137). He 
contends that policy entrepreneurs have to 'soften up' policy communities and 
larger publics in order to have their ideas endure, but an idea's intrinsic 
discourse is not among the 'softening up' mechanisms he puts forward 
(1984: 134).6 It is worth recalling here the discussion in Chapter 2 of the influence
5 I would note here the recently published work in this area of Hartley Dean, who has explored the
effect of 'third way' discourse on notions of citizenship (2004: 65-82). See also Lister et al.
(2003: 235-253).
5 This is an interesting shortcoming in Kingdon's discussion. He notes that consensus on an idea 
spreads through a policy community through awareness of the problems and agreement on 
solutions or proposals, and that there is what he calls a 'bandwagon effect' (1984:147). He 
observes:
Gradually, the idea catches on. People in and around government speak of a 
'growing realisation,' an 'increasing feeling,' a 'lot of talk in the air,' and 'coming to a 
conclusion.' After some degree of diffusion, there seems to be a take-off point: Many 
people are discussing the proposal or idea. At that point, knowledgeable people 
refer to a 'widespread feeling,' or ... 'by now, this is orthodox thinking (1984:147).
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of the 'there is no alternative' discourse in enabling a particular set of policy 
options at the expense of others.
I noted both at the outset of my thesis and at the beginning of my conclusion that 
there was a distinct lack of scholarly and media scrutiny of the organisation, and 
I asked why this should be so, given the combined weight of its members in the 
international arena. Another obvious question is whether we should care that we 
know so little about the organisation. I would argue that the answer to this 
question is an emphatic 'yes'. As noted in Chapter 1, the OECD is an 
autonomous site of authority through the legitimacy of the rational-legal 
authority it embodies and its control over technical expertise. It is seen as a 
source of independent, neutral, authoritative, 'good' (says Bayne) ideas that its 
members can then 'pretend to have thought of themselves'. Yet, it is also an 
epistemic community driven by its own, particular set of ideas about the world 
and how it works, and these ideas establish the boundaries of its vision of policy 
problems and solutions. Thus, when policy-makers consult the OECD, they 
receive its version of 'the "reality" or "truth" of the situation at hand' (Haas 
1992: 21). An important feature of this 'reality' is that it is not neutral between 
political arrangements of state-society relations, roles, and responsibilities, but 
confers legitimacy on one arrangement over others.
This suggests that, if the organisation is an epistemic community whose version 
of reality its members come to accept and utilise, then we need to know more 
about these ideas and, equally importantly, their implications. For example, if 
the OECD is able to endorse its particular interpretation of social justice to the 
exclusion of others, such that those offering alternative interpretations are seen as 
'unintelligible, mad, or at least beyond the pale of accepted argument' (Keeley 
1990: 91), then we need to be aware of exactly what it is endorsing. To return to 
Carol Bacchi's argument: we need to know what the OECD is presenting as the 
problem, what presuppositions are implied or taken for granted, and what effects 
are connected to this representation. As outlined in Chapter 6, the implications 
of the OECD's treatment of social justice are more significant than the 
organisation acknowledges. This raises questions about the implications of the
My suggestion is that discourse is an important element in this diffusion process; it is the 'talk in 
the air' that establishes the 'widespread feeling' and, ultimately, the 'orthodox thinking'. Kingdon 
acknowledges the diffusion, but not the mechanism via which this occurs.
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OECD's ideas on other policy areas. Bayne notes that the OECD 'covers all the 
subjects of interest to governments, from agriculture to transport and including 
education and employment, but none of the political ones -  no defence, law and 
order, culture or sport' (2003: 238). I would suggest that, even without these 
'political' topics, scholars are left with considerable scope for their investigations. 
My focus was on the OECD's representation of social justice and related issues, 
but I have hardly touched its ideas on other issues.
I would reiterate here that the OECD's specific policy ideas are only one level of 
investigation. As noted in the Introduction, given the dearth of either academic 
or media analysis of the OECD, there are several areas that are likely to prove 
rewarding areas of research. I have mentioned in passing those relating to the 
transfer of ideas from the organisation to its members. Others factors that could 
stand further scrutiny include the OECD's internal mechanisms, such as the 
relationship between departments and between the Secretariat and member 
delegations, and the movement of individuals between Paris and member 
countries.7 External factors that need to be explored include the OECD's 
relationship with the other international organisations. As noted in the 
Introduction and Chapter 1, there is some debate as to the OECD's role in the 
international arena. Bayne claims that the OECD's 'well-researched work is often 
used as the basis for rule-making in bilateral, regional and multilateral contexts' 
(2003: 238). This may be the case, but he does not offer evidence to support his 
statement. Again, this suggests an area that would benefit from further research.
I conclude with the following observation: on 25 May 1998, a month after street 
protests and a breakdown in negotiations had resulted in the suspension of MAI 
talks, a cartoon appeared in my local newspaper, The Canberra Times. It depicts a 
businessman in his shirtsleeves in a hotel room, a drink in his hand as he stares 
out the window at billowing smoke. A newspaper on the table has the headlines: 
'country in chaos', 'government in disarray', and 'mass rebellion'. His suitcase 
has a tag: 'IMF'. The speech bubble has a single word: 'Oops'. At the time, the
7 Bob Deacon, for example, has claimed that it is not possible to 'ascribe a meta-policy on economic 
and social matters to the OECD' because of the hierarchical relationship between its departments 
(1997: 70). He argues that the 'IMF flavoured' Economic Directorate is 'on top', while the 'less 
powerful Directorate of Education, Employment, Labour and Social Affairs ... pursue its own 
agenda' (1997: 70). My examination of the OECD's ideas suggests that there is more conformity of 
view than Deacon allows, which suggests, in turn, that further study is needed.
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IMF was the subject of debate over its tendency to use the same framework of 
ideas to assess policy problems in a range of different countries, imposing the 
same solutions on all, regardless of the differing circumstances. The framework 
offered the 'truth' about policy problems and solutions; it was the way that the 
IMF understood the world and how it worked. Alternative articulations of the 
situations in these countries and what could be done to aid them were 
incomprehensible. The result, as former World Bank chief economist Joseph 
Stiglitz has described, was often disastrous. I am reminded of this cartoon when 
I think about the OECD and the lack of scholarship on both the organisation and 
its ideas. Will we, too, look out the window one day and say, 'Oops'?
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